scholarly journals COSTRUTTIVISMO E REALISMO NELLE SCIENZE FISICHE

Author(s):  
Paolo Perinotti

While classical physics is consistent with an objectivist point of view, the advent of modern physics undermines its fundamental assumptions. Quantum mechanics, in particular, put a question to the philosophy of science as to whether its intrinsically probabilistic interpretation should be revised in order to save the traditional epistemology, or should be adopted unconditionally, along with its revolutionary consequences. We propose some crucial arguments in favour of the second option. Finally, we discuss how the above choice may suggest a constructivist view about the nature of physical sciences.

1985 ◽  
Vol 17 (51) ◽  
pp. 71-96
Author(s):  
Javier Echeverría

One of the main deficiencies of the twentieth century philosophy of science, in spite of evident achievements in the logical analysis and reconstruction of scientific theories, is the separation between formal sciences and those sciences with empirical contents. This distinction derives from Carnap and it was generally admitted by the Vienna Circle since the publication of “Formalwissenschaft und Realwissenschaft” in Erkenntnis in 1935. Later philosophy of science, in spite of other criticism of the neopositivist programme, has maintained this separation. It can be claimed that Realwissenschaften, physics in particular, have determined the development of later philosophy of science. Analyses of scientific theories most of the time refer to physical theories, and occasionally to biological ones. There is still a lot to be done in the field of mathematics and logic, in order to analyse and reconstruct their theories. But even if this task is undertaken, and some progress has been done lately, there is still a lot of work to do before a general theory of science can be proposed which transcends such a division between formal and empirical sciences, let alone the human or social sciences. This paper is intended as a contribution to supersede the first dichotomy between formal and physical sciences. One of the main problems in order to make some progress along these lines is that since its origins logical positivism had a deficient theory of knowledge, and the same happened with analytical philosophy developed immediately afterwards. This paper thus criticises examples of such a type of theory of knowledge, as expressed in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and Russell’s Philosophy of Logical Atomism. The core argument is as follows: these theorizations are inadequate for scientific knowledge; this type of knowledge, particularly the notion of ‘sign’ cannot be adapted to the simple scheme proposed in those works. The criticism here undertaken is developed from a rationalist point of view, in a sense which is closer to Leibniz and Saussure, than to recent philosophers fascinated with the word ‘reason’. Some new proposals are put forward, necessarily provisional, which justify the term, which in turn could be perfectly substituted by another, of Semiology of Science.


It is conventional to denote the physics of the period 1700-1900, from A the Principia to the advent of the relativity and quantum theories, as ‘classical’ or ‘Newtonian’ physics. These terms are not, however, very satisfactory as historical categories. The contrast between classical and ‘modern’ physics is perceived in terms that highlight the innovatory features of physics after 1900: the abandonment of the concepts of absolute space and time in Einstein’s theory of relativity, and of causality and determinism in quantum mechanics. ‘ Classical ’ physics is thus defined by ‘non-classical’ physics. The definitions and axioms of Principia , Newton’s exposition of the concepts of absolute space and time, and his statement of the Newtonian laws of motion, are rightly seen as fundamental to the 17th-century mechanization of the world picture.


Author(s):  
Mark Byers

The uncertainty of the glyph, reflecting a new commitment to the unpredictability of history and the fallibility of scientific reason, is shown in this chapter to have generated a major avant-garde interest in modern physics, particularly quantum mechanics. The chapter charts cognate developments in Olson’s work and that of Wolfgang Paalen, an Austrian-Mexican painter who had a decisive influence on abstract expressionism through his journal Dyn. Both Olson and Paalen are shown to have turned to post-classical physics—particularly Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’—as a platform for a new late modernist art that would break with both the political and the aesthetic principles of high modernism.


1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-441
Author(s):  
Edwin Ihrig

AbstractLie algebras, in the form of algebras of observables, play an essential role in the formulation of classical and quantum mechanics. We discuss whether lie groups play a similar role in general relativity through the holonomy group. We also explore what interrelations these ideas provide between classical physics, relativity and quantum physics.


