scholarly journals IDEAL COMBINATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEM AND PARTY SYSTEM FOR STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GOVERNMENT

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Widayati Widayati ◽  
Winanto Winanto

Indonesia since before independence until the time the core adopted a multi-party system. While the system of government changes, from a presidential, parliamentary, quasi presidential system. Multiparty presidential government systems can disrupt the stability and effectiveness of the government because there must be a coalition of political parties in the government, the preparation of the cabinet by the President must consider and accommodate the interests of coalition political parties, decision making or policy-making must also consider the interests of coalition political parties, so it will require longer time. The coalition of political parties is very fluid and pragmatic, so there may be a change in the coalition because there is a possibility that political parties that were outside the coalition will then enter the government coalition, and vice versa. Exit the entry of political parties in the government coalition will certainly be very disturbing, because political parties who have just joined the government will demand a seat in the government, especially in the cabinet. Unloading pairs of the cabinet or dismantling pairs of government seats will often occur. This of course greatly disrupts the stability and effectiveness of government. Therefore, a presidential government system ideally does not combine with a multi-party system. A change from a multi-party system to a simple multi-party system is needed, or if possible with a two-party system.

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Moch. Marsa Taufiqurrohman

Artikel ini berupaya meninjau kembali praktik koalisi partai politik di tengah sistem presidensial pasca reformasi, dan menilai sejauh mana dampaknya terhadap kestabilan pemerintahan. Pasca reformasi 1998, sejumlah besar partai politik telah didirikan, menunjukkan bahwa munculnya fragmentasi politik adalah sesuatu yang tidak terhindarkan. Alih-alih melaksanakan pemerintahan secara sehat, partai politik membentuk koalisi untuk memperkuat kedudukan mereka di parlemen. Implikasi penerapan multi partai dalam sistem presidensial ini seringkali menimbulkan deadlock antara eksekutif dan legislatif. Sistem presidensial yang dikombinasikan dengan sistem multi partai dapat menjadi sistem yang stabil dan efektif dengan cara penyederhanaan partai politik, desain pelembagaan koalisi, dan pengaturan pelembagaan oposisi. Namun di sisi lain koalisi juga menjadi sangat berpengaruh pada stabilitas pemerintahan. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif, artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti politik hukum terkait praktik koalisi partai politik di Indonesia dan mengetahui upaya-upaya dalam praktik ketatanegaraan yang dapat merealisasikan stabilitas sistem pemerintahan presidensial pada koalisi di multi partai. Artikel ini menemukan kesimpulan bahwa model pemilihan legislatif dan eksekutif yang dipilih langsung oleh rakyat justru menjadi penyebab disharmonisasi antara legislatif dan eksekutif yang mengarah kepada terjadinya kebuntuan antar kedua lembaga tersebut. Lebih-lebih apabila yang menguasai lembaga ekesekutif dan lembaga legislatif adalah dari latar belakang partai politik yang berbeda. Akibatnya, praktik koalisi seperti ini cenderung mengakibatkan lebih banyak masalah, sehingga penerapan sistem ini memiliki dampak signifikan terhadap demokrasi yang didefinisikan dan dinegosiasikan. This article attempts to review the practice of coalitions of political parties in the post-reform presidential system and assess the extent of their impact on the stability of the government. Post-1998 reform, a large number of political parties have been established, suggesting that the emergence of political fragmentation is inevitable. Instead of implementing a healthy government, political parties formed coalitions to strengthen their positions in parliament. The implication of implementing multi-party in the presidential system often creates deadlocks between the executive and the legislature. A presidential system combined with a multi-party system can become a stable and effective system by simplifying political parties, designing institutionalized coalitions, and organizing opposition institutions. But on the other hand, the coalition has also greatly influenced the stability of the government. By using normative juridical research methods, this article aims to examine legal politics related to the practice of political party coalitions in Indonesia and to find out the efforts in state administration practices that can realize the stability of the presidential system of government in multi-party coalitions. This article finds the conclusion that the legislative and executive election models directly elected by the people are the cause of disharmony between the legislature and the executive which leads to a deadlock between the two institutions. This is even more so if those who control the executive and legislative bodies are from different political party backgrounds. As a result, coalition practices like this are likely to cause more problems, so the adoption of these systems has a significant impact on defined and negotiated democracy.


