scholarly journals Egoistic punishment outcompetes altruistic punishment in the spatial public goods game

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Li ◽  
Yi Liu ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Haoxiang Xia
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Structured Population ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Cost

AbstractThe evolution of costly punishment is a puzzle due to cooperators’ second-order free-riding. Previous studies have proposed many solutions mainly focused on reducing the punishment cost or punishing second-order free riders directly or indirectly. We attempt to explain this confusion from the perspective of punishment motivation, which is why the punisher is willing to pay the cost. The answer is that the punisher is egoistic. Egoistic punishment aims to protect punishers’ own cooperative benefits shared by the defectors. In such case, egoistic punishers would pay a cost in punishing defectors and retrieve lost payoffs from defectors. Here, we examined the evolution and performance of egoistic punishment and compared it with typical altruistic punishment using classic peer-punishment and pool-punishment modes. Results showed egoistic punishment can evolve and effectively promote cooperation within a large parameter range, whether in a well-mixed or structured population, or through peer-punishment or pool-punishment modes. This result is also robust to different strategy-updating rules. The evolution under the pool-punishment mechanism is more complicated. The influence of parameters is counter-intuitive because of cycle dominance; namely, the cost is the key factor to control the level of cooperation and the fine determines the ratio of the punishers and cooperators. Compared with altruistic punishment, egoistic punishment can promote cooperation in a lower-fine and higher-cost area, especially in the pool punishment mode, and the egoistic punishers have stronger survivability. Egoistic punishers represent the natural fairness in a social system. Results revealed that focusing on individual equity can significantly promote collective cooperation. This study provides another explanation for the evolution of costly punishment.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

Punishment Leads to Cooperative Behavior in Structured Societies

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shade T. Shutters
Keyword(s):  
Social Structure ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Degree Distribution ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Structured Population ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Scale Free Networks

Altruistic punishment occurs when an agent incurs a cost to punish another but receives no material benefit for doing so. Despite the seeming irrationality of such behavior, humans in laboratory settings routinely pay to punish others even in anonymous, one-shot settings. Costly punishment is ubiquitous among social organisms in general and is increasingly accepted as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Yet if it is true that punishment explains cooperation, the evolution of altruistic punishment remains a mystery. In a series of computer simulations I give agents the ability to punish one another while playing a continuous prisoner's dilemma. In simulations without social structure, expected behavior evolves—agents do not punish and consequently no cooperation evolves. Likewise, in simulations with social structure but no ability to punish, no cooperation evolves. However, in simulations where agents are both embedded in a social structure and have the option to inflict costly punishment, cooperation evolves quite readily. This suggests a simple and broadly applicable explanation of cooperation for social organisms that have nonrandom social structure and a predisposition to punish one another. Results with scale-free networks further suggest that nodal degree distribution plays an important role in determining whether cooperation will evolve in a structured population.

scholarly journals Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Synergistic Effects ◽  
Evolutionary Stability ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Microscopic Mechanism ◽  
Spatial Pattern Formation ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Over Time

Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order freeriding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that non-cooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does act detrimental, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order freeriding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.

scholarly journals An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons

2012 ◽  
Vol 279 (1743) ◽  
pp. 3716-3721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arne Traulsen ◽  
Torsten Röhl ◽  
Manfred Milinski
Keyword(s):  
Second Order ◽  
Experimental Results ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Economic Experiment ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Police System

Punishment can stabilize costly cooperation and ensure the success of a common project that is threatened by free-riders. Punishment mechanisms can be classified into pool punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by a paid third party, (e.g. a police system or a sheriff), and peer punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by peers. Which punishment mechanism is preferred when both are concurrently available within a society? In an economic experiment, we show that the majority of subjects choose pool punishment, despite being costly even in the absence of defectors, when second-order free-riders, cooperators that do not punish, are also punished. Pool punishers are mutually enforcing their support for the punishment organization, stably trapping each other. Our experimental results show how organized punishment could have displaced individual punishment in human societies.

