scholarly journals Prawo i Sprawiedliwość w polskim systemie partyjnym (przyczynek do dyskusji o systemotwórczej roli partii)

2018 ◽  
pp. 79-94
Author(s):  
Andrzej ANTSZEWSKI

Among the numerous functions of political parties, the role of creating the governance system is highly significant. It manifests itself in the ability of political parties to establish permanent relations with the other parties and in this way provides the essence of a party system. The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate the role the Law and Justice party (PiS) plays in the creation of the governance system. Since 2005, PiS has been one of the two dominant political parties struggling to win the parliamentary and presidential elections. In order to determine the scope of this party’s influence on the shape of the party system, their achievements in elections, parliament and Cabinet activity need to be analyzed. Such a quantitative analysis allows us to grasp PiS’s development trends in political competition. The paper discusses the reasons for their electoral success in 2005 as well as their defeat in 2007 and the aftermath of both these elections for the party’s competition to the government. The achievements of PiS confirm that this party has won the status of a party that structures the political competition, a status that has not been lost irrespective of the five elections at different levels that the party has lost. PiS has successfully adopted the postulates of the Left in terms of the economy and social issues, whereas it has maintained the image of a right-wing party in terms of the shape of the state and its moral foundations. PiS has managed to form an electorate that differs from other parties’ electorates in terms of its social and demographic properties as well as its political attitudes, which reinforces the position of PiS in the electoral struggle. Yet PiS has failed to establish a permanent coalition government. The elimination of Self-Defence (Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (LPR) from the Sejm has practically deprived PiS of any coalition potential, or has at least significantly reduced this potential. This, coupled with a continuously growing negative electorate, may turn out to constitute the main obstacle to PiS regaining power.

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-179
Author(s):  
Andrey Vershinin

The article examines the issue of exercising the freedom of association in political parties in Russia in a comparative analysis with the leading democratic countries of the world. Modern democracies cannot be imagined without political parties, which are the representors of the interests of their voters in legislative bodies and local government bodies. The development of civil society and the entire political system in the country depends on how the freedom of association in political parties and the access of parties to participate in elections is realized. The development of legislation on political parties in the Russian Federation proceeded unevenly. In the first years after the adoption of the Constitution the legislative body did not introduce strict requirements for parties. The adoption of a special federal law on political parties in 2001 became a turning point in the development of the party system. The author identifies two large blocks of restrictions on the creation of parties. The first is legislative restrictions, the second is the restrictions that arise from the unfair activities of legislative and law enforcement agencies. In this work, legislative restrictions are compared with restrictions in other democracies, as well as based on legal positions developed by the European Court of Human Rights. The author comes to the opinion that some restrictions on the creation of parties are not necessary now, in the meantime they significantly narrow the possibilities of party creation and political competition. First, we are talking about a ban on the creation of regional parties. The Constitutional Court in its legal positions indicated that this restriction is temporary and will be lifted over time. Within the framework of this work, the author will give suggestions on changing the approach to the creation of political parties in Russia, which should affect the emergence of new strong parties at different levels of public authority. The author believes that a system of “controlled multiparty system” has developed in Russia, which is implemented both in changing the legislation on political parties based on the interests of the “party in power” and the practice of the registration body, which prevents the formation of new parties claiming to redistribute the existing distribution of forces. Based on the analysis of the legislation on political parties, law enforcement practice, decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the ECHR and the legislation of foreign countries, the author proposes approaches to reforming the existing party system, which include small cosmetic changes and large-scale changes in approaches to the creation of parties.


2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asel Doolotkeldieva ◽  
Alexander Wolters

The parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan in October 2015 garnered widespread approval from commentators for the level of fairness and freedom maintained throughout the campaign. However, the results of the vote do not provide a clear indication of the current state of affairs of parliamentarism in the republic. Focusing on the commercialization of party lists, we argue that neither identity politics nor the logic of neopatrimonialism adequately explain the dynamics of political competition in Kyrgyzstan. Instead, we see perpetual uncertainty emerging from contradicting yet increasing attempts to harness the capital of privatized party lists and to impose discipline. Eventually, and beyond short-term threats of an emerging super-presidentialism, Kyrgyzstan risks suffering from hollow parliamentarism, with political parties persistently failing to supply legislative initiatives with substantial agendas and adequate professionals. The weakly institutionalized political parties and their short-sighted electoral strategies undermine both the parliamentary system and its political pluralism.


