III. Challenging Stereotypes – The Contexts of Reception

2003 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 32-50

This chapter broadens the basis of the discussion in three respects. Firstly, the discussion will include examples which show how the history of reception of ancient texts and ideas is intermingled with and to some extent shaped by the artistic forms and cultural politics of receiving traditions. This means that in looking at examples of modern reception it is necessary to consider the routes through which the ancient text or idea itself has passed and the way in which subsequent cultural assumptions filter modern representations. Secondly, I have deliberately chosen examples which engage with the claim that the ancient world provides models, either in the sense of examples of how human beings might behave or, more subtly, ways in which Greek or Roman history or culture has been presented as a base from which subsequent generations might analyse and critique not just the ancient world, but also their own. In this aspect of the discussion I shall challenge the notion, put forward by a number of critics and most recently fostered by Page du Bois, that those looking to the ancient world as a source of insight, whether artistic, moral or political, are necessarily conservatives. Thirdly, in pursuing this argument I shall also begin to scrutinize and revise any easy assumptions that may linger concerning underlying differences in the ways in which it is possible to characterize Greek and Roman material and its reception or about restrictions in the variety and potential of either. The focus here will be on Roman ideas and texts. The next chapter will concentrate on Greek examples.

1997 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julian Thomas

I am grateful to Håkan Karlsson for his thoughtful commentary on some of the issues concerning Heidegger and archaeology which were raised in a previous issue of this journal, and find myself fascinated by his project of a ‘contemplative archaeology’. However, one or two points of clarification could be made in relation to Karlsson's contribution. Firstly, as a number of authors have pointed out (e.g. Anderson 1966, 20; Olafson 1993), the gulf between Heidegger's early work and that which followed the Kehre may have been more apparent than real. While his focus may have shifted from the Being of one particular kind of being (Dasein) to a history of Being (Dreyfus 1992), the continuities in his thought are more striking. Throughout his career, Heidegger was concerned with the category of Being, and the way in which it had been passed over by the western philosophical tradition. It is important to note that in Being and time the analysis of Dasein essentially serves as an heuristic: the intention is to move from an understanding of the Being of one kind of being to that of Being in general. What complicates the issue is the very unusual structure of this specific kind of being, for Heidegger did not choose to begin his analysis with the Being of shoes or stones, but with a kind of creature which has a unique relationship with all other worldly entities. ‘Dasein’ serves as a kind of code for ‘human being’ which enables Heidegger to talk about the way in which human beings exist on earth, rather than becoming entangled in biological or psychological definitions of humanity. In this formulations, what is distinctive about human beings is that their own existence is an issue for them; Dasein cares, and this caring is fundamentally temporal.


1938 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 98-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. V. D. Balsdon

The available evidence concerning the history of the Extortion Court, the quaestio repetundarum, at Rome is tabulated opposite page 114. In view of the bulk of this evidence, it is at first sight surprising that this should be one of the most confused chapters of Roman history. Indeed, it is improbable that all Roman historians would agree upon any more precise statement of certainty than the following: that C. Gracchus, whether by a lex Sempronia iudiciaria, or by a lex Sempronia de repetundis, or by a lex Acilia de repetundis which may, or may not, be reproduced in the lex repetundarum, fragments of which are preserved at Naples and at Vienna (CIL i, 583), established equites (selected either from owners and past owners, within certain age limits, of the equus publicus, or from all those who possessed the equestrian census) either in place of, or in association with, senators as jurors in the quaestio de repetundis; that Q. Servilius Caepio, probably in his consulship in 106 B.C., proposed, and perhaps carried, a judiciary law in the interest of the Senate; that C. Servilius Glaucia either in m (Mommsen), 108 (Carcopino) 104 (Last) or 101 B.C. (Niccolini) carried a lex repetundarum and perhaps other judiciary laws in which he possibly either gave for the first time, or restored, to the equites complete possession of the juries and certainly effected two reforms in procedure, (a) by legalising the prosecution not only of recent magistrates and pro-magistrates, but also of their accomplices and (b) by introducing the form of ‘double action’ known as comperendinatio; that M. Livius Drusus, as tribune in 91 B.C., endeavoured unsuccessfully to establish, or to re-establish, as the case may be, mixed juries of senators and equites, and to make equestrian as well as senatorial jurors liable to prosecution for accepting bribes; that in 89 B.C. by a lex Plautia of the tribune M. Plautius Silvanus mixed juries were established, certainly for trials of maiestas, and perhaps for repetundae too. After this, the way is clearer, Sulla re-established senatorial juries, which survived until 70 B.C., when, by the lex Aurelia, jurors were selected from three panels—from senators, equites and tribuni aerarii.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-149
Author(s):  
Irina-Andreea Stoleriu

