scholarly journals The Importance of Corporate Governance of Banks Concerning the Ownership in the International Environment

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-27
Author(s):  
Mejra Festić ◽  
Polona Črepinko ◽  
Borut Bratina

AbstractThe analysis of the factors of corporate governance is divided into four thematic sections. In the first part corporate governance is defined as part of the broader economic context. The second part deals with the principles of corporate governance. In the third part, the relation between the index of corporate governance and individual indicators (an indicator of commitment, transparency, and disclosure, caring for partners, and control and audit) regarding ownership is defined. An analysis was undertaken for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. A higher level of foreign ownership had a positive correlation with the corporate governance index. On the other hand, the correlation between state ownership and corporate governance index was not clear. The prevention of poor banking practices does not only lie in controlling functions, but also in the general corporate and risk-taking cultures, and the social perception of managerial roles, regardless of ownership structure.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Zonghao Chen

<p>This thesis consists of three empirical papers on corporate governance in Chinese listed firms. The first essay examines the influence of director characteristics and ownership structure on director compensation. Over the period 2005 through 2015, we find that director compensation in Chinese listed firms is influenced by both director characteristics and ownership structure. We measure director compensation by both the propensity to be paid and the level of compensation. For independent directors, we find that director busyness, tenure, and ownership concentration positively influence and state-ownership negatively influences director compensation. For non-independent directors, we find that tenure positively influences and that both state-ownership and related directors negatively influence director compensation. Lastly, our evidence suggests that women directors in China are not underpaid.  The second essay examines the influence of rookie independent directors on board functions and firm performance in Chinese public companies from 2008 to 2014. We find that rookie independent directors attend more board meetings than seasoned independent directors. Independent directors with higher board meeting attendance are more likely to remain in the firm in the following year (lower turnover rate). This influence of board attendance on re-appointment is stronger for rookie independent directors. Further, we find that boards with more rookie independent directors tunnel less to controlling shareholders, suggesting that rookie independent directors are efficient monitors. Lastly, we find that firms with more rookie independent directors are associated with higher accounting returns.  In the third essay, we investigate the influence of board networks on directors’ career outcomes in Chinese public firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that board connections increase compensation for independent directors. We find that board connections are positively associated with director turnover for non-related directors, but negatively associated with director turnover for related directors. Further, we find that board connections lead to additional future directorships. Overall, we find that board connections both directly lead to higher compensation and indirectly through labor mobility and additional board seats.</p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-606 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rihab Grassa

Purpose This paper aims to assess the effects of deposits structure and ownership structure on the GCC Islamic banks’ corporate governance disclosure (CGD) practices. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a sample of 38 Islamic banks operating in five Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and the authors observed them over the period from 2006 to 2011. The authors used the transparency and disclosure score, developed by Standard & Poor’s (S&P), to identify the sample’s CGD scores. Findings This paper’s findings suggest that the level of CGD is lower for Islamic banks with higher ownership concentration, for levered Islamic banks and for Islamic banks with greater concentration of nonprofit-sharing investment accounts (PSIA) and is higher for Islamic banks with greater concentrations of PSIA; the Islamic bank size; the bank age; listed bank and the country transparency index. By disaggregating the total CGD into the three sub-categories, the authors are able to specify, also, the components of corporate governance (CG) impacted by various determinants. Research limitations/implications This paper is subject to a number of limitations. First, there is manual scoring of annual reports (subjectivity). Second, the research focuses exclusively on the GCC context and excludes the other Middle East, Southeast Asia and Far East countries, where ownership structure and deposits structure might affect CGD differently. Third, the governance score, which is used in this research, is developed by S&P and does not take into account the characteristics of Islamic banks. Practical implications The findings of this paper suggest many policy implications. First, through the optimization of ownership structure, GCC countries’ regulators have to improve the Islamic banking system’s CG mechanisms through the optimization of ownership structure (dispersed ownership) to promote transparency and disclosure. Second, regulators and policymakers should revise guidelines with the main purpose of protecting PSIA’ holders (considered to be minor shareholders without voting power) through promoting disclosure and transparency. Third, the findings can be useful for many international supervisory bodies, like the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), in evaluating transparency and disclosure standards. Originality/value This study is expected to be useful for all market participants, namely, investors, financial analysts, managers, marker regulators and many international Islamic supervisory bodies, such as the IFSB and AAOIFI, by providing new requirements on CGD in the GCC region and in better understanding its determinants for Islamic banks in this region.


2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew G. Walder

Over the past decade, the ownership and control of China's corporate sector has finally begun to depart fundamentally from patterns typical in the socialist past. Students of corporate governance have watched these changes with an intense curiosity about their impact on firm performance. Students of comparative economic institutions have examined them for hints of a new variety of Asian capitalism and have sought to anticipate China's international competitiveness and impact. But these changes potentially will create a new corporate elite with greater compensation, personal wealth, and independence from government agencies than ever before. This transformation of China's political economy may eventually alter the Chinese state itself, although the extent and nature of this change are still far from clear. The key questions of interest are the social origins of the new elite, the scale of the economic assets they control, and especially their continuing relationships with party and government agencies. The answers will vary decisively by sector, four of which are described here: a state-owned sector, a privatized sector, a transactional sector, and an entrepreneurial sector. The evolving mix of these sectors will determine the future contours of the Chinese corporate economy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 293
Author(s):  
Mukhtaruddin Mukhtaruddin ◽  
M. Adam ◽  
Isnurhadi Isnurhadi ◽  
Luk Luk Fuadah

Good corporate governance (GCG) is a principle implemented by the company to ensure that the interests of stakeholders are not neglected. GCG consists of five main pillars which are transparency, accountability, responsiveness, independency, and fairness. In Indonesia, GCG implementation has not been effective enough as it is only necessarry for large companies and the public. The instrument used to assess GCG implementation is not appropriate either, examples of such are its portion, the existence and role of independent commissioners, portion, the existence and role of the audit committee, and ownership structure. This paper analyzes the implementation of culture found in Indonesian people living in GCG system. With the implementation of this social culture, the corporate GCG is better in its implementation because it is built on the noble values of the people. It then became the Pancasila which is the philosophy of Indonesia as such the the GCG implementation is accessed using the Pancasila Corporate Governance Index (PCGI).