Return on Invesment (ROI) of Software Product: A Systematic Literature Review

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-57
Author(s):  
Rizqa Raaiqa Bintana ◽  
Putri Aisyiyah Rakhma Devi ◽  
Umi Laili Yuhana
Keyword(s):  
Return On Investment ◽  
Assessment Criteria ◽  
Software Product ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Rational Consideration ◽  
Actual Return ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Investment Models ◽  
The Impact

The quality of the software can be measured by its return on investment. Factors which may affect the return on investment (ROI) is the tangible factors (such as the cost) dan intangible factors (such as the impact of software to the users or stakeholder). The factor of the software itself are assessed through reviewing, testing, process audit, and performance of software. This paper discusses the consideration of return on investment (ROI) assessment criteria derived from the software and its users. These criteria indicate that the approach may support a rational consideration of all relevant criteria when evaluating software, and shows examples of actual return on investment models. Conducted an analysis of the assessment criteria that affect the return on investment if these criteria have a disproportionate effort that resulted in a return on investment of a software decreased. Index Terms - Assessment criteria, Quality assurance, Return on Investment, Software product

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Nodes with the highest control power play an important role at the final level of cooperation in directed networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Ebrahimi ◽  
Marzieh Yousefi ◽  
Farhad Shahbazi ◽  
Mohammad Ali Sheikh Beig Goharrizi ◽  
Ali Masoudi-Nejad
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Control Power ◽  
Final Level ◽  
Input Signals ◽  
Tumoral Cells ◽  
Power Play

AbstractControllability of complex networks aims to seek the lowest number of nodes (the driver nodes) that can control all the nodes by receiving the input signals. The concept of control centrality is used to determine the power of each node to control the network. The more a node controls the nodes through connections in the network, the more it has the power to control. Although the cooperative and free-rider strategies and the final level of cooperation in a population are considered and studied in the public goods game. However, it is yet to determine a solution to indicate the effectiveness of each member in changing the strategies of the other members. In a network, the choice of nodes effective in changing the other nodes’ strategies, as free-riders, will lead to lower cooperation and vice versa. This paper uses simulated and real networks to investigate that the nodes with the highest control power are more effective than the hubs, local, and random nodes in changing the strategies of the other nodes and the final level of cooperation. Results indicate that the nodes with the highest control power as free-riders, compared to the other sets being under consideration, can lead to a lower level of cooperation and are, therefore, more effective in changing the strategies of the other nodes. The obtained results can be considered in the treatment of cancer. So that, destroying the tumoral cells with the highest control power should be a priority as these cells have a higher capability to change the strategies of the other cells from cooperators to free-riders (healthy to tumoral).

Altruistic Punishment: The Golden Keystone of Human Cooperation and Social Stability?

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-284
Author(s):  
Peter Lewisch
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Altruistic Punishment ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Open Questions ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
Emotional Basis ◽  
Instrumental Goal

Abstract ‘Altruistic punishment’ (i.e., costly punishment that serves no instrumental goal for the punisher) could serve, as suggested by the pertinent experimental literature, as a powerful enforcer of social norms. This paper discusses foundations, extensions, and, in particular, limits and open questions of this concept-and it does so mostly based on experimental evidence provided by the author. Inter alia, the paper relates the (standard) literature on negative emotions as a trigger of second party punishment to more recent experimental findings on the phenomenon of ‘spontaneous cooperation’ and ‘spontaneous punishment’ and demonstrates its (tight) emotional basis. Furthermore, the paper discusses the potential for free riding on altruistic punishment. While providing valuable insights into the understanding of social order, ‘altruistic punishment’ is thus not the golden keystone of social stability.

From a Seed to a Need: the Growth of Shape Memory Applications in Europe.

1991 ◽  
Vol 246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ir. J. Van Humbeeck
Keyword(s):  
Shape Memory ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Marketing Research ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Manufacturing Cost ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Place Promotion ◽  
Memory Applications ◽  
The Cost

AbstractA more systematic marketing research approach has finally revealed good ideas anticipating a market need for the use of shape memory alloys. The success of those new ideas, prototypes and applications are analysed in terms of “the value of the function”, defined as the importance of the function divided by the cost of providing the function. A high importance and/or a low cost of the function are thus the basic requirements for the successful introduction of shape memory applications. Attention is also paid to the way how the 4 P's, product, price, place, promotion (the marketing mix) are applied by the European companies. Those different items will be illustrated on the basis of some small-, medium- and largescale applications, used in different markets. “to the point research”, fundamental and applied, on material properties as well as on manufacturing (cost reduction) is being discussed as the key factor to increase the function value.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document