The present study is meant to underline the importance of a famous work from the baroque period, Las Meninas, made by the painter Diego de Silva y Velásquez who has become a source of inspiration for future generations of artists. Numerous modern and contemporary artists have integrally or partially ”paraphrased” Velásquez’s composition by intercepting the portrait of revolutionary group for the time when it was created, extremely innovative regarding its compositional qualities and its hidden meanings which underlined the role and status of the artist in the context of a conservative society. Thus, the painting becomes the living proof of the way in which the artist manages to overcome the limitations of the social status of ordinary human beings, by portraying himself as a close friend of the royal family and by opening, through this type of representation, an important chapter in the history of portraiture.


2019 ◽  
Vol 67 (5) ◽  
pp. 1086-1101 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Farrugia

This article explores how the ‘post-Fordist work ethic’ contributes to the formation of classed subjectivities. Drawing on the work of Kathi Weeks, the article approaches the post-Fordist promise of self-realisation through work in terms of the individualised accrual of value that has become so central to the experience of class within the cultural politics of neoliberalism. Empirically, the article draws on a programme of research on the formation of young workers to describe two ideal typical manifestations of the post-Fordist work ethic, characterised as ‘subjects of achievement’ and ‘subjects of passion’, which reflect classed differences in the way that self-realisation through work is defined and experienced. In this way, the article argues that the contemporary work ethic is inflected with forms of class distinction that pre-date the shift to post-Fordism, and that these distinctions within the post-Fordist work ethic are critical to classed modes of contemporary subjectification. This differentiation reflects the ideological history of work and class under capitalism as well as the promise of individualised self-realisation that is so critical to subject formation in the post-Fordist present.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 ◽  
pp. 89-112

Reading Plutarch's Parallel Lives is a fascinating encounter with the history of the ancient world. It includes witnessing the foundation of Athens (Thes. 24.1–3) and Rome (Rom. 11.1–12.1); participating in the battles of Salamis (Arist. 9.1–4; Them. 13.1–15.4), Pharsalus (Pomp. 69.1–72.6; Caes. 42.1–45.8), Philippi (Brut. 49.1–10), and Actium (Ant. 65.1–66.8); marvelling at Alexander sitting on Darius’ throne (Alex. 37.7); being dazzled by the wonderful buildings on the Acropolis (Per. 12.1–13.14); watching in dismay as Caesar is killed with twenty-three dagger blows (Caes. 66.1–14); sharing Pyrrhus’ desperation with one more victory (Pyrrh. 21.14); and standing aghast at the rape of the Sabines (Rom. 14.1–15.7), the tragic fate of Spartacus (Crass. 8.1–11.10), and Hannibal's triumph at Cannae (Fab. 16.1–9). It is a rendezvous with so many distinguished figures of Greek and Roman history: the protagonists and antagonists of the Lives, of course, but also the many less-known figures behind the scene, like Mnesiphilus, the teacher of Themistocles (Them. 2.6–7) or Damon, the brains behind the young Pericles (Per. 4.1–4). The decisive moments of history, such as Caesar's famous alea iacta est before his crossing of the Rubicon (Caes. 32.8; Pomp. 60.4), or his veni vidi vici at Zela (Caes. 50.3), are juxtaposed with ‘petite histoire’ with all its juicy anecdotes: Demetrius’ liaison with Lamia (Demetr. 27.1–14), Pericles’ relationship with Aspasia (Per. 24.2–12), Pompey's fondness for Flora (Pomp. 2.5–8), and, of course, Antony's notorious affair with Cleopatra (Ant. 36.1–7; 53.5–12; 71.4–86.9).


