scholarly journals Competition and Game of the Pre-Installed Market and Post-Installed Market of the Internet of Vehicles from the Perspective of Cooperation

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 996
Author(s):  
Chaohui Zhang ◽  
Yijing Li ◽  
Yishan Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Evolutionary Trends ◽  
Internet Of Vehicles ◽  
Cooperative Relationships ◽  
Competition State

The Internet of Vehicles market is broadly divided into two parts—the pre-installed market and the post-installed market. Although they possibly have cooperative relationships, there is a competition game between them in terms of interests, and a healthy game relationship can promote the optimization of products and the overall improvement of the service level in the Internet of Vehicles market. Through the evolutionary game model, this article analyzes the dynamic game process between the pre-installed market and the post-installed market of the Internet of Vehicles, explores the various evolution trends of the Internet of Vehicles market from the perspective of cooperation, and combines the numerical simulation analysis to study the three possible evolutionary trends and corresponding steady states. The results show that, when the cooperation ratio is relatively high, both sides of the game are in the cyclical competition and game, which is the optimal competition state of the Internet of Vehicles market. On the contrary, any kind of “steady state” is unfavorable to the overall market. Therefore, all parties should be encouraged to establish a deeper level of cooperation and jointly promote the further prosperity of the Internet of Vehicles market in the process of cooperation and competition.

Network effect in shared supply chain platform value co-creation behavior in evolutionary game1

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Zou Xiaohong ◽  
Chen Jinlong ◽  
Gao Shuanping
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Condition ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Effect ◽  
Chain Model ◽  
The Cost

The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game Analysis of Public Opinion Supervision of Engineering Quality in the Network Citizen Journalism Environment

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yaohong Yang ◽  
Yi Zeng ◽  
Jing Dai ◽  
Ying Liu
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Mobile Networks ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Citizen Journalism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Self Healing ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government

With the rapid development of mobile networks and citizen journalism, public opinion supervision has become an essential social supervision on engineering quality. They consider the dynamic characteristics of the spread process of public opinion and the game process of social supervision on engineering quality. The tripartite evolutionary game model of the government, contractors, and the public was constructed by coupling the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) model of public opinion spread and the evolutionary game model. Then, the influence laws of public opinion spread on the tripartite evolutionary game were analyzed and discussed through numerical simulation analysis. The results show that the public with more significant influence or authority is more able to restrain the quality behavior of government and contractors; increasing the probability of transforming ignorant into latent, the probability of converting latent into the communicator and topic derivation rate or reducing the direct immunization self-healing can improve the effectiveness of public opinion supervision; the true online public opinion can effectively restrain the quality behavior of contractors and urge the government to supervise actively. The research conclusions can provide a reference for improving the social supervision mechanism of engineering quality in the era of network citizen journalism.

Coordination of a Supply Chain with Demand Stimulation and Random Demand Disruption

2011 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tiaojun Xiao ◽  
Jia Luo ◽  
Jiao Jin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Decentralized Supply Chain ◽  
Penalty Costs ◽  
Dynamic Game Model

This chapter develops a dynamic game model of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer to study the coordination mechanism and the effect of demand disruption on the coordination mechanism, where the market demand is sensitive to retail price and service. We assume that the supplier and the retailer only know the distribution of the disrupted amount after the demand disruption and they share the quantity deviation costs. We find that an all-unit wholesale quantity discount-subsidy mechanism can coordinate the supply chain. We give the coordination mechanism of the supply chain after the demand disruption and find that the demand disruption remarkably influences the price-service level decisions of the centralized supply chain and the coordination mechanism of the decentralized supply chain. In particular, the expected quantity differs from the planned quantity although the penalty costs prevent from this deviation.

Explaining Study on Cooperative investment risk of Joint Venture Companies from an Economics of Organization Perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hao Dai ◽  
Chaoqi Zhang ◽  
Xiaojing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Joint Venture ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Investment Model ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Investment Risk ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Research Topics

Background: Joint investment has increasingly become a popular investment method for venture capitalists. From the two traditional perspectives of investors and start-ups, research on Joint Venture Capital in the past 40 years has achieved rich results. Most recent literature is based on research from the perspective of organisational economics, which further advances the vertical development of research on Joint Venture Capital. Objective: The objective of this paper is to review research topics and core literature on Joint Venture Capital from the perspective of organisational economics, and through introducing the model of venture capitalists' ‘bounded rationality’ and evolutionary game in the joint investment risk analysis, this paper distinguishes the influence of the game model on the formation of joint investment. Finally, it reaches a conclusion and suggests a direction for future research. Method: This paper finds and reviews literature on joint venture capital and dynamic game model of joint investment risk is collated to reduce the actual risk assumed by each investor. Additionally, the paper summarises research topics and progress from the perspective of organisational economics to identify possible research directions for the future. Results: Based on the evolutionary game method for analysis of the model of joint investment, the following conclusion is drawn: the greater the heterogeneity of the participating entities, the smaller the unit conflict cost benefit and the greater the probability of successful joint venture investment. The joint investment operation mechanism will also be maintained in a long-term and stable manner. Conclusion: From the perspective of organisational economics, the latest research on Joint Venture Capital has extensively absorbed new research results of relevant disciplines. Consequently, Joint Venture Capital activities can be understood from a broader perspective and with new insights, which reflect complex and dynamic interaction and correlative dependence between network members. To establish a more successful joint investment model, the paper introduces a relatively novel evolutionary game method for analysis of the joint investment model.

