The Myth of the Democratic Advantage

2015 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rory Truex
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Advantage

Finding the “Democratic Advantage” in Sovereign Bond Ratings: The Importance of Strong Courts, Property Rights Protection, and the Rule of Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 515-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen Biglaiser ◽  
Joseph L. Staats
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Bond Ratings ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Sovereign Bond ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Property Rights Protection ◽  
Democratic Advantage

AbstractMuch scholarship in the political economy literature has investigated the influence of the democratic advantage on sovereign bond ratings by credit rating agencies (CRAs). Missing from earlier work, however, is inquiry into the effects on bond ratings of factors that lower political risk, such as adherence to the rule of law, the presence of a strong and independent judicial system, and protection of property rights. Using panel data for up to thirty-six developing countries from 1996 to 2006, we find that rule of law, strong and independent courts, and protection of property rights have significant positive effects on bond ratings. Policymakers wanting to obtain higher bond ratings and increased revenue from bond sales would do well to heed the message contained in these findings.

The Challenges of Civil Resistance Transitions

2020 ◽  
pp. 20-43
Author(s):  
Jonathan C. Pinckney
Keyword(s):  
Political Mobilization ◽  
Transitional Period ◽  
Political Transition ◽  
Political Transitions ◽  
Civil Resistance ◽  
Nonviolent Resistance ◽  
Novel Theory ◽  
Regime Types ◽  
Democratic Advantage ◽  
The Relationship

What are the effects of nonviolent (civil) resistance on political transitions? This chapter examines what we know about the relationship between nonviolent resistance and political order and uses that established knowledge to argue for a novel theory of civil resistance transitions. Civil resistance gives countries a democratic advantage relative to other ways of initiating a political transition. But that advantage must be carried through the uncertainty of the transitional period. Two key challenges can undermine this advantage: a failure to maintain high levels of social and political mobilization and a failure to direct mobilization away from revolutionary maximalist goals and tactics into new institutional avenues. The chapter details the mechanisms of civil resistance transitions that these challenges undermine and the unique regime types that variation in these challenges leads to.

The Democratic Advantage by the Numbers

2020 ◽  
pp. 53-60
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
International System ◽  
Quantitative Evidence ◽  
Major Powers ◽  
Global Power ◽  
Form Of Government ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
Democratic Advantage ◽  
Significant Support ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines quantitative evidence for a link between a state’s domestic political institutions and its power in the international system. Using standard international relations datasets, it finds significant support for the democratic advantage idea. It is notable how often democracies appear at or near the top of global power rankings. And this is even more remarkable when one considers how historically rare this form of government has been. This chapter finds that, on average, democracies possess more power than autocracies. It reveals that they are more likely to find themselves among the major powers and at the very top of the global distribution of power. Finally, it also demonstrates that, when comparing democratic and autocratic competitors from a common baseline and watching their power trajectories unfold over time, the trend-lines favor democracies. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the research design for the case studies to follow.

The Democratic Advantage in Theory

2020 ◽  
pp. 11-35
Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Social Science ◽  
Social Science Research ◽  
Science Research ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
International Capital ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Key Terms ◽  
Democratic Advantage

This chapter puts forth the argument that democracies enjoy built-in advantages in long-run geopolitical competitions. It begins by defining key terms, such as “democracy” and “autocracy.” Then, drawing on the writing of political philosophers, such as Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu, and contemporary social science research, this chapter explains the unique economic, diplomatic, and military advantages that democracies bring to the international arena. These advantages include: higher long-run rates of economic growth, access to international capital, larger and more reliable alliances, and a tendency to win international wars. It then explains how these advantages grant democracies an edge in amassing wealth and power, becoming great powers, and achieving global hegemony at rates greater than their autocratic rivals.

The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition

2003 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth A. Schultz ◽  
Barry R. Weingast
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rates ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
International Competition ◽  
Access To Credit ◽  
Tax Smoothing ◽  
Liberal Government ◽  
Financial Power ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Democratic Advantage

Despite their presumed liabilities, institutions associated with democracy serve as a source of power in prolonged international competition by increasing the financial resources that states can bring to bear. The theory of sovereign debt suggests that a state's ability to raise money through public borrowing is enhanced when debtholders have mechanisms for sanctioning state leaders in the event of default. Institutions associated with liberal government provide such mechanisms. All other things being equal, states that possess these institutions enjoy superior access to credit and lower interest rates than do states in which the sovereign has more discretion to default unilaterally. Liberal states can not only raise more money from a given economic base but can also pursue tax-smoothing policies that minimize economic distortions. The ability to finance competition in a manner that is consistent with long-term economic growth generates a significant advantage in prolonged rivalries. These claims are explored by analyzing the Anglo-French rivalry (1688–1815) and the Cold War.

