scholarly journals FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOUTH CAUCASIAN COUNTRIES: RESULTS AND NEW CHALLENGES

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Larisa ALEKSANYAN

The newly independent states (South Caucasian countries being no exception), the products of the Soviet Union’s traumatic disintegration, needed independent foreign policies. Throughout the three decades of their independence they formulated their priorities and defined approaches and principles under strong pressure of certain factors. This process has been unfolding amid the complicated social and political processes and geopolitical transformations in the region shaken by the post-Soviet ethnic conflicts. As could be expected, the newly independent South Caucasian states opted for different routes in their economic and statehood development, while their ruling elites took into account the external and internal contexts when shaping their foreign policies. Different approaches and different foreign policy priorities opened the doors to non-regional geopolitical actors: the United States, the European Union, Iran and Turkey have joined Russia, whose presence is rooted in its past. Recently, China, Israel and Japan have become interested in the region. Thus, today the regional countries are orientated to the interests of non-regional states. This has not benefited the situation in the region or cooperation among the regional states. Foreign policy of the South Caucasian countries is inseparable from the regional security problems, which means that it should become an object of meticulous studies. In the latter half of 2020, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh changed the region’s geopolitical setting and shattered its stability. The article sums up the results of the policies pursued by the South Caucasian countries and identifies the challenges and possible developments in the region after the Karabakh war of 2020.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor V. Bocharnikov

The article analyzes the specifics and content of Armenia's multi-vector foreign policy, its results and prospects for further implementation. The article considers the processes of formation and development of the Armenian statehood in the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The years when Armenia was part of the USSR were the period of its highest development. At the same time, along with the achievements in the spheres of socio-economic and cultural development, nationalist public sentiments were formed during this period, which undermined the foundations of the multinational state. The most important catalyst for fundamental changes in the development of the political situation in Armenia, in Transcaucasia and in the USSR as a whole was the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region in the late 80s of the XX century, which transformed into an ethno-political confl ict. The most acute phase of the conflict coincided with the collapse of the USSR and the establishment of the statehood of Armenia and Azerbaijan. With the mediation of the Russian Federation, a ceasefire agreement was signed in May 1994, which was generally observed until September 2020 — the Second Karabakh War. The article examines the main stages of the formation of the statehood of Armenia and the formation of its foreign policy strategy, due to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the actual blockade and pressure from Azerbaijan and Turkey. Building allied relations with Russia was carried out along with the implementation of a multi-vector foreign policy, focusing on the United States and the European Union within the framework of the European program "Eastern Partnership". The main factors determining the modern foreign and domestic policy of Armenia are considered. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the processes caused by the results of the" Second Karabakh War " (September — November 2020) and their significance for the formation of a regional security system in the South Caucasus. The main vectors of the development of Armenia's relations with the Russian Federation and other leading countries of the region, the conditions and factors, and the prospects for the development of the military-political situation in the South Caucasus are determined.


1997 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 399-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Neil MacFarlane

FOR SOME YEARS NOW, WESTERN ACADEMICS AND POLICY-MAKERS HAVE embraced the cause of democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe. To take but one well-known example, President Clinton in the 1994 State of the Union Address cited the absence of war among democracies as a reason for promotion of democracy around the world. Assistance to former Warsaw Pact and newly independent states has been made conditional to varying degrees on the acceptance of democratic change. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development and associated non-governmental organizations have unleashed armies of promoters of democracy throughout the region to: observe elections; monitor human rights; draft new constitutions and laws defending civil and political rights; train judges and police personnel; and organize and assist political parties, media and non-governmental pressure groups. In short, they have sought to transplant the fabric of civil society and democratic institutions. These armies have landed on terrain often quite foreign to them and have often displayed little sensitivity to the social, economic and political context in which they are operating. This may have contributed to results other than those intended.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philipp Lutscher

Conventional wisdom expects to see a rise of cyber activities around aggressive foreign policy events. In this article, I test this claim by investigating whether sanctions lead to an increase in DoS attacks using new data on Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks measured from Internet traffic. Exploring the development of DoS attacks around sanctions imposed against Russia in 2014 indeed shows an increase of DoS attacks against several sanction sender states. Extending this case study to a systematic analysis including all sanction threats and impositions made by the United States and the European Union from 2008 until 2016 shows no apparent patterns. However, when I exclusively consider sanctions against technologically advanced countries, the frequency of attacks rises systematically against the United States. Overall, it appears that countries do not always have to expect a digital retaliation after aggressive foreign policies. Nevertheless, this article finds evidence for an increase of DoS attacks against states when they impose sanctions against technologically advanced countries.


Author(s):  
Andriy Martynov

The influence of internal political processes in the USA and Germany on the evolution of US-German relations is analyzed in the article. The crisis of the mono-polar system of international relations was synchronized with changes in the global order. It affected relations between the US and Germany. The scientific literature has been dominated by the view that President Trump’s conservative-moderate foreign policy strategy is contrary to the traditions of liberal-democratic multilateral diplomacy. D. Trump’s views on the international positioning of the United States can be considered as a variant of foreign policy realism, in contrast to classical republican neo-conservatism or democratic liberal interventionism. The German foreign policy course in the time of the Bundes Chancellor A. Merkel is a manifestation of liberal-democratic globalism. Under President Obama and Chancellor A. Merkel, German-American relations remained at a high allied level. President Trump abolishes talks on Transatlantic Free Trade Area. German elites see the populist and nationalist policies of D. Trump as a challenge to European integration. They consider US European policy an attempt to split the European Union. In the domestic political dimension, German liberals consider the Alternative to Germany party as Trump’s ideological counterparts. The American liberal political elite accused A. Merkel of failing to prevent the spread of anti-American sentiment in Germany. Political sentiment in the US and Germany after the pandemic is unpredictable. A noticeable trend was the aggravation of the crisis of liberal globalization. This outlines the tendency for further political polarization of American and German societies.