Author(s):  
Sidney Perkowitz

Today, physics is firmly grounded in classical physics, which accurately describes much of our immediate and relatively nearby world, the mid-range scale of the cosmos; and in modern physics, quantum mechanics and relativity, which describe much of the small and large scales of the universe that lie far beyond direct human reach. However, physics is not stagnant, it still lacks important answers because of unexplained phenomena, because of new research tools, and because its aspirations, especially the quest for a Theory of Everything, have grown. ‘How physics works’ considers how physicists choose which experiments to perform, how to develop theories, and how these two halves of the physics equation come together.


Author(s):  
Leemon B. McHenry

What kinds of things are events? Battles, explosions, accidents, crashes, rock concerts would be typical examples of events and these would be reinforced in the way we speak about the world. Events or actions function linguistically as verbs and adverbs. Philosophers following Aristotle have claimed that events are dependent on substances such as physical objects and persons. But with the advances of modern physics, some philosophers and physicists have argued that events are the basic entities of reality and what we perceive as physical bodies are just very long events spread out in space-time. In other words, everything turns out to be events. This view, no doubt, radically revises our ordinary common sense view of reality, but as our event theorists argue common sense is out of touch with advancing science. In The Event Universe: The Revisionary Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead, Leemon McHenry argues that Whitehead's metaphysics provides a more adequate basis for achieving a unification of physical theory than a traditional substance metaphysics. He investigates the influence of Maxwell's electromagnetic field, Einstein's theory of relativity and quantum mechanics on the development of the ontology of events and compares Whitehead’s theory to his contemporaries, C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell, as well as another key proponent of this theory, W. V. Quine. In this manner, McHenry defends the naturalized and speculative approach to metaphysics as opposed to analytical and linguistic methods that arose in the 20th century.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Mormann

Abstract The main thesis of this paper is that Pap’s The Functional A Priori in Physical Theory and Cassirer’s Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics may be conceived as two kindred accounts of a late Neo-Kantian philosophy of science. They elucidate and clarify each other mutually by elaborating conceptual possibilities and pointing out affinities of neo-Kantian ideas with other currents of 20th century’s philosophy of science, namely, pragmatism, conventionalism, and logical empiricism. Taking into account these facts, it seems not too far fetched to conjecture that under more favorable circumstances Pap could have served as a mediator between the “analytic” and “continental” tradition thereby overcoming the dogmatic dualism of these two philosophical currents that has characterized philosophy in the second half the 20th century.


2011 ◽  
Vol 20 (05) ◽  
pp. 729-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOÃO PAULO M. PITELLI ◽  
PATRICIO S. LETELIER

We review the mathematical framework necessary to understand the physical content of quantum singularities in static spacetimes. We present many examples of classical singular spacetimes and study their singularities by using wave packets satisfying Klein–Gordon and Dirac equations. We show that in many cases the classical singularities are excluded when tested by quantum particles but unfortunately there are other cases where the singularities remain from the quantum mechanical point of view. When it is possible we also find, for spacetimes where quantum mechanics does not exclude the singularities, the boundary conditions necessary to turn the spatial portion of the wave operator to be self-adjoint and emphasize their importance to the interpretation of quantum singularities.


Author(s):  
David Wallace

Decoherence is widely felt to have something to do with the quantum measurement problem, but getting clear on just what is made difficult by the fact that the ‘measurement problem’, as traditionally presented in foundational and philosophical discussions, has become somewhat disconnected from the conceptual problems posed by real physics. This, in turn, is because quantum mechanics as discussed in textbooks and in foundational discussions has become somewhat removed from scientific practice, especially where the analysis of measurement is concerned. This paper has two goals: firstly (§§1–2), to present an account of how quantum measurements are actually dealt with in modern physics (hint: it does not involve a collapse of the wave function) and to state the measurement problem from the perspective of that account; and secondly (§§3–4), to clarify what role decoherence plays in modern measurement theory and what effect it has on the various strategies that have been proposed to solve the measurement problem.


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