scholarly journals Kierkegaard contra Hegel on the ‘Absolute Paradox’

2009 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 54-66
Author(s):  
Genia Schönbaumsfeld

In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hegel propounds three interrelated theses:(1) The radical continuity of religion and philosophy:The subject of religion as of philosophy is the eternal truth in its objectivity, is God and nothing but God and the explication of God. Philosophy is not worldly wisdom, but knowledge of the non-worldly, not knowledge of the outer substance, of empirical being and life, but knowledge of what is eternal, of what God is and what emanates from his nature. For this nature must reveal and develop itself. Philosophy therefore explicates itself only by explicating religion, and by thus explicating itself, explicates religion … Hence religion and philosophy collapse into each other; philosophy is indeed itself religious service [Gottesdienst]. (Hegel 1986c: 28)(2) The view that philosophy renders in conceptual form the essence of what Christianity consists in and thus transcends the merely subjective vantage-point of faith:In philosophy religion obtains its justification from the thinking consciousness … Faith already contains the true content, but it still misses the form of thought. All previously considered forms — feeling, representation — can have the content of truth, but they themselves are not the true form which makes the true content necessary. Thought is the absolute judge before whom the content needs to prove and justify itself, (ibid.: 341)(3) Philosophy alone shows Christianity to be rational and necessary:This vantage-point [of philosophy] is therefore the justification of religion, especially of the Christian, the true religion; it apprehends [erkennen] the content in its necessary form [nach seiner Notwendigkeit], according to reason; at the same time it also knows the forms in the development of this content. (ibid.: 339)

2004 ◽  
pp. 4-10
Author(s):  
Anatolii M. Kolodnyi

In our literature, following Professor D. Ugrinovich, it is still customary to divide religious studies into theoretical and historical ones. It even found its name in the name of some religious departments, institutes. We will not discuss here the issue of the legitimacy of such a division. To me, the philosophy of religion is one of the disciplinary entities of religious studies, as is the history of religion. The main specificity of religious studies (as opposed to the study of religious phenomena by individual sciences) is that it studies religion not as a whole, but as a whole, in the organic totality of all its components and functions. Religion appears to him not as a static phenomenon, but as a dynamic phenomenon. The subject of religious studies is a functioning religion, and this functioning occurs through the interaction and interplay of all its components, and not with the absolute extinction of something in it in the change of historical eras, because religion has a prehistoric meaning.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Erik Meganck

Abstract In this article, I want to make the following points, none of which are totally new, but their constellation here is meant to be challenging. First, world is not a (Cartesian) thing but an event, the event of sense. This event is opening and meaning – verbal tense. God may be a philosophical name of this event. This is recognized by late-modern religious atheist thought. This thought differs from modern scientific rationalism in that the latter’s so-called areligious atheism is actually a hyperreligious theism. On the way, the alleged opposition between philosophy and theology, between thought and faith is seen to erode. The core matter of this philosophy of religion will be the absolute reference, the system of objectivity and the holiness of the name. All this because of a prefix a- that has its sense turned inside out by the death of God.


2003 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 36-55
Author(s):  
Andreas Häger

Different forms of artistic expression play a vital role in religious practices of the most diverse traditions. One very important such expression is music. This paper deals with a contemporary form of religious music, Christian rock. Rock or popular music has been used within Christianity as a means for evangelization and worship since the end of the 1960s. The genre of "contemporary Christian music", or Christian rock, stands by definition with one foot in established institutional (in practicality often evangelical) Christianity, and the other in the commercial rock musicindustry. The subject of this paper is to study how this intermediate position is manifested and negotiated in Christian rock concerts. Such a performance of Christian rock music is here assumed to be both a rock concert and a religious service. The paper will examine how this duality is expressed in practices at Christian rock concerts.


