Casualties and Incumbents: Do the Casualties from Interstate Conflicts Affect Incumbent Party Vote Share?

2011 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-817 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Koch

Research suggests that the costs of international conflict (e.g. casualties) alter public opinion, executive approval and policy positions of elected officials. However, do casualties affect voting in terms of aggregate outcomes and individual vote choices? This article examines how casualties from interstate conflicts affect voter behaviour, specifically incumbent vote share. Using the investment model of commitment to model individual vote choice, it is argued that increases in the costs of conflict (i.e., more casualties) can increase the probability that voters will support the incumbent, increasing incumbent vote share. This model is tested with both cross-national aggregate data from twenty-three countries and individual-level British survey data. The results support the argument.

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane P. Singh ◽  
Jaroslav Tir

Comparative politics scholarship often neglects to consider how militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) shape political behavior. In this project, we advance an argument that considers voter responses to international conflict at the individual level. In particular, we consider how the well-known conditioning effects of partisanship manifest in relation to militarized international conflict. Examining individual- and macro-level data across ninety-seven elections in forty-two countries over the 1996–2011 period, we find consistent evidence of militarized conflict impacting vote choice. This relationship is, however, moderated by partisanship, conflict side (initiator or target), and conflict hostility level. Among non-copartisan voters, the incumbent benefits the most electorally from initiating low-hostility MIDs or when the country is a target of a high-hostility MID; the opposite scenarios (initiator of a high-hostility MID or target of a low-hostility MID) lead to punishment among this voter group. Copartisans, meanwhile, tend to either maintain or intensify their support in most scenarios we examine; when a country is targeted in a low-hostility MID, copartisan support erodes mildly.


2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (03) ◽  
pp. 473-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Holbrook

The idea that economic conditions influence election outcomes and voting behavior is hardly novel and would appear to be close to uniformly accepted, especially in the case of American presidential elections. Beginning with the early aggregate studies (Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Bloom and Price 1975; Kramer 1971; Tufte 1978) and the important individual-level work that followed soon thereafter (Kiewiet 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Fiorina 1981), election scholars have devoted considerable attention to the influence of the economy on voting behavior and election outcomes. Although the findings are many and sometimes disparate, a few general conclusions have emerged: economic voting is incumbency oriented rather than policy oriented (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983); at the individual level, evaluations of the national economy are more closely tied to vote choice than are evaluations of personal finances (Kiewiet 1983; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981; Kinder, Adams, and Gronke 1989); and, with the exception of 2000, the incumbent party is habitually returned to office when economic times are good and tossed out when economic times are bad (Campbell and Garand 2000). In short, we know a lot about how the economy influences voters and elections, and it would seem that there are few issues left to resolve.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Barnfield

The potential influence of perceived popularity of political parties or candidates on individual vote choice is most commonly studied in terms of a ‘bandwagon effect’. However, there is confusion over exactly what the bandwagon effect is. In this article, I seek to remedy this confusion by providing a clear definition and typology of bandwagon effects, grounded in a review which reappraises existing scholarship. I argue that the bandwagon effect is a distinct social phenomenon involving an individual-level change in vote choice or turnout decision towards a more or increasingly popular candidate or party, motivated initially by this popularity. I then break this down employing a typology which draws on distinctions made in the literature between static and dynamic, and conversion and mobilisation effects. This conception of the bandwagon effect leaves it open to the operation of a variety of possible underlying processes. Scholars should apply such clear concepts as are proposed here in bandwagon research, to situate and clarify their contributions theoretically and offer a more nuanced understanding of whether, how and why bandwagon effects occur across different political contexts.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
ERIK NEIMANNS

Abstract Research on the politics of social investment finds public opinion to be highly supportive of expansive reforms and expects this support to matter for the politics of expanding social investment. Expanding social investment, it is argued, should be particularly attractive to left-wing voters and parties because of the egalitarian potential of such policies. However, few studies have examined to what extent individual preferences concerning social investment really matter politically. In this paper, I address this research gap for the crucial policy field of childcare by examining how individual-level preferences for expanding childcare provision translate into voting behavior. Based on original survey data from eight European countries, I find that preferences to expand public childcare spending indeed translate into electoral support for the left. However, this link from preferences to votes turns out to be socially biased. Childcare preferences are much more decisive for voting the further up individuals are in the income distribution. This imperfect transmission from preferences to voting behavior implies that political parties could have incentives to target the benefits of childcare reforms to their more affluent voters. My findings help to explain why governments frequently fail to reduce social inequality of access to seemingly egalitarian childcare provision.


