scholarly journals Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent’s action in a false-belief test

2019 ◽  
Vol 116 (42) ◽  
pp. 20904-20909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fumihiro Kano ◽  
Christopher Krupenye ◽  
Satoshi Hirata ◽  
Masaki Tomonaga ◽  
Josep Call
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Great Apes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Behavioral Cues ◽  
Visual Access ◽  
Nonhuman Species ◽  
Previous Location

Human social life depends on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. A signature of theory of mind, false belief understanding, requires representing others’ views of the world, even when they conflict with one’s own. After decades of research, it remains controversial whether any nonhuman species possess a theory of mind. One challenge to positive evidence of animal theory of mind, the behavior-rule account, holds that animals solve such tasks by responding to others’ behavioral cues rather than their mental states. We distinguish these hypotheses by implementing a version of the “goggles” test, which asks whether, in the absence of any additional behavioral cues, animals can use their own self-experience of a novel barrier being translucent or opaque to determine whether another agent can see through the same barrier. We incorporated this paradigm into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief test for great apes. In a between-subjects design, apes experienced a novel barrier as either translucent or opaque, although both looked identical from afar. While being eye tracked, all apes then watched a video in which an actor saw an object hidden under 1 of 2 identical boxes. The actor then scuttled behind the novel barrier, at which point the object was relocated and then removed. Only apes who experienced the barrier as opaque visually anticipated that the actor would mistakenly search for the object in its previous location. Great apes, therefore, appeared to attribute differential visual access based specifically on their own past perceptual experience to anticipate an agent’s actions in a false-belief test.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind Abilities and Social Competence in Preschool Children

2019 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 09-11
Author(s):  
Shrunga Manchanapura Shivalingaiah ◽  
Fathimath Ramseena ◽  
Nafeesath Shareen
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Life ◽  
True Belief ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Clinical Population ◽  
Typically Developing ◽  
Typically Developing Children ◽  
Future Studies ◽  
Objective Theory ◽  
Mixed Responses

Abstract Background and Objective Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability that can be attributed to mental status beliefs, intents, emotions, proficiency, etc., to oneself and to others, and the understanding that others also have intentions, conceptions, desires, and perspectives that are different from one’s own. Daily social life depends on the ability to evaluate the behavior of other people on the basis of their mental state such as their beliefs, intentions, compassions, and goals. This study was conducted to explore the ToM abilities in preschoolers. Methods A total of 36 preschoolers participated in the study. Two stories were narrated to the children, the classic Sally-Anne Task and the Smarty’s Task. In both the tasks, the responses of the children were scored as either true belief or false belief. Results The results of the present study revealed mixed responses among the preschoolers. It was found that 3- to 4-year-old children had more false beliefs for both the tasks when compared with 4- to 5-year-old. Conclusion This study highlights the importance of ToM abilities in typically growing children and other clinical population. It can be concluded that the ToM abilities were improved in typically developing children. Future studies are required to explore the higher levels of embedding of ToM, and also to incorporate it in the clinical population.

scholarly journals Neural correlates of theory-of-mind are associated with variation in children’s everyday social cognition

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 579-589 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cora E Mukerji ◽  
Sarah Hope Lincoln ◽  
David Dodell-Feder ◽  
Charles A Nelson ◽  
Christine I Hooker
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
School Age Children ◽  
Cognitive Behavior ◽  
School Age ◽  
Temporoparietal Junction ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

ABSTRACT Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to reason about others’ mental states, is central to healthy social development. Neural mechanisms supporting ToM may contribute to individual differences in children’s social cognitive behavior. Employing a false belief functional magnetic resonance imaging paradigm, we identified patterns of neural activity and connectivity elicited by ToM reasoning in school-age children (N = 32, ages 9–13). Next, we tested relations between these neural ToM correlates and children’s everyday social cognition. Several key nodes of the neural ToM network showed greater activity when reasoning about false beliefs (ToM condition) vs non-mentalistic false content (control condition), including the bilateral temporoparietal junction (RTPJ and LTPJ), precuneus (PC) and right superior temporal sulcus. In addition, children demonstrated task-modulated changes in connectivity among these regions to support ToM relative to the control condition. ToM-related activity in the PC was negatively associated with variation in multiple aspects of children’s social cognitive behavior. Together, these findings elucidate how nodes of the ToM network act and interact to support false belief reasoning in school-age children and suggest that neural ToM mechanisms are linked to variation in everyday social cognition.

