An examination of hybrid organized criminal groups’ alliances with terrorist groups

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reggie Kramer
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Criminal Groups

Functionality of Kenya Prisons Service in Managing Terrorist Prison Criminal Group Activities at Kamiti Maximum Prison, Nairobi Kenya

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 611-620
Author(s):  
Jane Waithira Kimani Kinyanzui
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Group ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Assessment Instruments ◽  
Group Activities ◽  
Descriptive Research ◽  
Rehabilitation Programs ◽  
Close Supervision ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Use Of The Internet ◽  
Criminal Groups

Prisons all over the world have become the ‘epicenter’ of terrorist groups' activities that include violent extremism, radicalization and recruitments into terrorist prison criminal groups. Although many scholars, especially in Kenya, have not scratched this area, the fact remains that prisons have become a center of terrorist recruitment, strengthening, interconnecting, organizing, and conducting terrorist actions with subjects outside of prison. This study, therefore, was designed to evaluate the Kenya Prisons Service's functionality in managing Terrorist Prison criminal group Activities at Kamiti Maximum Prison. Three objectives focused this study; to examine the nature of available Terrorist Prison Criminal Groups Management strategies at the institution; to identify the anti-Terrorist Prison Criminal Groups Management gaps, and finally, to identify activities associated with Terrorist Prison Criminal Groups at Kamiti Maximum Prison. The paper employed a descriptive research design and a hybrid methodology where qualitative and quantitative data were obtained. Results showed that the most embraced terrorist management techniques were separation/isolation as it allows for close supervision and use of risk assessment instruments amongst other measures. Results also showed that clandestine use of the internet while in prison was associated with the recruitment of other prisoners into terrorist groups, Islamist militant prison radicalization, and external influences. The study findings showed that the main ways to mitigate the Terrorist Prison Criminal Group activities in Kenya included creating employment opportunities for the youth, creating rehabilitation programs for terror convicts, and offering education to the public. Amongst other measures, this was perceived as mitigation to reduce terrorist groups. The study recommended judges and magistrates to only incarcerate the most serious criminals and prefer non-custodial sentences for petty offenders. This will better manage the radicalization of petty prisoners. Key words: Inmates, terrorist criminals, Prison, Isolation, Concentration, Separation.

Terrorism in Colombia

2003 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 80-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel Darío Paredes Zapata
Keyword(s):  
Rural Areas ◽  
Poor Country ◽  
National Level ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Capital City ◽  
Internally Displaced ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Drug Manufacturing ◽  
Criminal Groups

AbstractColombia is a poor country that has been plagued by ongoing violence for more than 120 years. During the 1940s, subversive terrorist groups emerged in rural areas of the country when criminal groups came under the influence of Communism, and were later transformed into contemporary groups, such as the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) or National Liberation Army and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionares de Colombia (FARC) or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). Paramilitary terrorist groups emerged in response to subversive groups and were later transformed into contemporary groups, such as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) or United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia.Terrorism has placed an enormous burden on modern Colombia. From 1995 to 2002, 9,435 people were killed by terrorism-related events, of which 5,864 were killed by subversive terrorist activities and 3,571 were killed by paramilitary terrorist activities. In 2002, at least nineteen attacks produced 10 or more casualties, of which 18 were bombings. In 2002, terrorists killed at least 12 mayors, 71 legislators, and internally displaced 300,000 persons from their homes. Since terrorist groups in Colombia are typically supported by drug manufacturing and trafficking, it has been difficult at times to distinguish violence due to terrorism from violence due to illicit drug trafficking. Terrorism has also had a major adverse effect on the economy, with restricted travel, loss of economic resources, and lack of economic investment. In addition to political, military, and commercial targets, terrorists have specifically targeted healthcare infrastructure and personnel.At the national and local levels, much emergency planning and preparedness has taken place for terrorism-related events. The Centro Regulador de Urgencias (CRU) or Emergency Regulation Center in Bogota plays a major role in coordinating local prehospital and hospital emergency response in the capital city and the national level where necessary.

