Concrete Kantian Respect

1998 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancy Sherman
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
The Core ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
In Virtue Of

When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. No doubt, part of the appeal of the Kantian notion of respect is that it offers an intuitive way of talking about the wrongness of manipulation and coercion, and in general, the wrongness of unfairly taking advantage of another. For to respect persons is to take seriously their status as persons, and to forswear, at some level, actions and attitudes that would compromise their dignity. Talking about respect has become shorthand for signaling deontological concerns. More formally, within recent Kantian exegesis, respect is viewed as yielding a more accessible and less contrived account of the Categorical Imperative than the more traditional criterion of universalizability and the contradictions tests applied to it. Within the Kantianinspired political theory of John Rawls, respect is also a core notion, representing a pervasive good, the bases of which, just states have an obligation to distribute to their members. Yet, for all its appeal, respect is an odd feature of Kantian ethics. For it is an emotion in a theory that prides itself in grounding morality in principles of reason alone. In this essay, I draw attention to the importance of respect in Kant's account in order to show just how he makes room for the emotions. Indeed, I shall argue that on Kant's account of full moral agency, we are emotional as well as rational creatures. Although Kant often portrays respect as an abstract emotional attitude mysteriously connected to our rationality, I argue that on a suitable revision, respect can be transformed into a more concrete attitude, cultivated and expressed alongside other emotions requisite for full virtue.

scholarly journals Debates acerca das apropriações da ética kantiana

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 95-134
Author(s):  
Gustavo Da Encarnação Galvão França
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Realist ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
German Philosopher ◽  
Contemporary Author

Este artigo procura colocar em foco a interpretação de John Rawls (1921-2002) acerca da ética de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Sendo Rawls, talvez, o autor contemporâneo que mais ecos encontrou lançando uma teoria política original que reclama para si uma herança kantiana, faz-se de grande importância esclarecer os pontos centrais de sua apropriação e os questionamentos levantados por outros comentadores de Kant que possuem leituras conflitantes do filósofo de Königsberg. Assim, tratarei, em primeiro lugar, do forte formalismo que Rawls atribui a Kant, derivado, em grande parte, de seu foco na primeira formulação do imperativo categórico em detrimento das demais. Em seguida, abordarei a consequência particular que o professor de Harvard extrai daí e que batiza de construtivismo ético: além de o imperativo categórico se constituir num procedimento vazio de teste das máximas particulares, esse procedimento verdadeiramente cria os princípios morais a partir da razão. Anteriormente à atividade racional, inexistem fatos morais. Por fim, trarei um brevíssimo resumo das críticas dirigidas por outros autores a essa caracterização construtivista do pensamento moral kantiano, buscando apresentar os argumentos dos que preferem enquadrar Kant como um realista em moral. Debates surrounding appropriations of Kantian ethics: doubts about John Rawls' constructivism  Abstract: This article seeks to throw light on John Rawls’s (1921-2002) interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) ethics. Being Rawls, perhaps, the contemporary author that has found more repercussion proposing a political theory which claims a kantian inheritance, it’s greatly important to clarify the central points of his appropriation and the questionings arisen by others Kant’s commentators which have conflicting views about the German philosopher. Therefore, first of all, I will consider the Strong formalism that Rawls attributesto Kant, derived mainly of his focus on the categorical imperative’s first formulacion, to the detriment of the others. Then, I willl talk about the particular consequence the Harvard’s professor draws from that, which he baptizes ethical constructivism: not only the categorical imperative is simply an empty procedure to test the particular maxims, but also this procedure truly creates the moral principles from reason alone. Previous to the racional activity, there is no moral facts. Finally, I will bring a brief summary of the critics made by other authors to that constructivist caracterization of the kantian moral thought, trying to introduce the arguments of those who prefer to classify Kant as a moral realist.

Kant and Some Critics

2020 ◽  
pp. 188-213
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Mutual Respect ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Moral Rightness ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Universal Law

Kant argues that an understanding of the relation between morality and rational agency reveals the nature of moral rightness. Moral principles give us reasons for acting apart from our feeling or preferences. They give us reasons that apply to all rational agents alike. Principles that embody such reasons conform to a categorical imperative that states a universal law for all rational agents. Against critics who contend that this universal law is too general to tell us anything useful about right and wrong, Kant argues that it requires us to treat rational agents as ends in themselves, not to be sacrificed simply for the sake of other people’s goals. This attitude of mutual respect among rational agents is the basis for a moral and social order that realizes human freedom.

