Poetry and Equity: Aristotle's Defense of Fiction

Traditio ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 38 ◽  
pp. 17-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy Eden
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Direct Response ◽  
Ethical Action ◽  
Legal Code ◽  
Legal Case ◽  
Literary Arts ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Ethical Presuppositions

Reading the Poetics in light of Aristotle's most complete statements of equity in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Rhetoric, this essay undertakes to demonstrate how and why Aristotle develops an art of poetry within the context of a science of ethics. It seeks to show, that is, how in direct response to Plato's epistemological and ethical objections to tragedy, Aristotle's argument for the preservation of the literary arts follows from a fundamental conviction that poetry shares not only its object of inquiry but also its method of inquiry with the ethical and legal sciences. Like moral philosophy or ethics, tragedy investigates human action. To this end, it relies on the mechanism of ‘fiction’ (πoíησις), which clearly emerges in the course of the Poetics as the literary counterpart to ‘equity’ in the disciplines of ethics and law. As logical constructs, both fiction and equity are designed to qualify ethical action by negotiating between universal propositions — the general ethical presuppositions of the poet's audience or the advocate's legal code — and particular circumstances — the details of the plot or the events of the individual legal case.

Gewalt und Kommunikation

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Jens Bonnemann
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Valuable Contribution ◽  
Human Species ◽  
Normal Case ◽  
Jean Paul ◽  
Philosophy Of Dialogue ◽  
The Individual

In ethics, when discussing problems of justice and a just social existence one question arises obviously: What is the normal case of the relation between I and you we start from? In moral philosophy, each position includes basic socio-anthropological convictions in that we understand the other, for example, primarily as competitor in the fight for essential resources or as a partner in communication. Thus, it is not the human being as isolated individual, or as specimen of the human species or socialised member of a historical society what needs to be understood. Instead, the individual in its relation to the other or others has been studied in phenomenology and the philosophy of dialogue of the twentieth century. In the following essay I focus on Martin Buber’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s theories of intersubjectivity which I use in order to explore the meaning of recognition and disrespect for an individual. They offer a valuable contribution to questions of practical philosophy and the socio-philosophical diagnosis of our time.

Karl Barth's Moral Thought

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald McKenny
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Theological Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Good ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Form Of Life ◽  
God's Grace ◽  
The Right

Does theological ethics articulate moral norms with the assistance of moral philosophy? Or does it leave that task to moral philosophy alone while it describes a distinctively Christian way of acting or form of life? These questions lie at the heart of theological ethics as a discipline. Karl Barth’s theological ethics makes a strong case for the first alternative. This book follows Barth’s efforts to present God’s grace as a moral norm in his treatments of divine commands, moral reasoning, responsibility, and agency. It shows how Barth’s conviction that grace is the norm of human action generates problems for his ethics at nearly every turn, as it involves a moral good that confronts human beings from outside rather than perfecting them as the kind of creature they are. Yet it defends Barth’s insistence on the right of theology to articulate moral norms, and it shows how Barth may lead theological ethics to exercise that right in a more compelling way than he did.

The Ethical Views of Maimonides within the context of Islamicate Civilization

1991 ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Lawrence V. Berman
Keyword(s):  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Jewish Law ◽  
Major Theme ◽  
Major Topic ◽  
Practical Activity ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Guide Of The Perplexed ◽  
Underlying Theme ◽  
The Ideal

This chapter examines the ethical views of Maimonides. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics had a decisive influence on Maimonides’ views, as did concepts found in biblical, talmudic, and post-talmudic literature. A major topic discussed in the Ethics is the goal for man, in general and in particular, aside from the importance of this subject for determining the kind of life the individual should pursue. A second major theme of the Ethics is the nature of the excellences or virtues of man in relation to practical activity and thinking. An underlying theme of the Ethics is that the happiness of the individual is ensured by proper laws which habituate the individual to proper behaviour in accordance with man’s nature. Maimonides’ principal works are his Commentary on the Mishnah, his Code of Jewish Law (Mishneh Torah), and his Guide of the Perplexed. In these works, which span Maimonides’ productivity over the course of his lifetime, the influence of the Ethics is marked. Thus, one sees how a central figure of Islamicate civilization, heir to the best in that civilization of an intellectual cast, was none the less receptive to the important influence of the Ethics. The chapter then discusses Maimonides’ concept of the ideal man in the light of the Ethics.

