scholarly journals Agency: What Does It Mean to Be a Human Being?

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard N. Williams ◽  
Edwin E. Gantt ◽  
Lane Fischer

This paper will look at the results of what has been termed “the crisis of modernism” and the related rise of postmodern perspectives in the 19th and 20th centuries. It concentrates on what is arguably the chief casualty of this crisis – human agency – and the social science that has developed out of the crisis. We argue that modern and postmodern social science ultimately obviate human agency in the understanding of what it means to be a human being. Attention is given to the contemporary intellectual world and the way in which it has been deeply informed by neo-Hegelian and other postmodern scholarly trends, particularly in accounting for how agency has come to play little role in social science understanding of human action. The paper also offers an alternative conception of human agency to the commonly endorsed libertarian model of free choice. Finally, the paper argues that this view of agency preserves meaning and purpose in human action and counters the pervasive social science worldview that sacrifices agency and meaning to powerful invisible abstractions.

Author(s):  
Maarten Franssen

I defend the truth of the principle of methodological individualism in the social sciences. I do so by criticizing mistaken ideas about the relation between individual people and social entities held by earlier defenders of the principle. I argue, first, that social science is committed to the intentional stance; the domain of social science, therefore, coincides with the domain of intentionally described human action. Second, I argue that social entitites are theoretical terms, but quite different from the entities used in the natural sciences to explain our empirical evidence. Social entities (such as institutions) are conventional and open-ended constructions, the applications of which is a matter of judgment, not of discovery. The terms in which these social entities are constructed are the beliefs, expectations and desires, and the corresponding actions of individual people. The relation between the social and the individual 'levels' differs fundamentally from that between, say, the cellular and the molecular in biology. Third, I claim that methodological individualism does not amount to a reduction of social science to psychology; rather, the science of psychology should be divided. Intentional psychology forms in tandom with the analysis of social institutions, unitary psycho-social science; cognitive psychology tries to explain how the brain works and especially how the intentional stance is applicable to human behavior.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Nowlin

Monahan and Walker have proposed that American judges should fundamentally alter the way they receive and assess social science evidence in court, by treating social science research as “law-like” or authoritative when certain professional research criteria are met. Strict application of the stipulated criteria to various kinds of social science research introduced into American and Canadian courts reveals, however, that such research can seldom be considered authoritative in the way Monahan and Walker imagine. Accordingly, as a general rule judges should be reluctant to apply Monahan and Walker’s “social authority” model to the courtroom resolution of difficult questions of social, economic, and cultural or historical facts.


1986 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-107
Author(s):  
A. Muhammad Ma’ruf

