The National Defence College

2021 ◽  
pp. 162-198
Author(s):  
Vipul Dutta

The final chapter looks at the National Defence College (NDC) in Delhi that was inaugurated by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960. It is the last of the military institutional creations designed to meet the training needs of senior ranking Indian officers. This chapter will contextualise the emergence of the NDC in the changing perceptions, roles and responsibilities of the Indian Armed forces. It will dwell at length on the post-independence cohort of senior Indian military officers that represented the ‘constituency’ of the NDC, and re-look at their subsequent assignments which symbolised a paradigm shift in the mandate of the armed forces, thereby offering a fresh perspective on the post-independence phase of the military institutional ‘Indianisation’.

Author(s):  
Mónica Ricketts

The final chapter discusses in parallel the political histories of Spain and Peru in the final years of imperial rule in South America. Peru did not experience a long national struggle and lacked large elites committed to independence. As in the old metropolis, a constant and violent struggle between men of letters and military officers dominated. After decades of military reform and war, army officers with experience in command and government felt entitled to rule. Old subjects and new citizens were also accustomed to seeing them lead. Men of letters, on the other hand, found limited opportunities to exercise their new authority despite their ambitions. Additionally, both in Spain and Peru, liberal men of letters failed to create a new institutional order in which the military would be subjected to civilian rule. It would take decades for both parts of the former Spanish monarchy to accomplish that goal and allow for peace.


1976 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur N. Gilbert

In the eighteenth century, most military crimes were tried at the Regimental level. In theory, the military law of the day decreed that the General Courts Martial be reserved for major offenses: those that might result in capital sentences or lashings of great magnitude. Murder, rape, robbery, and other crimes deemed capital undgr eighteenth century civil law, were tried at the General Courts Martial, as were specific military crimes that seriously affected the ongoing life of the armed forces—mutiny, desertion, and the like. As one would expect, there were many more petty crimes than major offenses. Still, the General Courts Martial books show a surprisingly small number of cases, even in wartime, when the army grew precipitously to meet a military threat.For most soldiers, crime and punishment was administered by the Regimental Courts, yet we know very little about them. There are no Regimental Courts Martial records to speak of and few surviving accounts of their procedures. What we do know suggests that they were very important to those military officers who were responsible for the order and discipline of the British army.Until 1718, the rules and procedures governing Regimental Courts Martial were vague and uncertain. In that year, a modest attempt was made to codify RCM procedures. It was decreed that the RCM could inflict corporal punishment for such crimes as neglect of duty and disorderly conduct in quarters, among others, and that all such trials had to be conducted by five commissioned officers. Conviction was decided by a plurality of votes. Significantly, the oath, used previously when officers were called upon to serve as judge and jury, was eliminated in Regimental Courts Martial cases. As a result, the Judge Advocate noted some years later, “since that time the Prisoner has not had the benefit of that great and I may say, only security to be fairly and impartially tried.”


Author(s):  
Paul W. Chambers

The history of civil–military relations in Thailand has paralleled the gradual post-1980 primacy of monarchical power over the country. Until 1932, the monarchy ruled absolute across Siam (Thailand). From 1932 until 1980, the military held more clout than the monarchy (though the palace slowly increased its influence after 1957). Since 1980, monarchy and military have dominated the country with the military as junior partner. The two form a khakistocracy: the military’s uniform color of khaki combined with the aristocracy (monarchy). Though there have been brief instances of elected civilian governments, all were overthrown by the military. In fact, Thailand likely holds the record for the highest number of military putsches in the world. Since the death of King Bhumipol Adulyadej in 2016, the clout of the armed forces has become more centralized under his successor and son King Maha Vajiralongkorn. At the same time, post-2019 Prime Minister (and post-2014 junta leader) General Prayuth Chanocha has sought to entrench military power across Thailand. As a result, in 2021, the monarchy and military continue to enhance authoritarian rule as a khakistocracy camouflaged behind the guise of a charade form of democracy. Civil–military relations represent exclusively a partnership between the monarch and the armed forces.


