The Regimental Courts Martial in the Eighteenth Century British Army

1976 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Gilbert

In the eighteenth century, most military crimes were tried at the Regimental level. In theory, the military law of the day decreed that the General Courts Martial be reserved for major offenses: those that might result in capital sentences or lashings of great magnitude. Murder, rape, robbery, and other crimes deemed capital undgr eighteenth century civil law, were tried at the General Courts Martial, as were specific military crimes that seriously affected the ongoing life of the armed forces—mutiny, desertion, and the like. As one would expect, there were many more petty crimes than major offenses. Still, the General Courts Martial books show a surprisingly small number of cases, even in wartime, when the army grew precipitously to meet a military threat.For most soldiers, crime and punishment was administered by the Regimental Courts, yet we know very little about them. There are no Regimental Courts Martial records to speak of and few surviving accounts of their procedures. What we do know suggests that they were very important to those military officers who were responsible for the order and discipline of the British army.Until 1718, the rules and procedures governing Regimental Courts Martial were vague and uncertain. In that year, a modest attempt was made to codify RCM procedures. It was decreed that the RCM could inflict corporal punishment for such crimes as neglect of duty and disorderly conduct in quarters, among others, and that all such trials had to be conducted by five commissioned officers. Conviction was decided by a plurality of votes. Significantly, the oath, used previously when officers were called upon to serve as judge and jury, was eliminated in Regimental Courts Martial cases. As a result, the Judge Advocate noted some years later, “since that time the Prisoner has not had the benefit of that great and I may say, only security to be fairly and impartially tried.”

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Butler

Abstract This article considers the breakdown in discipline in the British Army which occurred in Britain and on the Western Front during the process of demobilization at the end of the First World War. Many soldiers, retained in the army immediately after the Armistice, went on strike, and some formed elected committees, demanding their swifter return to civilian life. Their perception was that the existing demobilization system was unjust, and men were soon organized by those more politically conscious members of the armed forces who had enlisted for the duration of the war. At one stage in January 1919, over 50,000 soldiers were out on strike, a fact that was of great concern to the British civilian and military authorities who miscalculated the risk posed by soldiers. Spurred on by many elements of the press, especially the Daily Mail and Daily Herald, who both fanned and dampened the flames of discontent, soldiers’ discipline broke down, demonstrating that the patriotism which had for so long kept them in line could only extend so far. Though senior members of the government, principally Winston Churchill, and the military, especially Douglas Haig and Henry Wilson, were genuinely concerned that Bolshevism had ‘infected’ the army, or, at the very least, the army had been unionized, their fears were not realized. The article examines the government’s strategy regarding demobilization, its efforts to assess the risk of politicization and manage the press, and its responses to these waves of strikes, arguing that, essentially, these soldiers were civilians first and simply wanted to return home, though, in the post-war political climate, government fears were very real.


2021 ◽  
pp. bmjmilitary-2021-001945
Author(s):  
Iain Parsons ◽  
J Ellwood ◽  
M J Stacey ◽  
N Gall ◽  
M Grundy-Bowers ◽  
...  

IntroductionReflex syncope is the most common subtype of syncope and, despite not being associated with increased mortality, often results in significant morbidity and costly diagnostics. Reflex syncope can be of concern for certain occupational groups and may be exacerbated by some occupations. Reflex syncope in the military is anecdotally common but the extent in the UK Armed Forces (UKAF) is unknown. The aim of this study was to assess the incidence and prevalence of reflex syncope in the UKAF.MethodsA retrospective search of the Defence Medical Information Capability Programme using prespecified read-codes was performed at defence primary healthcare centres over the period of 1 January 2019 to 1 January 2020. Data were obtained on 76 103 service personnel (SP) (53% of the UKAF).ResultsThe overall syncope case rate for the UKAF was 10.5 per 1000 person-years (p-yrs). In comparing services there was a significantly increased risk of syncope in the British Army (10.7 per 1000 p-yrs) compared with the Royal Air Force (8.6 per 1000 p-yrs) (p=0.0365), SP who served overseas (16.7 per 1000 p-yrs) in comparison with UK medical centres (10.3 per 1000 p-yrs) (p<0.0001), and British Army units that regularly took part in State Ceremonial and Public Duties (15.8 per 1000 p-yrs vs 10.2 per 1000 p-yrs) (p=0.0035). Army training units conferred a significantly reduced risk of syncope (p<0.0001).ConclusionsThese data are the first to define the incidence and prevalence of syncope in the UKAF. Orthostasis and heat are probable triggers, although recruits are potentially protected. These data offer opportunities to improve the health and well-being of SP, with economic, logistical and reputational benefits for the UKAF. Further research to identify personnel at risk of future syncopal events may allow for targeted use of countermeasures.