1970 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-71
Author(s):  
Hanoch Ben-Pazi

The subject of tradition engaged both Emmanuel Lévinas and Jacques Derrida in many of their writings, which explore both the philosophical and cultural significance of tradition and the particular significance of the latter in a specifically Jewish context. Lévinas devoted a few of his Talmudic essays to the subject, and Derrida addressed the issue from the perspective of different philosophical and religious traditions. This article uses the writings of these two thinkers to propose a new way of thinking about the idea of tradition. At the core of its inquiry lie the paradigm of the letter and the use of this metaphor as a means of describing the concept of tradition. Using the phenomenon of the letter as a vantage point for considering tradition raises important points of discussion, due to both the letter’s nature as a text that is sent and the manifest and hidden elements it contains. The focus of this essay is the phenomenon of textual tradition, which encompasses different traditions of reading and interpreting texts and a grasp of the horizon of understanding opened up in relation to the text through its many different interpretations. The attention paid here to the actions of individuals serves to highlight the importance of the interpersonal realm and of ethical thought.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-54
Author(s):  
Jerzy Kosiewicz

Abstract In the presented text the author points out to anthropological as well as axiological foundations of the boxing fight from the viewpoint of Hegel’s philosophy. In the genial idealist’s views it is possible to perceive the appreciation of the body, which constitutes a necessary basis for the man’s physical activity, for his work oriented towards the self-transformation and the transformation of the external world, as well as for rivalry and the hand-to-hand fight. While focusing our attention on the issue of rivalry and on the situation of the fight - and regarding it from the viewpoint of the master - slave theory (included in the phenomenology of spirit), it is possible to proclaim that even a conventionalised boxing fight - that is, restricted by cultural and sports rules of the game - has features of the fight to the death between two Hegelian forms of selfknowledge striving for self-affirmation and self-realisation. In the boxing fight, similarly as in the above mentioned Hegelian theory, a problem of work and of the development of the human individual (that is, of the subject, self-knowledge, the participant of the fight) appears. There appears also a prospect of death as a possible end of merciless rivalry. The fight revalues the human way in an important way, whereas the prospect for death, the awareness of its proximity, the feeling that its close and possible, saturates the life with additional values. It places the boxer, just like every subject fighting in a similar or a different way, on the path towards absolute abstraction - that is, it brings him closer to his self-fulfilment in the Absolute, to the absolute synthesis. The Hegelian viewpoint enables also to appreciate the boxing fight as a manifestation of low culture (being in contrast with high culture), to turn attention to the relations which - according to Hegel - take place between the Absolute and the man, as well as to show which place is occupied by the subject both in the process of the Absolute’s self-realisation and in the German thinker’s philosophical system. Independently of the dialectical, simultaneously pessimistic and optimistic overtone of considerations connected with the very boxing fight (regarding destruction and spiritualisation on a higher level), it is possible to perceive farreaching appreciation of the human individual in Hegel’s philosophy since the Absolute cannot make its own self-affirmation without the individual, without the human body, without the fight aimed at the destruction of the enemy and without the subjective consciousness and the collective consciousness which appear thanks to this fight. Thus, it is justified to suppose that the foundation of the whole Hegel’s philosophy is constituted by anthropology and that in the framework of this anthropology a special role is played by the fight and by work, which changes the subject and his(her) environment. Admittedly Hegel does not emphasise it explicitly, nevertheless his views (with their centre, which, according to Hegel himself and his interpreters, is constituted by the Absolute) have, as a matter of fact, an anthropocentric character and the main source of the subject’s development is the struggle which, irrespectively of its result, always primarily leads to the destruction or even to the death of one of the sides, just like in the boxing fight. However, it is also a germ of the positive re-orientation of the subject, the beginning and a continuation of that what the phenomenology of the spirit describes as a movement towards absolute abstraction.


