ZMANJŠEVANJE TVEGANJ ZA NASTANEK CIVILNO-VOJAŠKIH KONFLIKTOV

2018 ◽  
pp. 27-45
Author(s):  
BRANIMIR FURLAN
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Leadership ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Negative Effects ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Conflicts ◽  
Military Relations

Povzetek Za sodobne demokratične civilno-vojaške odnose je značilna vključenost vojaških voditeljev v procese kreiranja politik o vprašanjih nacionalne varnosti in uporabe oboroženih sil. Pri oblikovanju obrambnih ali varnostnih interesov, ciljev in strategij se prepletata civilna in vojaška domena. Zaradi različnih pogledov na nacionalno varnost in obrambo ter z njima povezano vlogo vojske prihaja v civilno-vojaških odnosih do trenj, ki večinoma pomagajo pri sprejemanju dobrih odločitev in oblikovanju kakovostnih varnostnih ali obrambnih strategij. Trenja lahko prerastejo v civilno-vojaški konflikt in vodijo v destabilizacijo civilno-vojaških odnosov. Avtor na podlagi teoretičnih spoznanj o civilno-vojaških odnosih ter študije primera prakse tujih civilno-vojaških odnosov opisuje okoliščine, ki vodijo v civilno-vojaški konflikt. Pri tem predstavi nekatere negativne učinke uveljavljanja mehanizmov civilnega nadzora in pozitivne ter negativne zglede odzivanja ob nesoglasju med udeležencema civilno-vojaškega dialoga. Za zmanjšanje tveganja za nastanek konfliktov ter s tem ohranjanje stabilnih civilno-vojaških odnosov izpostavlja med drugim potrebo po zavedanju vojaških voditeljev o prevladujoči vlogi civilnih voditeljev v razpravah, v katerih prihaja do nesoglasij, ter potrebo po preudarni uporabi mehanizmov civilnega nadzora izvajalcev nadzora. Ključne besede: civilni nadzor, civilno-vojaški konflikti, civilno-vojaška trenja Abstract Modern and democratic civil-military relations are characterized by equal involvement of senior military leadership into processes for the creation of politics associated with questions on national security and use of armed forces. Civilian and military domains overlap in the process of defining defence and security interests, goals and strategies. Due to different perspectives on national security and defence, and the related role of the armed forces, civil-military tensions are logical consequence of this process. In most cases, tensions support effective decision making and creation of good security or defence strategies. At certain point, tensions may lead to civil-military conflicts and lead to the destabilization of civil-military relations. Using different theories of civil-military relations and foreign case studies, the author describes circumstances that lead to civil-military conflicts. He describes certain negative effects of implementing civilian control mechanisms, as well as good and bad examples of how both actors in civil-military debate respond to tensions. In order to reduce risks for the development of conflicts and consequently assure the stabilization of civil-military relations, the author highlights, among others, a need for the military leadership to be aware of the supremacy of civilian authorities in debates where consent does not exist, and a need for prudent use of control mechanisms by the civilian authorities. Key words: civilian control, civil-military conflicts, civil-military tensions

Civilians and the Military in Latin America: The Absence of Incentives

2013 ◽  
Vol 55 (04) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas C. Bruneau
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
National Security ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
South American ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Abstract This article argues that civil-military relations should be conceptualized not only in terms of democratic civilian control but also for effectiveness in implementing a spectrum of roles and missions. It also argues that achieving effectiveness requires institutional development as a necessary but not sufficient condition. Currently in Latin America, the focus in civil-military relations remains exclusively on civilian control. While there is a growing awareness of the need for analysis beyond asserting control over the armed forces, so far nobody has proposed or adopted a broader analytical framework. This article proposes such a framework, and employs it to analyze differences among four major South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. The explanation for the differences identified by use of the framework is found in the incentives of civilian elites in Chile and Colombia, who have recognized serious threats to national security and defense.

scholarly journals The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

US Civil-Military Relations in the Gray Zone

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-282
Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The United States ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Leaders ◽  
The Face ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.