SASI ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 516
Author(s):  
Suparto Suparto

The government system in post-reform Indonesia is a presidential system with many parties. The advantage of this system is that it is more democratic because many parties are considered to accommodate the wishes and interests of people from various backgrounds through political parties, while the weakness is that it is difficult for the ruling party if it is not in the majority. The purpose of this study was to determine the implementation of a presidential system of multi-party governance in post-reform Indonesia. The results of the study are that in a presidential government system with many parties (multi-party system) such as in Indonesia, it will cause problems if no political party wins the election with a majority vote, the President must build a coalition with a number of political parties that have representatives in the House of Representatives (DPR). DPR). Since the holding of the 1999 and 2004 elections, there have been efforts to simplify political parties, by reducing the number of election participants through the electoral threshold and then changing since 2009 to reducing the number of political parties that may sit in parliament by using the minimum threshold requirement (parliamentary threshold). However, this method has not been successful because there are still relatively many political parties sitting in parliament, this is due to the parliamentary threshold that is too small. Ideally, the parliamentary threshold, which was previously 4% in the 2019 election, is raised to 8% in the 2024 election. Thus, a strong, effective and stable presidential government system with only 4 (four) to 6 (six) political parties will be realized.


Author(s):  
R. A. W. Rhodes

The core executive is a new concept replacing the conventional debate about the power of the prime minister and the Cabinet. It refers to all those organizations and procedures that coordinate central government policies, and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the government machine. In brief, the ‘core executive’ is the heart of the machine. The chapter reviews the several approaches to studying the British executive: prime ministerial government; prime ministerial cliques; Cabinet government; ministerial government; segmented decision-making; and bureaucratic coordination. It then discusses several ways forward by developing new theory and methods. The Afterword discusses the core executive as interlocking networks, and the fluctuating patterns of executive politics.


2018 ◽  
pp. 79-94
Author(s):  
Andrzej ANTSZEWSKI

Among the numerous functions of political parties, the role of creating the governance system is highly significant. It manifests itself in the ability of political parties to establish permanent relations with the other parties and in this way provides the essence of a party system. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate the role the Law and Justice party (PiS) plays in the creation of the governance system. Since 2005, PiS has been one of the two dominant political parties struggling to win the parliamentary and presidential elections. In order to determine the scope of this party’s influence on the shape of the party system, their achievements in elections, parliament and Cabinet activity need to be analyzed. Such a quantitative analysis allows us to grasp PiS’s development trends in political competition. The paper discusses the reasons for their electoral success in 2005 as well as their defeat in 2007 and the aftermath of both these elections for the party’s competition to the government. The achievements of PiS confirm that this party has won the status of a party that structures the political competition, a status that has not been lost irrespective of the five elections at different levels that the party has lost. PiS has successfully adopted the postulates of the Left in terms of the economy and social issues, whereas it has maintained the image of a right-wing party in terms of the shape of the state and its moral foundations. PiS has managed to form an electorate that differs from other parties’ electorates in terms of its social and demographic properties as well as its political attitudes, which reinforces the position of PiS in the electoral struggle. Yet PiS has failed to establish a permanent coalition government. The elimination of Self-Defence (Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) from the Sejm has practically deprived PiS of any coalition potential, or has at least significantly reduced this potential. This, coupled with a continuously growing negative electorate, may turn out to constitute the main obstacle to PiS regaining power.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
SONA NADENICHEK GOLDER

Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.


Author(s):  
David Judge ◽  
Cristina Leston-Bandeira ◽  
Louise Thompson

This concluding chapter reflects on the future of parliamentary politics by identifying key puzzles implicit in previous discussions which raise fundamental questions about what Parliament is and why it exists. The goal is to determine the ‘predictable unknowns’ as starting points for exploring the future. Three principal puzzles that need ‘hard thinking’ in order to understand legislatures are considered: representation, collective decision-making, and their role in the political system. The chapter also examines the difficulties in reconciling ideas about popular sovereignty and direct public participation with notions of parliamentary sovereignty and indirect public participation in decision-making; the implications of the legislative task of disentangling UK law from EU law in the wake of Brexit for Parliament's recent strengthened scrutiny capacity; and how Parliament has integrated the core principles of representation, consent, and authorization into the legitimation of state policy-making processes and their outputs.


1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Cox

This paper looks at the question of whether or not political parties in Britain have autonomy in drawing up legislation when in office. Using the development of party and governmental policies for land values problems since 1947 as case study, the paper assesses the relative merits of various explanations of policy making. While it is true in this particular case that adversary party politics and relative governmental autonomy in decision making does exist, the paper concludes by assessing the consequences of this for effective policy implementation. It is argued that policy formulated primarily on the basis of ideology and dogma leads to policy failure and, ultimately, the generation of pluralistic and/or corporatist tendencies.


