Security of Supply and Energy Policy in Western Europe

1961 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 400-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold Lubell

The point of view from which this article is written is that the world-wide trend toward increased use of oil involves Western Europe in greater risks of interruption of supplies than it does the other major world consumers (the United States and the USSR), who produce most of their own oil; and that the implications of permitting the trend to continue to develop at its present rate should be seriously reconsidered. The trend toward increased use of oil in Western Europe has been clear for some years, as it was for the United States a bit earlier and has become for the USSR more recently. What is somewhat alarming at the present time is that the process is speeding up in Western Europe and that resistance to it is weakening.

1969 ◽  
Vol 50 ◽  
pp. 24-39

There was another substantial rise in output in industrial countries between the second and third quarters. But during the third quarter the deceleration of economic growth in the United States became more marked and showed signs of spreading to Canada and Western Europe. Developments have been broadly consistent with our August forecast and we still expect the aggregate national output of the industrial countries to be higher by about 4½ per cent in 1969 than it was in 1968 and to rise by another 3-4 per cent in 1970. It now looks as though we were rather too optimistic about prospects in the United States, where the increase is unlikely to exceed 3 per cent this year and may not reach 2 per cent in 1970. On the other hand growth in Western Europe is still tending to surpass expectations. Despite the Italian strikes it will probably be over 5½ per cent this year; and it may exceed 4½ per cent in 1970.


1974 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 23-37

The world economic position and prospects have worsened further in the last three months. In the United States and Japan, in particular, recessionary conditions are proving to be more marked and more prolonged than we had expected, and it looks as though by the end of the year all the major industrial countries, with the possible exception of France, will have experienced at least one quarter in which output has fallen or at best shown no appreciable rise. The other developed countries have fared better, but we no longer expect there to be any growth of output in the OECD area either in the second half of the year or in the year as a whole. In 1975 the position should be rather better, at least by the second half. We expect OECD countries' aggregate GNP to grow by about 2 per cent year-on-year and nearly 3 per cent between the fourth quarters of 1974 and 1975.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 145-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
GEOFFREY HAWTHORN

Many expected that after the Cold War, there would be peace, order, increasing prosperity in expanding markets and the extension and eventual consolidation of civil and political rights. There would be a new world order, and it would in these ways be liberal. In international politics, the United States would be supreme. It would through security treaties command the peace in western Europe and east Asia; through its economic power command it in eastern Europe and Russia; through clients and its own domination command it in the Middle East; through tacit understanding command it in Latin America; and, in so far as any state could, command it in Africa also. It could choose whether to cooperate in the United Nations, and if it did not wish to do so, be confident that it would not be disablingly opposed by illiberal states. In the international markets, it would be able to maintain holdings of its bonds. In the international financial institutions, it would continue to be decisive in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; it would be an important influence in the regional development banks; and it would be powerful in what it was to insist in 1994 should be called the World (rather than Multinational) Trade Organisation. Other transactions in the markets, it is true, would be beyond the control of any state. But they would not be likely to conflict with the interests of the United States (and western Europe) in finance, investment and trade, and would discipline other governments.


2019 ◽  
pp. 86-102
Author(s):  
Susana Sueiro Seoane

This chapter analyzes Cultura Obrera (Labor Culture), published in New York City from 1911 to 1927. Pedro Esteve, the primary editor, gave expression to his ideas in this newspaper and while it represented Spanish firemen and marine workers, it reported on many other workers’ struggles in different parts of the world, for example, supporting and collecting funds for the Mexican revolutionary brothers Flores Magón. This newspaper, as all the anarchist press, was part of a transnational network and had a circulation not only in many parts of the United States but also in Latin American countries, including Argentina and Cuba, as well as on the other side of the Atlantic, in Spain and various European countries.


Author(s):  
Regi Theodor Enerstvedt

Activity theory is a “productive” resource for shedding light on the functioning of traditional and innovative activities. In discussing theoretical-methodological problems related to a valid theory of activity, the author puts forward the hypothesis that singular references to the Vygotskian school lead to an unproducive confinement of activity theory. First of all, there are problems concerning terminology and concepts. Second, there are issues related to the roots of the activity theory and the cultural-historical school. It is a common mistake in Western Europe and in the United States to regard cultural-historical psychology as the basis for critical psychology and to regard both schools as identical with activity theory. Embracing such a point of view is a mistake and a serious matter.


