scholarly journals What Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy and Cooperation Contract

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (20) ◽  
pp. 5584 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weimin Ma ◽  
Ranran Zhang ◽  
Shiwei Chai
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Green innovation, implemented by enterprises, contributes to sustainable development and environmental protection. However, because of the high cost and high risk of green innovation, enterprises are reluctant to step into green innovation activities in practice. Government subsidies are conducive to promoting green innovation in enterprises. To investigate firms’ preferences for green innovation, we consider a three-player game in a supply chain where a government offers subsidies (price, innovation, or both subsidies) to a manufacturer and a retailer, while the latter two players cooperate with each other through contracts (revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts). By exploring the impacts of government subsidies and cooperative contracts on the optimal level of green innovation efforts and profits of participants, we find that: (1) for green innovation that leads to increased production costs, the government should subsidize both the retailer and the manufacturer to improve the level of green innovation; (2) the revenue-sharing contract is more effective than the cost-sharing contract under the premise of government subsidies; and (3) the revenue-sharing ratio decreases in production and innovation costs, while the cost-sharing ratio increases in these two costs.

Impact of carbon permit allocation rules on incentive contracts for carbon emission reduction

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1143-1167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinqin Li ◽  
Yujie Xiao ◽  
Yuzhuo Qiu ◽  
Xiaoling Xu ◽  
Caichun Chai
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Allocation Rules ◽  
Permit Allocation ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions. Design/methodology/approach The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared. Findings The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare. Practical implications These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

scholarly journals Technology Sharing and Competitiveness in a Stackelberg Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Junlong Chen ◽  
Zihan Wei ◽  
Jiali Liu ◽  
Xiaosong Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Competition And Cooperation ◽  
Product Heterogeneity ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
Leaders And Followers ◽  
The Government ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Cost

The existing literature has made great achievements in technology sharing (licensing patents) contracts, which has defects in the selection of oligopoly models, the setting of innovation subjects, the consideration of product heterogeneity, and production costs. This paper aims to reveal the competitiveness strategies of leaders and followers for innovation, technology sharing, and sharing fees in a Stackelberg market. The three-stage sequential game method is used to achieve the objective. The results are as follows. First, whether an enterprise uses innovation or shares technology is related to the fixed cost of innovation, the return on innovation, and product differentiation. It will hinder innovation activities if the fixed cost of innovation is too high, the return on innovation is too low, or the products are too homogeneous. A relatively low return on innovation makes it possible for the two enterprises to engage in sharing. However, with a relatively high return on innovation, only a high level of product differentiation can ensure technology sharing. Second, the optimal sharing fee is dynamic, showing an upward and then downward trend as the return on innovation grows. Product differentiation has an uncertain impact on the cost. Third, either the leader or the follower is likely to be the optimal bearer of social responsibility depending on the returns on innovation and product differentiation. This study has theoretical significance for optimizing technology-sharing decisions, improving competitiveness for enterprises, and formulating effective industrial policy for the government. And it provides some practical guidance for competition and cooperation between enterprises with technological innovation behavior.

scholarly journals The Impact of Green Credit on the Green Innovation Level of Heavy-Polluting Enterprises—Evidence from China

2022 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 650
Author(s):  
Zhifeng Zhang ◽  
Hongyan Duan ◽  
Shuangshuang Shan ◽  
Qingzhi Liu ◽  
Wenhui Geng
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Double Difference ◽  
Credit Policy ◽  
Green Innovation ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
Corporate Credit ◽  
Credit Financing ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

This article uses the “Green Credit Guidelines” promulgated in 2012 as an example to construct a quasi-natural experiment and uses the double difference method to test the impact of the implementation of the “Green Credit Guidelines” on the green innovation activities of heavy-polluting enterprises. The study found that, in comparison to non-heavy polluting enterprises, the implementation of green credit policies inhibited the green innovation of all heavy-polluting enterprises. In the analysis of heterogeneity, this restraint effect did not differ significantly due to the nature of property rights and the company’s size. The mechanism test showed that green credit policy limits the efficiency of business investment and increases the cost of financing business debt. Eliminating corporate credit financing, particularly long-term borrowing, negatively impacts the green innovation behavior of listed companies.

scholarly journals The Impact of Government Subsidies on Private R&D Investment in Different Markets

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Jinglve Wang ◽  
Guohua Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Private Investment ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
End Products ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
D Investment ◽  
Governmental Subsidy

