scholarly journals The Janus-Faced Nature of Philosophy of Science: Eleven Theses

Axiomathes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Buzzoni
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Critical Reflection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Science Philosophy ◽  
The One ◽  
Common Sense Knowledge

AbstractElsewhere I have tried to provide the justification of both the irreducible (transcendental) distinction of science and philosophy and their inevitable (naturalistic) complementarity. Unlike empirical science, philosophy has no limit whatever as far as its possible objects are concerned. To say that there is no limit whatever to the possible objects of philosophy is to say that, strictly speaking, it has no object at all and must find its object outside itself, that is, in common sense knowledge and the natural and human sciences. Against the background of this conception, the paper argues that philosophy of science, as a critical reflection on common sense knowledge and the natural or human sciences, inherits from philosophy in general this two-faced Janus nature, which in the philosophy of science shapes the epistemological status of the discipline in an even more prominent way. To show this in detail, the paper enunciates eleven theses that derive from the intimate connection of unity and distinction that exists between philosophy of science on the one hand and the particular and specialized scientific knowledge on the other.

Ontology and Perception

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-58
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Galko ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Complex Environment ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Ontological Question ◽  
The One ◽  
Bodies Of Water ◽  
The Relationship

The ontological question of what there is, from the perspective of common sense, is intricately bound to what can be perceived. The above observation, when combined with the fact that nouns within language can be divided between nouns that admit counting, such as ‘pen’ or ‘human’, and those that do not, such as ‘water’ or ‘gold’, provides the starting point for the following investigation into the foundations of our linguistic and conceptual phenomena. The purpose of this paper is to claim that such phenomena are facilitated by, on the one hand, an intricate cognitive capacity, and on the other by the complex environment within which we live. We are, in a sense, cognitively equipped to perceive discrete instances of matter such as bodies of water. This equipment is related to, but also differs from, that devoted to the perception of objects such as this computer. Behind this difference in cognitive equipment underlies a rich ontology, the beginnings of which lies in the distinction between matter and objects. The following paper is an attempt to make explicit the relationship between matter and objects and also provide a window to our cognition of such entities.

scholarly journals Major projects in urban sites: Challenge of the Builders

2018 ◽  
Vol 149 ◽  
pp. 02003
Author(s):  
Ammar Dhouib
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Construction Projects ◽  
The Other ◽  
Observational Method ◽  
Urban Construction ◽  
Environmental Requirements ◽  
The One ◽  
Urban Sites ◽  
Displacement Measurements

Faced with the complexity of urban construction projects and difficulties in the field, engineers must, on the one hand, dimension with rigor and common sense the foundations with all the requirements of today of quality, conformity and respect of deadlines and budget and take into account, on the other hand, safety and environmental requirements and societal and sustainable development criteria, the purpose of this communication is to present concrete projects of foundations and excavation deep in geologically heterogeneous and highly urbanized sites, with monitoring and displacement measurements in order to compare predictions with reality and to promote the "observational method".

scholarly journals A Dilemma for the Scientific Realist

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Realist ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The One ◽  
Evidential Basis ◽  
Apparent Conflict

This note poses a dilemma for scientific realism which stems from the apparent conflict between science and common sense. On the one hand, we may accept scientific realism and agree that there is a conflict between science and common sense. If we do this, we remove the evidential basis for science and have no reason to accept science in the first place. On the other hand, we may accept scientific realism and endorse common sense. If we do this, we must reject the conflict between science and common sense. The dilemma is to be resolved by distinguishing between basic common sense and widely held beliefs. Basic common sense survives the advance of science and may serve as the evidential basis for science.

scholarly journals Is Science Eliminating Ordinary Talk?

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-41
Author(s):  
Louis Caruana
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Science Philosophy ◽  
Actual Operation ◽  
Theories Of Meaning ◽  
Methodology Of Science ◽  
Broad Overview

Discussions dealing with natural science, philosophy and common sense are bound to draw on long-standing debates dealing with realism, methodology of science, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, theories of meaning, and other topics. Instead of presenting a broad overview of these main trends, which will necessarily be superficial, I will do a kind of case study. The aim is to present just one particular debate which is of relevance to current research. The presentation is meant to give a taste of how these various long-standing debates are brought to bear on a specific issue. In this way, the very practice of engaging in a particular area of philosophy of science will serve as a platform from where the major areas can be seen in actual operation. The paper has four sections: the nature of ordinary talk; the ontological implications of this; the recently proposed account of the mental; an evaluation.

scholarly journals Soldati e neuropsichiatria nell'Italia della Grande Guerra

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Romano
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Professional Ethics ◽  
Critical Reflection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Military Psychiatry ◽  
Constant Tension ◽  
War Effort ◽  
The One ◽  
The Great War ◽  
The Relationship

Against the backdrop of a critical reflection on the psychiatric concepts of organicism and predisposition to mental illness, the research investigates the relationship between psychiatry and the Great War from a perspective that considers the complexity of the orientations assumed by both the Italian alienists on war pathologies and the health practices implemented towards soldiers. The study highlights the comparison/clash between two totally different approaches forced to coexist during the conflict: on one side, the one from military psychiatry, and on the other the distinctive one from civil asylums. The two perspectives were not always clearly separated, but it is possible to detect a constant tension between the duties towards the war effort and the professional ethics dictated by the neuropsychiatric discipline.

