Technically Allowed: Federal Scrutiny of Stanford University's Indirect Cost Expenditures and the Changing Context for Research Universities in the Post-Cold War Era

2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-127
Author(s):  
Brent D. Maher

Stanford University's indirect cost rates for federally sponsored research dramatically increased from 58 percent in 1980 to 78 percent in 1991. Faculty frustration with increasing rates and scrutiny from a zealous government contracting officer culminated in a congressional inquiry into Stanford's indirect cost accounting practices in 1990 and 1991. The investigation revealed controversial luxury expenses charged to the government, including a yacht and antiques for the Stanford president's home, which attracted extensive public attention. Stanford president Donald Kennedy admitted some expenses were accounting errors but defended many expenses as permissible under government rules. Stanford's aggressive overhead recovery practices represent the institution's struggle to adapt to a changing economy for sponsored research in the twilight of the Cold War. The congressional response, which included a cap on administrative cost recovery for all universities, highlighted how shifting federal priorities—from defense research to deficit reduction—strained the relationship between the federal government and academic science.

This first-ever history of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) is told through the reflections of its eight chairs in the period from the end of the Cold War until 2017. Coeditors Robert Hutchings and Gregory Treverton add a substantial introduction placing the NIC in its historical context going all the way back to the Board of National Estimates in the 1940s, as well as a concluding chapter that highlights key themes and judgments. The historic mission of this remarkable but little-understood organization is strategic intelligence assessment in service of senior American foreign policymakers. It has been at the center of every critical foreign policy issue during the period covered by this volume: helping shape America’s post–Cold War strategies, confronting sectarian conflicts around the world, meeting the new challenge of international terrorism, and now assessing the radical restructuring of the global order. Each chapter places its particular period of the NIC’s history in context (the global situation, the administration, the intelligence community) and assesses the most important issues with which the NIC grappled during the period, acknowledging failures as well as claiming successes. With the creation of the director of national intelligence in 2005, the NIC’s mission mushroomed to include direct intelligence support to the main policymaking committees in the government. The mission shift took the NIC directly into the thick of the action but may have come at the expense of weakening its historic role of providing over-the horizon strategic analysis.


Author(s):  
Damien Van Puyvelde

This chapter charts and explains the rise of intelligence outsourcing in the post-Cold War era. In the 1990s, the private sector led the information technology revolution and became an indispensable asset for the intelligence community. Meanwhile government policies downsized the government intelligence workforce and a number of experienced officials moved to the private sector. Intelligence contracting boomed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks because the private sector offered a pool of knowledge and capabilities that managers deemed necessary at the time. The government hired thousands of contractors to intensify the national intelligence effort rapidly, and outsourcing diversified to an unprecedented level. In the atmosphere of emergency that characterized the early days of the global war on terrorism, this expansion was not planned, and a variety of contractors related to the intelligence community in ways that were not always harmonious and economically viable.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 499-520
Author(s):  
Bidisha Biswas

AbstractThe dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is one of the world’s most protracted and potentially dangerous conflicts. While the international community has strong interest in limiting violent conflagration between the two states, third party action aimed at amelioration has been very limited. This contrasts with overall global mediation efforts, which have increased in the post-Cold War period. Using archival research, this study explores the reasons for the Government of India’s implacable opposition to any external intervention in the conflict. We argue that both strategic and ideational motivations have influenced its decisions. In particular, India’s strict adherence to the principle of strategic autonomy precludes the possibility of accepting external mediation. By exploring how and why strategic and ideational motivations intersect to become a formidable barrier to third party intervention, this article contributes to our understanding of why certain countries develop resistance to mediation.


