Counterinsurgency
This chapter analyzes existing literature on counterinsurgency and other approaches to internal conflict to build a foundation for the compellence theory of counterinsurgent success. Today's Western policy prescription for insurgency is based on the good governance approach. In this view, good governance is necessary to defeat insurgency because it is bad governance that causes insurgency. Greater representative governance and more public goods will build broad popular support for the government, attract civilian cooperation against the insurgency, and marginalize the insurgents. The chapter argues that counterinsurgency campaigns backed by great powers succeed when the counterinsurgent government forms a coalition with rival civilian and military elites who cooperate in exchange for personal or group gain, and when the government uses the resources provided by the new coalition to cut the flow of support to insurgents, most often by targeting civilians with brute force to control their behavior, as well as targeting the insurgency directly. The compellence theory considers counterinsurgency as primarily a domestic political process of violent state-building.