Sovereign Bond Ratings and the Democratic Advantage

2008 ◽  
Vol 41 (8) ◽  
pp. 1092-1116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen Biglaiser ◽  
Brian Hicks ◽  
Caitlin Huggins
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Bond Ratings ◽  
Heckman Model ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Portfolio Flows ◽  
Sovereign Bond ◽  
Democratic Advantage

As developing countries expose portfolio investors to potential high risk, it is expected that investors will follow the advice of credit rating agencies (CRAs) before sending capital abroad. Controlling for political and economic explanations in the literature, the authors use panel data for 50 developing countries from 1987 to 2003 to determine if changes in CRA ratings affect portfolio flows. Using a two-stage Heckman model, they find that countries that are under newer political institutions and facing economic challenges are more likely to be selected by portfolio investors because they offer risk premia, but that CRA ratings and democracy have significant positive signaling effects on the countries that receive the largest private equity inflows. In fact, democracy and bond ratings are the most important for the poorest developing countries. The results suggest the significance of CRA ratings for equity investors and contribute a revision for the democratic advantage debate.

scholarly journals Playing Defense in the Illinois 10th: Surviving "Obama-mania" in the Shadow of Chicago

2009 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 137-154
Author(s):  
Wayne E. Steger
Keyword(s):  
High Energy ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Energy Prices ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Congressional District ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Status ◽  
Partisan Identification ◽  
Limit Solutions ◽  
Democratic Advantage

Mark Kirk, Republican Representative for the 10th congressional district of Illinois, faced a daunting reelection challenge in 2008. As noted earlier, national conditions favored the Democrats in 2008 with an unpopular Republican president, increasingly unpopular wars, high energy prices, a looming recession, increasing problems with the health care system, and growing budget deficits that limit solutions. National polls indicated wide-spread public dissatisfaction with the status quo on a wide range of issues and increasing support for “change”. Further, the Democrats won control of the House and Senate in 2006 and more recent polls indicated a growing Democratic advantage in national partisan identification. Finally, Democrats nominated a charismatic presidential candidate who excited Democratic voters while Republicans nominated one who drew temperate support from segments of the Republican base. Still, Mark Kirk was able to defend his seat and score a reelection win in this difficult environment.

Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage

2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 709-738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Beaulieu ◽  
Gary W. Cox ◽  
Sebastian Saiegh
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Regime Type ◽  
Gdp Per Capita ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Credit Access ◽  
Access To Credit ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Democratic Advantage

AbstractThe literature exploiting historical data generally supports the democratic advantage thesis, which holds that democracies can sell more bonds on better terms than their authoritarian counterparts. However, studies of more recent—and extensive—data sets find that democracies have received no more favorable bond ratings from credit rating agencies than otherwise similar autocracies; and have been no less prone to default. These findings raise the question: where is the democratic advantage? Our answer is that previous assessments of the democratic advantage have typically (1) ignored the democratic advantage in credit access; (2) failed to account for selection effects; and (3) treated GDP per capita as an exogenous variable, ignoring the many arguments that suggest economic development is endogenous to political institutions. We develop an estimator of how regime type affects credit access and credit ratings analogous to the “reservation wage” model of labor supply and treat GDP per capita as an endogenous variable. Our findings indicate that the democratic advantage in the postwar era has two components: first, better access to credit (most autocracies cannot even enter the international bond markets); and second, better ratings, once propensity to enter the market is controlled and GDP per capita is endogenized.

Sectional Differences in Partisan Bias and Electoral Responsiveness in US House Elections, 1850–1980

1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Brady ◽  
Bernard Grofman
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Wall Street Journal ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Critical Importance ◽  
Incumbency Advantage ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
Partisan Bias ◽  
The Us ◽  
Electoral Change ◽  
Democratic Advantage

In this Note we challenge the claim asserted in a 1984 Wall Street Journal editorial that partisan gerrymandering by Democratic-controlled state legislatures is the principal reason for the inability of Republicans to translate their national share of votes proportionally into seats in the US House of Representatives. In contrast to previous work, we show the critical importance of sectional (South/non-South) differences for understanding the dynamics of electoral change at the congressional level. We argue that the inability of Republicans to translate votes effectively into congressional seats is largely a product of wasted Republican votes in the South, although we recognize that a handful of states (e.g., California) are significantly gerrymandered against Republicans, and we also recognize that part of the reason for the present-day Democratic advantage in the House is an incumbency advantage that benefits the party that controls most seats.

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