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 309-330 ◽  

The article centers on a discussion of Frank Ruda’s chapter in the anthology Reading Marx, in which he argues that the history of emancipatory thought is a series of footnotes to Plato’s Cave. In considering emancipation to be a way out of the non- or pre-human state, Marx becomes the thinker closest to Plato. According to Ruda, a critique of capitalism must be based on the refutation of the myth of the (unconditional) given, which he identifies with the ideological operation of naturalization. Capitalist naturalization dependent on abstraction and abstraction from abstraction ends by reducing the worker to the state of an animal. However, this is a strange animal that has nothing to do with real animals, and therefore should be called a non-animal. The way out of the Cave turns out to be the realization that the figure of the non-animal does not conceal within itself an unalienated substance and that no positive utopia lies beyond the Cave - on the contrary, the path to liberation leads to the Real of the shadows themselves, to a kind of negative utopia. Accepting Ruda’s general line of reasoning, the author of the article nevertheless wonders whether this interpretation that Ruda has put forward is the kind of new way to read Marx to which Reading Marx aspires. The author compares this interpretation with one from the Marxist legacy proposed by Michel Henry and with François Laruelle’s non-Marxism (which is an extension of Henry’s thought). Their example shows that naturalization could be not only a target in the criticism of capitalism but also a method for that criticism. The myth of the unconditional given has been countered by Henry with a myth about the given which coincides with its condition. Then according to non-Marxism, the myth of the givenness conditions is what is be overcome instead of the myth about the given. That argument is illustrated by Katerina Kolozova’s denunciation of the anthropocentric orientation of the critique of capitalism, which holds that the animal has been reduced to the non-animal in capitalism in exactly the same way as human beings have been and draws the conclusion that in the last instance both animal and human are generically identical.


Author(s):  
Joseph Kirby

In works like What Is Ancient Philosophy and Philosophy as a Way of Life, French classicist Pierre Hadot argues that, in the ancient world, the word philosopher was used primarily to refer to people who transformed their way of living through spiritual practices—and not, as in the modern world, to someone devoted to the reading and writing of specifically philosophical texts. Along similar lines, in You Must Change Your Life, German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk argues that the concept of religion should be replaced by a concept of spiritual practice, or anthropotechnics, the regimens of spiritual training whereby human beings strive to shape themselves through repetitive actions. Importantly, both of these thinkers are attempting to revive spiritual practice not only as scholarly concept but also as a living exhortation, for human beings to once again take up the crucible of disciplined self-transformation. That being said, the ancient understanding of spiritual practice remains radically different from the way spiritual practice manifests for a contemporary thinker like Sloterdijk. This difference, in turn, stems from a profound disagreement concerning the nature of reality itself. Generally speaking, ancient philosophers understood reality to be fundamentally harmonious, peaceful, and good—and within this vision, spiritual practice was understood in terms of reconnecting to this fundamental goodness. In modern thought, by contrast, reality is generally understood to be fundamentally violent, chaotic, and ultimately indifferent to human flourishing—and within this alternative view, spiritual practice is then understood in terms of the cultivation of self-control, as part of a larger cultural project to transform the indifferent natural world into a comfortable human home. As for ancient spiritual practice and its concomitant cosmology, these are criticized from the modern perspective as being nothing more than a flight into illusion, motivated by terror at the as-yet-uncontrolled world of nature. If the modern critique of ancient spiritual practice begins with a critique of cosmology, the ancient critique of modern cosmology would begin from the opposite side of the spectrum, with a critique of modern spiritual practice. More precisely, the ancient practitioner would argue that modern cosmology is actually the result of a flawed approach to spiritual training. This critique turns on the location of what Hadot calls practical physics within the ancient curriculum of spiritual development. In short, the widespread historical narrative, whereby the infinite depths of space and time only became thinkable after Copernicus and Galileo, is actually not true; people have been contemplating the way human life appears from the perspective of the infinite abyss for thousands of years, and the moral upshot of this practical physics was the same in the ancient world as it is now: to inculcate a sense of humility, shared vulnerability, and universal human solidarity. In the ancient world, however, this perspective was not seen as the single, scientific truth of the human condition, but rather was understood as an imaginative spiritual exercise. Moreover, this exercise was itself set within a larger curriculum of training that began with the practice of selfless moral discipline. This is because the ego-dissolution that arises from this “view from infinity” can be spiritually dangerous, leading to a sense of fatalism or even nihilism—the idea that the only good is the power to ensure our own pleasure and survival within a fundamentally meaningless universe. According to the ancient philosophers, however, this conclusion, and the abyss of terror, as well as the sense of ontological despair often experienced by modern people, would be the logical results of an incorrect approach to spiritual training: namely, the precocious dissolution of the ego in the infinite, but without the preliminary cultivation of a relatively selfless ego that can peacefully endure its own dissolution. By the terms of this ancient curriculum, meanwhile, the proper pursuit of these two sides of spiritual life—moral selflessness and self-dissolution—would eventually give way to the experiences that Neoplatonists referred to with the word metaphysics, and which 3rd-century theologian Origen describes in terms of the experience of infinite love.