Controlling Blue Berets: The Consequences of Political Neglect in the Case of Uruguay’s Participation in Peacekeeping

2019 ◽  
pp. 0095327X1987721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julián González Guyer ◽  
Nicole Jenne
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Test ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Policy Management ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic State ◽  
Democratic Rule ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Peacekeeping has widely been seen as conducive to submit the military to democratic rule. We put the assumption to an empirical test based on the case of Uruguay, today a fully democratic state that has consistently ranked among the world’s top peacekeeping contributors per capita. Specifically, we ask whether participation in peacekeeping has increased civilian control over the military. To answer this question, we focus on three aspects of democratic civil–military relations: civilian oversight, civilian policy management, and armed forces–society relations. We conclude that peacekeeping has done little to trigger greater involvement of civilians in the area of military and defense policy but that it contributed to reduce the gap between the armed forces and society. Nevertheless, due to political neglect by civilian authorities, the state of civil–military relations is one of subordinate military autonomy short of ideal, even if it does not represent a threat to democratic rule.

Redefining Civil-Military Relations in Honduras

1996 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Institutional Autonomy ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Regimes ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Considerable Body

During the last two decades, military rulers have been replaced by democratically elected civilian governments throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, scholars (Mainwaring et al., 1992:3,8) contend that nearly all contemporary Latin American polities remain unconsolidated democratic regimes principally because civilian control over the armed forces has not yet been established. Although the armed forces have returned to their barracks, they have retained considerable political and institutional autonomy. A number of scholars (Loveman, 1994; Agüero, 1992; and others) emphasize that most Latin American constitutions still recognize the military's right to intervene when the constitutional order is threatened. The armed forces are also generally granted broad jurisdiction over internal security, as well as the freedom to organize their institution without civilian interference. There is a considerable body of opinion which maintains that fears of military intervention continue to constrain the behavior of civilian politicians and social groups (Valenzuela, 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Rouquié, 1986; and Rial, 1990).

Collective Democratic Control of the Armed Forces

2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ye Phone Kyaw
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Constitutional Government ◽  
Political Role ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
National League ◽  
The Right ◽  
Military Relations

Under its 2008 Constitution, Myanmar is undergoing a political transition from a military regime to a more liberalized democratic and constitutional government. The current National League for Democracy government’s reforms are in stagnation, while debates on the political role of the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar military) as guaranteed by the 2008 Constitution continue. A widespread perception persists that civil-military relations in Myanmar lack civilian control and are a barrier to the reform processes. Such assumptions, however, are made in the absence of theoretical analysis. This article will argue that Myanmar’s constitutional government has the right to establish “democratic control,” while the Tatmadaw’s national political role remains significant. Democratic control of Myanmar’s civil-military relations is based on a “collective” rather than a “confrontational” approach—one that is called “collective democratic control.” The current stagnation in reform and in the national reconciliation process are the result of a lack of understanding of the existing structure of civil-military relations, rather than a lack of democratic control of the armed forces.

On Resignation

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard H. Kohn
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Military Leaders ◽  
The Public ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Senior Officers ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
Civilian Authority ◽  
The Military

Arguments in favor of the topmost senior officers exercising “principled resignation” in opposition to policies, decisions, or orders that they find immoral, unethical, or disastrous for the country weaken the military profession and endanger American national security. A member of the Joint Chiefs, a combatant commander, or a topmost war commander who “resigns” would be injecting themselves improperly into a policy role, opposing civilian authority, and undermining civilian control of the military. The act would be politicizing for the military and likely fail to change what the officer opposes. Most importantly, their act of personal conscience would poison civil–military relations long into the future; civilian trust in military subordinates not to undermine support for policies and decisions with the public and other political leaders would decline. Even more than today, they would choose their senior military leaders for compatibility and agreement above other traits.