In contrast to the econometric models that have been commonly used throughout a large portion of the literature, we develop six game-theoretic models to analyze governmental subsidy strategies in different market environments and to investigate the question of whether government subsidies crowd in or crowd out private investment in R&D activities. Based on realistic situations, we classify governmental subsidy strategies into three types, namely, no subsidy provided, subsidies provided based on the price of the end products, and subsidies provided based on the cost of R&D. In addition, according to whether competition exists in the market, we classify markets into monopoly markets and duopoly markets. Our research shows (a) that the relationship between government subsidies and private R&D investment is deeply impacted by the form of the subsidies used; (b) that the characteristic value of the R&D project and the competitive environment of the market are the two key factors that should be considered when governments decide which form of subsidy to employ; and (c) the optimal amount for each type of subsidy.

Research on the Cost Sharing of Customer Collaborative Product Innovation

2013 ◽  
Vol 711 ◽  
pp. 677-682
Author(s):  
Xue Zhang ◽  
Guang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Product Innovation ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Innovation System ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
Software Environment ◽  
Application Study ◽  
Innovation Activities ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Stable Development

Customer collaborative product innovation is the major style of the innovation activities of enterprises, which not only needs supporting by the hardware and software environment, but the participations of both customers and staffs of enterprises. This paper analyzes the participators in customer collaborative product innovation system form the viewpoints of customers and enterprises respectively. Based on Cooperative game theory, the cost sharing model for customer collaborative product innovation is established. Practical application study is provided for the model use, which analyzes the costs sharing of each participator quantitatively so as to guarantee a long-lasting and stable development for customer collaborative product innovation system.

scholarly journals A Two-Echelon Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Freshness and Greenness Concerns: A Cost-Sharing Contract Perspective

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Manyi Tan ◽  
Manli Tu ◽  
Bin Wang ◽  
Tianyue Zou ◽  
Hong Cheng
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

Agricultural products are basic needs of human beings, and whether they are cultivated in a green (or organic) manner has direct impact on environment and public health. This research incorporates product freshness and greenness into a two-echelon agricultural product supply chain (APSC). Game theoretic analyses are carried out to examine pricing, freshness, and greenness decisions of the supply chain members with and without cost-sharing for greenness investment. Subsequently, we conduct comparative and sensitivity analyses for these optimal decisions and profits of the APSC members under different cases. Numerical experiment is employed to investigate the impact of key parameters on equilibrium decisions and profitability. Analytical and experimental results show that the cost-sharing contract of greenness investment for agricultural products helps to strengthen the supply chain members’ effort in improving the greenness and freshness levels of the agricultural product, thereby enhancing both individual and channel profitability of the APSC under certain conditions. This research also reveals a widened profit gap between the producer and the retailer under the cost-sharing contract.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals KERAGAAN AGROINDUSTRI DAN POSISI PRODUK BERDASARKAN SIKLUS HIDUP PRODUK PADA SOSIS GULUNG VARIAN NOODLE DI CV CUCURUTUKU CERIA

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 561
Author(s):  
Meliani Indah Sari ◽  
Dyah Aring Hepiana Lestari ◽  
Wuryaningsih Dwi Sayekti
Keyword(s):  
Life Cycle ◽  
Product Life Cycle ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

This study aims to analyze the process production of sausage noodle roll, the income and production costs, the marketing action and determine the position based on the life cycle of sausage noodle roll as well learn the role of supporting service for sausage noodle roll in CV Cucurutuku Ceria. This research method is a case study. The determination of consumer samples is taken by Convenience Sampling. Analysis of the data used in this research is descriptive qualitative and quantitative analysis. The data of this study was collected in May 2019 until June 2019. The results showed that the value R/C>1, that means sausage noodle roll business was profitable. Calculation of the cost of production on sausage rolls noodles amounted to Rp1,046.53. The BEP unit calculation has been achieved for a long time, in the amount of 42,791 units from the BEP calculation of 604 units. The noodle rolls sausage has also obtained a profit from the selling price of Rp ,000.00 per pcs from the calculation of the BEP price of Rp1,238.58 per pcs. The marketing mix that has been utilized by CV Cucurutuku Ceria is collaboration with e-commerce companies namely gofood and grabfood to facilitate consumers in the ordering process and CV Cucurutuku Ceria has utilized social media as promotional activities for sausage noodle roll product. In the product life cycle, sausage noodle roll are in a stage of decline. CV Cucurutuku Ceria has not fully utilized the government policies regarding the protection and empowerment of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises.Keywords: cost, noodle, position, and sausage

scholarly journals Kajian Literatur Sistematis: Skema Pengendalian Biaya dalam Asuransi Kesehatan Nasional di Beberapa Negara