scholarly journals Privacy Protection Algorithm For The Internet Of Vehicles Based On Local Differential Privacy And Game Model

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 1025-1038
Author(s):  
Wenxi Han ◽  
Mingzhi Cheng ◽  
Min Lei ◽  
Hanwen Xu ◽  
Yu Yang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Privacy Protection ◽  
Differential Privacy ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Internet Of Vehicles

A Novel Evolutionary Game Model of the Behavior of Stakeholders in the Field of E-commerce Live Broadcasting

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 1124-1132
Author(s):  
Dandan Qi ◽  
Jingwen Fang ◽  
Mingliang Li ◽  
Ping Han
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Quantitative Research ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Data Sources ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Live Broadcast ◽  
Main Factors ◽  
Correct Understanding

When economic entities are facing severe tests, the live broadcast sale is booming with its own advantages. However, at the same time, it is also facing a series of problems such as lack of anchor credit, numerous fakes, and weak platform supervision. In the process of quantitative research on live delivery of goods, various difficulties will be encountered, such as information asymmetry between subjects and untrue data sources. Therefore，This paper establishes an evolutionary game model between the anchor ,the consumer, and the anchor and the live broadcast platform, and explores its equilibrium state, and performs numerical simulation analysis on this basis. Discuss and analyze the main factors that influence the strategic choice of the evolutionary body, deepen the understanding of the live broadcast industry, so as to promote the correct understanding of the live broadcast industry and related fields, and put forward reasonable and effective suggestions and countermeasures for regulating the development of the live broadcast economy.

scholarly journals Research on Audit Supervision of Internet Finance

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 2
Author(s):  
Hua Liu ◽  
Sheng Ge
Keyword(s):  
Financial Institutions ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Analysis Tool ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Financial Audit ◽  
Financial Credit ◽  
Internet Finance

Internet finance is a new form of finance that applies capacities found on the Internet to the traditional financial industry. However, at the present stage, internet finance is faced with many problems, such as overly rapid development and non-standard operation. This paper adopted the evolutionary game theory as the analysis tool to design an evolutionary game model of government audit supervision of Internet finance, and analyzed the evolutionary stability of the strategies used by Internet financial institutions and government financial audit supervision departments. A simulation calculation was carried out by placing the calculation experimental method “Scenario–Coping”, which simulated the initial probability of different strategies adopted by both parties of the game and evaluated the influence of changing the penalty intensity of Internet financial institutions’ violation on the outcome of the evolutionary game. Based on the simulation analysis, the paper provided policy suggestions on strengthening audit supervision and promoting its sustainable development from three aspects: strengthening the construction of the Internet financial credit information system, improving Internet financial laws and regulations, and improving the early warning level of Internet financial credit risk.

scholarly journals Dynamic Game and Simulation Analysis in Railway Technical Regulation Supervision

2020 ◽  
Vol 218 ◽  
pp. 01052
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Han ◽  
Chengcheng Li ◽  
Xiang Xie
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Main Body ◽  
Technical Regulation ◽  
Railway Station ◽  
Supervision System ◽  
Regulation Mode ◽  
Mode A ◽  
Technical Regulations

In order to discuss the factors that affect the regulation behavior of railway technical regulations and perfect the regulation mode, a game model with CRG, railway bureau and railway station as the main body of regulation is constructed. The results show that the intensity and cost of rewards and punishments have an impact on the railway technical regulations and supervision system.

A Novel Network Survivability Analysis and Evaluation Model

2013 ◽  
Vol 347-350 ◽  
pp. 2082-2088
Author(s):  
Chun Lei Wang ◽  
Dong Xia Wang ◽  
Qing Miao ◽  
Liang Ming ◽  
Lan Fang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Network Performance ◽  
Evaluation Method ◽  
Evaluation Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Multiple Criteria Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Network Survivability ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Network System ◽  
Analysis And Evaluation

Network survivability has the characteristics of complexity, dynamic evolution and uncertainty, which has become one of the most important factors for analyzing and evaluating network performance. Network survivability analysis and evaluation is a process of analyzing and quantifying the degree to which network system can survive in network threats. This paper proposes a novel network survivability analysis and evaluation model.Firstly, network survivability is abstracted as a dynamic game process among network attacker, network defender and normal user, thereafter network survivability evolutionary game model is established and network survivability analysis algorithm is proposed based on the game model. Secondly, the survivability characteristics of the network can be measured and evaluated based on the analyzed information based on the proposed immune evolutionary algorithm for network survivability metric weight solving and network survivability evaluation method using multiple criteria decision making. Finally, the proposed network survivability analysis and evaluation model is experimented in a typical network environment and the correctness and effectiveness of the model is validated through experimental analysis.

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