scholarly journals Importance of language for children’s theory of mind: Comparison of verbal and nonverbal theory of mind tasks

Psihologija ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 23-23
Author(s):  
Sanja Simlesa ◽  
Kaja Hacin ◽  
Maja Cepanec ◽  
Jasmina Ivsac-Pavlisa
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Language Comprehension ◽  
Cognitive Skills ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Hierarchical Regression ◽  
Typically Developing ◽  
Typically Developing Children ◽  
The Past ◽  
Verbal Tasks

The ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, known as the theory of mind (ToM), has been widely researched over the past 40 years, along with its relation to language comprehension. However, a majority of the research on the relation between ToM and language used only verbal tasks assessing false belief understanding as a measure of ToM. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze the relation between language and ToM, using a larger battery of ToM measures, with different language demands. A total of 203 typically developing children between 46 and 68 months of age, with average nonverbal cognitive skills, were assessed using language comprehension and ToM tasks. The language aspect was assessed using the Reynell Developmental Language Scales (Language Comprehension scale A). To assess ToM, verbal and non-verbal tasks were taken from the ToM subtest of the NEPSY-II. Results indicated a significant correlation between language comprehension and verbal and non-verbal ToM measures. Hierarchical regression showed that language comprehension was a significant predictor for children's performance on both verbal and non-verbal ToM tasks. Specifically, language comprehension affected ToM, regardless of the language demands of the ToM tasks. However, language comprehension was a stronger predictor for verbal than non-verbal ToM tasks. The results of this study contribute to the view that the relation between language and ToM is fundamental and exceeds the features of specific tasks.

Theory of Mind

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Wilde Astington ◽  
Claire Hughes
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representation ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
School Age ◽  
Comprehensive Description ◽  
Deontic Reasoning ◽  
Developmental Progression ◽  
New Directions ◽  
Atypical Development

The chapter begins with an explanation of key foundational concepts in theory of mind, such as mental representation and false belief. We then discuss the history and current broad scope of the term, proposing a developmental-componential view that incorporates intuitive and reflective aspects of theory of mind. We continue with a comprehensive description of the developmental progression of theory of mind: from infants’ intuitive understanding of ordinary actions as reflecting others’ attention and intentions, through toddlers’ appreciation of world-inconsistent goals and preschool developments in understanding representational mental states, to school-age children’s mastery of an interpretative and complex theory of mind. We consideren passantindividual differences in development, as well as atypical development, such as in autism. Finally, new directions for research are explored, in the areas of neurology, education, and deontic reasoning.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind and Linguistic Acquisition

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arab World English Journal ◽  
Ronnie Goodwin
Keyword(s):  
Early Childhood ◽  
Cognitive Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Literal Interpretation ◽  
Cognitive Domains ◽  
Idiomatic Expressions ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Relationship

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a conceptual theory that is credited with enabling individuals to anticipate the mental states of others, including their beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and additional emotive circumstances (Flavell, 2004). Linguistic acquisition is a natural development that begins to develop in children from birth and enables communication. The cognitive domains necessary to comprehend language is also required in order for the formation of ToM to develop. The interpretations made through ToM presumptions can contain the discernment of another’s false belief. In this context, the individual must be aware that the literal interpretation could be an inaccurate symbol or manufactured belief. This understanding requires a certain level of cognitive development in the child since the intention may be to signify something else and the child must be able to correctly process idiomatic expressions in order to accurately make ToM determinations (Caillies & Le Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008). This paper explores the relationship between ToM and linguistic acquisition in normally developing children, as well as those with various disabilities to ascertain the degree of cognitive development necessary in order to make ToM determinations. Exploration of this relationship reveals that linguistic and cognitive development are both essential in the construct of ToM perceptions in early childhood.

