ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUP OF THE FRENCH LAW

2012 ◽  
Vol 34 (34) ◽  
pp. 9-26
Author(s):  
Vitomir Popović ◽  
Ranko Vulic
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
French Law

Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries

2020 ◽  
pp. 66-107
Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Full Range ◽  
Opportunity Costs ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Structural Reforms ◽  
Political Upheaval ◽  
Group Preferences ◽  
Distributive Conflict ◽  
Original Survey

The politics of adjustment in deficit countries were characterized by strong domestic discontent, leading to significant political upheaval. Why did policymakers in these countries nonetheless implement unprecedented austerity and painful structural reforms? Zooming in on the domestic drivers of this adjustment choice, this chapter highlights mechanisms by which internal adjustment grew more politically feasible in deficit countries. The chapter draws on original survey data on the policy preferences of 359 economic interest groups in Ireland, Spain and Greece. It finds that while groups were consistently negative to a full range of scenarios by which external adjustment could be achieved in deficit countries, their preferences toward austerity measures and structural reforms varied much more widely. This variation, it is argued, facilitated the formation of pro-internal adjustment coalitions in deficit country contexts. Moreover, the chapter shows that opportunity costs mattered. While opposed to internal adjustment in absolute terms, a large majority of interest groups in deficit countries grew pliable to the prospect of it when faced with a choice between this and the alternative of abandoning the euro; even if internal adjustment programs were comprised of policies that groups themselves distinctly opposed.

Pride and Prejudice in Prague: Understanding Early Policy Error and Belated Reform in the Czech Economic Transition

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shale Horowitz ◽  
Martin Petráš
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Economic Transition ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Group Support ◽  
Pride And Prejudice ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Economic Ideology

Failed banking sector policies and weak regulatory policies are the keys to the collapse of the Czech economic “miracle.” Why were these policy errors made? Why has it taken so long to correct them? We examine the roles of economic interest groups, political institutions, technocratic economic ideology, and political leadership. Initially, economic interest group support provided broad liberal constraints on economic policy making. Within this context, neither political institutions nor technocratic economic ideology prevented political leaders from making the key early policy errors. A change in technocratic ideology made eventual error correction difficult to avoid. But stable economic interest group support and institutional divisions made it possible for responsible leaders to delay the corrections.

scholarly journals The Entrepreneurs’ Organisation into Several Forms of GROUPS under the Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 222
Author(s):  
Ana ILANA
Keyword(s):  
European Community ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Legal Person ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Separate Entity ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Harmonious Development ◽  
Business World ◽  
Legal Personality ◽  
National Market

<em>An Economic Interest Group is a form of organisation for participants in an economic or civil activity that has been under regulation in Romania for more than 10 years, nevertheless it is quite rare in the business world today. There is some reluctance to use this form of organisation, which is often mistaken for a Group of Companies, a much more common form, but which has no recognition in terms of a legal person status, i.e., the Group of Companies is not a separate entity with legal personality. The need to bring this form of organisation under regulation was justified by an intention to support the harmonious development of economic activities, as well as their ongoing and balanced expansion throughout the European Community, for the proper working of a single market which offers conditions similar to the those of a national market.</em>

Warlordism in Comparative Perspective

2007 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Marten
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Comparative Study ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
International Security ◽  
Local Authority ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Republican China ◽  
Causal Factors ◽  
Medieval Europe ◽  
Definition Of

Warlordism creates significant problems in failed states: it impedes the development of stable and secure societies, thwarts economic growth, and creates new threats to international security. Through a comparative study of four seemingly disparate cases—medieval Europe, Republican China, and Somalia and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s—it is possible to develop an inductive, generalizable definition of warlordism. Warlordism emerges when armed men seize small slices of territory in disintegrating states for their own benefit, using charisma and patronage ties to cement their local authority, and disrupting commerce and investment through their fragmentary rule. Two causal factors were necessary for the demise of warlordism in medieval Europe and Republican China: the presence of a powerful and aggrieved economic interest group, and the appearance of a transformative idea from outside the existing system that supported the interest group's actions. If this same causal relationship holds true today, then warlordism will be more quickly eliminated in Somalia than in Afghanistan. The international community can take action to help eliminate warlordism, but change ultimately depends on domestic factors and will likely be violent.

Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries

2020 ◽  
pp. 172-205
Author(s):  
Stefanie Walter ◽  
Ari Ray ◽  
Nils Redeker
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Qualitative Interviews ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Group Preferences ◽  
Economic Interest Groups ◽  
Distributive Conflict ◽  
Original Survey ◽  
Broad Consensus

A key characteristic of the Eurozone crisis is that the burden of adjustment was carried almost exclusively by crisis countries. Surplus countries did not contribute to the necessary rebalancing, even though internal adjustment likely would have reduced some of the pressure on deficit states. The chapter argues that surplus countries’ resistance to internal adjustment is rooted in domestic distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, original survey data is leveraged from 357 economic interest groups from Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands and qualitative interviews with interest group representatives. The chapter shows that although there is general support for internal adjustment among economic interest groups, they disagree heavily about how exactly to achieve this goal. Together with a broad consensus to avoid a breakup of the Eurozone, the resulting deadlock turned interstate financing—such as bailouts to crisis countries—into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in ordoliberal ideology or export orientation, distributive conflicts thus contributed significantly to surplus countries’ resistance to adjust.

scholarly journals Economic Interest Group Allocations in Open-Seat Senate Elections

1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 347-362 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Keith Gaddie ◽  
James L. Regens
Keyword(s):  
Interest Group ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Senate Elections ◽  
Open Seat

On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Work of Mancur Olson Jr.

1976 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Relative Influence ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
British Industry ◽  
Democratic Ideology ◽  
Mancur Olson

The academic literature on interest groups has tended to concentrate on the assessment of the relative influence of these groups in different political systems, and on the implications of the activities of interest groups for democratic ideology. In recent years, however, the work of Mancur Olson has stimulated an increasing interest in the formation of interest groups, and in the reasons why individuals (or corporate bodies) join them. The aim of this article is to examine Olson's analysis in the light of a study of one major British economic interest group, the Confederation of British Industry. In the course of this examination I hope to illustrate some of the weaknesses of Olson's analysis and to suggest how it might be refined and developed.

Explaining regional economic policies in China: interest groups, institutions, and identities

2002 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Horowitz ◽  
C. Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Statistical Tests ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
Economic Interest ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Joint Influence ◽  
Future Work

What explains variation in investment climates across China's provinces and urban autonomous regions? Three main explanations are considered: variation in the character and size of economic interest groups, in central government policies, and in pre-communist provincial identities and traditions. There is statistical and anecdotal support for the interest group and provincial identity factors. On the other hand, there is little evidence that variation in central government policy has had much effect. Future work should refine statistical tests and case studies to better understand the joint influence of interest group pressures and provincial identities.

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