I. THE BIOLOGY-CULTURE CONNECTION IN THE HISTORYOF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THOUGHTThe story of modem anthropology is a story of the Euro-American attemptto discover the other than Euro-American human being. Within thatstory is the story of the intellectual self-discovery of the Euro-American;within that is the story of the discovery of racism; within that is the storyof political and ideological pressures on the processes of such discoveries;within that the amazing and wonderful story of the scientific discovery ofthe worldly nature of the human being - conceptualized generally: acrossall space and time, all colors and languages; and within that story is a storyof the social and natural sciences: of their methods, results, potentialities,and pitfalls.If there is a central theme that runs through all these stories within thestory, it is the story of the impact of Darwinian and post-Darwinian biologyon the social and human sciences. Modem anthropology is not much morethan an evolutionist form of humanism. Evolutionism is to be found in mosttypes of contemporary anthropological studies, as a central position or animplicit assumption. It is clearly axiomatic to thought, analysis, and interpretationin the discipline. As such it is a fundamental issue in the considerationof modem anthropology for inclusion in, and recasting for, Islamic educationalpurposes. The aim of this presentation is to consider briefly how theimpact of Darwin, and of biology after Darwin, on recent anthropologicalthought may be measured as a step toward developing an Islamic methodologyfor anthropological research and teaching.Since its publication in 1859 by Charles Darwin (and Alfred Russell),evolutionary theory has been refined and developed by virturally all life sciencedisciplines and a few other disciplines such as anthropology. Anthropdogyis rooted partly in the life sciences and partly in the social sciences. Humanevolutionary theory developed by anthropologists has gained wide acceptancein all sectors of the Western scientific establishment. Adherence to, and propagationof, an evolutionist world-view has become a symbol of the liberalistmission of Western science in the face of periodic opposition to it comingfrom conservative, evangelist, Christian fundamentalists, and politicians whorepresent them. A few of the anti-evolutionists are also scientists (Williams,1983). They have given leadership to the most recent form of antievolutionism,called scientific creationism. Within the scientific and educationalcommunity their view is at present a minority view; the dominant viewbeing the pro-evolutionary one. Among the Judeo-Christian population atlarge, in the United States, surveys indicate that about half of the people givecredence to the evolutionary view. The others either do not or do not care.An effect of post-Darwinian natural science on social science was to bringhuman evolution into focus as incorporating psychological, social, and culturalaspects in addition to the biological (see e.g. in Eiseley, 1958; Freeman, 1974;Harris, 1968; Opler, 1964; Reed, 1961; Stocking, 1968). The historical relationshipof bio-evolutionary theory to the social sciences in general andspecifically to anthropology, is complex. Nowadays it is one of the dependenceof the latter on the former. It has been argued, however, that in its formativeyears, Darwinian evolutionary theory was in fact an application of socialscience concepts to biology. Darwin himself acknowledged that the Malthusianstatement of the principle that human population, when unchecked, increasesin geometrical ratio while subsistence increases only in arithmeticalratio, influenced his idea of natural selection. The subsequent acceptance ofMendelian genetics, on which the modem form of evolutionism rests, quicklytransformed even the fundamental social science principles of the study ofhuman races and variation. The continuing success of the biological sciences ...


Author(s):  
Henry Louis Gates, Jr

Race is one of the most elusive phenomena of social life. While we generally know it when we see it, it's not an easy concept to define. Social science literature has argued that race is a Western, sociopolitical concept that emerged with the birth of modern imperialism, whether in the sixteenth century (the Age of Discovery) or the eighteenth century (the Age of Enlightenment). This book points out that there is a disjuncture between the way race is conceptualized in the social science and medical literature: some of the modern sciences employ racial and ethnic categories. As such, race has a physical, as opposed to a purely social, dimension. The book argues that in order to more fully understand what we mean by race, social scientists need to engage genetics, medicine, and health. To be sure, the long shadow of eugenics and the Nazi use of scientific racism have cast a pall over the effort to understand this complicated relationship between social science and race. But while the text rejects pseudoscience and hierarchical ways of looking at race, it makes the claim that it is time to reassess the Western-based, social construction paradigm. The chapters in this book consider three fundamental tensions in thinking about race: one between theories that see race as fixed or malleable; a second between the idea that race is a universal but modern Western concept and the idea that it has a deeper and more complicated cultural history; and a third between sociopolitical and biological/biomedical concepts of race. Arguing that race is not merely socially constructed, the chapters offer a collection of views on the way that social scientists must reconsider the idea of race in the age of genomics.


2020 ◽  
pp. 266-291
Author(s):  
Ben Bradley

The concepts of civilization and culture play a structuring role in Descent’s discussion of human agency. The evolutionary history Darwin described found continuity between animals and proto-humans. Thereafter, human history took on the idealized form of a single stairway rising in stages. Despite his enlightened opposition to slavery, Darwin placed on the stairs’ bottom step ‘the lowest savage,’ pictured in a disturbingly derogatory way. On the top step were certain nineteenth-century Europeans. Descent does not hold the progress of civilization to be inevitable, however. Indeed, Darwin holds natural selection to play a subordinate role in shaping contemporary human agency. While the foundations of human action are laid by our descent from animals, agency is specified—for good or ill—by the social customs and institutions which structure the development and group-life of a given individual: evolution proposes, culture disposes. This formula is fleshed out through Descent’s discussions of language use, moral agency, religious belief, virtue, and aesthetics. Resonances are explored with perspectives on social organization in Social Darwinism, Evolutionary Psychology, and theories of cultural evolution.