1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
JEANNE A.K. HEY ◽  
LYNN M. KUZMA

Literature on the foreign policy behavior of economically dependent states holds that they will comply with the foreign policy preferences of the United States, particularly on cold war issues. Regional foreign policies of Mexico and Costa Rica defy this view. Despite significant economic dependence on U.S. aid and trade, both Miguel de la Madrid and Oscar Arias developed peace plans for Central America that directly countered the objectives of the Reagan policy for the area. Pressures resulting from (a) regional security threats, (b) the flow of refugees into Costa Rica and Mexico, (c) the foreign policy traditions of each country, and (d) the need to counteract the effects of dependence guided these presidents to accept the risks of a defiant foreign policy in order to satisfy local demands. Even though heavily dependent and under pressure from the U.S. government to comply with its regional foreign policy, Mexico and Costa Rica implemented policies that served their own national interests and defied Washington.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
◽  
◽  

Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 65-77
Author(s):  
Martin Dahl

When the political camp centred on the Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in 2015, it led to a change in priorities in Polish foreign policy. The Three Seas Initiative (TSI), understood as closer cooperation between eastern states of the European Union in the area between the Baltic, Adriatic, and Black seas, has become a new instrument of foreign policy. The initiative demonstrates the growing importance of Central and Eastern Europe in the global game of great powers. The region has become a subject of rivalry, not only between the United States and Russia but also China. Therefore, the main objective of this article is to try to describe the importance of the region to Germany and how Germany’s stance on the TSI has evolved. The article consists of three parts, an introduction to the issues, the genesis of the TSI, and the definition of goals set by the states participating in this initiative, as well as analysis of the German stance towards the initiative since its development in 2015. The theories of geopolitics and neorealism are used as the theoretical basis for the analysis.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Blitz

The global reaction to US President Donald Trump's executive order, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” of January 27, 2017,1 revealed great public sympathy for the fate of refugees and the principle of refugee protection. In the case of Europe, such sympathy has, however, been dismissed by politicians who have read concerns regarding security and integration as reason for introducing restrictive policies on asylum and humanitarian assistance. These policies are at odds with public sentiment. Drawing upon public opinion surveys conducted by Amnesty International, the European Social Survey (ESS), and Pew Global Attitudes Survey across the European Union and neighboring states, this article records a marked divide between public attitudes towards the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and official policies regarding asylum and humanitarian assistance, and seeks to understand why this is the case. The article suggests that post-9/11 there has been a reconfiguration of refugee policy and a reconnecting of humanitarian and security interests which has enabled a discourse antithetical to the universal right to asylum. It offers five possible explanations for this trend: i) fears over cultural antagonism in host countries; ii) the conflation of refugees and immigrants, both those deemed economically advantageous as well as those labelled as “illegal”; iii) dominance of human capital thinking; iv) foreign policy justification; and v) the normalization of border controls. The main conclusion is that in a post-post-Cold War era characterized in part by the reconnecting of security and humanitarian policy, European governments have developed restrictive policies despite public sympathy. Support for the admission of refugees is not, however, unqualified, and most states and European populations prefer skilled populations that can be easily assimilated. In order to achieve greater protection and more open policies, this article recommends human rights actors work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its partners to challenge the above discourse through media campaigns and grassroots messaging. Further recommendations include: • Challenging efforts to normalize and drawing attention to the extreme and unprecedented activities of illegal and inhumane practices, e.g., detention, offshore processing, and the separation of families through the courts as part of a coordinated information campaign to present a counter moral argument. • Identifying how restrictive asylum policies fail to advance foreign policy interests and are contrary to international law. • Evidencing persecution by sharing information with the press and government agencies on the nature of claims by those currently considered ineligible for refugee protection as part of a wider campaign of information and inclusion. • Engaging with minority, and in particular Muslim, communities to redress public concerns regarding the possibility of cultural integration in the host country. • Clarifying the rights of refugees and migrants in line with the UNHCR and International Organization for Migration (IOM) guidelines and European and national law in order to hold governments to account and to ensure that all — irrespective of their skills, status, nationality or religion — are given the opportunity to seek asylum. • Identifying and promoting leadership among states and regional bodies to advance the rights of refugees.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 451-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne Jenichen

AbstractIt is a common—often stereotypical—presumption that Europe is secular and America religious. Differences in international religious freedom and religious engagement policies on both sides of the Atlantic seem to confirm this “cliché.” This article argues that to understand why it has been easier for American supporters to institutionalize these policies than for advocates in the EU, it is important to consider the discursive structures of EU and US foreign policies, which enable and constrain political language and behavior. Based on the analysis of foreign policy documents, produced by the EU and the United States in their relationship with six religiously diverse African and Asian states, the article compares how both international actors represent religion in their foreign affairs. The analysis reveals similarities in the relatively low importance that they attribute to religion and major differences in how they represent the contribution of religion to creating and solving problems in other states. In sum, the foreign policies of both international actors are based on a secular discursive structure, but that of the United States is much more accommodative toward religion, including Islam, than that of the EU.


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