Inferentialism, Context-Shifting and Background Assumptions
AbstractIn this paper I present how the normative inferentialist can make the distinction between sentence meaning and content of the utterance. The inferentialist can understand sentence meaning as a role conferred to that sentence by the rules governing inferential transitions and content of the utterance as just a part of sentence meaning. I attempt to show how such a framework can account for prominent scenarios presented by contextualists as a challenge to semantic minimalism/literalism. I argue that inferentialism can address contextualist challenges in a simple and effective manner by understanding sentence meaning as broad, but invariant.
1997 ◽
pp. 191-197
2017 ◽
Vol 7
(9)
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pp. 30
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2020 ◽
Vol 13
(4)
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pp. 798-807