scholarly journals Конница тюрко-монгольских народов Великой степи в российской армии XVIII – начала XIX в. Часть 2

Author(s):  
Utash B. Ochirov ◽  

The article examines activities of Turko-Mongols to have inhabited the Great Steppe and adjacent territories in the military service of Russia throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries. The period witnessed the employment of ethnic military units of irregular cavalries Russian army recruited from the Mongolian-speaking Kalmyks and Buryats, Turkic-speaking Bashkirs, Teptyars, Mishar and Tatars. The work focuses on the largest ethnic military forces ― those of the Kalmyks and Bashkirs. Despite Russian forces were reorganized to from a regular army in the early 18th century, the latter still contained significant irregular components, including ones recruited from Turko-Mongols. Initially, the ethnic groups had served as independent military contingents with traditional structures, tactics, and weapons, but by the late 18th century all ethnic forces were clustered into Don Cossack-type regiments. The first part of the article deals with the features of military service of the Kalmyks and Bashkirs in their usual habitat ― in the Great Steppe. The second part of the article, which will be published in the next issue, analyzes the actions of the Turkic-Mongol cavalry in the three largest wars of Russia in the XVIII – early XIX centuries. (The Northern, Seven-Year War, the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Foreign Campaign of 1813–1814). Rational approaches and command of the ethnic units would yield good results ― both in Eurasian plains and European battlefields. The use of ethnic forces within the Russian army not only saved essential financial and physical resources for the defense of large territories and dramatically long frontiers but also facilitated further integration of their elites into the Empire’s community.

Author(s):  
Utash B. Ochirov ◽  

The article examines activities of Turko-Mongols to have inhabited the Great Steppe and adjacent territories in the military service of Russia throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries. The period witnessed the employment of ethnic military units of irregular cavalries Russian army recruited from the Mongolian-speaking Kalmyks and Buryats, Turkic-speaking Bashkirs, Teptyars, Mishar and Tatars. The work focuses on the largest ethnic military forces ― those of the Kalmyks and Bashkirs. Despite Russian forces were reorganized to from a regular army in the early 18th century, the latter still contained significant irregular components, including ones recruited from Turko-Mongols. Initially, the ethnic groups had served as independent military contingents with traditional structures, tactics, and weapons, but by the late 18th century all ethnic forces were clustered into Don Cossack-type regiments. In the first part of the article, published in the previous issue, the features of military service of the Kalmyks and Bashkirs in their usual habitat ― in the Great Steppe were considered. The second part of the article analyzes the actions of the Turkic-Mongol cavalry in the three largest wars of Russia in the XVIII-early XX century. XIX centuries. (The Northern, Seven-Year War, the Patriotic War of 1812 and the Foreign Campaign of 1813–1814). Rational approaches and command of the ethnic units would yield good results ― both in Eurasian plains and European battlefields. The use of ethnic forces within the Russian army not only saved essential financial and physical resources for the defense of large territories and dramatically long frontiers but also facilitated further integration of their elites into the Empire’s community.


Author(s):  
Vladimir N. Benda

Since the early 18th century, signifi cant changes had been made in the military organisation of Russia, after which it received, in almost all respects, a new device, borrowed, in many cases, from European states. To maintain high combat readiness and combativity of the regular army being established, it was necessary to provide it with all necessary types of allowances, including fi nances, uniforms and other belongings. The article considers some problems of organisation of providing the personnel of the Russian army, including the artillery and engineering corps, with such types of allowances as clothing and fi nances, on the basis of previously unknown archival documents stored in the Archive of the Militaryhistorical Museum of artillery, engineering troops and signal troops and other sources. Special attention is paid to the issues of providing with monetary allowances, necessary uniforms and other belongings of employees, privates, non-commissioned offi cers and offi cers of artillery and engineering units. It is concluded that the existing order of proportional formation of the annual budget of the Department of artillery at the expense of one or another part of the income of various provinces and from other places led to chronic underfunding of Artillery Department, which, in turn, made it diffi cult to allocate funds in full for keeping and maintenance of daily life of the artillery and engineering corps. Some archival and other sources are for the fi rst time introduced in the study into scientifi c circulation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-69
Author(s):  
Magdalena Ujma

