scholarly journals Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Energy Factor

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-340
Author(s):  
S. S. Zhiltsov ◽  
E. M. Savicheva

A key factor that influenced regional security in the South Caucasus was the hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the fall of 2020. Those events have changed the balance of power in the region. The efforts of Azerbaijan, which relied on political and military support from Turkey, led to Baku’s control over part of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The hostilities of the fall of 2020 aggravated the internal political situation in Armenia. Turkey strengthened its position in the region. In addition to solving geopolitical problems and promoting its economic interests in the countries of the South Caucasus, Ankara’s policy was aimed at expanding its presence in the energy sector, including through increased influence on Azerbaijan. The implementation of the “Southern Gas Corridor” project has made Turkey a key “player” in the South Caucasus in the energy sphere. Ankara has gained an opportunity to influence gas supplies to Europe. It also has access to Azerbaijan’s gas streams. In the long run, Turkey hopes to reach hydrocarbon resources on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, particularly Turkmen gas. With information and political support from the United States, Turkey has promoted the idea of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline. Thus, Turkey’s policy promoted the development of the East-West Energy Corridor. The Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian trilateral format contributed to this. It allowed Ankara to greatly expand its presence in the South Caucasus and to impact the political and economic development of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Overall, however, Ankara’s policy has had a negative impact on regional security and has intensified the competition for influence in the South Caucasus among extra-regional actors.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor V. Bocharnikov

The article analyzes the specifics and content of Armenia's multi-vector foreign policy, its results and prospects for further implementation. The article considers the processes of formation and development of the Armenian statehood in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The years when Armenia was part of the USSR were the period of its highest development. At the same time, along with the achievements in the spheres of socio-economic and cultural development, nationalist public sentiments were formed during this period, which undermined the foundations of the multinational state. The most important catalyst for fundamental changes in the development of the political situation in Armenia, in Transcaucasia and in the USSR as a whole was the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region in the late 80s of the XX century, which transformed into an ethno-political confl ict. The most acute phase of the conflict coincided with the collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the statehood of Armenia and Azerbaijan. With the mediation of the Russian Federation, a ceasefire agreement was signed in May 1994, which was generally observed until September 2020 — the Second Karabakh War. The article examines the main stages of the formation of the statehood of Armenia and the formation of its foreign policy strategy, due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the actual blockade and pressure from Azerbaijan and Turkey. Building allied relations with Russia was carried out along with the implementation of a multi-vector foreign policy, focusing on the United States and the European Union within the framework of the European program "Eastern Partnership". The main factors determining the modern foreign and domestic policy of Armenia are considered. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the processes caused by the results of the" Second Karabakh War " (September — November 2020) and their significance for the formation of a regional security system in the South Caucasus. The main vectors of the development of Armenia's relations with the Russian Federation and other leading countries of the region, the conditions and factors, and the prospects for the development of the military-political situation in the South Caucasus are determined.


Author(s):  
Mehran Kamrava

As middle powers with regional aspirations, Iran and Turkey see the South Caucasus region as an ideal arena for expanding their reach and influence. As post-sanctions Iran finds greater space for diplomacy and trade, the ensuing competition between the two neighboring countries is likely to intensify in the coming years. For both states, trade and soft power are the most viable tools for expanding their influence. In the long run, the competition in trade is only likely to benefit the three states of the South Caucasus. But it is also likely to keep the multiple conflicts that have ravaged the region over the last several decades — especially between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia, and even the historic animosity between Turkey and Armenia — frozen and without a solution in sight.


Author(s):  
Mahmood Monshipouri

The relationship between Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus states have been influenced by an array of geopolitical, strategic, cultural, and economic factors. The competition between Iran and Turkey and their roles in the South Caucasus are best defined by traditional balance-of-power relations and the broader context of the post-Soviet era. This chapter unpacks the complex dynamics of pipeline politics in the South Caucasus region by underlying the need to understand the “Great Power Game” involving geostrategic and geo-economic interests of local governments, regional actors, global powers, and international oil companies. The larger focus turns on underscoring the importance of the region’s large oil and gas reserves; its land connection between the Caspian Sea, South Caucasus, and Europe; and its long-standing territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet era. Iran and Turkey have fought for influence in the South Caucasus while maintaining relatively good bilateral relationships in the region.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Alekseevich Avatkov ◽  
Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kasianenko

