scholarly journals Protecting Sentient Artificial Intelligence: A Survey of Lay Intuitions on Standing, Personhood, and General Legal Protection

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Martínez ◽  
Christoph Winter

To what extent, if any, should the law protect sentient artificial intelligence (that is, AI that can feel pleasure or pain)? Here we surveyed United States adults (n = 1,061) on their views regarding granting 1) general legal protection, 2) legal personhood, and 3) standing to bring forth a lawsuit, with respect to sentient AI and eight other groups: humans in the jurisdiction, humans outside the jurisdiction, corporations, unions, non-human animals, the environment, humans living in the near future, and humans living in the far future. Roughly one-third of participants endorsed granting personhood and standing to sentient AI (assuming its existence) in at least some cases, the lowest of any group surveyed on, and rated the desired level of protection for sentient AI as lower than all groups other than corporations. We further investigated and observed political differences in responses; liberals were more likely to endorse legal protection and personhood for sentient AI than conservatives. Taken together, these results suggest that laypeople are not by-and-large in favor of granting legal protection to AI, and that the ordinary conception of legal status, similar to codified legal doctrine, is not based on a mere capacity to feel pleasure and pain. At the same time, the observed political differences suggest that previous literature regarding political differences in empathy and moral circle expansion apply to artificially intelligent systems and extend partially, though not entirely, to legal consideration, as well.

Pravovedenie ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-540
Author(s):  
Viktor B. Naumov ◽  
◽  
Ekaterina V. Tytjuk ◽  

The article is dedicated to the issues of protection of artworks, created by the artificial intelligence or with the help of artificial intelligence. The authors of the article analyze the term “artificial intelligence” from the perspective of technologies, legal doctrine and legislation and provide critical comparison of these definitions, basing on which stipulate several key criteria of the definition of artificial intelligence. The article also describe basic principles of the working process of the artificial intelligence systems. Basing on the key criteria, provided as a result of the analysis of the existing definitions of the “artificial intelligence”, the authors generate their own definition of this term. The article also provides detailed analysis of the term “creativity” from the perspective of the objective and subjective approaches. The analysis includes comparison of the process of the creation of the work of art by the human and by the artificial intelligence. The authors question whether it is possible in principle to apply the term “work of art” to the objects created by the artificial intelligence. According to the authors’ point of view, current level of the artificial intelligence technologies does not provide any possibility to apply the term “creativity” to artificial intelligence as the model of the working process of the artificial intelligence is based ultimately on the mathematical algorithms. According to the article, this mean that the objects created by the artificial intelligence or with the help of it do not meet traditional requirements of creativity. The article provide several potential regulation models for the objects created by the artificial intelligence or with the help of it. These models can be broken down as follows: no legal protection is required, public domain model, protection under information law, protection as know-how objects, protection as intellectual property objects. The authors of the article provide comparative analysis of the above-mentioned models of protection, the advantages and disadvantages of each model, give their opinion on the existing and potential legislative initiatives in the sphere of artificial intelligence regulation.


Author(s):  
Christian List

AbstractThe aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and a moral status? I will tentatively defend the (increasingly widely held) view that, under certain conditions, artificial intelligent systems, like corporate entities, might qualify as responsible moral agents and as holders of limited rights and legal personhood. I will further suggest that regulators should permit the use of autonomous artificial systems in high-stakes settings only if they are engineered to function as moral (not just intentional) agents and/or there is some liability-transfer arrangement in place. I will finally raise the possibility that if artificial systems ever became phenomenally conscious, there might be a case for extending a stronger moral status to them, but argue that, as of now, this remains very hypothetical.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-36
Author(s):  
Igor Milinkovic

Abstract The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems raises dilemmas regarding their moral and legal status. Can artificial intelligence possess moral status (significance)? And under what conditions? Can one speak of the dignity of artificial intelligence as the basis of its moral status? According to some authors, if there are entities who have the capacities on which the dignity of human beings is based, they would also possess intrinsic dignity. If dignity is not an exclusive feature of human beings, such status also could be recognised by artificial intelligence entities. The first part of the paper deals with the problem of moral status of artificial intelligence and the conditions that must be fulfilled for such a status to be recognised. A precondition for the existence of moral status of artificial intelligence is its ability to make autonomous decisions. This part of the paper considers whether developing autonomous AI is justified, or, as some authors suggest, the creation of AI agents capable of autonomous action should be avoided. The recognition of the moral status of artificial intelligence would reflect on its legal status. The second part of the paper deals with the question of justifiability of ascribing legal personhood to the AI agents. Under what conditions would recognition of legal personhood by the artificial intelligence be justified and should its legal subjectivity be recognised in full scope or only partially (by ascribing to the AI agents a “halfway-status,” as some authors suggest)? The current state of the legal regulation of artificial intelligence will be observed as well.