Author(s):  
Peter Baldwin

To Return To The Bulk of our material in this book, what absolute differences separate the United States from Europe? The United States is a nation where proportionately more people are murdered each year, more are jailed, and more own guns than anywhere in Europe. The death penalty is still law. Religious belief is more fervent and widespread. A smaller percentage of citizens vote. Collective bargaining covers relatively fewer workers, and the state’s tax take is lower. Inequality is somewhat more pronounced. That is about it. In almost every other respect, differences are ones of degree, rather than kind. Oft en, they do not exist, or if they do, no more so than the same disparities hold true within Western Europe itself. At the very least, this suggests that farreaching claims to radical differences across the Atlantic have been overstated. Even on violence—a salient difference that leaps unprompted from the evidence, both statistical and anecdotal—the contrast depends on how it is framed. Without question, murder rates are dramatically different across the Atlantic. And, of course, murder is the most shocking form of sudden, unexpected death, unsettling communities, leaving survivors bereaved and mourning. But consider a wider definition of unanticipated, immediate, and profoundly disrupting death. Suicide is oft en thought of as the exit option for old, sick men anticipating the inevitable, and therefore not something that changes the world around them. But, in fact, the distribution of suicide over the lifespan is broadly uniform. In Iceland, Ireland, the UK, and the United States, more young men (below forty-five) than old do themselves in. In Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, the figures are almost equal. Elsewhere, the older have a slight edge. But overall, the ratio between young and old suicides approximates 1:1. Broadly speaking, and sticking with the sex that most oft en kills itself, men do away with themselves as oft en when they are younger and possibly still husbands, fathers, and sons as they do when they are older and when their actions are perhaps fraught with less consequence for others. Suicide is as unsettling, and oft en even more so, for survivors as murder.


Author(s):  
David Damrosch

This chapter discusses the comparatists who reshaped the comparative literature in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s. It mentions Anna Balakian, who became a leading figure in both the American and International Comparative Literature Associations. It also describes Anna and her family's emigration in 1921 from Turkey to western Europe and eventually to the United States. The chapter analyzes how comparatists sought to change the world in the postwar years, a time of rapid expansion in higher education and optimism about America's role in fostering international cooperation and understanding. It also focuses on the need of politics of comparative studies to have a dual focus on institutional politics, a wider political scene, and a postcolonial perspective.


Author(s):  
Robert Jackson ◽  
Georg Sørensen

This chapter examines three important debates in International Political Economy (IPE). The first debate concerns power and the relationship between politics and economics, and more specifically whether politics is in charge of economics or whether it is the other way around. The second debate deals with development and underdevelopment in developing countries. The third debate is about the nature and extent of economic globalization, and currently takes places in a context of increasing inequality between and inside countries. This debate is also informed by the serious financial crisis of 2008 and has raised questions regarding the viability of the current model of capitalism in the United States and Western Europe.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1097184X1987278
Author(s):  
Adam Baird

Belize has one of the highest homicide rates in the world; however, the gangs at the heart of this violence have rarely been studied. Using a masculinities lens and original empirical data, this article explores how Blood and Crip “gang transnationalism” from the United States of America flourished in Belize City. Gang transnationalism is understood as a “transnational masculinity” that makes cultural connections between local settings of urban exclusion. On one hand, social terrains in Belize City generated masculine vulnerabilities to the foreign gang as an identity package with the power to reconfigure positions of subordination; on the other, the establishment of male gang practices with a distinct hegemonic shape, galvanized violence and a patriarchy of the streets in already marginalized communities. This article adds a new body of work on gangs in Belize, and gang transnationalism, whilst contributing to theoretical discussions around the global to local dynamics of hegemonic masculinities discussed by Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) and Messerschmidt (2018).


Worldview ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Lionel Gelber

When the United States fostered the recovery and underwrote the security of Western Europe she had more than sentiment to impel her. That salient zone is a pivotal sector of the world balance, and while she may station fewer of her own troops upon its soil, she can entertain no total disengagement from it. But there is another West European item, the future of the Common Market, which calls for a fresh American scrutiny. The West will be better off if Western Europe acquires more of an ability to stand on its own feet. Gaullism, however, revealed a less modest goal, one that was not confined to France and did not vanish with the departure of General de Gaulle. On the contrary, it may have gained new leverage from his downfall.


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