Advance by Retreat? The Formation of British Labour's Electoral Strategy

1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth D. Wald

Every step towards our goal is dependent on gaining the assent and support of at least a numerical majority of the whole people. Thus, even if we aimed at revolutionizing everything at once, we should necessarily be compelled to make each particular change only at the time, and to the extent, and in the manner which ten or fifteen million electors, in all sorts of conditions, of all sorts of temperaments, from Land's End to the Orkneys, could be brought to consent to it.Now, anybody can see the difficulties which politicians must encounter when they are trying to get votes from the West End of London and South Wales at the same time.Whatever else it might be, whatever its other functions or activities in modern democratic societies, a political party is first and foremost an organization that seeks control of government through the electoral process. Unless it first attains the legitimate governing authority that accompanies majority status, a political party cannot implement the policies necessary to realize its vision of the just society, nor can it fulfill the other roles assigned to parties by modern democratic theory. For just such reasons, it is commonly said that votes are to political parties what profits are to corporations; just as corporate behavior would be incomprehensible without reference to the profit motive, so party behavior is often inexplicable without recognizing the centrality of electoral competition. For parties with normative goals in countries with democratic political systems, the drive for electoral supremacy must be a constant concern.

1975 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Finn Fuglestad

The institutional framework imposed upon Niger in 1946, tended to function according to traditional political concepts, norms, notions and values. Hence the distinction established in this paper between ‘traditionalist’ (UNIS/BNA) and ‘modern’ political parties, refers to the degree of reliance upon this traditional culture and also to the degree to which party-leaders were able to manipulate the norms, notions, etc., of the traditional political systems, in order to gain influence within the new institutional framework. The French Administration, functioning largely as an indigenous chieftaincy, was to a certain extent forced to interfere in politics, since an electoral victory for a ‘modern’ political party (i.e. the évolués) would have to be interpreted—according to the logic of traditional political theory—as a loss of the ‘force’, ‘power’ or ‘luck’, without which the French could no longer be regarded as the legitimate rulers of Niger.If the French finally decided to collaborate with the évolués (and in the process disentangled themselves from the ‘chieftaincy-model’), it was because the évolués constituted the only group capable of grasping the intricate problems of economic development and of running a modern state.


Author(s):  
Jens Richard Giersdorf

Nearly a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germany was subsumed into the West German national structure. As a result, the distinct political systems, institutions, and cultures that characterized East Germany have nearly completely vanished. In some instances, this history was actively—and physically—eradicated by the unified Germany. This chapter works against the disappearance of East German culture by reconstructing the physicality of the walk across the border on the day of the opening of the Berlin Wall and two choreographic works depicting East German identities on stage. The initial re-creation of the choreography of a pedestrian movement provides a social, political, and methodological context that relates the two dance productions to the social movement of East German citizens. Both works take stances on the political situation in East Germany during and after the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, although one is by a West German artist, Sasha Waltz, and the other by East German choreographer Jo Fabian.


1996 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cotton

The Analysis of Opposition in Asian Political Systems raises acute problems of definition. At one end of a continuum lie those polities in which an ‘opposition’ is either inconceivable (North Korea is perhaps the best example) or inevitably in a state of war or confrontation with the regime (as is the case in Burma/Myanmar). In cases at this end of the continuum opposition cannot be democratic in the systemic sense, unless the opposition realizes its programme and becomes a democratic government. At the other end of the continuum, however, the character, standing and potential of ‘opposition’ is very much a matter of debate. In these systems a multiplicity of non-governing political parties exist, and these parties contest elections and send members to legislatures, though they often operate under rules (informal as well as formal) and conditions which tend to prevent them from gaining power. The focus of this article will be upon these systems, which are here labelled – whether parliamentary or presidential – ‘constitutional’. ‘Constitutional’ is understood as entailing the existence of an embedded and more or less regularly operating set of electoral mechanisms which plays an essential part in the selection of the government.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-892 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Lennox Esselment

