scholarly journals Performance feedback promotes proactive but not reactive adaptation of conflict-control

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Bejjani ◽  
Sophie Tan ◽  
Tobias Egner

Cognitive control refers to the use of internal goals to guide how we process stimuli, and control can be applied proactively (in anticipation of a stimulus) or reactively (once that stimulus has been presented). The application of control can be guided by memory; for instance, people typically learn to adjust their level of attentional selectivity to changing task statistics, such as different frequencies of hard and easy trials in the Stroop task. This type of “control-learning” is highly adaptive, but its boundary conditions are currently not well understood. In the present study, we assessed how the presence of performance feedback shapes control-learning in the context of item-specific (reactive control, Experiments 1a and 1b) and list-wide (proactive control, Experiments 2a and 2b) proportion of congruency manipulations in a Stroop protocol. We found that performance feedback did not alter the modulation of the Stroop effect by item-specific cueing, but did enhance the modulation of the Stroop effect by a list-wide context. Performance feedback thus selectively promoted proactive, but not reactive, adaptation of cognitive control. These results have important implications for experimental designs, potential psychiatric treatment, and theoretical accounts of the mechanisms underlying control-learning.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina Bejjani ◽  
Tobias Egner

Cognitive control describes the ability to use internal goals to strategically guide how we process and respond to our environment. Changes in the environment lead to adaptation in control strategies. This type of control-learning can be observed in performance adjustments in response to varying proportions of easy to hard trials over blocks of trials on classic cognitive control tasks. Known as the list-wide proportion congruent (LWPC) effect, here, increased difficulty is met with enhanced attentional control. Recent research has shown that reinforcement events, in the form of performance feedback, enhance the LWPC effect, but the underlying mechanisms are not yet understood. To assess different hypotheses of how feedback is processed in the LWPC, we manipulated proportion congruency in a Stroop task over blocks of trials and provided trial-by-trial task-relevant word and task-irrelevant, trial-unique image performance feedback. The LWPC task was followed by a surprise recognition memory task for feedback images, which allowed us to test whether attention to feedback (incidental memory for the images) varies as a function of proportion congruency, time, and individual differences in reward sensitivity. We replicated a robust LWPC effect. Importantly, the memory data revealed better encoding of feedback images from context-defining trials (e.g., congruent trials in a mostly congruent block), especially early on in a new context, and in congruent conditions. Individual differences in reward sensitivity were not strongly associated with control-learning effects. These results suggest that reinforcement promotes the rapid forming of associations between stimuli and control demands, or context binding.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S89-S89
Author(s):  
Anita Kwashie ◽  
Yizhou Ma ◽  
Andrew Poppe ◽  
Deanna Barch ◽  
Cameron Carter ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Cognitive control mechanisms enable an individual to regulate, coordinate, and sequence thoughts and actions to obtain desired outcomes. A theory of control specialization posits that proactive control is necessary for anticipatory planning and goal maintenance and recruits sustained lateral prefrontal activity, whereas reactive control, essential for adapting to transient changes, marshals a more extensive brain network (Braver, 2012). Increased task errors and reduced frontoparietal activity in proactive contexts is observed in severe psychopathology, including schizophrenia (Poppe et al., 2016), leading to the prediction that patients rely on reactive control more when performing such tasks. However, evidence of primate prefrontal ‘switch’ neurons, active during both proactive and reactive contexts, challenges the notion that cognitive control relies on discrete processing networks (Blackman et al., 2016). To examine this contradiction, we sought to characterize the distinctiveness between proactive and reactive control in healthy and patient populations using the Dot Pattern Expectancy Task (DPX). We also examined if a bias toward proactive or reactive control predicted behavioral metrics. Methods 44 individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and 50 matched healthy controls (HC) completed 4 blocks of the DPX during a 3-Tesla fMRI scan (Poppe et al., 2016). Participants followed the ‘A-then-X’ rule, in which they pressed one button whenever an A cue followed an X probe, and pressed a different button for any other non-target stimulus sequence. We examined bilateral frontoparietal ROIs from the literature for evidence of cognitive control specialization as well as whole-brain analyses. Subsequent nonparametric tests and measures of neural response variation strengthened our interpretations. Participant d’-context (dependent on task accuracy) measured their tendency to engage in proactive control. Results Behavioral data revealed that HC participants showed a greater proclivity for proactive control than did their SZ counterparts. HC reaction time outpaced SZ reaction time in trials requiring successful marshalling of proactive control. Preliminary neuroimaging analyses suggest marginal between-group differences in control specialization. HC specialization appeared to be most apparent in diffuse frontal lateral regions, and bilateral posterior parietal cortex. Within the SZ group, specialization was most evident in bilateral posterior parietal cortex. Between-group control specialization differences were most apparent in right hemisphere frontal regions. Superior frontal gyrus and medial temporal lobe activity during proactive processes accounted for modest variance in d’-context. Discussion There were significant between-group differences in goal maintenance behavioral metrics such as reaction time and a tendency to engage in proactive control. Control specialization occurred more diffusely in controls compared to patient counterparts. However, activity in these regions had minimal ability to predict behavioral metrics. Overall, the relatively small size of control-specific areas compared to regions involved in dual processing offers support for the malleable nature of regions implicated in human cognitive control.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1125-1136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Chevalier ◽  
Shaina Bailey Martis ◽  
Tim Curran ◽  
Yuko Munakata