Author(s):  
Pradeep K. Chhibber ◽  
Rahul Verma

The 2014 national elections were an ideological showdown between the main political parties with distinctly different visions offered to Indian voters. The BJP advocated a de-emphasis on statism and recognition whereas the Congress and many regional parties favored the status quo. Voter surveys of the 2014 election provide clear evidence of this ideological divide both among party members and voters of particular parties. The divide was furthered by Narendra Modi, the chief campaigner for the BJP, whose personal appeal was important to the electoral success of the BJP. Consistent with theoretical expectations ideologically motivated voters were more likely to participate in political activity around election time. They are also able to distinguish between the ideological vision offered by the various parties and coalitions.


2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 753-766 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard S. Katz ◽  
Peter Mair

We restate and clarify the idea of the “cartel party,” a concept that has found considerable traction in studies of parties throughout the democratic world, including those far from the original research site and data on which the cartel model was based. The cartel party thesis holds that political parties increasingly function like cartels, employing the resources of the state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral success. The thesis has been subject to varied empirical testing and to substantial theoretical evaluation and criticism. Against this background, we look again at the cartel party thesis in order to clarify ambiguities in and misinterpretations of the original argument. We also suggest further refinements, specifications and extensions of the argument. Following a background review of the original thesis, we break it down into its core components, and then clarify the terms in which it makes sense to speak of cartelization and collusion. We then go on to explore some of the implications of the thesis for our understanding of contemporary democracies and patterns of party organization and party competition and we identify a possible agenda for future research in party scholarship.


2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Montserrat Baras ◽  
Oscar Barberà ◽  
Astrid Barrio ◽  
Juan Rodríguez-Teruel

AbstractThis article explores how multi-dimensional competition party systems shape the intraparty opinion structure in political parties. The aim is to extend and test May’s law of ideological curvilinear disparity to multi-dimensional settings. The data are based on the case of Catalonia, a party system characterized by the relevant presence of non-state wide parties, where political competition is based on two main dimensions: the left right axis and the subjective national identity one. The paper shows that while the Catalan parties do fit with May’s law in the left-right axis, this is not the case in the national identity one. In addition, it further illustrates how the interaction between both axes affects party competition and internal opinion differences between leaders, activists and voters. The results attest the complexity of the intraparty opinion structures in multidimensional competition systems.


2001 ◽  
Vol 34 (5) ◽  
pp. 493-526 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW K. MILTON

This article examines general patterns of the politics of media reform in Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Taiwan, all societies transitioning to democracy. Although the media are becoming more free and independent in each, there remain significant political constraints on journalism in all four countries. Using arguments from organizational analysis, the author contends that the persistence of institutional connection between the media and the government, state, and political parties has left the media in a politically dependent position. This dependence is manipulated by politicians across the political spectrum in an effort to sustain electoral success and political authority. The prevalence of this pattern in Taiwan indicates that the so-called Leninist legacy is not always the primary inhibitor of greater liberalization. The difficulties in all four countries indicate, the author contends, that rebuilding old institutions differs from creating brand new democratic ones.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Moch. Marsa Taufiqurrohman