Scientific realism and antirealism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur Fine
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Empirical Adequacy ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Dual Character ◽  
Objects Of Knowledge ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Existence

Traditionally, scientific realism asserts that the objects of scientific knowledge exist independently of the minds or acts of scientists and that scientific theories are true of that objective (mind-independent) world. The reference to knowledge points to the dual character of scientific realism. On the one hand it is a metaphysical (specifically, an ontological) doctrine, claiming the independent existence of certain entities. On the other hand it is an epistemological doctrine asserting that we can know what individuals exist and that we can find out the truth of the theories or laws that govern them. Opposed to scientific realism (hereafter just ‘realism’) are a variety of antirealisms, including phenomenalism and empiricism. Recently two others, instrumentalism and constructivism, have posed special challenges to realism. Instrumentalism regards the objects of knowledge pragmatically, as tools for various human purposes, and so takes reliability (or empirical adequacy) rather than truth as scientifically central. A version of this, fictionalism, contests the existence of many of the objects favoured by the realist and regards them as merely expedient means to useful ends. Constructivism maintains that scientific knowledge is socially constituted, that ‘facts’ are made by us. Thus it challenges the objectivity of knowledge, as the realist understands objectivity, and the independent existence that realism is after. Conventionalism, holding that the truths of science ultimately rest on man-made conventions, is allied to constructivism. Realism and antirealism propose competing interpretations of science as a whole. They even differ over what requires explanation, with realism demanding that more be explained and antirealism less.

ANALISIS TERHADAP SOAL PENILAIAN AKHIR SEMESTER TINGKAT SD/MI DALAM PERSPEKTIF HIGH ORDER THINK SKILLS

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (33) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yudha Andana Prawira ◽  
Titim Kurnia
Keyword(s):  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Critical Reflection ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
High Order ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
National Education ◽  
The One ◽  
High Level ◽  
High Level Thinking

The National Education World is currently trying to improve the ability of its students to think critically and creatively. One of these efforts has been pursued through evaluations that also lead to critical reflection. This research is a descriptive analysis of the final semester evaluation questions that are examined from the point of view of high-level thinking [HOTS]. The reference to the HOTS criteria is that the researcher refers to the opinions of King and his friends. From the manuscript data, the issues examined are samples from the Bandung area. The results of the analysis show that 10 out of 15 HOTS ranges proposed by King are already included in the scripts made by the teachers. On the one hand, it shows the teacher's creativity in compiling questions. On the other hand, all these questions do not refer to the HOTS criteria as planned. Therefore, there is a need to increase teachers' skills in compiling scripts as HOTS. This increase can be done through teacher training.Keywords: Evaluation, HOTS, critical thinking and creativity thingking

Infoxication 2.0

2009 ◽  
pp. 60-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Benito-Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Web 2.0 ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Time Management ◽  
Information Overload ◽  
Future Generation ◽  
Language Learner ◽  
The Other ◽  
Know How ◽  
The One

This chapter reviews the issue of information overload, introducing the concept of “infoxication 2.0” as one of the main downsides to Web 2.0. The chapter describes some of its potential effects on the learner, on the one hand, and puts forward some solutions to deal with the informational and communication barrage worsened by Web 2.0 plethora, on the other. The review of the issue reveals that although the problem of information overload has existed for many years, the massive abundance of fragmented Web 2.0 informational and communicative resources for the language learner might become an obstacle, i.e. it is often difficult to find what’s useful. Two kinds of solutions are identified, those based on common sense and time management, and those based on technology agents such as RSS readers and especially the future generation of RSS mash-up tools. An emphasis is placed on the role of the teacher as the facilitator to provide the know-how on these tools.

The Failure of Self-Consciousness in Sartre's Being and Nothingness

Dialogue ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-756
Author(s):  
Kathleen Wider
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Sense Of Self ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Reflective Consciousness ◽  
Central Tenet ◽  
Ultimate Failure ◽  
The One

The central tenet in the ontology Sartre describes and seeks to defend in Being and Nothingness is that being divides into the for-itself and the in-itself. Self-consciousness characterizes being-for-itself and distinguishes it from being-in-itself. What it means for a being to exist for itself is that it is self-conscious. How Sartre characterizes self-consciousness in Being and Nothingness is, however, a question that remains to be asked. There is no simple answer to this question. For Sartre, there are really several levels of self-consciousness: the self-consciousness of consciousness at the pre-reflective level, at the level of reflection (both pure and impure) and at the level of being-for-others. There is a profound difference between the self-consciousness of being-for-others and impure reflection, on the one hand, and the self-consciousness of reflection and pre-reflective consciousness, on the other. With being-for-others and impure reflection, self-consciousness involves the attempt to grasp the self as an object for consciousness. Although the nature of this attempt and the reasons for its ultimate failure differ at each level, these levels are bound together by a common sense of self-consciousness as a consciousness of the self as an object.

Religion's ‘Foundation in Reason’: The Common Sense of Hume's Natural History

1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 565-581
Author(s):  
M. Jamie Ferreira
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rational Justification ◽  
Rational Argument ◽  
Regular Model ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One ◽  
The Right ◽  
Forceful Critique ◽  
Critique Of Religion

David Hume’s critique of religion reveals what seems to be a vacillation in his commitment to an argument-based paradigm of legitimate believing. On the one hand, Hume assumes such a traditional (argumentbased) model of rational justification of beliefs in order to point to the weakness of some classical arguments for religious belief (e.g., the design argument), to chastise the believer for extrapolating to a conclusion which outstrips its evidential warrant. On the other hand, Hume, ‘mitigated’ or naturalist skeptic that he is, at other times rejects an argumentbased paradigm of certainty and truth, and so sees as irrelevant the traditional or ‘regular’ model of rational justification; he places a premium on instinctive belief, as both unavoidable and (usually) more reliable than reasoning. On this view, a forceful critique of religion would have to fault it, not for failing to meet criteria of rational argument (failing to proportion belief to the evidence), but (as Hume sometimes seems to) for failing to be the right sort of instinct.

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