PROCES DALjE HARMONIZACIJE EVROPSKOG POTROŠAČKOG PRAVA

Author(s):  
Dragan Vujisić ◽  

At the time of the establishment of the European Communities in 1957, there was no special provision on consumer policy for the whole of Europe. At the time, individual consumer policies of member states reflected different national cultures, traditions, administrative systems and priorities. Consumer policy at European level has become necessary for them in order to have adequate protection when trading in the single market. The first special consumer protection program was adopted in 1975, which was the basis for a growing body of directives and regulations in the field of consumer protection. Currently, about 90 EU directives cover consumer protection issues. Key EU policy areas related to consumer protection are the protection of life, health and safety of consumers; consumer information; protection of economic interests of consumers; protection of legal interests of consumers.

1980 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 9-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans B. Thorelli ◽  
Jack L. Engledow

Consumer information systems in general, and independent consumer information programs in particular, are seen as indispensable elements of consumer policy, both private and public. In open market democracies, information has inherent merit relative to consumer protection by direct regulation. Policy conclusions are based on large-scale research concisely summarized.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (02) ◽  
pp. 146-161
Author(s):  
Ruli Purnamasari ◽  
Solihan Solihan ◽  
Viyola Azzahra

Abstrak   Efektivitas penegakan hukum terhadap produsen makanan berbahaya menuju Indonesia Sehat 2025 tersebut didasarkan apabila pelaku usaha memproduksi dan memperdagangkan produk makanan yang mengandung bahan kimia serta membahayakan kesehatan dan keselamatan konsumen, maka pelaku usaha/produsen melanggar Undang-Undang Nomor 36 Tahun 2009 tentang Kesehatan, Undang-Undang Nomor 18 Tahun 2012 tentang Pangan, Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1999 tentang perlindungan Konsumen.  Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian hukum normative yang bertujuan untuk mengetahui Faktor yang mempengaruhi terhadap efektivitas penegakan hukum terhadap produsen makanan berbahaya menuju Indonesia Sehat 2025. Faktor hukumnya, yaitu lemahnya sanksi terhadap pelanggarnya, proses penanganan masalah berbelit-belit, kurang profesionalnya para aparatur penegak hukum dan kurangnya koordinasi antar penegak hukum. Tanggung jawab pidana produsen terhadap kerugian yang diderita konsumen akibat makanan berbahaya yang diproduksi, dipasarkan, ditawarkan dan diperdagangkannya, secara yuridis, dalam konsepsi Undang-Undang Perlindungan Konsumen dan peraturan perundang-undangan terkait lainnya.   THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ON FOOD MANUFACTURERS IN INDONESIA   Abstract   The effectiveness of law enforcement against dangerous food producers towards Healthy Indonesia 2025 is based on if business actors produce and trade food products that contain chemicals and endanger the health and safety of consumers, then the business actor/producer violates Law Number 36 of 2009 concerning Health, Law No. Law Number 18 of 2012 concerning Food, Law Number 8 of 1999 concerning Consumer Protection. This research is a normative legal research that aims to determine the factors that influence the effectiveness of law enforcement against producers of dangerous food towards Healthy Indonesia 2025. The legal factors are the weakness of sanctions against violators, the process of handling problems is complicated, the lack of professionalism of law enforcement officials and the lack of coordination between law enforcement. The producer's criminal responsibility for the loss suffered by the consumer due to the dangerous food produced, marketed, offered and traded, legally, in the conception of the Consumer Protection Act and other relevant laws and regulations.   Keywords: Effectiveness, Law Enforcement, Food Producers


2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-324
Author(s):  
José Luis Zamora Manzano

In the present paper, we will focus on information on consumer protection and mediation which allows a much quicker resolution of any conflicts that arise in the matter of consumption, emphasizing the sources of Roman law where we find the Consumer protection carried out by the aediles, who were in charge of controlling and monitoring the markets, speculation and weights and measures, for this we analyze mainly sources such as D.21.1.1.1 and the vice that originated the redhibition D.21.16 and 21.1.14.10, among others. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the aediles developed in the same way as the praetors within their sphere of competence of the markets, the resolution of conflicts through the transaction that implies a history of mediation and that today is articulated as an alternative method of dispute resolution. Subsequently we analyze the bases that remain on some principles of current consumer law and the panorama that shows the incorporation of EU directives such as 2011/83/EU and the recent 2013/11/EU that encourages alternative dispute resolution (ADR).