Young children engage cognitive control reactively in response to events, rather than proactively preparing for events. Such limitations in executive control have been explained in terms of fundamental constraints on children's cognitive capacities. Alternatively, young children might be capable of proactive control but differ from older children in their metacognitive decisions regarding when to engage proactive control. We examined these possibilities in three conditions of a task-switching paradigm, varying in whether task cues were available before or after target onset. RTs, ERPs, and pupil dilation showed that 5-year-olds did engage in advance preparation, a critical aspect of proactive control, but only when reactive control was made more difficult, whereas 10-year-olds engaged in proactive control whenever possible. These findings highlight metacognitive processes in children's cognitive control, an understudied aspect of executive control development.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Linda Truong ◽  
Kesaan Kandasamy ◽  
Lixia Yang

The dual mechanisms of control framework (DMC) proposes two modes of cognitive control: proactive and reactive control. In anticipation of an interference event, young adults primarily use a more proactive control mode, whereas older adults tend to use a more reactive one during the event, due to age-related deficits in working memory. The current study aimed to examine the effects of mood induction on cognitive control mode in older (ages 65+) compared to young adults (ages 18–30) with a standard letter-cue (Experiment 1) and a modified face-cue AX-CPT (Experiment 2). Mood induction into negative and/or positive mood versus neutral mood was conducted prior to the cognitive control task. Experiment 1 replicated the typical pattern of proactive control use in young adults and reactive control use in older adults. In Experiment 2, older adults showed comparable proactive control to young adults in their response time (RT). Mood induction showed little effect on cognitive control across the two experiments. These results did not reveal consistent effects of mood (negative or positive) on cognitive control mode in young and older adults, but discovered (or demonstrated) that older adults can engage proactive control when dichotomous face cues (female or male) are used in AX-CPT.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rongxiang Tang ◽  
Julie Bugg ◽  
Jean-Paul Snijder ◽  
Andrew R. A. Conway ◽  
Todd Samuel Braver

Cognitive control serves a crucial role in human higher mental functions. The Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) account provides a unifying theoretical framework that decomposes cognitive control into two qualitatively distinct mechanisms – proactive control and reactive control. While prior behavioral and neuroimaging work has demonstrated the validity of individual tasks in isolating these two mechanisms of control, there has not been a comprehensive, theoretically-guided task battery specifically designed to tap into proactive and reactive control across different domains of cognition. To address this critical limitation and provide useful methodological tools for future investigations, the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) task battery was developed to probe these two control modes, as well as their intra-individual and inter-individual differences, across four prototypical domains of cognition: selective attention, context processing, multi-tasking, and working memory. We present this task battery, along with detailed descriptions of the experimental manipulations used to encourage shifts to proactive or reactive control in each of the four task domains. We rigorously evaluate the group effects of these manipulations in primary indices of proactive and reactive control, establishing the validity of the DMCC task battery in providing dissociable yet convergent measures of the two cognitive control modes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grace M. Clements ◽  
Daniel C. Bowie ◽  
Mate Gyurkovics ◽  
Kathy A. Low ◽  
Monica Fabiani ◽  
...  