scholarly journals Two Takes on the Social Brain: A Comparison of Theory of Mind Tasks

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (11) ◽  
pp. 1803-1814 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Ida Gobbini ◽  
Aaron C. Koralek ◽  
Ronald E. Bryan ◽  
Kimberly J. Montgomery ◽  
James V. Haxby
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mirror Neuron System ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Superior Temporal Sulcus ◽  
Neural System ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Fusiform Gyrus ◽  
Neural Systems ◽  
General Role ◽  
The Social

We compared two tasks that are widely used in research on mentalizing—false belief stories and animations of rigid geometric shapes that depict social interactions—to investigate whether the neural systems that mediate the representation of others' mental states are consistent across these tasks. Whereas false belief stories activated primarily the anterior paracingulate cortex (APC), the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PC), and the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)—components of the distributed neural system for theory of mind (ToM)—the social animations activated an extensive region along nearly the full extent of the superior temporal sulcus, including a locus in the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), as well as the frontal operculum and inferior parietal lobule (IPL)—components of the distributed neural system for action understanding—and the fusiform gyrus. These results suggest that the representation of covert mental states that may predict behavior and the representation of intentions that are implied by perceived actions involve distinct neural systems. These results show that the TPJ and the pSTS play dissociable roles in mentalizing and are parts of different distributed neural systems. Because the social animations do not depict articulated body movements, these results also highlight that the perception of the kinematics of actions is not necessary to activate the mirror neuron system, suggesting that this system plays a general role in the representation of intentions and goals of actions. Furthermore, these results suggest that the fusiform gyrus plays a general role in the representation of visual stimuli that signify agency, independent of visual form.

scholarly journals The Effects Of Adult Ageing And Culture On Theory Of Mind

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
louise phillips ◽  
Louisa Lawrie ◽  
Alexandre Schaefer ◽  
Min Hooi Yong
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Cultural Differences ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Social Rules ◽  
Mental State Attribution ◽  
Generational Changes ◽  
False Belief Reasoning

Older adults tend to have poorer mental state understanding (Theory of Mind, ToM) than their younger counterparts, including in both Western and Asian cultures. The current study aimed to directly investigate whether there are any cultural differences in the pattern of age effects on ToM tasks. Given evidence of cultural differences in the development of ToM across childhood, we predicted that older Asian adults would find the mental state tasks particularly resource-demanding. We used two ToM tests which made differing demands on updating multiple mental states (the false belief task) and applying social rules to mental state processing (the faux pas task). We also looked at the role of education, socioeconomic status, individualism versus collectivism and working memory (WM). A total of 298 participants from UK and Malaysia completed faux pas, false belief, and WM tasks. Results showed that interacting effects of age and culture were evident in faux pas detection, some aspects of false belief reasoning, and WM tasks, with older Malaysian participants performing poorly compared to the other groups. We also found that WM fully mediated age differences in ToM in the Malaysian sample. High levels of individualism were associated with poorer faux pas detection, but education and socioeconomic status did not explain additional variance in the ToM tasks. This pattern of results may reflect generational changes in the familiarity and cognitive load of explicit mental state attribution, along with cultural differences in the pace and nature of cognitive ageing.

scholarly journals Conversationally and Monologically-Produced Narratives: A Complex Story of Horizontal Décalages

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edy Veneziano
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Internal State ◽  
Old French ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Level Of Functioning ◽  
French Speaking ◽  
Picture Story ◽  
Representational Level ◽  
Practical Level

Abstract Theory-of- mind-related abilities present a long development characterized by both vertical and horizontal décalages. A vertical type of décalage can be seen in children’s abilities to take into account, on a practical level, others’ intentional and mental states and use internal state terms to talk about them before they are able to succeed, at the dominant representational level of functioning, in false belief tasks. Several horizontal décalages can also be observed. It is only after success in FB tasks that children can talk about the mental states of characters in fictional stories. Moreover, ToM-related and other inferential elements are expressed earlier and more frequently in conversationally-constructed than in monologically-produced narratives. This paper examines in particular this type of horizontal décalage by comparing the types of explanations produced by eighty 6- and 7-year-old French-speaking children during a short conversational intervention (SCI) focused on the causes of the story events to those expressed in monological narratives, about the same wordless picture story, produced immediately after or before the SCI. The results confirm that children expressed more ToM-related and other inferential elements during the SCI than in the two monologically-produced narratives. However, the comparison between explanations produced during the SCI and in the immediately following monological narrative also reveals complex relations among understanding, knowing and expressing this knowledge. The reasons and the significance of the horizontal décalages found in the study are discussed.