Diálogos ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 176
Author(s):  
Paulo Ribeiro Rodrigues da Cunha

O presente artigo procura resgatar um dos períodos mais intensos e menos estudados da Guerra Fria no Brasil, quando duas correntes militares antípodas política e ideológicas atuaram na perspectiva de influenciar através de suas entidades de classe um projeto de nação. Entretanto, essa reflexão tem por foco, os militares nacionalistas e de esquerda, oficiais e praças das forças armadas cuja intervenção foi bem sucedida ao final, com a vitória da Tese do Monopólio Estatal do Petróleo e não intervenção brasileira no conflito coreano, embora ao custo de uma repressão sobre centenas de militares, muitos deles presos e torturados e até hoje não anistiados, demonstrando em última instância, a fragilidade da democracia e do Estado Democrático e de Direito no Brasil. Abstract The Military and the Cold War in Brazil The present article seeks to recover one of the most intense and least studied period of the Cold War in Brazil, when two military antipodal political and ideological currents acted in the perspective of influencing through its class entities a nation project. However, this reflection is focused on the nationalist and leftist military, officers and squares of the armed forces whose intervention was successful in the end, with the victory of the Thesis of the State Petroleum Monopoly and not Brazilian intervention in the Korean conflict, although at cost of a crackdown on hundreds of soldiers, many of them imprisoned and tortured and still unamused, demonstrating in the last instance the fragility of democracy and the Democratic State and Law in Brazil. Resumen Los Militares y la Guerra Fría en Brasil El presente artículo busca rescatar uno del período más intensos y menos estudiados de la Guerra Fría en Brasil, cuando dos corrientes militares antípodas políticas e ideológicas actuaron en la perspectiva de influenciar a través de sus entidades de clase un proyecto de nación. Sin embargo, esta reflexión tiene por foco, los militares nacionalistas y de izquierda, oficiales y plazas de las fuerzas armadas cuya intervención fue exitosa al final, con la victoria de la Tesis del Monopolio Estatal del Petróleo y no intervención brasileña en el conflicto coreano, aunque al costo de una represión sobre cientos de militares, muchos de ellos presos y torturados y hasta hoy no aniquilados, demostrando en última instancia, la fragilidad de la democracia y del Estado Democrático y de Derecho en Brasil.


Hadmérnök ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-101
Author(s):  
György Leskó

The fulfilment of environmental protection requirements and social expectations has become a requirement in the field of military operations as well. Impacts that threaten the ecosystems increasingly occur during the activities of the armed forces and military operations. A recently created new field of science, the ecology of warfare, investigates the military, the support systems for the armed forces and national defence, and their relation to the environment as living systems above the level of the individual (like human ecology). Ecology of warfare examines habitats, the relationship between organisms and the environment in the military field. The capability-based, mission-based, coordinated (target, place and time) ability to use military forces has an impact on the ecology. The analysis of the place and role of military operations from the perspective of the ecology of warfare is an important, timely issue. In the study, the author analyses the tasks required for planning, organising and conducting a military operation and their relationship to environmental protection.


Federalism-E ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Madison Cross

November 4, 2015 marked the day that Canadian Armed Forces veteran, Harjit Singh Sajjan, was sworn in as Minister of National Defence.[1] The Canadian population applauded the appointment made by Justin Trudeau because it appeared natural to have a Minister of National Defence who had previously worn the Canadian Armed Forces uniform. The support was an unexplained phenomenon; for some reason, the Canadian public was excited, curious and confident in the ministry’s new leader because of his close ties to the department. Though many veterans have held the position of Minister of National Defence, it has never been a requirement to be a veteran to hold the position. Many scholars believe that a Minister of National Defence who has prior military experience is more of an asset in this role. Despite this belief, there remains no military prerequisites for the Minister of National Defence position. This paper will analyze the role of the Minister of National Defence and discuss why having a member of parliament who is also a veteran is not a practical policy to continue implementing in future governments.   [1] Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada Following the Swearing-in of the 29th Ministry. (n.d.). Retrieved November 18, 2017, from http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/statement-prime-minister-canada-following-swearing-29th-ministry-2070297.htm


Author(s):  
Paul W. Chambers

The evolution of Cambodia’s armed forces has been incremental yet highly disjointed, reflecting the country’s post–World War II history itself. At the same time, there has been a legacy of military authoritarianism in Cambodia. Using the framework of historical institutionalism, this chapter looks at the evolution of Cambodia’s armed forces across time. The chapter points to a 1979 critical juncture which affected the military’s organizational history. It also stresses that especially since 1997 the armed forces has become increasingly concentrated under the personalized control of Prime Minister Hun Sen. The military in 2020 appears as a mechanism of Hun Sen’s, doing his bidding and following his preferences. As such the armed forces in Cambodia should be viewed as an interventionist military that has acted as the junior partner in an asymmetrical relationship with Hun Sen. With Hun Sen’s 2018 appointment of his son Hun Manet to command the army, concurrent with being deputy supreme commander of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, it appears as though the military is becoming even further centralized under the Hun family. As a result, although civilian control over the military technically exists in Cambodia today, it is not an institutionalized, accountable form of control, but rather an unofficial, tool of violent power for the Prime Minister.