2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Pisano ◽  
Mark Lubell

This article seeks to explain cross-national differences on environmental behavior. After controlling for a series of sociodemographic and psychosocial factors, it was predicted that national levels of wealth, postmaterialism, education development, and environmental problems are positively related to environmental behavior. The national-level variance is to a substantial degree explained by individual-level variables, capturing compositional effects. The remaining variance is explained by the contextual-level variables. All of the country-level variables are predictors in the expected direction, with the exception of environmental degradation, which is negatively related to behavior, and education development, which has no impact on private environmental behavior. More importantly, cross-level interactions show that in more developed countries, there are stronger relationships between proecological attitudes and reported proenvironmental behavior. These findings contribute to the growing cross-cultural research on environmental behavior pointing out the necessity of simultaneously assessing the effects of both individual and contextual-level forces affecting behavior across nations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003232172199363
Author(s):  
Raimondas Ibenskas ◽  
Jonathan Polk

Are political parties in young democracies responsive to the policy preferences of the public? Compared to extensive scholarship on party responsiveness in established democracies, research on party responsiveness in young democracies is limited. We argue that weaker programmatic party–voter linkages in post-communist democracies create incentives for parties to respond to their supporters rather than the more general electorate. Such responsiveness occurs in two ways. First, parties follow shifts in the mean position of their supporters. Second, drawing on the research on party–voter congruence, we argue that parties adjust their policy positions to eliminate previous incongruence between themselves and their supporters. Analyses based on a comprehensive dataset that uses expert surveys, parties’ manifestoes and election surveys to measure parties’ positions, and several cross-national and national surveys to measure voters’ preferences provide strong support for this argument.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-42
Author(s):  
Pankaj Sinha

The paper categorizes factors responsible for forecasting the outcome of U.S. presidential election 2016 using factor analysis, which groups the various economic and non-economic parameters based on the correlation among them. The major economic factor significant in 2016 US presidential election is the growth of the economy, and the ‘anti-incumbency factor that signifies how long the incumbent party has been controlling the White House is found to be an important non-economic factor likely to play a dominant role in the election. The dependent variables considered are the vote shares of the nominees of the incumbent and the non-incumbent majority party candidates. The forecast is calculated by running a regression of the significant factors, obtained through factor analysis technique, on the incumbent party vote share as well as on the non-incumbent party vote share. The proposed models forecast the vote share of Democrat candidate Mrs. Hillary Clinton to be 45.59% with a standard error of ±2.32% and that of Republican candidate Mr. Donald Trump to be 39.51% with a standard error of ±3.87%. Hence, the models built in the paper signal a comfortable margin of victory for the Presidential nominee of the incumbent party, Hillary Clinton.The study re-establishes the notion that the non-economic factors have a greater influence on the outcomes of election as compared to the economic factors, as some of the important economic factors such as inflation and unemployment rate failed to establish their significance. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (11-12) ◽  
pp. 3471-3491
Author(s):  
Anthony E. Coy ◽  
Jody L. Davis ◽  
Jeffrey D. Green ◽  
Paul E. Etcheverry

A dyadic approach to studying relationship dynamics yields considerably more insights than examining each partner separately. Yet relatively little research has examined dyadic models of commitment, despite commitment being essential to relationship persistence. Accordingly, we tested a dyadic version of the investment model of commitment. In two cross-sectional studies of couples and one experiment, we tested the role of partner investments and perceived partner investments as novel antecedents of commitment. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that greater partner investments were related to greater levels of individuals’ commitment, while controlling for individuals’ own satisfaction with, investments in, and alternatives to the relationship. Study 3 revealed that partner-reported investments predicted commitment independent of perceived partner investments. The findings advance the investment model beyond the individual level, emphasizing the need to examine dyadic elements of relationships.


Politics ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M Van Hauwaert ◽  
Christian H Schimpf ◽  
Flavio Azevedo

Recent research in the populism literature has devoted considerable efforts to the conceptualisation and examination of populism on the individual level, that is, populist attitudes. Despite rapid progress in the field, questions of adequate measurement and empirical evaluation of measures of populist attitudes remain scarce. Seeking to remedy these shortcomings, we apply a cross-national measurement model, using item response theory, to six established and two new populist indicators. Drawing on a cross-national survey (nine European countries, n = 18,368), we engage in a four-folded analysis. First, we examine the commonly used 6-item populism scale. Second, we expand the measurement with two novel items. Third, we use the improved 8-item populism scale to further refine equally comprehensive but more concise and parsimonious populist measurements. Finally, we externally validate these sub-scales and find that some of the proposed sub-scales outperform the initial 6- and 8-item scales. We conclude that existing measures of populism capture moderate populist attitudes, but face difficulties measuring more extreme levels, while the individual information of some of the populist items remains limited. Altogether, this provides several interesting routes for future research, both within and between countries.


2020 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingo Stamm ◽  
Aila-Leena Matthies ◽  
Tuuli Hirvilammi ◽  
Kati Närhi

AbstractLabour market and unemployment policies in particular are rarely connected to issues of environmental sustainability. In the present article, the link is examined by focusing on ecosocial innovations in four European countries – Finland, Germany, Belgium and Italy. These innovations are small-scale associations, cooperatives or organizations that create new integrative practices combining both social and environmental goals. By asking how their social practices are linked with labour market and unemployment policies, we explore the scope for new ecosocial policies. The results of this cross-national case study lead to three lessons to be learnt for a future ecosocial welfare state: at the sectoral level, organizational level and individual level. In summary, many valuable ideas, instruments and programmes towards sustainability already exist in the field, but they are not yet integrated in the current labour market and unemployment policies.


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