scholarly journals Dialektyka „swój”–„obcy” w prawicowej filozofii politycznej 1789– –1945

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 29-54
Author(s):  
Adam Wielomski

DIALECTICS ‘WE’–‘ALIENS’ IN RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1789–1945 The aim of the author of this text is to polemicize with the stereotype according to which nationalism is a synonym of the “extreme right.” For this purpose the method of historical exemplification was used. Part I of this text is devoted to defining the concept of the “right” and to present the supporters of the French Revolution and other 19th-century revolutions, their idea of nationalism, the nation-state and sovereignty of the nation. This presentation shows that up to 1890 nationalism is located in the revolutionary left. The first nationalists are Jacobins. The counter-revolutionary right is opposed to nationalism. For this right, nationalism is combined with the idea of empowering nations to the rights of self-determination, which is closely connected with the idea of people’s sovereignty. This situation persists until 1870–1914, when the ideas of national sovereignty are implemented in the politics of the modern states. However, the liberal state does not meet the expectations of nationalists, because it neglects the interests of the nation as the highest value. That is the cause for them moving from the political left to the right part of the political scene, replacing the legitimist right. The latter is annihilated with the decline of aristocracy. In the 19th century, the left is nationalistic and xenophobic. We find clear racist sympathies on the left. The political right does not recognize the right of nations to self-determination, the idea of ethnic boundaries. It is cosmopolitan.

2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.


2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 359-370
Author(s):  
Matti Peltonen

Sweden and Finland reviewed their alcohol control policies in the 1950s at more or less the same time. Sweden abolished its ration book system and lifted restrictions on the sale of medium strength beer, Finland in turn revised its mechanisms for controlling the purchase of alcohol, a version of the Bratt system. In Sweden, alcohol consumption increased sharply and the number of drunkenness offences doubled. In Finland, by contrast, nothing happened. Why? History provides one possible source of explanation. The Swedish version of the Bratt system was much stricter (with monthly rations allocated on the basis of social class and sex) and therefore there was greater pressure towards a liberalisation of alcohol policy than was the case in Finland. During the war and in the post-war years Finland had a strong labour movement, which was keen to underline and demonstrate that the working class were in every respect decent and upright people. The debate that was touched off by the General Strike in 1956 is particularly interesting. On the political right, workers were frequently portrayed as heavy drinkers; the political left worked hard to fend off this propaganda attack. In this kind of atmosphere it was impossible to seriously call for a liberalisation of alcohol control policy in Finland.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-28
Author(s):  
Jerzy Supady

The Enlightenment ideology and the French Revolution had a very negative impact on the activities of religious congregations in respect of nursing care of the sick in hospitals in the 18th century. Emperor Napoleon I attempted to improve the existing situation by restoring the right for nursing care to nuns. In the first half of the 19th century, in Germany catholic religious orders had the obligation to provide nursing care and in the 30’s of the 19th century the Evangelical Church also joined charity work in hospitals by employing laywomen, i.e. deaconesses.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Ardis Travis Eakin

This dissertation reviews the life and political impact of Friedrich Gentz, who was born in Breslau, Prussia, in 1764, and died in Vienna, Austria, in 1832. Though remembered today as only a second- (or even third)- tier statesman alongside such luminaries of his day as Napoleon, Metternich, Wellington, and others, Gentz was nonetheless of importance in the shifting tides of late 18th and early 19th-century politics in Europe. The German translator of Edmund Burke, he was instrumental in bringing the conservative thinker's ideas into the conversations of Central Europe, while his writings against first the French Revolution, then Napoleon, marked him as one of the leading opponents of revolutionary ideology, and led the French emperor to dub him "that miserable scribe." But Gentz was important even beyond his anti-revolutionary polemics. As a product of the Enlightenment, he had some sympathy with the forces of modernity, and his career reflected the struggle to combine an openness to reform with hostility to revolution. In his later collaboration with Metternich to forge what became known as the Restoration, we can see just how much the post-Napoleonic conservative order in Europe was built upon a specific vision, one that rejected the quasi-feudal patterns of the ancien regime just as firmly as it did the democratic radicalism of its own day. Though it ultimately did not last, Gentz's work is clearly visible in the political contours of the 19th century. From the Enlightenment salons of Berlin to the dazzling Congress of Vienna and beyond, Between the Old and the New traces the eventful career of one of the most interesting men of letters in Revolutionary-era Europe.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-123
Author(s):  
Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse

