The Nationalization of Democracy in the Weimar and First Austrian Republics

Author(s):  
Erin R. Hochman

This chapter examines republicans' rhetorical defense of the republics. Countering claims by the political right that the new republics were un-German, republicans argued that parliamentary democracy and German nationalism were not at odds. To prove their point, they cited the revolution of 1848 and their support for an Anschluss, or a political union between Germany and Austria. In doing so, republicans attempted to create their own form of nationalism by contrasting their großdeutsch nationalism with right-wing alldeutsch (pan-German) nationalism and conservative nationalism. Even though republicans at times harbored prejudices, they used großdeutsch nationalism to support democratic rights and practices, to reconcile national and international allegiances, and to create a national community that cut across religious, political, and social divisions.

Author(s):  
Erin R. Hochman

This concluding chapter discusses the subsequent Nazi appropriation of the Anschluss and briefly recounts the differences between the republican and Nazi ideas about an Anschluss and nationalism. It expands on the republican use of großdeutsch nationalism: in allowing diverse groups to participate in a national community that was compatible with a democratic and pluralistic society, großdeutsch nationalism became a critical aspect in republicans' energetic attempts to legitimize the embattled republics. While it is true that republicans on both sides of the Austro-German border were never able to convince the political right that they were loyal Germans or that parliamentary democracy was a German form of government, the chapter argues that their inability to do so does not mean that their attempts to create a democratic and peaceful großdeutsch nationalism should be dismissed.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.


2020 ◽  
pp. 001041402095767
Author(s):  
Max Schaub ◽  
Johanna Gereke ◽  
Delia Baldassarri

Does local exposure to refugees increase right-wing support? This paper studies a case uniquely suited to address this question: the allocation of refugees to the rural hinterlands of eastern Germany during the European refugee crisis. Similar to non-urban regions elsewhere, the area has had minimal previous exposure to foreigners, but distinctively leans towards the political right. Our data comprise electoral outcomes, and individual-level survey and behavioral measures. A policy allocating refugees following strict administrative rules and a matching procedure allow for causal identification. Our measurements confirm the presence of widespread anti-immigrant sentiments. However, these are unaffected by the presence of refugees in respondents’ hometowns: on average, we record null effects for all outcomes, which we interpret as supporting a sociotropic perspective on immigration attitudes. Masked by these overall null findings, we observe convergence: local exposure to refugees appears to have pulled both right- and left-leaning individuals more towards the center.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-54
Author(s):  
Adam Wielomski

DIALECTICS ‘WE’–‘ALIENS’ IN RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1789–1945 The aim of the author of this text is to polemicize with the stereotype according to which nationalism is a synonym of the “extreme right.” For this purpose the method of historical exemplification was used. Part I of this text is devoted to defining the concept of the “right” and to present the supporters of the French Revolution and other 19th-century revolutions, their idea of nationalism, the nation-state and sovereignty of the nation. This presentation shows that up to 1890 nationalism is located in the revolutionary left. The first nationalists are Jacobins. The counter-revolutionary right is opposed to nationalism. For this right, nationalism is combined with the idea of empowering nations to the rights of self-determination, which is closely connected with the idea of people’s sovereignty. This situation persists until 1870–1914, when the ideas of national sovereignty are implemented in the politics of the modern states. However, the liberal state does not meet the expectations of nationalists, because it neglects the interests of the nation as the highest value. That is the cause for them moving from the political left to the right part of the political scene, replacing the legitimist right. The latter is annihilated with the decline of aristocracy. In the 19th century, the left is nationalistic and xenophobic. We find clear racist sympathies on the left. The political right does not recognize the right of nations to self-determination, the idea of ethnic boundaries. It is cosmopolitan.


2021 ◽  
pp. 52-70
Author(s):  
Gerda Hooijer ◽  
Desmond King

This chapter explores how the welfare state’s critics, from the political right and the left, have contributed to institutional change through their ideas and advocacy. It discusses the neoliberal, conservative, social democratic, and right-wing populist critiques on the welfare state. These ideas are important to understand changes to the welfare state because they create the momentum for institutional disturbance. The chapter’s focus on the critics emphasizes the endogenous undercurrents disrupting welfare states, as well as the path-shaping capacity of new ideas. It shows that political reforms of the welfare state are not only driven by functional needs, vested interests, institutional habits, and public opinion, but also by ideas and their political advocates.