Politics and the Public in Rawls' Political Liberalism

1995 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Frazer ◽  
Nicola Lacey
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Core ◽  
Recent Statement ◽  
Susan Moller Okin ◽  
Do So

This paper is a critical discussion of a number of related themes in John Rawls' Political Liberalism. First, it considers whether Rawls' recent statement of his position proceeds from an adequate methodology for political theory. In particular, it questions whether Rawls has succeeded in accommodating both universalist, analytic and particularist, interpretive aspects of the political theoretical enterprise. Second, it engages in critical analysis of the conceptions of the political and the public which lie at the core of Rawls' theory. In this part of the paper, an important though not exclusive focus will be certain questions raised by Susan Moller Okin and other feminist critics of Rawls about the internal consistency of his conception of justice. It is argued that Political Liberalism neither addresses these questions explicitly nor, contrary to Okin's view, provides implicit conceptual tools which could allow a sympathetic interpreter of Rawls to do so. The direction of the argument will suggest certain preconditions for the development of a more substantively and methodologically adequate approach to political theory.

scholarly journals Equal Respect for Rational Agency

2020 ◽  
pp. 182-203
Author(s):  
Michael Cholbi
Keyword(s):  
Practical Rationality ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Rational Agency ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
The Core ◽  
Human Choice ◽  
Psychological Evidence ◽  
Equal Respect ◽  
Human Rationality

Individuals are owed equal respect. But on the basis of what property of individuals are they owed such respect? A popular Kantian answer—rational agency—appears less plausible in light of the growing psychological evidence that human choice is subject to a wide array of biases (framing, laziness, etc.); human beings are neither equal in rational agency nor especially robust rational agents. Defenders of this Kantian answer thus need a non-ideal theory of equal respect for rational agency, one that takes seriously our characteristic deficiencies of practical rationality without junking the niotion that rational agency entitles us to equal respect. This chapter defends an understanding of respect for rational agency wherein the object of such respect is individuals’ aspiration to rationally govern their lives. This understanding of respect for rational agency retains the core notion of respect as a kind of deference, directs respect at persons, has suitably egalitarian implications, and does not require us to deny the aforementioned psychological evidence regarding the infirmities of human rationality.

From Crusades to Colonization: Violence in Secular and Religious Political Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Xavier Scott
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
State Power ◽  
Charles Taylor ◽  
Medieval Period ◽  
Beliefs And Values

This paper examines the transition in political philosophy between the medieval and early-modern periods by focusing on the emergence of sovereignty doctrine. Scholars such as Charles Taylor and John Rawls have focused on the ability of modern-states to overcome conflicts between different religious confessionals. In contrast, this paper seeks to examine some of the peace-promoting features of Latin-Christendom and some of the conflict-promoting features of modern-secular states. The Christian universalism of the medieval period is contrasted with the colonial ventures promoted by the Peace of Westphalia. This paper’s goal is not to argue that secularism is in fact more violent than religion. Rather, it seeks to demonstrate the major role that religion played in early modern philosophy and the development of sovereignty doctrine. It argues against the view that the modern, secular state is capable of neutrality vis-à-vis religion, and also combats the view that the secular nature of modern international law means that it is neutral to the different beliefs and values of the world’s peoples. These observations emphasize the ways in which state power and legitimacy are at the heart of the secular turn in political philosophy. 

Kantian Perspectives on Private Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Arthur Ripstein
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Private Law ◽  
Legal Institutions ◽  
Naive Theory ◽  
Private Rights ◽  
Kantian View ◽  
Moral Structure ◽  
The Right ◽  
In Virtue Of

This chapter articulates the Kantian approach to private law. It begins by explaining the aims and ambitions of Kantian legal philosophy more generally and, in particular, introducing the Kantian idea that a particular form of thought is appropriate to a particular domain of inquiry or conduct. The chapter situates the Kantian view within a broad natural law tradition. For the part of that tradition that Immanuel Kant develops, the moral structure of natural law is animated by a conception of personal interaction that is so familiar as to be almost invisible. Despite its centrality to both morality and law, in the absence of legal institutions, this natural law is inadequate to its own principles. It requires legal institutions to render it fully determinate in its application consistent with everyone’s independence. It also requires public institutions of adjudication. The chapter further looks at Kant’s “division” of private rights, distinguishing first between the innate right that everyone has simply in virtue of being human and acquired rights that require an affirmative act to establish them. It then goes through the Kantian division of the titles of private right, situating them in relation to the distinction between persons and things. Finally, the chapter articulates the Kantian account of what might be called the naïve theory of remedies—that is, that the remedy is an imperfect continuation of the right that was violated.

Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance

1992 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Will Kymlicka
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Religious Pluralism ◽  
Religious Diversity ◽  
Individual Autonomy ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Group Rights ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Social Pluralism

AbstractIn his most recent work, John Rawls argues that political theory must recognize and accomodate the ‘fact of pluralism’, including the fact of religious diversity. He believes that the liberal commitment to individual rights provides the only feasible model for accomodating religious pluralism. In the paper, I discuss a second form of tolerance, based on group rights rather than individual rights. Drawing on historical examples, I argue that this is is also a feasible model for accomodating religious pluralism. While both models ensure tolerance between groups, only the former tolerates individual dissent within groups. To defend the individual rights model, therefore, liberals must appeal not only to the fact of social pluralism, but also to the value of individual autonomy. This may require abandoning Rawls’s belief that liberalism can and should be defended on purely ‘political’, rather than ‘comprehensive’ grounds.