scholarly journals Case Report: Theory of Mind and Figurative Language in a Child With Agenesis of the Corpus Callosum

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Melogno ◽  
Maria Antonietta Pinto ◽  
Teresa Gloria Scalisi ◽  
Fausto Badolato ◽  
Pasquale Parisi
Keyword(s):  
Case Report ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Corpus Callosum ◽  
Figurative Language ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Metaphor Comprehension ◽  
Brain Hemispheres ◽  
False Belief Tasks

In this case report, we studied Theory of Mind (ToM) and figurative language comprehension in a 7.2-year-old child, conventionally named RJ, with isolated and complete agenesis of the corpus callosum (ACC), a rare malformation due to the absence of the corpus callosum, the major tract connecting the two brain hemispheres. To study ToM, which is the capability to infer the other’s mental states, we used the classical false belief tasks, and to study figurative language, i.e., those linguistic usages involving non-literal meanings, we used tasks assessing metaphor and idiom comprehension. RJ’s intellectual level and his phonological, lexical, and grammatical abilities were all adequate. In both the ToM false belief tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension, RJ showed a delay of 3 years and a significant gap compared to a typically developing control group, while in idioms, his performance was at the border of average. These outcomes suggest that RJ has a specific pragmatic difficulty in all tasks where he must interpret the other’s communicative intention, as in ToM tasks and novel sensory metaphor comprehension. The outcomes also open up interesting insights into the relationships between ToM and figurative language in children with isolated and complete ACC.

scholarly journals Theory of Mind in Pre-school Aged Children: Influence of Maternal Depression and Infants’ Self-Comforting Behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Nonnenmacher ◽  
Mitho Müller ◽  
Joana Taczkowski ◽  
Anna-Lena Zietlow ◽  
Beate Sodian ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Child Development ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Maternal Depression ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Sensitive Period ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Affective States ◽  
School Aged Children ◽  
Dsm Iv

A milestone of child development is theory of mind (ToM): the ability to attribute mental states, especially beliefs and desires, to other persons and to understand that their behavior is guided by mental states. The learning process about the mental world also takes place in social communication and interaction, beginning in infancy. Infancy is assumed to be a sensitive period for the development of social skills through interaction. Due to limited self-regulatory skills, infants depend on sensitive behavior of their caregivers to regulate affective states and physiological arousal, and in turn, mutually regulated affects allow the infant to gradually acquire the capability to self-regulate negative affective states. Effective and adequate affect regulation is an important prerequisite for environmental interaction and thus for the development of socio-emotional skills. The present study investigated the relation of self-regulatory abilities in infancy and later ToM in pre-school aged children of clinically depressed mothers and healthy controls. The sample comprised of N = 55 mother–child dyads, n = 22 diagnosed with postpartum or lifetime depression according to DSM-IV and n = 33 healthy controls. Mother–infant-interaction was videotaped during the Face-to-Face Still-Face paradigm. At 3 and 42 months postpartum mothers were interviewed with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-I) to evaluate maternal psychopathological status according to DSM-IV. At the age of M = 4.0 years, children’s ToM abilities were assessed using content-false-belief and location-false-belief tasks. The results of this study show that contrary to our hypotheses, maternal depression did not impair the development of children’s ToM-abilities per se. Rather, an interaction effect highlights the role of infant’s self-comforting behavior during mother–infant interaction in infancy (3 months postpartum) for ToM-development at pre-school age assessed with the Maxi-task; this association was distinct for female in comparison to male children. The results of this longitudinal study shed light on the discussion, how maternal depression influences child development and point in the direction that self-comforting behaviors in infancy can also be seen as a resource.

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