1958 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-61
Author(s):  
C. M. H. Millar

The present vogue for prisoners' escape stories gives rise quite naturally to an inquiry about the ancient world: has Greek and Roman history or literature any comparable stories to offer? One might expect their pages to be crowded with such stories; escapes are usually made in time of wars and tyrannies, of upheavals and rapid changes of fortune; and heaven knows there were enough of all these in the history of Greece and Rome.


Vox Patrum ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 66 ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Stanisław Łucarz

The article focuses on the notion of femaleness and its role in the history of salvation in the works of Clement of Alexandria. Although these are not the central themes of his considerations, he reflects on this subject against the back­ground of his magnificent vision of the incarnation of the divine Logos. The be­getting or generating of Logos by Father is the first stage of the incarnation, which is followed by the next stages: the creation of the world and of human beings, the revelation in the Old Testament and – although not directly – in the Greek philosophy. The last stage is the incarnation in Jesus Christ. All this leads towards the divinization and the unity in God. Femaleness in Clement’s work should be considered as a part of cosmic dimensions. For him, men and women are substan­tially – i.e. on the level of their souls – equal, hence in the spiritual and intellectual dimension both sexes are vested with identical dignity and enjoy equal rights. The differences between sexes are located in the body and affect various aspects of human life, mostly biological and reproductive ones, not to mention the family, community and religious reality. In practice, it is the woman who is subordinated to man due to the fact, as Clement holds, that the female body is weaker than the male one, more subjugated to passivity, less perfect and more susceptible to pas­sions. For that reason, on the way to salvation, it is the man who is the head of the woman. However, it is not an absolute subjection. If the woman goes on the way to salvation (a Christian woman), and the man does not, the Lord is the head of the woman (the divine Logos, whom she follows). All these differences resulting from the possession of a body are eliminated in eschatology, in which will be the total equality. On that way to the eschatological fulfillment, the divine Logos is indispensable. He incarnates himself and comes to the world through a woman. He chooses what is weaker in order to reveal His power. This way it is a woman, and not a man, who first experiences His divinizing closeness and action.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliot Michaelson ◽  
Rachel Sterken ◽  
Jessica Pepp

The term "fake news" ascended rapidly to prominence in 2016 and has become a fixture in academic and public discussions, as well as in political mud-slinging. In the flurry of discussion, the term has been applied so broadly as to threaten to render it meaningless. In an effort to rescue our ability to discuss—and combat—the underlying phenomenon that triggered the present use of the term, some philosophers have tried to characterize it more precisely. A common theme in this nascent philosophical discussion is that contemporary fake news is not a new kind of phenomenon, but just the latest iteration of a broader kind of phenomenon that has played out in different ways across the history of human information-dissemination technologies. While we agree with this, we argue that newer sorts of fake news reveal substantial flaws in earlier understandings of this notion. In particular, we argue that no deceptive intentions are necessary for fake news to arise; rather, fake news arises when stories which were not produced via standard journalistic practice are treated as though they had been. Importantly, this revisionary understanding of fake news allows us to accommodate and understand the way that fake news is plausibly generated and spread in a contemporary setting, as much by non-human actors as by ordinary human beings.


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