Abstract An analysis of the relationship between Jan III Sobieski and the people he distinguished shows that there were many mutual benefits. Social promotion was more difficult if the candidate for the office did not come from a senatorial family34. It can be assumed that, especially in the case of Atanazy Walenty Miączyński, the economic activity in the Sobieski family was conducive to career development. However, the function of the plenipotentiary was not a necessary condition for this. Not all the people distinguished by Jan III Sobieski achieved the same. More important offices were entrusted primarily to Marek Matczyński. Stanisław Zygmunt Druszkiewicz’s career was definitely less brilliant. Druszkiewicz joined the group of senators thanks to Jan III, and Matczyński and Szczuka received ministerial offices only during the reign of Sobieski. Jan III certainly counted on the ability to manage a team of people acquired by his comrades-in-arms in the course of his military service. However, their other advantage was also important - good orientation in political matters and exerting an appropriate influence on the nobility. The economic basis of the magnate’s power is an issue that requires more extensive research. This issue was primarily of interest to historians dealing with latifundia in the 18th century. This was mainly due to the source material. Latifundial documentation was kept much more regularly in the 18th century than before and is well-organized. The economic activity of the magnate was related not only to the internal organization of landed estates. It cannot be separated from the military, because the goal of the magnate’s life was politics and, very often, also war. Despite its autonomy, the latifundium wasn’t isolated. Despite the existence of the decentralization process of the state, the magnate families remained in contact with the weakening center of the state and influenced changes in its social structure. The actual strength of the magnate family was determined not only by the area of land goods, but above all by their profitability, which depended on several factors: geographic location and natural conditions, the current situation on the economic market, and the management method adopted by the magnate. In the 17th century, crisis phenomena, visible in demography, agricultural and crafts production, money and trade, intensified. In these realities, attempts by Jan III Sobieski to reconstruct the lands destroyed by the war and to introduce military rigor in the management center did not bring the expected results. Sobieski, however, introduced “new people” to the group of senators, who implemented his policy at the sejmiks and the Parliament, participated in military expeditions and managed his property.


2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Zens

AbstractThis article examines the administration of Hacı Mustafa Pasha, the military governor of Belgrade from 1793 to 1801. His appointment to this strategically located post was at odds with the contemporary trend in Ottoman provincial politics. Unlike most high-ranking provincial officials at this time, especially in the Balkans, Mustafa Pasha was not among the wealthy and militarily powerful ayan (local notables) but rather a career bureaucrat. His tumultuous and ultimately tragic administration reveals that his appointment was part of the attempt by Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) to recentralize provincial governance. This study also provides a sociopolitical portrait of Belgrade and the surrounding region during the 18th century, as well as a brief look at the dangerous alliance of ayan and the janissaries.


2019 ◽  
pp. 572-582
Author(s):  
Andrei V. Matison ◽  

Falsifications of noble pedigrees have repeatedly been subject of historical studies, but researchers have not yet turned to the study of similar falsifications made by bishops’ servants and their descendants. Due to uncertainty of their social status, representatives of bishops’ boyar scions and ministry clerks made every effort to establish their nobility by birth. However, not many could apply for integration into gentlefolk. At the same time, their descendants, having gained the right to receive hereditary titles through military service, nevertheless, were at pains to achieve affiliation to “ancient” nobility to have the right to include their names in the part 6 of the gubernia genealogical books. This article describes two cases: distortion and outright falsification of private pedigrees made in the late 18th century by descendants of the Tver bishop's house servants when approving their nobility. In the first case, the great-grandson of the bishop's dyak, collegiate assessor Peter Posnikov only maintained his ancestors’ “ancient” nobility. In the second case, the descendant of the bishop’s boyar scions, collegiate assessor Nikita Voronov directly falsified his pedigree by “reading” it from homonimous nobles of Vologda. Posnikov failed to achieve his affiliation to the “ancient” nobility. Voronov’s fabricated evidence was judged convincing, and he and his family were mentioned in the part 6 of the genealogy book of the Tver guberbia and later recognized as “ancient” nobility by the Senate. In order to investigate Posnikov and Voronov’s claims to nobility, the author has studied the materials of the Tver Gubernia Noble Assembly of Deputies. To establish their original pedigree, the materials of scribe and census descriptions, as well as office documentation of the Tver bishop's house, have been used. Both cases are illustrative of how the descendants of the bishops' servants pursued their desire to achieve affiliation to “ancient” nobility.