Pak-US Strategic Partnership and Challenge of Internal Radical Symbiosis

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-64
Author(s):  
Asif Salim ◽  
Holli Semetko ◽  
Sania Zehraa
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Current Paper ◽  
Strategic Partnership ◽  
Al Qaeda ◽  
Modus Operandi ◽  
Security Challenges ◽  
Common Strategy ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Criminal Groups ◽  
The Impact

Pakistan’s efforts against the terrorism has entirely changed the security landscape of Pakistan. Growing waves of extremism, militancy and sectarianism emerged as a fundamental threat to the security of the state as the aftermath of 9/11. Different terrorist groups gathered under the umbrella of al-Qaeda and posed grave security challenges to the state. Although, their doctrinal philosophy and aims were stridently at contrast, but security situation compelled them to jointly chalk out a common strategy. Moreover, militants’ splinter groups with new leadership find out new source of funding which denied the upper hand of the security vanguards on them. The current paper at the first stage supplies deep analysis of the birth of various militant groups and on the next stage discusses different Jihadi, sectarian, and criminal groups’ closed nexus and their modus operandi. The outcome of the discussion shows that the benefits of marriage of convenience between the security apparatus and radical militants were less, but the impact was generational.

scholarly journals THE LINK BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM

2017 ◽  
pp. 085
Author(s):  
Ana Prokić
Keyword(s):  
Organized Crime ◽  
National Level ◽  
Criminal Policy ◽  
Fund Raising ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Criminal Groups ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Favorable Conditions ◽  
Financial Transactions

The heightened control of financial transactions in the post 9/11 society significantly curbed the fund-raising activities aimed at financing terrorism. Terrorist groups were forced to evolve and find new ways of financing their activities, while transnational criminal organizations adapted to the new circumstances by turning into powerful hybrid criminal-terrorist entities. These traditionally separate phenomena have begun to reveal many operational and organizational similarities. Globalization of the economy has created favorable conditions for terrorist organizations and criminal groups to coordinate their activities, to cooperate and share their resources, whereas both national and international legislation have unfortunately failed to keep pace with the evolving development of crime and terrorism. This article aims to examine the individual characteristics of organized crime and terrorism by pointing out to their similarities and differences, and to analyze the complexity of the crime-terror nexus. Adequate anti-terrorist and anti-criminal policy at the national level as well as globally rests on understanding each problem separately as well as their versatile correlations. Otherwise, there is a risk of a theoretical "fusion" of one problem into another which may generate problems in combating organized crime and terrorism. The author highlights the importance of acknowledging and understanding the link between crime and terror groups as the first step towards formulating an effective state response to this evolving threat. 

The Crime–Terror Nexus

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katharine Petrich
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Organizational Behavior ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Criminal Activity ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Security Threat ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Criminal Groups

The crime–terror nexus is the convergence of two types of disruptive nonstate group activities, crime and terrorism. The phrase can also be used to refer to cooperation between criminal and terrorist groups. When conceptualizing the crime–terror nexus, it’s helpful to categorize relationships in three ways. To achieve nexus status, groups either collaborate, combine, or convert. The most common presentation of nexus (or hybrid) groups is terrorist “conversion,” when a purely terrorist organization transitions into a more diversified model, rather than criminal groups moving toward political violence (though there are some notable exceptions) or two groups of different types “joining forces.” Responses to the crime–terror nexus have been uneven. Organized crime and terrorism research have traditionally been siloed from each other, with academics, policymakers, and law enforcement specializing in one or the other—an artificial divide that has become particularly problematic given the modern interconnectedness of political and economic systems wrought by globalization. Traditional security thinking is biased against crime–terror convergence because it emphasizes the difference in motivation between criminal and terrorist groups. Adherents have argued that any such relationships would be transactional and short-lived because criminal groups are interested in remaining out of the public eye, while terrorist groups are explicitly interested in drawing attention to themselves. However, this perspective misses both the potential benefits of diversified activities for violent nonstate groups, and the idea that groups can pursue a range of goals simultaneously across different levels of the organization. Notable exceptions to this institutional siloing include “deep web” and “dark networks” research, which have identified criminal–extremist relationships as relying on similar infrastructure and thus persisting over a longer time span. Both law enforcement and researchers should take their cue from this wholistic orientation. Siloing crime and terrorism from one another presents operational problems: while these groups and their activities may move easily between criminal and political violence, states often separate their law enforcement from their military and domestic security agencies, creating bureaucratic hurdles for effective disruption of hybrid groups. A small cadre of researchers, however, have begun to rectify these artificial disciplinary boundaries. Recent literature on the crime–terror nexus can be broadly categorized into four major buckets: the causes and enabling conditions that allow for such interactions, the spectrum of possible relationships, the ways that groups change as they move into the other’s area of operation, and the policy implications for melded groups. Drawing on work across criminology, sociology, political economy, history, and organizational behavior, in addition to political science, we can more effectively map and understand the contours of the crime–terror nexus. Criminally diversified terrorist groups are a distinct security threat because they are more adaptable, resilient, and entrenched than their traditionally resourced counterparts. Further, criminal activity may alter a group’s long-term political goals, making negotiated settlements and demobilization agreements more challenging. By including the crime–terror nexus in assessments, both academics and policymakers can make more accurate assessments of the contours of low-intensity and asymmetric warfare, leading to better policy outcomes, durable institution building, and increased protections for populations impacted by violent nonstate actors.