Author(s):  
Ai-Xin Lee ◽  
Chee-Wooi Hooy

This study investigates state ownership on risk-taking behaviour in Malaysia’s banking industry. Using the panel of Malaysian commercial banks, this paper examines whether banks’ risk-taking is affected by Malaysian government ownership through the five largest investment arms of Malaysia (GLICs). The findings show that state-owned banks exhibit higher risk-taking behaviour compared to the private-owned banks in terms of loans. There is evidence that a higher degree of state ownership has a more significant impact on banks’ risk-taking behaviour. We also investigate the relationship with corporate governance mechanisms. The findings suggest that the composition of board of directors somehow plays a significant role in the governance of banks.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Valenza

Since the late 1990s, transparency has emerged as a major governance pillar helping resource-rich countries improve their performance and escape the resource curse. Within this debate, a few scholars have pointed to the correlation between ownership structure and transparency, and have argued that under state ownership, transparency should not be expected, as government officials refrain from strengthening institutions to retain their discretionary power. This study attempts to challenge scholarly existing knowledge by comparing transparency performances in two resource-rich countries with similar ownership structures, Norway and Russia. To this end, it analyses data from the Revenue Governance Index (2017). Overall, such a correlation is not confirmed. While in some cases, state ownership can in fact generate greater opacity, the example of Norway confirms that retaining control can also enhance transparency. As a result, it is suggested to look attentively at the features of state ownership, and in particular, at countries’ institutional quality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Haroon ur Rashid Khan ◽  
Waqas Bin Khidmat ◽  
Osama Al Hares ◽  
Naeem Muhammad ◽  
Kashif Saleem

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency–performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency–performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency–performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized.


2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 449-460 ◽  
Author(s):  
Balakrishnan Kavya ◽  
Santhakumar Shijin

The fundamental dichotomy between dispersed and focused ownership system has been a critical issue in the field of corporate governance. The concentrated ownership mainly controlled by families or state give more supremacy to firms over cash-flow rights. This study investigates the ownership structure of Indian corporates primarily vested in the hands of promoter and promoter groups. Using ordinary least square estimates, the study identifies the determinants of concentrated ownership structure. Further, the study attempts to provide evidence on the convergence of the controls in Indian firms, and thereby assess the wealth concentrated amidst few. The findings of the study reveal contrasting evidence against widely affirmed notion in finance literature by Berle and Means (1932) that widely held firm is the organizational framework of large enterprises. In contrast, our findings reveal that concentrated ownership holds large corporations. Moreover, in addition to the constituents such as firm size, the number of stock markets and geographic ownership also contribute towards a significant impact on concentrated ownership.


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (3, special issue) ◽  
pp. 220-222
Author(s):  
Andrea Rey

To date, future research trends will certainly concern sustainability and entrepreneurship due to the post-COVID-19 crisis. Studies will focus on the determinants related to corporate governance, such as corporate ownership, or the role of institutional investors, or a company that aims to get public by an IPO as a possible answer to the crisis. A future research trend will surely concern environmental and economic sustainability. Another line of research will concern the protection of biodiversity and gender equality. With the regard to the content of this issue of the Corporate Ownership and Control journal, ownership structure is the most popular issue considered by the authors of the papers.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Adel Bogari

The aim of this article is to examine the effect of the Corporate Governance features as measured by the Independence of the board of directors, the board size and the ownership structure (private ownership/State ownership and foreign ownership) on the banking efficiency of Saudi Arabian banks. A data set of the twelve biggest banks for the period 2000 to 2017 is used. As for banking efficiency scores, the methodology is based on the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). It allows for Technical Efficiency, Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency scores. The results of this study point to the significant role of The Independence (INDEP) variable supported by a positive and significant effect on efficiency in all regressions, indicating a positive relationship with the Technical Efficiency (TE) and the Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE). In the contrary, the independence of the board directors has a negative and significant effect on scale efficiency (SE). According to Board Size variable, results related to this later reveal a negative and a significant effect on technical efficiency (TE), Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) and Scale Efficiency (SE) in all regressions. Finally, as for the ownership structure variables, results confirm that Private Ownership (OWEN-P) provides positive and significant effects on both the Technical and the Scale Efficiency. This effect seems to be turn to be negative and significant when it is correlated to the Pure Technical Efficiency. State Ownership (OWEN-S) impacts positively and significantly the Technical Efficiency, the Pure Technical Efficiency and Scale Efficiency separately. As for the Foreign Ownership (OWEN-F) variable, except for the Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE), we note a positive and significant effect on the Technical and Scale Efficiency. This study implies better Corporate Governance practices should be supported to improve the overall efficiency and its components. This includes in particular, the Board Size and the Ownership structure variables.


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