Author(s):  
Ugo Pagallo

Scholars have increasingly discussed the legal status(es) of robots and artificial intelligence (AI) systems over the past three decades; however, the 2017 resolution of the EU parliament on the ‘electronic personhood’ of AI robots has reignited and even made current debate ideological. Against this background, the aim of the paper is twofold. First, the intent is to show how often today's discussion on the legal status(es) of AI systems leads to different kinds of misunderstanding that regard both the legal personhood of AI robots and their status as accountable agents establishing rights and obligations in contracts and business law. Second, the paper claims that whether or not the legal status of AI systems as accountable agents in civil––as opposed to criminal––law may make sense is an empirical issue, which should not be ‘politicized’. Rather, a pragmatic approach seems preferable, as shown by methods of competitive federalism and legal experimentation. In the light of the classical distinction between primary rules and secondary rules of the law, examples of competitive federalism and legal experimentation aim to show how the secondary rules of the law can help us understanding what kind of primary rules we may wish for our AI robots. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Governing artificial intelligence: ethical, legal, and technical opportunities and challenges’.


Author(s):  
Kostiantyn Zerov

Keywords: artificial intelligence, copyright, related rights, sui generis The publication provides a descriptive review of existingtheoretical approaches regarding the legal protection of objects generated byartificial intelligence systems in the field of copyright and related rights, namely.1) The inexpediency of legal protection of computer-generated objects. It is concludedthat the absence of legal regulation and free circulation of generated objects isconsidered the easiest option. Still, hardly fair and justified, as the creation of artificialintelligence systems requires large and significant investments in their development.2) The possibility of protecting computer-generated objects by copyright as originalworks. It has been established that extending the concept of «originality» to computergeneratedobjects seems unjustifiable.3) The introduction of the latest iteration of the fiction theory and establishing aspecial legal status for artificial intelligence systems. It is noted that such an approachseems premature because the existing artificial intelligence systems are amanifestation of «narrow» or «weak» artificial intelligence and not artificial generalintelligence.4) Protection of specific generated objects through related rights. It is concludedthat the objects generated by AI systems may be protected in Ukraine through theprism of related rights, under the condition that the relevant object can be attributedto a phonogram, videogram, or broadcast (program) of broadcasters respectively.5) Protection of generated objects through a special legal regime under copyrightlaw. It is described that this approach cannot be considered a universal example forimitating the legal protection of objects generated by computer programs because itsapplication leaves more questions and inconsistencies than solving the problem onthe merits.6) Protection of generated objects through sui generis law. It is assumed that applyingsuch an approach to the protection of objects generated by computer programswill not lead to significant changes in copyright and will protect the interests and investmentsof developers of artificial intelligence systems.


2020 ◽  
pp. jech-2020-214245
Author(s):  
Adrian Bacong ◽  
Heeju Sohn

BackgroundIn the United States, immigration policy is entwined with health policy, and immigrants’ legal statuses determine their access to care. Yet, policy debates rarely take into account the health needs of immigrants and potential health consequences of linking legal status to healthcare. Confounding from social and demographic differences and lack of individual-level data with sensitive immigration variables present challenges in this area of research.MethodsThis article used the restricted California Health Interview Survey (CHIS) to assess differences in self-rated health, obesity, and severe psychological distress. Between US-born citizens, naturalised citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPR), undocumented immigrants, and temporary visa holders living in California.ResultsResults show that while immigrant groups appear to have poorer health on the surface, these differences were explained predominantly by older age among naturalised citizens and by lower-income and education among LPRs and undocumented immigrants. Favourable family characteristics acted as protective factors for immigrants’ health, especially among disadvantaged immigrants.ConclusionImmigration policy that limits access to healthcare and family support may further widen the health disadvantage among immigrants with less legal protection.