2000 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Senator Richard Alston

Australia's telecommunications regime has been developed over several years with the clear intention of facilitating robust competition, while also providing a raft of consumer safeguards. After introducing elements of competition in the 1980s, the government was able to gradually increase the level of competition, until the introduction of full competition in the Telecommunications Act 1997. Since then, the government has encouraged a stronger competitive environment by strengthening the powers of the ACCC. It has also improved consumer protection safeguards through the enactment of the Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Services Standards) Act 1999. Further refining of the regime will not end here. The government will continue to review competition and consumer policy and continue to promote liberalised trade in telecommunications markets.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-201
Author(s):  
Yvonne Fondevila-McDonald ◽  
Emília Molinero-Ruiz ◽  
Montse Vergara-Duarte ◽  
Montserrat Guillén ◽  
Laia Ollé-Espluga ◽  
...  

Information quality deficiencies have been detected in occupational safety and health surveys in Europe, which typically gather self-reported data responded by employers or their representatives. For instance, their low response rates and informant profiles make estimations on establishments with safety representatives (SRs) unreliable. We tested the mode of administration and informants as sources of error regarding establishments with SRs in Catalonia, Spain. Two sources of information were compared: the Second Catalan Survey of Working Conditions 2011 (IICSWC)—with a methodology similar to surveys conducted at the state and European level—and the Progam on Prevention of Risks Management in Companies (PPRMC)—in which the labor authority collected data using a documentary verification in another sample of establishments. Percentage of establishments with SRs was estimated using the data from the PPRMC and also the differences in percentage between sources and informant profiles (with 95 percent confidence interval). Results show that the IICSWC overestimates the percentage of establishments with SRs.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Faizanur Rahman ◽  
Dr. Musheer Ahmed

The discourse on competition policy often uses the term 'consumer welfare' but rarely is clear about its meaning or role. Promotion of consumer welfare is the common goal of consumer protection and competition policy. As India's economies move progressively towards increased liberalisation, certain undesirable business practices can emerge which act as a hindrance to development and economic growth. The absence of a competition and consumer protection policy in India has created opportunities for some sectors of the business community to engage in unfair business practices viz., price fixing, speculative hoarding and collusive tendering. Competition policy and consumer policy reinforce one another. In markets that are effectively competitive, producers have internal incentives to further consumer policy objectives, for example, to develop a relationship for quality or to attract customers away from rivals by providing the necessary information to minimise switching costs. At the same time, when consumers are able to exercise their choices effectively, they can act as a competitive discipline upon producers. Thus, there is a strong case to be made for the co-ordination of these two policy areas. In the light of India's commitment to a liberalised economy, there is a need for a fair and equitable environment where producer and consumer can maximise their profit and satisfaction respectively. There is therefore a need for India's Competition and Consumer Protection policy if market oriented policies are to be given the best possible chance of success. In the backdrop of this, it is therefore imperative for India to develop this Policy ensuring the supporting legislation, infrastructure and regulations. In this context, the present paper analysis the standard of consumer welfare required to be taken into consideration while dealing with competition issues, and to what extent is protection accorded to consumers under other legislations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karsten Mause

SummaryBased on the economics of consumer protection and some contributions from the economics of education, the present paper presents an analytical framework to deal with the problem of consumer protection in the higher education sector. It is shown that there are not only governmental mechanisms (information provision, quality regulation) but also market-based mechanisms (seller signaling, private certification, private information intermediaries, student screening) to mitigate the informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers of educational services. This informational asymmetry, called students’ ex-ante quality uncertainty, provides the central economic rationale for thinking about student protection, quality assurance, and consumer information in the higher education marketplace. The basic argument of this paper is that governmental quality assurance is unnecessary in higher education if the market participants themselves, with the help of private third parties (i. e., certifiers and information intermediaries), are able to cope with market failure due to asymmetric information.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document