Author(s):  
R.S Anderson

Invited to lunch at the Nehru home in January 1947, Patrick Blackett was seated beside the acting Prime Minister. Jawaharlal Nehru knew of Blackett's experience in war and military affairs, and asked him how long it would take ‘to Indianize the military’, meaning both its command structure and its weapons production and supply. He was not yet the Prime Minister and India was not yet an independent nation. Blackett's reply was a challenging one, obliging Nehru to explore two different kinds of strategy and thus two different military set-ups. For the ‘realistic’ strategy Blackett preferred, he told Nehru that Indianization could be completed in 18 months; this would prepare India for conflict with other similar powers in the region. For the unrealistic strategy, in which India would prepare for conflict with major world powers, Blackett predicted it would take many, many years. Nehru liked his approach, and wrote to him soon afterwards to ask Blackett to advise him on military and scientific affairs. From this invitation much followed. In this paper, the first of two about Patrick Blackett in India, I examine the record from his perspective upon his work with and for the military. He was regularly in touch with military development in India between 1947 and roughly 1965, advising the Chiefs of Staff, the Minister of Defence and the Prime Minister himself. He carried with him the experience and opinions generated from his military career beginning in the First World War, and most particularly his assumptions about the application of science to war from 1935 until he went to India in 1947. He kept informed about military development right through to his last journey to India in 1971, following the end of his term as President of the Royal Society.


1973 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham F. Lowenthal

Several years ago, in a general essay on Dominican politics, I wrote a few pages about the political role of the Dominican Armed Forces. I argued that “the history of the past few years in the Dominican Republic may best be viewed as a constant struggle among changing alliances, not in terms of confrontation between civilian authority and the military establishment” (Lowenthal, 1969: 40). I suggested that “far from being a professional institution dedicated to certain principles that impel its occasional entry into politics, the Dominican Armed Forces have never had any significant function beyond politics, except for plunder” (Lowenthal, 1969: 40). Painting a picture of constant struggle within the Dominican Armed Forces, for power and a chance at the spoils, I played down the importance, for understanding the political role of Dominican military officers, of institutional and ideological considerations.


Author(s):  
Józef GACEK ◽  
Bronisław MARCINIAK ◽  
Ryszard WOŹNIAK

Under the "Authorisations of the Minister of National Defence" (latest - No. 57/MON dated 22 December 2014), a Permanent Expert Team operates at the Institute of Armament Technology of the Faculty of Mechatronics and Aerospace of the Military University of Technology (Warsaw, Poland), performing test shootings for the purpose of verifying the fulfilment of technical requirements to be met by garrison shooting ranges and their locations. During almost 20 years of its activity, the Team has conducted research studies under more than 325 civil law contracts concluded with operators of shooting ranges, numerous expert analyses and prepared specialist opinions for courts and prosecutor's offices, and participated in the creation of normative acts and documents, concerning - among others - provision of safety of the operated field training facilities, mainly garrison and training ground shooting ranges. The results of the Team's work have been used, among others, by the Ministry of National Defence (with the active participation of the Team) to prepare regulations of the Minister of National Defence concerning the technical conditions to be met by garrison shooting ranges and their locations. The first of these regulations was issued on 4 October 2001 (Polish Journal of Laws of 2001, no. 132, item 1479), and its latest revision on 15 December 2017 (Polish Journal of Laws of 2018, item 113). The paper presents selected results of studies of the Permanent Expert Team related to, among others, ensuring the safety of users of garrison and training ground shooting ranges, which form a part of the field training facilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, the Police, the Border Guard, the Customs Service, security companies, hunting and sports organisations. Of particular value are the conclusions and propositions of the Expert Team related to, for example: improvement of quality of the law created in Poland, concerning in particular training facilities; ensuring safety at shooting ranges during training with firearms of various types and calibres, utilising various types of ammunition; expert supervision over construction, acceptance and operation of shooting ranges; principles of safe operation of shooting ranges, ensuring longevity of the facilities, etc.


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