Slovakia: Creating and Transforming Civil-Military Relations

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matej Navrátil ◽  
Michal Onderco
Keyword(s):  
Armed Forces ◽  
Positive Development ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Military Intelligence ◽  
Great Loss ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
Elected Representatives

The civil-military relations in Slovakia have been marked by rapid transformation after the collapse of communism, including the expansion of the civilian power over armed forces, a gradual shift that has meant a great loss of autonomy for the armed forces. The dominance of civilians over the military happened through various means. First and foremost, there was a massive legal and legislative shift in the institutional distribution of power. However, the power of civilians over the military has been cemented through the adoption of a business-like structure, a change in military education, as well as “the power of the purse.” Overall, Slovakia’s case is not unique among the countries of the former communist bloc, where the desire to integrate into NATO and the EU has led to significant changes in the way the domestic societies are organized. However, Slovakia’s case is interesting because it demonstrates that the establishment of civilian dominance over the military can potentially lead to absurd consequences such as the inability to pay petty expenses. Notably, the desire to integrate in NATO led Slovakia to adopt numerous external recommendations with far-reaching consequences for domestic legislation. In a process that is not unlike what the scholars of European integration call “Europeanization,” Slovakia’s case shows that the goal to demonstrate one’s readiness to join international organizations can lead to a complete transformation in the nation’s defense policy. Conversely, and perhaps more speculatively, if one were to perceive civilian control over the military as the total subordination of all its components to the elected representatives, the situation is much less straightforward in the case of military intelligence. Under Vladimír Mečiar (in 1994–1998), the state secret (civilian) and security apparatus served not the public interest, but the interest of the ruling coalition. Military intelligence, however, remained autonomous and was not exploited to serve to Mečiar. Although from the normative standpoint, this might be perceived as a positive development, it demonstrates that this component of the military was at that time out of the government’s reach, even the reach of an authoritative ruler such as Mečiar.

Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers By Wendy Hunter. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 243p. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-243
Author(s):  
Craig Arceneaux
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Theoretical Orientation ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Latin American Politics ◽  
Democratic Transitions ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Chapel Hill ◽  
Transitions To Democracy ◽  
Military Relations

Writing at a time when the literature on transitions to democracy was fixated on the mode of transition, and when concepts such as authoritarian legacy, authoritarian enclave, or the shadow of the past dominated, Wendy Hunter's 1997 book, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, went against the grain. In a direct attack on institutionalist approaches that emphasized the resiliency of military prerogatives in transitions from military regimes, Hunter argues that democracy itself would, over time, reduce the influence exerted by the armed forces. A solid theoretical orientation, rich casework, and insightful commentary on the dynamics behind the creation of civilian control all mark the book as a noteworthy contribution to the literature on democratic transitions, civil–military relations, and Latin American politics.

scholarly journals NEUČINKOVITOST VOJSKE KOT POKAZATELJ NEUSTREZNOSTI CIVILNEGA NADZORA (2)

2015 ◽  
pp. 11-23
Author(s):  
BRANIMIR FURLAN
Keyword(s):  
First Generation ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Methodological Framework ◽  
Military Effectiveness ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military ◽  
The Impact

Prispevek je nadaljevanje analize o vzročno-posledični povezavi med civilnim nadzorom in učinkovitostjo vojske. V prvem delu je bil predstavljen teoretično- metodološki okvir analize, v tem delu pa avtor predstavlja rezultate raziskave o stanju civilno-vojaških odnosov v Republiki Sloveniji ter vplivih civilnega nadzora na učinkovitost Slovenske vojske. Raziskava je pokazala, da se v Sloveniji uveljavlja praksa civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami po vzoru drugih demokratičnih držav, vendar problematika prve generacije civilno-vojaških odnosov še ni končana. Uveljavljanje nadzora v praksi zagotavlja podrejenost vojske civilnim oblastem, pri čemer mehanizmi nadzora ne krepijo sposobnosti Slovenske vojske, da učinkovito izpolni svoje poslanstvo. Posledično lahko povzročijo nezadovoljstvo vojske ali izgubo kredibilnosti v javnosti. This article is a continuation of the analysis of cause-effect relations between civilian control and military effectiveness. The first part presented the theoretical and methodological framework, while in the second part, the author presents the results of the study of civil-military relations in the Republic of Slovenia, focusing on the impact of civilian control on the effectiveness of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The study showed that the practice of civilian control over the armed forces in Slovenia follows the example of those in other democratic states. However, the issue of the first-generation civil-military relations has not yet been completed. The enforcement of civilian control in practice provides for a complete subordination of the military to civilian authorities; however, it does not contribute to the ability of the military to effectively execute its missions. Rather, civilian control can cause military dissatisfaction and reluctance, as well as loss of credibility with the society.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document