The research subject is the peculiarities of modern political-military relations in the South Caucasus in the context of the Iran-Russia-Turkey Triangle. The author considers political-military relations in the region through the prism of national interests of regional actors, such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran; analyzes military and technical cooperation in the South Caucasus based on the example of Armenia and Azerbaijan; studies military expenditure of the countries of the region and military budgets of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are one of the hotbeds of tension and conflicts of interests of Russia, Turkey and Iran. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the systematization of ideas about the modern state of political-military relations in the South Caucasus in terms of the regional actors’ influence on the regional security system. Based on the documents, facts and research works, the author formulates a conclusion about the condition and the prospects of development of modern political-military relations in the South Caucasus in the context of the Iran-Russia-Turkey Triangle. The success of Turkey in terms of strengthening its positions in the South Caucasus against the background of rising competition in the region is undoubtable. Turkey has managed not only to position itself as a strong regional actor, which is able to indirectly influence regional disputes settlement, but also to promote the military triumph of Azerbaijan, its key ally in the region. It will result in further extension of export of Turkish weapons to Azerbaijan, and deeper cooperation between these two countries in other spheres. It concerns Russia and Iran, which are interested in maintaining the balance of powers in the region.  


Author(s):  
A. Krylov

The post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus is divided into three stages of different duration, format and character. The first stage (1991-2008) began after the collapse of the USSR and continued until the war in South Ossetia in August 2008. At this time, the formation of independent states took place, the vectors of foreign policy of the new states were determined. The second stage of the post-Soviet history of the South Caucasus (2008-2020) began after a five-day war and Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has strengthened its position in the South Caucasus by building a long-term system of response to potential threats in the southern direction. The Georgian factor has ceased to play an important role, the Armenian direction has become the main one in the policy of the United States and the collective West. To reformat the South Caucasus in American interests, “football diplomacy” was used, and then the second Karabakh war followed. After the end of the second Karabakh war, the third stage of the post-Soviet development of the South Caucasus began. At the end of 2020, Moscow managed to stabilize the situation and bring a contingent of Russian peacekeepers into the conflict zone. Further prospects for the development of the South Caucasus depend on many contradictory factors. The more tense the international situation and Russia's relations with the United States and the collective West will be, the higher the likelihood of the outbreak of new wars and conflicts in the South Caucasus.


Significance Mestan also implied that Borisov and Dogan were allied in promoting Russian interests in Bulgarian politics -- while Bulgaria's 'yellow press' accuses him of being a Turkish puppet. On January 13, Borisov dismissed reports that he was keen to revive the South Stream gas pipeline project, but confirmed that Bulgaria was lobbying the European Commission for a Varna gas hub that would revive at least the underwater part of South Stream bringing Russian natural gas to Europe. Impacts DPS realignment will strengthen Borisov's hand domestically, but alienate Turkey and worry the United States. His interest in a gas hub enjoys overwhelming support in both government and opposition, with only about 20 deputies likely to oppose it. Broadly coinciding with Russian interests, the hub must now secure EU financial and political support, in the teeth of US opposition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Larisa ALEKSANYAN

The newly independent states (South Caucasian countries being no exception), the products of the Soviet Union’s traumatic disintegration, needed independent foreign policies. Throughout the three decades of their independence they formulated their priorities and defined approaches and principles under strong pressure of certain factors. This process has been unfolding amid the complicated social and political processes and geopolitical transformations in the region shaken by the post-Soviet ethnic conflicts. As could be expected, the newly independent South Caucasian states opted for different routes in their economic and statehood development, while their ruling elites took into account the external and internal contexts when shaping their foreign policies. Different approaches and different foreign policy priorities opened the doors to non-regional geopolitical actors: the United States, the European Union, Iran and Turkey have joined Russia, whose presence is rooted in its past. Recently, China, Israel and Japan have become interested in the region. Thus, today the regional countries are orientated to the interests of non-regional states. This has not benefited the situation in the region or cooperation among the regional states. Foreign policy of the South Caucasian countries is inseparable from the regional security problems, which means that it should become an object of meticulous studies. In the latter half of 2020, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh changed the region’s geopolitical setting and shattered its stability. The article sums up the results of the policies pursued by the South Caucasian countries and identifies the challenges and possible developments in the region after the Karabakh war of 2020.


2021 ◽  
pp. 119-138
Author(s):  
Spencer W. McBride

This chapter describes the electioneering efforts of more than 400 missionaries that Mormon leaders dispatched throughout the United States to campaign for Smith, carrying copies of Smith’s political pamphlet aimed to win political support for their prophet. The experiences of these missionaries varied by location. One large rally led by campaign missionaries in Boston ended with a brawl between hecklers and the police. Other missionaries faced the threat of mob violence in the South because of their distribution of Smith’s pamphlet, which contained calls for the end of slavery. Missionaries in New York City created a campaign newspaper, The Prophet, to help boost Smith’s electoral profile.


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