Mental Causes

1968 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 98-114
Author(s):  
C. H. Whiteley

The question I shall consider is whether there are any mental causes, that is, whether there is anything which is both a state of mind and a cause of other mental or physical happenings. The obvious common-sense answer to this question is Yes. In ordinary discourse (that is, outside philosophy and psychology) we constantly refer to human actions and experiences in what appears to be causal language; we seem to be saying that some states of mind are causes of other states of mind, and of some bodily activities. Sometimes we do this by using the word ‘cause’ itself— ‘His driving into the ditch was caused by his seeing a child run into the road’, ‘The cause of his silence was his wish to protect his friend’. More often we use expressions which in physical contexts are admittedly causal— ‘A glimpse of the look on her face made him hesitate’, ‘Ambition was the driving force of his career’. Most philosophers have taken for granted the genuineness of these causal attributions. But recently it has been frequently denied that any state of mind can be properly described as the cause either of other states of mind or of physical occurrences, at any rate if by a state of mind one means a state of consciousness. Some philosophers who deny this are materialists, advocates of the Unity of Science. They believe that everything that happens in the universe can be causally accounted for by reference to a single set of fundamental laws, the laws of physics, and since a state of consciousness is not, as such, a physical state of any kind, it cannot have a place in the causal explanation of any event, and must be an epiphenomenon. Others are believers in an indeterminist interpretation of human freedom, and hold that o t introduce the category of cause and effect into the explanation of human actions is to deny that there is any genuine free will. I shall not be concerned with either of these general metaphysical objections, neither of which convinces me; but I shall consider some more specific objections to the admission of particular sorts of mental causes.

1993 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-177
Author(s):  
Karen Harding

Ate appearances deceiving? Do objects behave the way they do becauseGod wills it? Ate objects impetmanent and do they only exist becausethey ate continuously created by God? According to a1 Ghazlli, theanswers to all of these questions ate yes. Objects that appear to bepermanent are not. Those relationships commonly tefemed to as causalare a result of God’s habits rather than because one event inevitably leadsto another. God creates everything in the universe continuously; if Heceased to create it, it would no longer exist.These ideas seem oddly naive and unscientific to people living in thetwentieth century. They seem at odds with the common conception of thephysical world. Common sense says that the universe is made of tealobjects that persist in time. Furthermore, the behavior of these objects isreasonable, logical, and predictable. The belief that the univetse is understandablevia logic and reason harkens back to Newton’s mechanical viewof the universe and has provided one of the basic underpinnings ofscience for centuries. Although most people believe that the world is accutatelydescribed by this sort of mechanical model, the appropriatenessof such a model has been called into question by recent scientificadvances, and in particular, by quantum theory. This theory implies thatthe physical world is actually very different from what a mechanicalmodel would predit.Quantum theory seeks to explain the nature of physical entities andthe way that they interact. It atose in the early part of the twentieth centuryin response to new scientific data that could not be incorporated successfullyinto the ptevailing mechanical view of the universe. Due largely ...


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Dinev Penchev

A generalized and unifying viewpoint to both general relativity and quantum mechanics and information is investigated. It may be described as a generaliztion of the concept of reference frame from mechanics to thermodynamics, or from a reference frame linked to an element of a system, and thus, within it, to another reference frame linked to the whole of the system or to any of other similar systems, and thus, out of it. Furthermore, the former is the viewpoint of general relativity, the latter is that of quantum mechanics and information.Ciclicity in the manner of Nicolas Cusanus (Nicolas of Cusa) is complemented as a fundamental and definitive property of any totality, e.g. physically, that of the universe. It has to contain its externality within it somehow being namely the totality. This implies a seemingly paradoxical (in fact, only to common sense rather logically and mathematically) viewpoint for the universe to be repesented within it as each one quant of action according to the fundamental Planck constant.That approach implies the unification of gravity and entanglement correspondiing to the former or latter class of reference frames. An invariance, more general than Einstein's general covariance is to be involved as to both classes of reference frames unifying them. Its essence is the unification of the discrete and cotnitinuous (smooth). That idea underlies implicitly quantum mechanics for Bohr's principle that it study the system of quantum microscopic entities and the macroscopic apparatus desribed uniformly by the smmoth equations of classical physics.e


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 77-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonella Cirasola ◽  
Saul Hillman ◽  
Peter Fonagy ◽  
Marco Chiesa

2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jodi Martin ◽  
Jean-François Bureau ◽  
Marie-France Lafontaine ◽  
Paula Cloutier ◽  
Celia Hsiao ◽  
...  

AbstractIn this investigation the factor structure of the Adult Attachment Interview was studied in a partially at-risk sample of 120 young adults. More specifically, 60 participants had engaged in nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI; 53 females, M age = 20.38 years), and 60 were non-self-injuring controls matched by age and sex. Theoretically anticipated differential associations between preoccupied (but not dismissing) states of mind and NSSI were then examined. Exploratory factor analyses identified evidence for two weakly correlated state of mind dimensions (i.e., dismissing and preoccupied) consistently identified in factor analyses of normative-risk samples. As hypothesized, results further showed that preoccupied (but not dismissing) states of mind were associated with NSSI behavior. Findings support existing arguments suggesting that the regulatory strategy adults adopt when discussing attachment-related experiences with primary caregivers, particularly passive, angry, or unresolved discourse patterns, is uniquely correlated with NSSI.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 365-378 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Lee Raby ◽  
Heather A. Yarger ◽  
Teresa Lind ◽  
R. Chris Fraley ◽  
Esther Leerkes ◽  
...  