Artikel ini berupaya meninjau kembali praktik koalisi partai politik di tengah sistem presidensial pasca reformasi, dan menilai sejauh mana dampaknya terhadap kestabilan pemerintahan. Pasca reformasi 1998, sejumlah besar partai politik telah didirikan, menunjukkan bahwa munculnya fragmentasi politik adalah sesuatu yang tidak terhindarkan. Alih-alih melaksanakan pemerintahan secara sehat, partai politik membentuk koalisi untuk memperkuat kedudukan mereka di parlemen. Implikasi penerapan multi partai dalam sistem presidensial ini seringkali menimbulkan deadlock antara eksekutif dan legislatif. Sistem presidensial yang dikombinasikan dengan sistem multi partai dapat menjadi sistem yang stabil dan efektif dengan cara penyederhanaan partai politik, desain pelembagaan koalisi, dan pengaturan pelembagaan oposisi. Namun di sisi lain koalisi juga menjadi sangat berpengaruh pada stabilitas pemerintahan. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif, artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti politik hukum terkait praktik koalisi partai politik di Indonesia dan mengetahui upaya-upaya dalam praktik ketatanegaraan yang dapat merealisasikan stabilitas sistem pemerintahan presidensial pada koalisi di multi partai. Artikel ini menemukan kesimpulan bahwa model pemilihan legislatif dan eksekutif yang dipilih langsung oleh rakyat justru menjadi penyebab disharmonisasi antara legislatif dan eksekutif yang mengarah kepada terjadinya kebuntuan antar kedua lembaga tersebut. Lebih-lebih apabila yang menguasai lembaga ekesekutif dan lembaga legislatif adalah dari latar belakang partai politik yang berbeda. Akibatnya, praktik koalisi seperti ini cenderung mengakibatkan lebih banyak masalah, sehingga penerapan sistem ini memiliki dampak signifikan terhadap demokrasi yang didefinisikan dan dinegosiasikan. This article attempts to review the practice of coalitions of political parties in the post-reform presidential system and assess the extent of their impact on the stability of the government. Post-1998 reform, a large number of political parties have been established, suggesting that the emergence of political fragmentation is inevitable. Instead of implementing a healthy government, political parties formed coalitions to strengthen their positions in parliament. The implication of implementing multi-party in the presidential system often creates deadlocks between the executive and the legislature. A presidential system combined with a multi-party system can become a stable and effective system by simplifying political parties, designing institutionalized coalitions, and organizing opposition institutions. But on the other hand, the coalition has also greatly influenced the stability of the government. By using normative juridical research methods, this article aims to examine legal politics related to the practice of political party coalitions in Indonesia and to find out the efforts in state administration practices that can realize the stability of the presidential system of government in multi-party coalitions. This article finds the conclusion that the legislative and executive election models directly elected by the people are the cause of disharmony between the legislature and the executive which leads to a deadlock between the two institutions. This is even more so if those who control the executive and legislative bodies are from different political party backgrounds. As a result, coalition practices like this are likely to cause more problems, so the adoption of these systems has a significant impact on defined and negotiated democracy.


Democracy allows the people to have equal rights in decision-making that can change their lives. Consequently, opposition and coalition exist in this political system. While the opposition aims to correct and evaluate various government decisions, the coalition is the power holder or supporter of the government. Because Indonesia is a country that uphold legal formal consisting of many political parties, a coalition government party must be formed. This is done by gathering other parties until the government can run effectively so that it has the basis of a combination and effective legitimacy. In the second period of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's cabinet, the emergence of political parties that were powerless and did not dare to become the government's opposition became evidence of the need for democratization. The emergence of elitism, centralization, and anti-public, as well as the freezing of political structures and the backwardness of the cultural attitudes of the Indonesian people caused the opposition to stand on the word of democratization. Therefore coalitions and opposition are two important parts in building a democratic governance system in Indonesia. This article underlines that democracy in the political elite tends to produce a pseudo and half-hearted democracy. Therefor, the portrait of democratization is needed as a reinforcement of all elements of civil society and thus is not seen as a "devout movement of the state", but an urgent movement to change the attitude of the state through changes in the political composition within it.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Widayati Widayati ◽  
Winanto Winanto

Indonesia since before independence until the time the core adopted a multi-party system. While the system of government changes, from a presidential, parliamentary, quasi presidential system. Multiparty presidential government systems can disrupt the stability and effectiveness of the government because there must be a coalition of political parties in the government, the preparation of the cabinet by the President must consider and accommodate the interests of coalition political parties, decision making or policy-making must also consider the interests of coalition political parties, so it will require longer time. The coalition of political parties is very fluid and pragmatic, so there may be a change in the coalition because there is a possibility that political parties that were outside the coalition will then enter the government coalition, and vice versa. Exit the entry of political parties in the government coalition will certainly be very disturbing, because political parties who have just joined the government will demand a seat in the government, especially in the cabinet. Unloading pairs of the cabinet or dismantling pairs of government seats will often occur. This of course greatly disrupts the stability and effectiveness of government. Therefore, a presidential government system ideally does not combine with a multi-party system. A change from a multi-party system to a simple multi-party system is needed, or if possible with a two-party system.


Subject Political parties in democracy. Significance Amid a divisive standoff with the federal government, the leaders of Somalia’s federal member states on October 24 resolved to establish their own political party, the National Progressive Party, to advocate for a "federalist, progressive and consultative agenda". This development could represent a new phase in efforts to institutionalise the role of political parties in Somali politics. However, like other recent formations, it could ultimately remain more firmly grounded in existing models of political competition. Impacts Alliances among Hawiye clan-led political parties may incentivise other elites to create clan-centric formations. Universal suffrage would enhance the agency of political parties and increase the costs of electoral corruption. Conflict between the government and federal member states could derail efforts to adopt a new system in the next elections.


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