The resting-state human electroencephalogram (EEG) power spectrum is dominated by alpha (8–12 Hz) and theta (4–8 Hz) oscillations, and also includes non-oscillatory broadband activity inversely related to frequency (1/f activity). Gratton proposed that alpha and theta oscillations are both related to cognitive control function, though in a complementary manner. Alpha activity is hypothesized to facilitate the maintenance of representations, such as task sets in preparation for expected task conditions. In contrast, theta activity would facilitate changes in representations, such as the updating of task sets in response to unpredicted task demands. Therefore, theta should be related to reactive control (which may prompt changes in task representations), while alpha may be more relevant to proactive control (which implies the maintenance of current task representations). Less is known about the possible relationship between 1/f activity and cognitive control, which was analyzed here in an exploratory fashion. To investigate these hypothesized relationships, we recorded eyes-open and eyes-closed resting-state EEG from younger and older adults and subsequently tested their performance on a cued flanker task, expected to elicit both proactive and reactive control processes. Results showed that alpha power and 1/f offset were smaller in older than younger adults, whereas theta power did not show age-related reductions. Resting alpha power and 1/f offset were associated with proactive control processes, whereas theta power was related to reactive control as measured by the cued flanker task. All associations were present over and above the effect of age, suggesting that these resting-state EEG correlates could be indicative of trait-like individual differences in cognitive control performance, which may be already evident in younger adults, and are still similarly present in healthy older adults.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


Author(s):  
Matias M Pulopulos ◽  
Jens Allaert ◽  
Marie-Anne Vanderhasselt ◽  
Alvaro Sanchez-Lopez ◽  
Sara De Witte ◽  
...  

Abstract Previous research supports the distinction between proactive and reactive control. Although the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been consistently related to these processes, lateralization of proactive and reactive control is still under debate. We manipulated brain activity to investigate the role of the left and right DLPFC in proactive and reactive cognitive control. Using a single-blind, sham-controlled crossover within-subjects design, 25 young healthy females performed the ‘AX’ Continuous Performance Task after receiving sham vs active high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (HF-rTMS) to increase left and right DLPFC activity. Reaction times (RTs) and pupillometry were used to assess patterns of proactive and reactive cognitive control and task-related resource allocation, respectively. We observed that, compared to sham, HF-rTMS over the left DLPFC increased proactive control. After right DLPFC HF-rTMS, participants showed slower RTs on AX trials, suggesting more reactive control. However, this latter result was not supported by RTs on BX trials (i.e. the trial that specifically assess reactive control). Pupil measures showed a sustained increase in resource allocation after both active left and right HF-rTMS. Our results with RT data provide evidence on the role of the left DLPFC in proactive control and suggest that the right DLPFC is implicated in reactive control.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonya V. Troller-Renfree ◽  
George Buzzell ◽  
Nathan A. Fox

Cognitive control develops rapidly over the first decade of life, with one of the dominant changes being a transition from reliance on “as-needed” control (reactive control) to a more planful, sustained form of control (proactive control). While the emergence of proactive control is important for adaptive, mature behavior, we know little about how this transition takes place, the neural correlates of this transition, and whether development of executive functions are a precondition for developing the ability to adopt a proactive control strategy. The present study addresses these questions, focusing on the transition from reactive to proactive control in a cross-sectional sample of 79 children – forty-one 5-year-olds and thirty-eight 9-year-olds. Children completed an adapted version of the AX-Continuous Performance Task while electroencephalography was recorded and a standardized executive function battery was administered. Results revealed 5-year-olds predominantly employed reactive strategies, while 9-year-olds used proactive strategies. Critically, use of proactive control was predicted by working memory ability, above and beyond other executive functions. Moreover, when enacting proactive control, greater increases in neural activity underlying working memory updating were observed; links between working memory ability and proactive control strategy use were mediated by such neural activity. Collectively, the results provide convergent evidence that the developmental transition from reactive to proactive control is dependent on neurocognitive development of specific executive functioning skills. Developments in working memory appear to be a precondition for adopting the more mature, and adaptive, proactive control strategy.


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