The aim of the article is to show the centuries-old tradition of Polish elites working for nation-building and nation-preserving purposes. It dates back to at least the 18th century. The nation-preserving formula was developed in the 19th century, that is, during the partitions, when the Polish nation did not have its own statehood. In the first part of the article, I describe the specificity of Poles’ historical experiences, primarily after the partitions that took place at the end of the 18th century. I try to indicate three main approaches to nation-building (and nation-preserving) activities during this period. In the next part of the article, I try to show that this tradition lasted during the period of political transformation and European integration. While the nation-building approach, related to the reconstruction of sovereign statehood, democracy and a political nation, was dominant in the first case, the nation-preserving policy was observed more often, especially among the right-wing elites, after joining the EU, primarily due to the experiences of subsequent European crises.


1995 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul H. Brietzke

Benjamin Disraeli took a calculated “leap in the dark” in 1867, when he extended the right to vote to almost all British men. With hindsight, his leap can be seen to have been a necessary (but not sufficient) means of defusing discontent and promoting democratization. Ethiopia seems poised for an even bigger constitutional leap into a murkier realm, into an ethnicized attempt at democratization. To gain acceptance, a new constitution like Ethiopia's must seem to be all things to all people and, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, the end of the Cold War has seen an explosion of ethnic nationalisms similar to the one occurring in Europe late in the 19th century. Without benefit of hindsight one can only make informed guesses about the effects of a new Ethiopian “constitutionalism” on events which are largely beyond the drafters’ control. I will argue that there are grounds for a guarded optimism over Ethiopia's leap.


1962 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 365-391
Author(s):  
H. Tint

The patriotism of the French underwent a far-reaching reorientation between 1871 and 1940. Understood as the readiness to do one's best for one's country, if necessary by fighting for it, the most significant change that affected French patriotic feeling during this period is its shift from the political left to the right. Popular response to the republican call to arms after the fall of the Empire in 1870 was to know no future parallel in its magnitude and enthusiasm. Excluded from positions of political prominence, the working classes and their leaders soon came to think that if they had a patrie, it was not the Third Republic. On the other hand, the right after a century of forgetfulness, rediscovered the old patriotic slogans as the left discarded them. And it used them with considerable skill to its political advantage. But the difference between left- and right-wing patriotism is that defeat in 1870 brought to power a man determined to fight against heavy odds, Gambetta; while defeat in 1940 brought to power a man determined to capitulate before the enemy, Pétain. And yet it has to be recognized that the origins of this transformation are to be found in the policies of the same Gambetta who, no doubt deservedly, is commonly hailed as the Jacobin hero of French resistance in 1870–1.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 45-62
Author(s):  
Adam Wielomski

DIALECTICS “WE”–“ALIENS” IN RIGHT-WING POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1789–1945. PART IIThe aim of the author of this text is to polemicize with the stereotype according to which nationalism is a synonym of the “extreme right.” For this purpose the method of historical exemplification was used. In Part II we discuss examples of nationalisms in various European states between the years 1890 and 1945: France, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy. This is the epoch when nationalism denies its initial close relationship with the political and revolutionary left. Now it is in close relations with the right. During the Boulanger and Dreyfus affaires in France, the nationalists are on the political right. Their ideology is not only right-wing but also anti-Semitic. Sometimes openly racist Maurice Barrès. In general, however, French and Italian nationalists preach “state nationalism,” similar to the classic doctrine of raison d’état. In Spain and Portugal the right is strictly Catholic. This is the imperial right. We have here the dream of restoration of the Spanish Siglo de Oro. This project is antithetic to nationalism because it is universalist and supranational. It is different in Germany, where at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries the whole right is lit up by the vision of conquests, German empire, struggle of races. First, the Protestant, then also the German Catholic right is chauvinistic, racist and anti-Semitic. The article ends with reflections upon the relations between political right and the idea of nationalism.


Author(s):  
Martin Scheutz

Poverty and Institutional Poor Relief. The Misery of Responsibility. Poor relief in Lower Austria in the 19th century took place in an area of conflict between municipalities, the political districts and the state, the law on the right of domicile, amended in 1863, placing provision services primarily on the shoulders of the municipalities. The communes had to care for the local poor, the “push system” (Schubsystem) returned them to their home communes – but such care mostly proved inadequate. After the unbundling of institutional care for the poor via the foundation of general hospitals, ever more poorhouses dedicated to old-age care were built, but also hostels (Naturalverpflegestationen), which were principally aimed at jobseekers.


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