PREDESTINASI ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 93
Author(s):  
Davina Nyiam

Media has also been used as psychological warfare and a propaganda tool, particularly during times of wars and acts of insurgency. It has been used as a tool while fighting the wars and boosting the morale of the security forces across the nations. Propaganda, although it has existed almost indefinitely, has grown immensely during the past few centuries as a most strategic tool to guard the strategic interests of the nations. The propaganda was bolstered by the invention of the radio. The ability to communicate orally with a large number of people in a very small amount of time also helped the development of propaganda. This form of mass media has been used as the most effective tool with the government agencies to put forth their news and views. Radio has strategically suited governments across the globe to fight psychological wars by airing propaganda into the territories of the neighbouring countries. Since Radio is affordable and speaks in a local language and customs to a very common man, it has definitely an edge over other formats of communication when it comes to the question of guarding the strategic interests of a nation. This research discusses and deals with the strategic interests and the media and how radio has especially been used worldwide as a tool by a number of countries to safeguard their national interests. This chapter touches upon some theories and elements of propaganda, the use of radio during world wars and how countries guarded their strategic interests in the Cold War and Post-Cold War era.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 285-304
Author(s):  
Benedetto ZACCARIA

The present work focuses on the role played by Jacques Delors, who held the presidency of the European Commission between 1985 and 1995, in fostering public attention to the question of the so-called democratic deficit of the European Union (EU). It argues that Delors’s involvement in this question was a direct consequence of his post-1989 view of European integration as a “collective” project, that is, a political enterprise based on the direct consensus and involvement of its citizens. This perspective was shaped by the reconfiguration of the role of the European Community in the post-Cold War European scenario and by the impact that “democratic” transitions in Central and Eastern Europe had on the Community itself. As an advocate of a “collective” Europe, Delors criticised the Maastricht Treaty for its failure to push towards political integration, publicly disputing the democratic character of the EU since its very inception.


2009 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
TOMOHITO SHINODA

AbstractIn the fall 2007 Diet session, the largest opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) showed strong opposition against the government's proposal to continue the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) refueling operations to support maritime inspections in the Indian Ocean. In order to evaluate this parliamentary confrontation, the article compares the handling of this issue with the six past major post-Cold War national security policies. The DPJ constantly presented its own legislative proposals in order to participate in Diet deliberation. DPJ's counter proposals, however, were not always cooperative with the government. This different attitude by the DPJ could not be explained by the public and media opinions or the position of the supporting organization but by DPJ's political calculation.


Author(s):  
Misha Boutilier

Based on primary and secondary sources, this article analyzes the policy of the Mulroney government on humanitarian intervention in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1993. It finds that the Mulroney government chose to play a leading role in the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia, because doing so both allowed the government to implement its vision of a post-Cold War world order that aligned with its understanding of Canadian interests, and satisfied the demands and preferences of the Canadian public. At the same time, the Mulroney government stumbled into unanticipated situations in Yugoslavia, and failed to respond to them effectively. This led the government to reconsider the assumptions that had motivated its initial enthusiasm for intervention, and to commence a review of peacekeeping and intervention that it would not live to implement.


2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 523-559
Author(s):  
Jessica A. Stanton

AbstractDo rebel group violations of international humanitarian law during civil war—in particular, attacks on noncombatant civilians—affect conflict outcomes? I argue that in the post-Cold War era, rebel groups that do not target civilians have used the framework of international humanitarian law to appeal for diplomatic support from Western governments and intergovernmental organizations. However, rebel group appeals for international diplomatic support are most likely to be effective when the rebel group can contrast its own restraint toward civilians with the government's abuses. Rebel groups that do not target civilians in the face of government abuses, therefore, are likely to be able to translate increased international diplomatic support into more favorable conflict outcomes. Using original cross-national data on rebel group violence against civilians in all civil wars from 1989 to 2010, I show that rebel groups that exercise restraint toward civilians in the face of government violence are more likely to secure favorable conflict outcomes. I also probe the causal mechanism linking rebel group behavior to conflict outcomes, showing that when a rebel group exercises restraint toward civilians and the government commits atrocities, Western governments and intergovernmental organizations are more likely to take coercive diplomatic action against the government. The evidence shows that rebel groups can translate this increased diplomatic support into favorable political outcomes.


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