Torture, The State and the Individual

1989 ◽  
Vol 23 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 345-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford H. Kadish
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Innocent Person ◽  
Democratic Community ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Painful Question

The Report of the Landau Commission puts a painful question for public debate: can it ever be morally acceptable in a liberal democracy for the state to use cruel measures against a person to compel him to reveal information needed to prevent grave harms, such as the loss of lives? The question, of course, belongs to a class of questions that has baffled and divided people for generations. Are some actions inherently and intrinsically wrong, so that they may not be redeemed by the net good consequences they produce on balance? Even if this is the case in general, can it be true regardless of the enormity of the consequences? Battle lines in moral philosophy are drawn in terms of how these questions are answered. For consequentialists the morality of all actions is solely determined by their consequences, near and long term. For deontologists the morality of all actions is always determined, at least in part, by their intrinsic wrongness, so that if they are wrong they are not made right by their desirable consequences. Each side has, so it seems, an unanswerable objection to the position of the other. Deontologists ask: then you mean you are ready to declare, for example, that punishment of innocent persons may be morally justified if it is necessary to prevent crime? And consequentialists (without answering) ask in turn: then you mean that even if the life of thousands and the preservation of the basic freedoms of a democratic community depend on it, you would regard it as morally prohibited to use any force against a single innocent person?These questions are among the hardest of all hard questions. But they become even harder when they are asked in the context of a public debate over how a government should act in some immediate crisis.

Imperial Rule in Medieval Spain

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 288-318
Author(s):  
Wolfram Drews
Keyword(s):  
Iberian Peninsula ◽  
Political History ◽  
Tenth Century ◽  
Direct Response ◽  
Medieval Spain ◽  
Close Analysis ◽  
Medieval Iberia ◽  
Stark Contrast ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Conceptual Core

With the coronation of Alfonso VII of Léon and Castile as ‘emperor of all Spain’ in Toledo in 1135 the imperial aspirations of the Leonese kings reached a climax. Their origins, however, go back to the tenth century, when individual kings were called ‘imperator’ in charters. This article traces the origins of this tradition within the context of political history and outlines the phenomenon of imperial self-ascriptions on the Iberian Peninsula. While modern research traditionally focused on the question of whether or not the kings of León pursued an ‘imperial programme’ and, if they did, what fundamental ideas lay behind such a programme, this article proposes a different approach: by focusing on the interdependencies between Christian and Muslim powers, it argues that the coronation of Alfonso VII could have been a direct response to the proclamation of ‘Abd al-Mu’min as caliph of the Almohad Empire in 1132. A close analysis of the royal and imperial titles already used by Alfonso’s grandfather Alfonso VI shows that he imitated the traditional caliphal title to be ‘ruler of the faithful’, although religious references were not a traditional part of Christian imperial titles. By examining Leonese and Almohad imperial self-ascriptions, the article offers a model by which we can explore the ways in which neighbouring imperial powers influenced each other and developed competing claims to power. The article establishes that Christian use of imperial titles on the Iberian Peninsula came to an abrupt end once competition with Muslim rivals became obsolete. It underlines the importance of the individual context in which a title was used, a point that stands in stark contrast to the received view that there was an unchanging ‘conceptual core’ to the notion of ‘empire’ as it was used by the peninsula’s kings. The article also highlights the hegemonic connotations of imperial notions in medieval Iberia and the importance of a motif of rulership that included subjects of both Christian and Muslim belief.

The Not-so-trivial Truth of Methodological Individualism

1998 ◽  
pp. 69-76
Author(s):  
Maarten Franssen
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Methodological Individualism ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
Theoretical Terms ◽  
The Social ◽  
Intentional Psychology ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Social Entities

I defend the truth of the principle of methodological individualism in the social sciences. I do so by criticizing mistaken ideas about the relation between individual people and social entities held by earlier defenders of the principle. I argue, first, that social science is committed to the intentional stance; the domain of social science, therefore, coincides with the domain of intentionally described human action. Second, I argue that social entitites are theoretical terms, but quite different from the entities used in the natural sciences to explain our empirical evidence. Social entities (such as institutions) are conventional and open-ended constructions, the applications of which is a matter of judgment, not of discovery. The terms in which these social entities are constructed are the beliefs, expectations and desires, and the corresponding actions of individual people. The relation between the social and the individual 'levels' differs fundamentally from that between, say, the cellular and the molecular in biology. Third, I claim that methodological individualism does not amount to a reduction of social science to psychology; rather, the science of psychology should be divided. Intentional psychology forms in tandom with the analysis of social institutions, unitary psycho-social science; cognitive psychology tries to explain how the brain works and especially how the intentional stance is applicable to human behavior.

scholarly journals Akrasia in Epictetus: A Comparison with Aristotle

Apeiron ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-417
Author(s):  
Michael Tremblay
Keyword(s):  
Contemporary Literature ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Nicomachean Ethics ◽  
Strict Sense ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
General Plan ◽  
Key Features ◽  
Oxford University Press

AbstractThere has been little discussion of strict akrasia in contemporary literature on Stoicism ever since Brad Inwood (1985. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press) persuasively argued that Stoic psychology has no means to account for such a phenomenon. And it is true that we find no such phenomenon in Epictetus. However, Inwood’s argument only applies to akrasia in the strict sense, which is when an agent knowingly acts contrary to a self-directed imperative. Stoicism can still allow for akrasia in the broad sense, which is defined by Inwood as any instance when “an agent fails to stand by a previous decision about what he will do or by some general plan or programme of action” (133). When we widen our conception of akrasia to include the broad sense it becomes apparent that this phenomenon is of significant importance to Epictetus. This is best made evident through analogy with Aristotle. This paper argues that Epictetus’ ethics involves three key features which are also present in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1) A major problem for agents is when they fail to render a universal premise effective at motivating a particular action in accordance with that premise. 2) There are two reasons this occurs: Precipitancy and Weakness. 3) Precipitancy and Weakness can be prevented by gaining a fuller understanding of our beliefs and commitments. This comparison should make clear that akrasia is certainly not absent from Epictetus. Rather a very Aristotelian understanding of why we fail to act in accordance with what we take to be in our own best interests remains at the center of his ethics.