2021 ◽  
pp. 162-198
Author(s):  
Vipul Dutta

The final chapter looks at the National Defence College (NDC) in Delhi that was inaugurated by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960. It is the last of the military institutional creations designed to meet the training needs of senior ranking Indian officers. This chapter will contextualise the emergence of the NDC in the changing perceptions, roles and responsibilities of the Indian Armed forces. It will dwell at length on the post-independence cohort of senior Indian military officers that represented the ‘constituency’ of the NDC, and re-look at their subsequent assignments which symbolised a paradigm shift in the mandate of the armed forces, thereby offering a fresh perspective on the post-independence phase of the military institutional ‘Indianisation’.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo A. Flores-Macías ◽  
Jessica Zarkin

What are the political consequences of militarizing law enforcement? Across the world, law enforcement has become increasingly militarized over the last three decades, with civilian police operating more like armed forces and soldiers replacing civilian police in law enforcement tasks. Scholarly, policy, and journalistic attention has mostly focused on the first type, but has neglected the study of three main areas toward which we seek to contribute: 1) the constabularization of the military—i.e., when the armed forces take on the responsibilities of civilian law enforcement agencies, 2) the extent to which this process has taken place outside of the United States, and 3) its political consequences. Toward this end, we unpack the concept of militarized law enforcement, develop theoretical expectations about its political consequences, take stock of militarization in Latin America, and evaluate whether expectations have played out in the region. We show that the distinction between civilian and military law enforcement typical of democratic regimes has been severely blurred in the region. Further, we argue that the constabularization of the military has had important consequences for the quality of democracy in the region by undermining citizen security, human rights, police reform, and the legal order.


Author(s):  
Mónica Ricketts

Prior to the eighteenth century, Spain and the Spanish Empire lacked centralized and well-organized forces, both on land or sea. As a result, the Crown was able to find space in its military organizational efforts for substantial reform. In the 1760s, in the context of major imperial wars, Bourbon officers implemented an intense military reform in central areas of the empire, such as Cuba and Peru, expanded the size and power of the army and ensured that loyal military officers occupied leading positions of power. In Peru, the military became an attractive institution for Indians and castas (people of mixed descent), allowing them to climb higher on the social and political ladder. Conflicts and tensions arose in central areas of Spanish dominion. These problems were salient in the viceroyalty of Peru, where the reform was implemented and the armies expanded in the context of a new scale of international wars.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (32) ◽  
pp. 239-255
Author(s):  
Mukola Turkot

Тhe purpose of this article is to show the state of the functioning of law enforcement agencies in Ukraine, which are fighting against military crime. In addition, the algorithm for the activities of the military prosecutor’s office is shown after changes are made to the legislation. It was noted that the national security of Ukraine and its military security are protected by the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations. In these military formations serve soldiers, officers and generals. The tasks of each military formation are different. Introduction. The article defines the national security of Ukraine, the military security of Ukraine, and how security is created. The same is said about the subjects of ensuring the security of the state. The same is said about the subjects of ensuring the security of the state. It is separately noted that there is a bill on the State Bureau of Military Justice. This military law enforcement agency should implement the functions of pre-trial investigation against servicemen and others. The research methods are used taking into account the topic of the article, the problems that need to be addressed, and the conclusions to be drawn. Such methods were used: formal-logical, hermeneutical, comparative. Thanks to these methods, it was possible to compare the competence of military formations in Ukraine, to determine the necessary legal possibilities for the future law enforcement agency – the State Bureau of Military Justice. The conclusions contain the author’s statement that the time has come to create, in addition to the military prosecutor’s office, yet another law enforcement body whose competence extended to all military formations. This is due to the fact that in Ukraine at the moment there is no shadow of one military formation, whose competence extends to other military formations. The exception is the military prosecutor’s office.