2020 ◽  
pp. 165-186
Author(s):  
Keith Popple

This chapter outlines how British populist politics, and in particular right-wing populist politics, has had significant implications for communities, for the theory and practice of community development, and for those presently involved in the activity in the United Kingdom, where it has suffered substantial financial cutbacks. The outcome of the austerity measures that has led to the contemporary presence of populism in the UK has been a mounting dissatisfaction and a general lack of trust in politics amongst millions in the country. This, together with a hangover from the 'parliamentary expenses scandal' that involved members from both Houses of Parliament, has created a marked degree of scepticism about the workings of the British electoral system. Further, there has been a growing lack of confidence in the system of neoliberal globalised finance capitalism that has left countless communities poorer and economically less secure. People's anger and frustration with these actions have been harnessed by the political right, which during the 2016 Referendum debate focused on the impact of immigration on communities. The chapter then notes the unique elements of community development and reflects on the role it can play in these challenging times. It argues that community development now requires greater funding and recognition while reconceptualising itself in a more radical manner.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giedo Jansen

Abstract It is often held that the self-employed are an economically conservative, political right-wing class. Previous studies, however, have primarily dealt with self-employed workers as a relatively monolithic social class with shared interests as entrepreneurs and (potential) employers. But, with its recent rise, self-employment has developed into a heterogeneous employment type, with a growing number of dependent and precarious self-employed. In this article, the political preferences of people in self-employment are compared to the preferences of employees on temporary contracts. In doing so, hypotheses are tested from both classic theories on class voting, as well as theories on job precariousness and labor market vulnerabilities. For this purpose, European Social Survey Round 4 (ESS-4) data on eight West European countries are analyzed. The findings suggest that particular segments of self-employment share the characteristics of other forms of ‘atypical’ work, not only with respect to labor market insecurities, but also regarding the political orientations associated with such insecurities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-593
Author(s):  
Ujaan Ghosh ◽  
Amrita Chowdhury

Abstract Baidehīśa Bilāsa is a seventeenth century Odiā erotic retelling of the Rāmāyaṇa. The work is particularly pertinent today, as the political right wing in India celebrates Rāma’s abstinence and represses his conjugal life in public memory. Rāma’s leaving of Sītā for his kingdom (read the Hindu nation) is further highlighted as his choosing of Dharma (duty) over Kāma (pleasure). This text reorders that binary and demonstrates how preoccupied Rāma was in fulfilling his duties as a husband. It contains multiple erotic encounters between the couple and some important (and subversive) instances of queer imagination and interaction. This article is an attempt to survey and decipher the same. And, in doing so, we intend to contribute to the scholarship on Rāmāyaṇa and the literary history of pre-modern Odisha, which has received relatively little scholarly attention.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-62
Author(s):  
Adam Wielomski

DIALECTICS “WE”–“ALIENS” IN RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1789–1945. PART IIThe aim of the author of this text is to polemicize with the stereotype according to which nationalism is a synonym of the “extreme right.” For this purpose the method of historical exemplification was used. In Part II we discuss examples of nationalisms in various European states between the years 1890 and 1945: France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy. This is the epoch when nationalism denies its initial close relationship with the political and revolutionary left. Now it is in close relations with the right. During the Boulanger and Dreyfus affaires in France, the nationalists are on the political right. Their ideology is not only right-wing but also anti-Semitic. Sometimes openly racist Maurice Barrès. In general, however, French and Italian nationalists preach “state nationalism,” similar to the classic doctrine of raison d’état. In Spain and Portugal the right is strictly Catholic. This is the imperial right. We have here the dream of restoration of the Spanish Siglo de Oro. This project is antithetic to nationalism because it is universalist and supranational. It is different in Germany, where at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the whole right is lit up by the vision of conquests, German empire, struggle of races. First, the Protestant, then also the German Catholic right is chauvinistic, racist and anti-Semitic. The article ends with reflections upon the relations between political right and the idea of nationalism.


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