scholarly journals Prospects and Problems of the Use of New Order PMSC in East Africa

2021 ◽  
pp. 84-98
Author(s):  
A. Kupriyanov ◽  
I. Kramnik
Keyword(s):  
East Africa ◽  
Coast Guard ◽  
New Order ◽  
East African ◽  
Trade Networks ◽  
Nation States ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Slave Traders ◽  
Criminal Groups ◽  
Drug Traffickers

In recent decades, some researchers and experts have written a lot about the fact that the monopoly of nation-states on external violence is gradually disappearing, and non-state entities are becoming more and more proactive, challenging the state. Among these actors are criminal groups, underground trade networks, smugglers, slave traders, drug traffickers, gun runners, terrorist groups, pirates. All of them pose so-called non-traditional threats and challenges to states. In the context of the new Cold War, their activities are intensifying. This article is devoted to the analysis of the situation in the coastal waters of East Africa, one of the so-called gray zones, where non-state shadow actors are especially active. The authors investigate the capabilities of the East African states to withstand non-traditional maritime challenges and threats and come to the conclusion that these states are unable to cope on their own. The great powers, on the other hand, are focused on confronting each other and have no capacity to divert forces for operations to maintain order in distant regions. The authors believe that in these conditions, Russia is faced with new opportunities: it can create and send to the region private maritime security companies of a new type, New Order PMSC, which will be financed through a contract with the client state and at the same time will help to strengthen Russia's influence. Unlike ordinary PMSCs, they are not interested in dragging out the conflict, their goal is to eliminate hotbeds of danger and prepare the coast guard forces of client states to deal with potential threats. The activities of these companies will be equally beneficial to the states of East Africa and Russia. The authors propose an approximate composition of such PMSCs, outline the goals and objectives they face, and make certain that with the help of relatively low costs, Russia can improve the effectiveness of its policy in the region.

Understanding Suicide Terrorism

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (04) ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
A. Speckhard
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Suicide Terrorism ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Global Migration ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Single Region ◽  
Extensive Field ◽  
The World ◽  
Terrorist Groups

SummaryAs a terror tactic, suicide terrorism is one of the most lethal as it relies on a human being to deliver and detonate the device. Suicide terrorism is not confined to a single region or religion. On the contrary, it has a global appeal, and in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan it has come to represent an almost daily reality as it has become the weapon of choice for some of the most dreaded terrorist organizations in the world, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Drawing on over two decades of extensive field research in five distinct world regions, specifically the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, Russia, and the Balkans, the author discusses the origins of modern day suicide terrorism, motivational factors behind suicide terrorism, its global migration, and its appeal to modern-day terrorist groups to embrace it as a tactic.

Management of deradicalisation in the UK: reflections of a clinical psychologist

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Feryad A. Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Psychologist ◽  
Healthcare Team ◽  
Psychosocial Issues ◽  
Muslim Community ◽  
Home Office ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Violent Action ◽  
Clinical Counselling ◽  
The Uk

Radicalisation to violent action is not just a problem in foreign lands. Research has identified numerous politico–psychosocial factors to explain why young people from the UK are now joining terrorist groups such as ISIS. Our understanding has been expanded by the accounts of “returnees” who have subsequently either self-deradicalised or joined a government deradicalisation programme in the role of an Intervention Provider (IP). These individuals are now key to the deradicalisation programme. This article presents the reflections of a clinical psychologist who worked within a social healthcare team managing psychosocial issues related to radicalisation, in conjunction with an allocated IP. The project involved individuals from the Muslim community and, as such, issues discussed are specific to this group. It is acknowledged that the process in general is universally applicable to all groups though specifics may vary (under Trust agreement, details may not be discussed). This article also aims to share basic information on the current Home Office deradicalisation programme and raises questions about the current intervention. It also offers reflections on how the work of IPs may be facilitated and supported by clinical/counselling psychologists and psychotherapists.

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