Paragrana ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 28-39
Author(s):  
Jacques Poulain

AbstractAccording to Rorty, pragmatic philosophy asserts that it must play a role in determining the cultural politics, i. e. “which hopes and which programs for actions it must offer for a better future”. Based on Apel’s ethics of consensus and on the power of the best argument presented by Habermas, the social consensus appears to be able to regulate the total experiment of the human being with itself, and to identify the common needs and standards for a social reason of fairness. This pragmatic consensus to establish the rule of reason over desire, however, is based on a false image of the human being. In contrast, the experiment of the human being with itself can only be regulated by a judgment of truth on the human action and the human desire. The logic of truth only regulates this social experiment if the judgment of truth is actually shared between objectives and results.


2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-574
Author(s):  
Peter C. Perdue

During the 40 years since its founding, the Social Science History Association (SSHA) and its journal have attracted many scholars to the field of social science history, stimulating many new lines of research, but it has only had limited success in developing some of the more prominent new trends in the history field. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's early presence in the journalSocial Science Historydid not stimulate much further work on thelongue durée. In environmental history, transnational history, and studies of the non-Western world, the SSHA has not led the way. The article calls on members of the SSHA to think about creative responses to these new directions of inquiry.


1984 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 745-757 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhao Baoxu ◽  
David Chu

As an independent basic social science, the study of politics occupies an important position among all the social sciences. In 1952, however, China abolished political science teaching and research. This was a mistake which is now being corrected. China has reestablished the field of political science in recent years.When a historical event is shown to be mistaken, people often like to describe the reasons for its having taken place as very absurd and unimaginable, as though to demonstrate how confused people were at that time compared with how smart we are now. Such a simple attitude, however, will not help us in understanding the realities scientifically nor will it help us in learning from the lessons of history, and is therefore to be avoided.This essay describes both objective conditions and the way people thought, both in the early 1950s and after 1976. It deals with two opposite events: first, the abolition of political science in China three decades ago, and second, its current revival.


2021 ◽  
pp. 139-163
Author(s):  
Roger M. Keesing

The kula partners of the Melanesian Massim have been one of anthropology's most compelling and influential and enduring images of Otherness, created both by Malinowski's rhetorical power and the sheer fascination they themselves engender. Malinowski saw in the kula lessons for the social science of his time, as well as popular stereotypes, for example the critique of the ostensibly universal figure of the Homo economicus. While anthropology's fashions have changed, and what there ever was of a "primitive" world has been overturned, engulfed, and obliterated, the fascination of the kula has endured. Indeed, this fascination has been a lure helping to attract further generations of fieldworkers to Malinowski's Trobriands and other islands of the kula "ring." Assessing the new evidence, I will suggest that the emerging picture has important implications not only for our understanding of the region and the phenomenon, but for the way we think about Alterity, about "primitive society", a world that never existed, and about anthropology's Orientalist project of representing radical cultural difference to the West. The new perspectives on Massim exchange exemplify directions in which contemporary anthropology has been moving, and provide some useful insights about where and how it needs now to move.


Author(s):  
Charalambos Tsekeris

Sociology and society are undoubtedly on the move. The present concise reflection seeks to comprehensively elaborate on both the social science and the social life within the contemporary dynamical world environment. In this context, brief elaborations are formulated on the complicated issue of technoscientific knowledge and its implications, as well as on a sustainable analytic framework for generating and developing further critical sociological and epistemological considerations about human agency and reflexivity.


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