Abstract.Conventional wisdom about the structure of political parties in Canada has emphasized their confederal nature. In other words (and the New Democratic party excepted), parties with identical partisan complexions at the federal and provincial levels are thought to operate in “two political worlds.” This paper argues that election campaigns are a key integrating link between parties. How they fight elections reveals extensive cross-level co-operation, particularly through shared activists (local party activists, party staff and party professionals) and technological expertise. This has the effect of shrinking the space between party cousins and forges unity between them. While there are certain obstacles to electoral collaboration, there are also incentives for these parties to work to maintain and strengthen their ties with their partisan cousin at the other level. These findings make an important contribution by directly challenging the notion that Canada's federal system has led to increasingly disentangled political parties.Résumé.L'opinion communément admise au sujet de la structure des partis politiques au Canada a mis l'accent sur leur nature confédérale. En d'autres termes (exception faite du Nouveau Parti démocratique), on considère en général que les partis à caractère partisan identique au palier fédéral et provincial fonctionnent dans «deux mondes politiques à part». Le présent article avance que les campagnes électorales constituent un facteur d'intégration clé entre les différents niveaux d'un parti. La façon dont un parti dispute une élection révèle un haut degré de coopération entre les organisations provinciales et fédérales, surtout du fait qu'ils partagent des militants communs (militants locaux, personnel politique et professionnels du parti) et leur expertise technologique. Ce phénomène tend à rétrécir l'espace entre cousins du même parti et à bâtir l'unité d'organisation entre les deux niveaux. Même s'il y a des obstacles inévitables à la collaboration électorale, les partis cousins ont de bonnes raisons de veiller à maintenir et à renforcer leurs liens réciproques. Ces conclusions apportent une contribution importante à l'étude des partis politiques, en contestant directement l'idée que le système fédéral au Canada a encouragé les partis politiques de même allégeance à mener leurs activités de manière indépendante.


2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Moch. Marsa Taufiqurrohman

Artikel ini berupaya meninjau kembali praktik koalisi partai politik di tengah sistem presidensial pasca reformasi, dan menilai sejauh mana dampaknya terhadap kestabilan pemerintahan. Pasca reformasi 1998, sejumlah besar partai politik telah didirikan, menunjukkan bahwa munculnya fragmentasi politik adalah sesuatu yang tidak terhindarkan. Alih-alih melaksanakan pemerintahan secara sehat, partai politik membentuk koalisi untuk memperkuat kedudukan mereka di parlemen. Implikasi penerapan multi partai dalam sistem presidensial ini seringkali menimbulkan deadlock antara eksekutif dan legislatif. Sistem presidensial yang dikombinasikan dengan sistem multi partai dapat menjadi sistem yang stabil dan efektif dengan cara penyederhanaan partai politik, desain pelembagaan koalisi, dan pengaturan pelembagaan oposisi. Namun di sisi lain koalisi juga menjadi sangat berpengaruh pada stabilitas pemerintahan. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian yuridis normatif, artikel ini bertujuan untuk meneliti politik hukum terkait praktik koalisi partai politik di Indonesia dan mengetahui upaya-upaya dalam praktik ketatanegaraan yang dapat merealisasikan stabilitas sistem pemerintahan presidensial pada koalisi di multi partai. Artikel ini menemukan kesimpulan bahwa model pemilihan legislatif dan eksekutif yang dipilih langsung oleh rakyat justru menjadi penyebab disharmonisasi antara legislatif dan eksekutif yang mengarah kepada terjadinya kebuntuan antar kedua lembaga tersebut. Lebih-lebih apabila yang menguasai lembaga ekesekutif dan lembaga legislatif adalah dari latar belakang partai politik yang berbeda. Akibatnya, praktik koalisi seperti ini cenderung mengakibatkan lebih banyak masalah, sehingga penerapan sistem ini memiliki dampak signifikan terhadap demokrasi yang didefinisikan dan dinegosiasikan. This article attempts to review the practice of coalitions of political parties in the post-reform presidential system and assess the extent of their impact on the stability of the government. Post-1998 reform, a large number of political parties have been established, suggesting that the emergence of political fragmentation is inevitable. Instead of implementing a healthy government, political parties formed coalitions to strengthen their positions in parliament. The implication of implementing multi-party in the presidential system often creates deadlocks between the executive and the legislature. A presidential system combined with a multi-party system can become a stable and effective system by simplifying political parties, designing institutionalized coalitions, and organizing opposition institutions. But on the other hand, the coalition has also greatly influenced the stability of the government. By using normative juridical research methods, this article aims to examine legal politics related to the practice of political party coalitions in Indonesia and to find out the efforts in state administration practices that can realize the stability of the presidential system of government in multi-party coalitions. This article finds the conclusion that the legislative and executive election models directly elected by the people are the cause of disharmony between the legislature and the executive which leads to a deadlock between the two institutions. This is even more so if those who control the executive and legislative bodies are from different political party backgrounds. As a result, coalition practices like this are likely to cause more problems, so the adoption of these systems has a significant impact on defined and negotiated democracy.