HOPE AND MEMORY IN THE THOUGHT OF JUDITH SHKLAR

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 591-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATRINA FORRESTER
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Harvard University ◽  
The Political ◽  
American Liberalism ◽  
Judith Shklar ◽  
Exclusive Focus

Current interpretations of the political theory of Judith Shklar focus to a disabling extent on her short, late article “The Liberalism of Fear” (1989); commentators take this late essay as representative of her work as a whole and thus characterize her as an anti-totalitarian, Cold War liberal. Other interpretations situate her political thought alongside followers of John Rawls and liberal political philosophy. Challenging the centrality of fear in Shklar's thought, this essay examines her writings on utopian and normative thought, the role of history in political thinking and her notions of ordinary cruelty and injustice. In particular, it shifts emphasis away from an exclusive focus on her late writings in order to consider works published throughout her long career at Harvard University, from 1950 until her death in 1992. By surveying the range of Shklar's critical standpoints and concerns, it suggests that postwar American liberalism was not as monolithic as many interpreters have assumed. Through an examination of her attitudes towards her forebears and contemporaries, it shows why the dominant interpretations of Shklar—as anti-totalitarian émigré thinker, or normative liberal theorist—are flawed. In fact, Shklar moved restlessly between these two categories, and drew from each tradition. By thinking about both hope and memory, she bridged the gap between two distinct strands of postwar American liberalism.

scholarly journals Kantian Moral Agency and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

Problemos ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 139-151
Author(s):  
Riya Manna ◽  
Rajakishore Nath
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Deterministic Model ◽  
Comprehensive Analysis ◽  
Kantian Ethics ◽  
Freedom Of Will ◽  
Machine Morality ◽  
Human Tendency ◽  
Natural Necessity

This paper discusses the philosophical issues pertaining to Kantian moral agency and artificial intelligence (AI). Here, our objective is to offer a comprehensive analysis of Kantian ethics to elucidate the non-feasibility of Kantian machines. Meanwhile, the possibility of Kantian machines seems to contend with the genuine human Kantian agency. We argue that in machine morality, ‘duty’ should be performed with ‘freedom of will’ and ‘happiness’ because Kant narrated the human tendency of evaluating our ‘natural necessity’ through ‘happiness’ as the end. Lastly, we argue that the Kantian ‘freedom of will’ and ‘faculty of choice’ do not belong to any deterministic model of ‘agency’ as these are sacrosanct systems. The conclusion narrates the non-feasibility of Kantian AI agents from the genuine Kantian ethical outset, offering a utility-based Kantian ethical performer instead.

scholarly journals A Defense of Nonideal Theories of Justice / Uma Defesa de Teorias de Justiça Não Ideais

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Goya Tocchetto
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Human Dignity ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Systems ◽  
The Core ◽  
Current Prevalence ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Recent Debate ◽  
Inalienable Rights

Abstract: The overwhelming majority of contemporary theories of justice is grounded in the rationalist tradition (Frazer, 2010). As a consequence, political philosophers such as John Rawls (1971) have interpreted moral systems as axiomatic, substantially based on concepts of inalienable rights and duties—usually guided by the core value attached to human dignity. Once ethicists started working under an axiomatic framework, empirical evidence has become less and less useful. This road has been conducive to the current prevalence of ideal theories in the field. On a dissonant note, recent debate in political philosophy has rekindled our attention to the development of nonideal theories of justice. Yet before one argues in favor of nonideal (or comparative) theories of justice, one has to be certain that all arguments against the broader incorporation of empirical evidence in the development of political philosophical theories are not valid. Therefore the focus of the present paper is the assessment—and dismissal—of these arguments.Keywords: Theories of Justice; Nonideal Theories; Empirical Evidence; MethodologyResumo: A grande maioria das teorias de justiça contemporâneas se baseiam na tradição racionalista (Frazer, 2010). Como consequência, filósofos políticos como John Rawls (1971) têm interpretado sistemas morais como axiomáticos, baseados substancialmente em conceitos de direitos e deveres inalienáveis – geralmente guiados pelo valor central concedido à dignidade humana. Uma vez que os eticistas começaram a utilizar uma moldura axiomática, as evidências empíricas se tornaram cada vez menos úteis. Esse caminho foi relevante para a atual prevalência de teorias ideais nesse campo. De maneira dissonante, o debate recente na filosofia política reacendeu a atenção para o desenvolvimento de teorias de justiça não ideais. Contudo, antes que alguém argumente em favor de teorias de justiça não ideais (ou comparativas), é preciso estar certo de que todos os argumentos contrários a uma incorporação mais ampla de evidências empíricas no desenvolvimento de teorias políticas filosóficas não são válidos. Portanto, o foco deste artigo é a avaliação – e rejeição – destes argumentos.Palavras-chave: Teorias de justiça; Teorias não ideais; Evidência empírica; Metodologia.

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