Diálogos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 176
Author(s):  
Paulo Ribeiro Rodrigues da Cunha

O presente artigo procura resgatar um dos períodos mais intensos e menos estudados da Guerra Fria no Brasil, quando duas correntes militares antípodas política e ideológicas atuaram na perspectiva de influenciar através de suas entidades de classe um projeto de nação. Entretanto, essa reflexão tem por foco, os militares nacionalistas e de esquerda, oficiais e praças das forças armadas cuja intervenção foi bem sucedida ao final, com a vitória da Tese do Monopólio Estatal do Petróleo e não intervenção brasileira no conflito coreano, embora ao custo de uma repressão sobre centenas de militares, muitos deles presos e torturados e até hoje não anistiados, demonstrando em última instância, a fragilidade da democracia e do Estado Democrático e de Direito no Brasil. Abstract The Military and the Cold War in Brazil The present article seeks to recover one of the most intense and least studied period of the Cold War in Brazil, when two military antipodal political and ideological currents acted in the perspective of influencing through its class entities a nation project. However, this reflection is focused on the nationalist and leftist military, officers and squares of the armed forces whose intervention was successful in the end, with the victory of the Thesis of the State Petroleum Monopoly and not Brazilian intervention in the Korean conflict, although at cost of a crackdown on hundreds of soldiers, many of them imprisoned and tortured and still unamused, demonstrating in the last instance the fragility of democracy and the Democratic State and Law in Brazil. Resumen Los Militares y la Guerra Fría en Brasil El presente artículo busca rescatar uno del período más intensos y menos estudiados de la Guerra Fría en Brasil, cuando dos corrientes militares antípodas políticas e ideológicas actuaron en la perspectiva de influenciar a través de sus entidades de clase un proyecto de nación. Sin embargo, esta reflexión tiene por foco, los militares nacionalistas y de izquierda, oficiales y plazas de las fuerzas armadas cuya intervención fue exitosa al final, con la victoria de la Tesis del Monopolio Estatal del Petróleo y no intervención brasileña en el conflicto coreano, aunque al costo de una represión sobre cientos de militares, muchos de ellos presos y torturados y hasta hoy no aniquilados, demostrando en última instancia, la fragilidad de la democracia y del Estado Democrático y de Derecho en Brasil.


1984 ◽  
Vol 98 ◽  
pp. 305-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harlan W. Jencks

For millennia China's enemies have come chiefly out of northern and central Asia. In the 1980s, after a historically anomalous century during which most of her enemies came from the sea, China's defences once again are orientated north and west. The military threat of the 1980s is more complex than that posed by the barbarian nomads of old. The Soviet armed forces can launch land-air battles simultaneously all along the 10,000-kilometre Sino-Soviet border. Moreover, time and space factors which long shielded the interior of China provide little protection in the missile age.


2017 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Seamone ◽  
Shoba Sreenivasan ◽  
James McGuire ◽  
Dan Smee ◽  
Sean Clark ◽  
...  

The United States and Canada, among others, have recognized that “misconduct stress behaviors” can be a “hidden” by-product of war-zone deployments. The American military’s paradigm of punishment over treatment creates a “military misconduct Catch-22,” in which the service member’s treatment need is identified as a result of, or only after, violations of military law. Civilian society then bears the justice, familial, and social costs of the military’s failure to address combat stress–based misconduct. As an alternative to existing punitive military pathways, we propose a rehabilitative justice pathway that builds on the successes of civilian criminal justice mental health courts—to be implemented during active duty service, before separation from the Armed Forces. The approach, predicated on the circumstances of each case, promotes resilience, honorable discharge, and successful reintegration of service members into society.


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