AbstractThe first aim of the current study was to examine the latent structure of attachment states of mind as assessed by the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) among three groups of parents of children at risk for insecure attachments: parents who adopted internationally (N= 147), foster parents (N= 300), and parents living in poverty and involved with Child Protective Services (CPS;N= 284). Confirmatory factor analysis indicated the state of mind rating scales loaded on two factors reflecting adults’ preoccupied and dismissing states of mind. Taxometric analyses indicated the variation in adults’ preoccupied states of mind was more consistent with a dimensional than a categorical model, whereas results for dismissing states of mind were indeterminate. The second aim was to examine the degree to which the attachment states of mind of internationally adoptive and foster parents differ from those of poverty/CPS-referred parents and low-risk parents. After controlling for parental age, sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, (a) internationally adoptive parents had lower scores on the dismissing dimension than the sample of community parents described by Haltigan, Leerkes, Supple, and Calkins (2014); (b) foster parents did not differ from community parents on either the dismissing or the preoccupied AAI dimension; and (c) both internationally adoptive and foster parents had lower scores on the preoccupied dimension than poverty/CPS-referred parents. Analyses using the traditional AAI categories provided convergent evidence that (a) internationally adoptive parents were more likely to be classified as having an autonomous state of mind than low-risk North American mothers based on Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn's (2009) meta-analytic estimates, (b) the rates of autonomous states of mind did not differ between foster and low-risk parents, and (c) both internationally adoptive and foster parents were less likely to be classified as having a preoccupied state of mind than poverty/CPS-referred parents.


Author(s):  
Selim Berker

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, “It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong.” However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half.


Author(s):  
J.P. Griffin

In ordinary use, the word ‘happiness’ has to do with one’s situation (one is fortunate) or with one’s state of mind (one is glad, cheerful) or, typically, with both. These two elements appear in different proportions on different occasions. If one is concerned with a long stretch of time (as in ‘a happy life’), one is likely to focus more on situation than on state of mind. If a short period of time, it is not uncommon to focus on states of mind. By and large philosophers are more interested in long-term cases. One’s life is happy if one is content that life has brought one much of what one regards as important. There is a pull in these lifetime assessments towards a person’s objective situation and away from the person’s subjective responses. The important notion for ethics is ‘wellbeing’ – that is, a notion of what makes an individual life go well. ‘Happiness’ is important because many philosophers have thought that happiness is the only thing that contributes to wellbeing, or because they have used ‘happiness’ to mean the same as ‘wellbeing’. What, then, makes a life go well? Some have thought that it was the presence of a positive feeling tone. Others have thought that it was having one’s desires fulfilled – either actual desires (as some would say) or informed desires (as others would say). It is unclear how stringent the requirement of ‘informed’ must be; if it is fairly stringent it can, in effect, require abandoning desire explanations and adopting instead an explanation in terms of a list of good-making features in human life.


Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 45
Author(s):  
Lina Andersson

This paper uses the framework of stochastic games to propose a model of emotions in repeated interactions. An emotional player can be in either a friendly, a neutral, or a hostile state of mind. The player transitions between the states of mind as a response to observed actions taken by the other player. The state of mind determines the player’s psychological payoff which together with a material payoff constitutes the player’s utility. In the friendly (hostile) state of mind the player has a positive (negative) concern for other players’ material payoffs. This paper shows how emotions can both facilitate and obstruct cooperation in a repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. In finitely repeated games a player who cares only for their own material payoffs can have an incentive to manipulate an emotional player into the friendly state of mind. In infinitely repeated games with two emotional players less patience is required to sustain cooperation. However, emotions can also obstruct cooperation if they make the players unwilling to punish each other, or if the players become hostile when punished.


2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (S260) ◽  
pp. 595-602
Author(s):  
Nicholas Campion

AbstractThis paper will argue that astronomical models have long been applied to political theory, from the use of the Sun as a symbol of the emperor in Rome to the application of Copernican theory to the needs of absolute monarchy. We will begin with consideration of astral divination (the use of astronomy to ascertain divine intentions) in the ancient Near East. Particular attention will be paid to the use of Newton's discovery that the universe operates according to a single set of laws in order to support concepts of political quality and eighteenth century Natural Rights theory. We will conclude with consideration of arguments that the discovery of the expanding, multi-galaxy universe, stimulated political uncertainty in the 1930s, and that photographs of the Earth from Apollo spacecraft encouraged concepts of the ‘global village’.


Prospects ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 293-320
Author(s):  
Michael Lopez

Recent literary theory has questioned the way we look at a text as the product of an individual “author.” But for William James—who was, like Emerson, a thoroughly nineteenth-century mind-any utterance, even the most complicated philosophical system, was at bottom the expression of the personality of the author. The history of philosophy, James believed, was in essence the “clash of human temperaments,” and temperament seems to gravitate to either the “idealistic” or what James denned as the “materialistic” pole:Idealism will be chosen by a man of one emotional constitution, materialism by another.… [I]dealism gives to the nature of things such kinship with our personal selves. Our own thoughts are what we are most at home with, what we are least afraid of. To say then that the universe is essentially thought, is to say that I myself, potentially at least, am all. There is no radically alien corner, but an all-prevading intimacy. … That element in reality which every strong man of common-sense willingly feels there because it calls forth powers that he owns-the rough, harsh, sea-wave, north-wind element, the denier of persons, the democratizer-is banished because it jars too much on the desire for communication. Now, it is the very enjoyment of this element that throws many men upon the materialistic or agnostic hypothesis, as a polemic reaction against the contrary extreme. They sicken at a life wholly constituted of intimacy. There is an overpowering desire at moments to escape personality, to revel in the action of forces that have no respect for our ego, to let the tides flow, even though they flow over us. The strife of these two kinds of mental temper will, I think, always be seen in philosophy. Some men will keep insisting on the reason, the atonement, that lies in the heart of things, and that we can act with; others, on the capacity of brute fact that we must react against.


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