Author(s):  
Sven Arntzen

Dignity, according to one conception, is the absolute, inherent and inalienable value of every person. There is general agreement that this idea of dignity has a source in Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. I argue that Kant formulates what I characterize as an agency or agent based conception of dignity. Persons are bearers of dignity in their capacity as moral subjects and subjects of action. Central here is the idea that a rational agent is the subject of “any end whatsoever” and so must be considered the free cause of actions. Accordingly, to be treated merely as a thing, or “as a means”, is to be treated in a manner incompatible with having and acting for the sake of any end of one’s choosing. Also relevant in this connection is Alan Gewirth’s agency based theories of dignity and of human rights. I then consider this conception of dignity in addressing three ethical issues: to let die or keep alive, assisted suicide, and so-called dwarf-tossing. Finally, I consider challenges to the idea of dignity in general and the agency based conception of dignity in particular.


2020 ◽  
pp. 148-174
Author(s):  
Aleida Assmann

This chapter demonstrates how the problems of “polar inertia” and its implications have been the subject of intensified philosophical reflection and debate since the 1980s. Polar inertia is the condition in which we have arrived at a temporal limit. However, we have also arrived at the absolute dead end of the modern time regime, in terms of both its compatibility with the rhythms of human life and the logic internal to the dynamics it has unleashed. The positions taken all grapple with the aporias, or inner contradictions, of the modern temporal regime and its possible alternatives or compensations. However, they do not lose sight of the epistemic presuppositions of this temporal ontology in the process.


Archaeologia ◽  
1916 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 145-162
Author(s):  
C. Hercules Read ◽  
Reginald A. Smith

The important series of antiquities that forms the subject of this communication was discovered at Hallstatt in the Salzkammergut, Austria, about the year 1869. The exploration was undertaken at the instance of Sir John Lubbock (afterwards Lord Avebury), and it is believed that a journal was kept of the daily results, as appears to have been the case in all instances where authorized digging took place on the site. Unluckily in the interval between 1869 and the present time the journal referring to Lord Avebury's exploration has disappeared, and we thus lack an important part of the information that it should have furnished, viz. the indications as to what objects were associated together, and whether the interments to which they belonged were by cremation or by inhumation. While this loss is much to be regretted, yet the absolute value and importance of the series is still very great, both as typical of the period which stands prominent as the classical example of a cultural turning-point in the history of the arts, and as filling a very serious gap in the evolutionary series in the national collection.


Author(s):  
Thomas A. Lewis

This chapter examines one of the most contested elements of Hegel’s corpus, his mature treatment of religion in his Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Emphasizing the need to approach the lectures in context, this chapter first situates Hegel’s philosophy of religion within his larger philosophical project. Doing so both illuminates why the material’s significance has been so debated and highlights what should and should not be assumed at the outset of the lectures. Paying careful attention to Hegel’s structuring of the project, the chapter works through his treatments of the concept of religion, cognition of the absolute, religious practice, the history of religions, and Christianity. The analysis of part two of the lectures, Determinate Religion, closely examines Hegel’s conception of the manifestation of religion. The treatment of the Christian cultus, or community, stresses the connection Hegel develops (by 1827) between this community and modern social and political life.


2013 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-244
Author(s):  
Espen Hammer

Hegel's philosophy of religion is characterized by what seems to be a deep tension. On the one hand, Hegel claims to be a Christian thinker, viewing religion, and in particular Christianity, as a manifestation of the absolute. On the other hand, however, he seems to view modernity as largely secular, devoid of authoritative claims to transcendence. Modernity is secular in the political sense of requiring the state to be neutral when it comes to matters of religion. However, it is also secular in the sense of there being no recourse to authoritative representations of a transcendent God. Drawing on Charles Taylor's view of secularization, the article focuses on the second strand of his religious thinking, exploring how Hegel can be thought of as a theorist of secularization. It is claimed that his dialectic of religious development describes a process of secularization. Ultimately, Hegel's system offers a view of the absolute as immanent, suggesting that an adequate account of religion will necessarily have to accept secularization as the end-point of spirit's development. This is how the tension between religion and secularization can be resolved.


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