Author(s):  
Timothy K. Perttula ◽  
Robert Z. Selden

European glass beads are one of the most common artifact categories found on historic Caddo sites in the middle reaches of the Sabine River basin in East Texas on what Jones had dubbed Kinsloe focus sites. Several thousands beads were found by Jones in his investigation of burial features at these sites, along with other European trade goods and Caddo ceramic vessels, pipes, and chipped stone tools. In Jones’ description of the beads from the Kinsloe focus sites, he relied on the analytical and chronological interpretations of John Witthoft, then of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, although he did seek the advice of R. K. Harris, a notable glass beads expert who had worked on numerous historic Caddo and Wichita sites in eastern and northern Texas. Witthoft’s interpretations of the age of the beads from the sites tended to suggest that the Kinsloe focus sites dated to the early 17th century—when beads of such types tended to date in aboriginal sites in the Northeast U.S.—while Harris suggested that the glass beads on the Kinsloe focus sites dated from no earlier than the early 18th century, and likely dated in several cases after ca. A.D. 1750. Given the likely late 17th to late 18th century ages of the engraved ceramic vessels found on the Kinsloe focus sites, based in large measure on their occurrence on a wide range of Historic Caddo sites, Harris’ temporal interpretations of the glass bead assemblages are consistent with these ceramic temporal ranges, and thus the Kinsloe focus sites are seen as indicative of Caddo settlements postdating the beginning of intensive contact between Europeans and Caddo peoples that began after A.D. 1685.


10.1068/d42j ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Lester

Within the context of contemporary discussion over geography and developmental ethics, this paper examines part of the genealogy of a modern British sense of responsibility for the plight of distant strangers. The frame of reference for this sense, known as humanitarianism, was first cast overseas through debates over the slave trade in the late 18th century, and its remit was further extended as a result of the contested processes of colonial settlement in the 1820s and 1830s. This geographically expansive discourse is analysed through a study of two exemplary statements of humane intervention: the Aborigines Committee (1835–37), and the military Court of Enquiry into the death of the African Xhosa King Hintsa (1836). Each demonstrated a new-found concern for the fate of colonised individuals. They established that the sufferings of distant others were inextricably connected to the everyday privileges enjoyed by Britons. However, they also formulated prescriptive principles targeted not only at the relief of suffering, but at the moral and material improvement of distant subjects—principles which continue to inform more recent debates over global ethics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 64-66
Author(s):  
S.A. Kuzmin ◽  
◽  
L.K. Grigorieva ◽  
K.A. Izbagambetova ◽  
◽  
...  

The aim of the study was to evaluate the organization of screening of conscripts for COVID-19 infection in one of the subjects of the Russian Federation — Orenburg region. Materials and methods of the study. The study of organization of examination of conscripts for COVID-19 infection included study of the experience of the Center of Military Medical Examination of the Military Commissariat of Orenburg Region in carrying out military conscription under conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic; methodological recommendations approved by the Head of the Main Military Medical Department of the Defense Ministry of Russia as well as the analysis of the activities carried out at different stages of medical sorting. Results of the study and their analysis. The results of the study of the organization of COVID-19 screening of conscripts in Orenburg Region showed that sufficient and effective barrier medical screening was organized at all stages. Conscripts in good health condition were sent to the Armed Forces for military service under conscription. No claims were received from military units about poor quality selection of conscripts. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, recruitment commissions of Orenburg Region coped successfully with the task of drafting citizens for military service.


Author(s):  
S. Khalkhunov

The article examines the degree of studying the Ukrainian Central Council military policy by the Soviet historians from the beginning of 1917 to April 1918: considered the level of clarifying the issue about Ukrainianization Russian army military units, the creation of Ukrainian armed forces on Naddniprianschyna. The periodization was determined and the peculiarities of Soviet historiography formation on the topic under study were revealed. According to the results of the study, in the majority of Soviet historians’ works, the question of the Ukrainianization of the Russian army military units was considered solely in the context of the revolutionization process of the Russian army military units. Volunteer Ukrainian regiments and free-wing detachments were assessed in the line of Soviet class-based methodology as "punitive", "bourgeois-nationalist" formations. There are no reliable figures on the number of Ukrainian troops. The uncritical use of the materials of the state archives, the Soviet and the party press necessitated the ignoring of historicism and objectivity principles. At the same time it should be noted that even under the ideological scrutiny and political censorship of the 1920s and 1980s, Soviet researchers A. Likholat, S. Korolivsky, M. Rubach, N. Suprunenko, P. Garchev, A. Senderskyi, M. Yakupov, A. Tkachuk cited numerous facts in his writings that testified to the significant importance of the national component of the revolutionary processes, the significant influence of the national factor on the mass consciousness of soldiers and officers - Ukrainians. Under these conditions the main reasons for the defeat of Ukrainian military policy become apparent: the Central Council failed to form capable regular units using the support of the soldiers in the first stage of the revolution; the delay in carrying out agrarian reform contributed to the growing influence of the Bolsheviks in the Ukrainian village; refusal to build a regular army had fatal consequences for Ukrainian statehood.


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