De l’image-modèle à l’image de Dieu. Le dépassement de l’individu dans la doctrine éthique de Fichte, 1798–1812

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 171-184
Author(s):  
Luc Vincenti ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Image Of God ◽  
The Self ◽  
Spiritual Life ◽  
Individual Form ◽  
Ethical Action ◽  
Ideal World ◽  
Model Image ◽  
Rational Individual ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
The Individual

Fichte’s ethics changed in many ways between 1794 and 1812: in the first place spiritual life replaced the transformation of nature; individual supersession was radicalized; and ethics was linked with first philosophy. In 1812 it was no longer a matter of inflecting natural necessity by means of the model image of an ideal world (Vorbild). The theme of image reappears as an externalizing of absolute life. Ethical action becomes a moment of this manifestation: a return to unity, following the process of fragmentation of the originary phenomenon (the I or the I-one), into an infinity of individual I’s. This fragmentation is fondamental: life is self-consciousness only in this individual form. The ethical act manifests the concept or image of God with the self-annihilation of individuality. Fichte had already written, in part XI of the Second Introduction, that the I, “only reasonnable”, “is no longer an individual”, and in the first Sittenlehre, § 18 : “We are all supposed to act identically”. Fichte’s final Ethics thus does not radicalize the supersession of the individual. It defines the rational individual by this supersession of himself [or herself], making ethics into a moment [stage] of the absolute life. The matter is not to merge the individual into the whole, but to partake in a living order, in the activity of the whole, which reaches out to each of its members, only to return to the first unity, by forming the whole as such.De 1794 à 1812, l’éthique de Fichte connaît plusieurs évolutions : abandon de la transformation de la nature au profit de la vie spirituelle, radicalisation du dépassement de l’individu, et rapprochement entre éthique et philosophie première. En 1812 il n’est plus question d’infléchir la nécessité naturelle par l’image modeèe (Vorbild) d’un monde idéal. La thématique de l’image apparaît comme extériorisation de la vie absolue. L’action éthique devient un moment de cette manifestation : le retour vers l’un, au terme d’un morcellement du phénomène originaire (le »Moi« ou »Moi un«) en une infinité de Moi(s) individuels. Cette diffraction est essentielle : la vie ne peut être consciente d’elle-même que dans cette forme individuelle. L’agir éthique manifeste le concept ou l’image de Dieu en anéantissant l’individualité. Mais la XIe section de la Seconde Introduction précisait déjà, que dans le monde moral, le Moi »uniquement raisonnable«, »a cessé d’être un individu« et dans la première Sittenlehre, § 18, Fichte écrivait : »Nous devons tous agir de la même manière«. L’éthique tardive ne radicalise donc pas le dépassement de l’individu. Elle définit l’individu rationnel par le dépassement de soi, en faisant de l’éthique un moment de la vie absolue. La question est donc moins de fondre l’individu dans un tout que de participer à un ordre vivant, à l’activité du tout qui va jusqu’à chacun des membres pour revenir vers l’unité première en constituant la totalité comme telle.

Corporate Soulcraft in the Age of Brutal Markets

1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elmer W. Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Human Action ◽  
Economic Organization ◽  
Efficient Production ◽  
Free Markets ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Church And Community ◽  
The Individual ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
Do So

The economic and political arguments for the market principle over alternative forms of economic organization are to my mind irrefutable. It is on the moral level that the perplexing concerns about capitalism center, concerns that have been raised from the beginnings of the industrial era down to the present time. This essay focuses on one major aspect of the ongoing moral test of capitalism: the test of whether our major corporations can both succeed in their profit-making efforts and also serve as one of society’s chief mediating structures that stand, like family, church and community, between the individual and the state. Should the corporation serve not simply as a utilitarian arrangement for the efficient production of high quality goods and services, but also as a moral community that shapes human character and behavior? How can it do so in this age of brutal markets?James Q. Wilson, professor of management at UCLA, has no doubt about the answer. In an article last year, he said: “The problem of imbuing large-scale enterprise with a decent moral life is fundamental.” Corporations “are systems of human action that cannot for long command the loyalty of their members if their standards of collective action are materially lower than those of their individual members.” Capitalists should recognize, he concluded, “that, while free markets will ruthlessly eliminate inefficient firms, the moral sentiments of man will only gradually and uncertainly penalize immoral ones. But, while the quick destruction of inefficient corporations threatens only individual firms, the slow anger at immoral ones threatens capitalism, and thus freedom itself.”

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