Lentera Hukum ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 301
Author(s):  
Denindah Olivia

This paper analyzes the importance of Indonesia's comprehensive legal framework on automated decision-making empowered by Artificial Intelligence, comparing it to the European Union, the United States, and China. Specifically, this paper inquires about the status quo of the legal protection of automated decision-making In Indonesia. The analysis highlights profiling in an automated decision-making system with the following discussion about personal data protection. In this context, the European Union's member states set out the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) that prohibits automated decision-making to a certain extent. In the United States, the practice of automated decision-making is rather usual. Simultaneously, China takes an exceptional measure instead and develops this automation through a social credit system. The analysis concludes that Indonesia has weak legal protection towards personal data and profiling, which later becomes the basis in facilitating automated decision-making. The provision of automated decision-making and profiling is the absolute bare minimum to Indonesia's Personal Data Protection Bill due to insufficient legal certainty. In the end, it is paramount for lawmakers to consider a comprehensive regulation on automated decision-making by adopting the European Union's GDPR framework. KEYWORDS: Artificial Intelligence, Automated Decision-Making, Personal Data Protection.


2019 ◽  
pp. 45-57
Author(s):  
O. Plakhotnik

Artificial intelligence a set of scientific methods, theories and techniques whose aim is to reproduce, by a machine, the cognitive abilities of human beings. The artificial intelligence system is capable of using big data, calculating, evaluating, studying, deductive reasoning, abstract analysis and forecasting. The speed of information processing by artificial intelligence and its efficiency in making procedural decisions creates a model for digital automation of procedural decisions. The purpose of the article is to investigate the use of artificial intelligence in the judicial systems of developed countries and to analyze the prospects for its use in criminal proceedings in Ukraine. Such automation simplifies the process of making similar decisions in similar proceedings, which, of course, increases efficiency and simplifies procedural decision-making process in terms of procedural cost savings. Modern developments seek to ensure that machines perform complex tasks that were previously performed by humans. In the near future, accompanying organizational measures for the implementation of artificial intelligence and its regulatory support in public authorities associated with the storage of big data, processing information based on mathematical algorithms and making decisions based on artificial intelligence will be an integral part of our society. Artificial intelligence technologies are already being implemented in the judicial systems of China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and Argentina. In the near future, the chances of using such technologies in the courts of general jurisdiction of Ukraine and in the criminal proceedings of Ukraine can be assessed as extremely high, and its scope is not limited to the work of artificial intelligence in court. You can also talk about the work of artificial intelligence in the activities of the prosecutor and the police. The paper deals with the use of artificial intelligence in the judicial systems of developed countries and analyzes the prospects of its use in criminal proceedings in Ukraine. These systems are reviewed, as: COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) - United States of America, HART (Harm Assessment Risk Tool) - United Kingdom, Prometea - Argentina, Compulsory Similar Cases Search and Reporting Mechanism - China. The advantages of artificial intelligence systems are analyzed and a critique of their use is noted.


2021 ◽  
pp. 35-51
Author(s):  
O. RADUTNIY

The article outlines the path that humanity is developing from Homo sapiens to digital human being in three main vectors. The latest high-tech devices have been proven to provide a tight interactive connection with the user, thus gradually becoming an integral part of the biological body and human consciousness, a kind of organs or chains for transmitting nerve signals. The possibility of combining carbon technology (human) with silicon technology (artificial intelligence, implants, robotics) creates a powerful new challenge for legal doctrine, one of the main tasks of which is to describe the legal characteristics of digital human being, determine his or her legal status in the law system. To generalize the concepts of transhuman and posthuman, which operates on transhumanism, the author proposes to use the common term of digital human being. The necessity of directing state regulation to limit or prevent the antisocial use of improved physical and cognitive properties by digital human being is argued. The possibility of quantum immortality is considered. It has been suggested that new rights, responsibilities, and freedoms may emerge that now exist only in theory or even beyond imagination and discussion. They can become the subject of supernatural law as the successor of natural law. The possibility of the transition of the decision-making process from a digital human being to artificial intelligence in its implant, when the brain will continue to receive signals that will form the illusion of free will, is analysed. It is proved that a digital human being must be recognized as a special persona of legal relations.


Author(s):  
Klara Walkowicz

Currently almost all democratic countries grant legal protection to animals, guaranteeing them the right to life and freedom from suffering as a basis. Nevertheless, in certain countries, such as the United States and India, attempts are made to grant select species a package of rights which predisposes them to be called subjects instead of objects of law, and distinguishes them from other animals. Such activities are most commonly explained by the development of biological sciences, allowing for a better understanding of the abilities of animals in the intellectual and social spheres. Such demands, due to the still unclear legal status of animals in certain countries, are perceived as equating the position of humans and animals.


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