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anubha Taneja Mukherjee

Decision making is an inherently complicated procedure, which by its very nature requires the decision-maker to co-opt all the stakeholders concerned. The procedure of decision-making may vary from country to country, depending on its size, culture, history and special demographic circumstances. Around the world, key decision-makers include the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. While the distribution of powers between these three may vary in tandem with their relation to each other, their roles remain the same. While the legislature enacts laws for its citizens, the executive, popularly known as the government, implements these laws and while doing so promulgates policies that are in alignment with the said laws. Mostly, the executive is also authorised to promulgate some laws of its own. The judiciary, on the other hand, comes into the picture when there is a dispute with regard to such laws. It also steps in on its own at times. While settling such disputes, the judiciary also ends up setting what we know as precedents, which also become a part of the legal fabric of a society. In a nutshell, these three are the key decision makers in any country. As mentioned above, while making decisions, these authorities are mostly required to co-opt all the stakeholders concerned, thereby making decision making a consultative process. These stakeholders include think tanks, research bodies, media and most importantly the affected party. The reason for having such a consultative procedure in place is that the decision makers are not experts in every subject or issue that comes their way. For instance, when a need to promulgate a national policy on thalassemia presents itself to a certain government, whether it be owing to media reportage or representations from the civil society, the decision makers will look towards people considered to be the experts in the subject to come forward and be a part of the policy making. One could say that this sounds like an ideal situation where the government actually invites people concerned with thalassemia to come forward and share views about it for the purpose of policy making. It is, however, true! It is as true for India as it is for any developed country. What we must ensure then is that the government or the decision maker considers us, the patients, as the experts. While it does sound obvious that those impacted with the disorder would be the ones with the first-hand knowledge about the disorder, the very fact that there is a topic in this conference on the role of patients in decision making speaks volumes about the distance that remains to be covered by the patients of thalassemia as far as participation in decision-making is concerned. With the massive strides in the field of medical science and the unflinching support of organisations like Thalassemia International Federation (TIF), we have now reached the stage where we must step out of the victim mode and represent ourselves before the decision-makers, whether by forming Patients Advocacy Groups or otherwise. One may take cue from various associations around the world. Global HD Organisations are a good example. They are known to have got together to give patients a voice in clinical research. The most popular strategy for reaching out to the decision makers is to unite, engage, and partner both in private meetings and consultative fora like events, task forces and projects. “Unite, Engage & Partner” can therefore be the most successful mantra for engaging with the decision makers. Talking of examples of advocacy and participation by patients, while there are numerous examples in Europe and North America of the power of patient advocacy so much so that patients are on the same level as doctors when it comes to voicing opinions in policy making, TIF on an international level has created since 2009 the Expert Patients Programme, and is now moving forward in giving patients a voice through its educational platform. Recently, India also launched its first Thalassemia Patients Advocacy Group (PAG) in the august presence of the Deputy Chief Minister of the capital of the country. The India PAG has seven patients from the fields of law, psychology, education and IT. The Group is already involved with the government on the formulation of the National Thalassemia Policy. This is a great start and this should give enough and more encouragement to thalassemics across the world to UNITE, ENGAGE AND PARTNER in the process that impacts them the most – decision-making!


Subject Outlook for presidential elections in Guinea-Bissau. Significance Controversial outgoing President Jose Mario Vaz is among twelve candidates vying for the presidency on November 24. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)-backed elections are set to go ahead as planned, fears linger that they will not end recurring political turmoil. Impacts If Pereira wins, he will likely try drafting a new constitution to give greater clarity to the current ambiguous semi-presidential system. Ongoing political instability will exacerbate border insecurity and long-standing narco-trafficking. A more active, internationally backed civil society will ensure added scrutiny of political parties and the government over the long term.


Modern Italy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-325
Author(s):  
Paolo Morisi

A central debate in political science centres on the origins of political parties and specifically on the question as to whether they emerged as a result of the rise of parliamentary institutions. Regarding the Italian party system, the commonly held view is that Italian parties emerged as a consequence of national unification and the establishment of parliament. This article contributes to the debate on the origins of Italian parties by presenting empirical evidence on the timing of their initial formation, analysing data regarding the social base, membership, organisational articulation and policy-making accomplishments of the two major political movements active before and after the establishment of the national parliament. The article argues that, at least in the Italian case, parties did not originate in the legislature; rather, similar to countries such as Germany and Spain, Italian parties developed as a result of a major national crisis.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document