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eka Pujiyanti ◽  
Ery Setiawan ◽  
Euis Ratnasari Jasmin ◽  
Indah Pratiwi Suwandi
Keyword(s):  
Cost Containment ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Social Insurance ◽  
Drug Market ◽  
Healthcare Services ◽  
Cochrane Library ◽  
Payment Systems ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost

AbstrakPengendalian biaya merupakan salah satu dari beberapa strategi untuk memastikan keseimbangan finansial dari skema asu­ransi kesehatan nasional. Beberapa model pengendalian biaya yang umum digunakan secara global yaitu seperti cost-shar­ing, capping, dan sebagainya. Review ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk menentukan biaya dan dampak dari implementasi skema kebijakan sebagai instrumen pengendalian biaya di berbagai negara. Review sistematis dilakukan dengan mengambil data dari beberapa database yaitu Proquest, Pubmed, dan Cochrane Library dengan intervensi utamanya yaitu menggu­nakan metode cost-sharing. Hasil dari review difokuskan pada skema pengendalian biaya dari perspektif pemerintah, yaitu lingkup asuransi sosial yang dapat berupa modifikasi sistem pembayaran, cost-sharing, capping/quota, dan waiting period. Berdasarkan salah satu studi di Kanada, dapat dilihat bahwa dihasilkan dampak yang signifikan pada sistem kesehatan, mengurangi pengeluaran dan penggunaan obat yang tidak esensial, serta secara tidak langsung meningkatkan efisiensi pasar obat melalui kepedulian peserta dalam penggunan obat. Dalam penelitian ini dapat disimpulkan bahwa implementasi dari skema pengendalian biaya dapat mengurangi risiko bahaya dari perspektif peserta dengan kontribusi tambahan pada penggunaan pelayanan kesehatan. AbstractCost-containment is one of several strategies to ensure the financial sustainability of the National Health Insurance scheme. Sev­eral cost-containment models were commonly globally, such as cost-sharing, capping, and others. This review aims to determine the costs and impacts of implemented policy schemes as cost-containment instruments in various countries. We performed a systematic review from several primary databases (Proquest, Pubmed, and Cochrane Library) with the primary intervention are the cost-sharing methods. The results of our review focused on the cost containment scheme from the government perspective, in which the context of social insurance can be a modification of payment systems, cost-sharing, capping/quota, and waiting period. From one of the studies in Canada, we can see that the result has a significant impact on the health system, reducing the expendi­ture and the use of drugs that are not essential, and also indirectly improve the technical efficiency of the drug market through the care of participants in drug utilisation. In this research, it can be concluded that the implementation of cost containment schemes can reduce the moral hazard risk from the perspective of participants with additional contributions to the utilisation of healthcare services

Reliability improvement incentive strategies in the manufacturing industry

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suyuan Wang ◽  
Huaming Song ◽  
Canran Gong
Keyword(s):  
Failure Rate ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Manufacturing Industry ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Reliability Improvement ◽  
Reliability Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Feasible Solutions ◽  
The Cost

PurposeCompanies face the critical reliability problem of products due to the development of outsourcing. This study intends to provide some feasible solutions for a company to improve the reliability level of products.Design/methodology/approachThe paper considers the reward and reliability decisions regarding a product made with two complementary components from two different suppliers: high-capable and low-capable. Two kinds of reliability improvement incentives (normal incentive and cost-sharing incentive) through which a manufacturer provides a reward and shares the reliability improvement cost with a supplier are discussed. As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer determines the strategy, while the suppliers are responsible for determining its reliability. Using a game-theoretic framework, four different contract scenarios are addressed. We develop analytical methods to better understand how the manufacturer decides the incentive mechanism to be used for the suppliers.FindingsThe results show that cost-sharing contracts do not always lead to a higher reliability level and more enormous profits. Setting a target reliability level is better for the manufacturer. The cost-sharing contract is beneficial for a high-capable supplier even though it does not directly participate in that kind of mechanism. A low-capable supplier gains more profit when the manufacturer provides incentive mechanisms that do not specify a target reliability level.Originality/valueThis paper investigates the reliability improvement mechanism used for complementary products and focuses on identifying the optimal decisions when demand is influenced by the gap between the product's failure rate and the standard failure rate.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document