Author(s):  
Piero Ignazi

Abstract Political parties share a very bad reputation in most European countries. This paper provides an interpretation of this sentiment, reconstructing the downfall of the esteem in which parties were held and their fall since the post-war years up to present. In particular, the paper focuses on the abandonment of the parties' founding ‘logic of appropriateness’ based, on the one hand, on the ethics for collective engagement in collective environments for collective aims and, on the other hand, on the full commitment of party officials. The abandonment of these two aspects has led to a crisis of legitimacy that mainstream parties have tried to counteract in ways that have proven ineffective, as membership still declines and confidence still languishes. Finally, the paper investigates whether the new challenger parties in France, Italy and Spain have introduced organizational and behavioural changes that could eventually reverse disaffection with the political party per se.


The Geologist ◽  
1858 ◽  
Vol 1 (6) ◽  
pp. 233-238
Author(s):  
John Morris

The Llandovery rocks were so named by Sir R. Murchison from the locality in South Wales where they are most fully developed, and where their physical relations to the formations above and below them are clearly exposed. Those rocks constitute an intermediate place in the Silurian table, connecting, by some of their contained organic remains, the fauna of the upper and lower Silurian groups. The upper Llandovery rock contains many shells common to the Wenlock beds, and is considered to form the natural base of those deposits; on the other hand, the lower Llandovery is related by its fossils to the Caradoc beds below, and both members of this formation are united by having certain fossils in common and peculiar to them, but are chiefly characterized by the abundance of some species of Petraia, Atrypa, and especially Pentamerus. This group consists of soft, argillaceous sandstones and building stones (Goleugoed), shales, some calcareous bands, hard, coarse grits, and quartzose, pebbly conglomerates. Thickness 2,000 to 3,000 feet.Localities.—Both members of this group, and their relations to the overlying and subjacent rocks, are well exhibited at Noeth Grüg, near Llandovery, South Wales. In Radnorshire, Shropshire, and Hereford, the upper member, or Pentamerus oblongus zone, is alone present, and is seen in some places to be unconformable to the Longmynd and Caradoc rocks. The conglomerates of the west flank of the Malverns, and the sandstones of May Hill and Huntly, Gloucestershire, are of this age.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Tri Cahya Indra Permana

Undang-Undang Parpol mengatur bahwa perselisihan Parpol diselesaikan secara internal oleh Mahkamah Partai atau sebutan lain daripada itu dan secara eksternal oleh Pengadilan Negeri dan Mahkamah Agung. Substansi perselisihan yang final dan mengikat di Mahkamah Partai adalah perselisihan kepengurusan, selebihnya dapat diajukan upaya hukum ke Pengadilan Negeri dan Mahkamah Agung. Di dalam praktek, pengaturan tersebut telah menjauhkan dari rasa keadilan, kepastian hukum dan kemanfaatan, oleh karenanya sebaiknya direvisi yang mana perselisihan PAW, pelanggaran terhadap hak anggota partai politik, penyalahgunaan wewenang,  pertanggungjawaban keuangan, dan atau keberatan terhadap keputusan partai politik (termasuk keputusan untuk tidak memutuskan terhadap sesuatu hal) final dan mengikat dengan Putusan MPP. Sedangkan perselisihan kepengurusan dapat diajukan upaya hukum ke Mahkamah Konstitusi. Political parties act stipulates that a political party dispute resolved internally by the Mahkamah Partai or other designation of that and externally resolved by the District Court and the Supreme Court. The dispute substance in Mahkamah Partai which is final and binding is about organization dispute, the other can be settled in District Court and the Supreme Court. In practice, that arrangement makes the decision apart from the sense of justice, legal certainty and utility. Therefore, these rules should be revised so that the regulation of PAW, violations of the rights of members of political parties, abuse of authority, financial liability, or an objection to the decision of political parties (including the decision not to decide on something) is final and binding through Mahkamah Partai decision. While the organization disputes can be submitted to the Constitutional Court for legal action.


2011 ◽  
pp. 259-268
Author(s):  
Svetozar Ciplic

In this paper an attempt has been made to present one of the most prominent contradictions of the contemporary parliamentarianism in states which have a proportional voting system. This contradiction stems from the three-fold relationship between: a voter, a member of parliament (MP) and a political party from whose electoral list the MP is elected. On the one hand, a person does not have the possibility to be elected in the parliament if acting independently, outside the political party and its party mechanisms and logistical capacities. On the other hand, after being appointed the parliamentary term as a result of the party's will, the person attains the freedom, through their free term of office, to distance themselves from their political party, and even to leave it and join another political option. The paper also shows that this phenomenon significantly affects and deforms the principle of citizens' sovereignty, given that it is the political parties which have the major impact on the voters' sovereign will expressed at the elections. .


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Euis Ammelia ◽  
Meidi Kosandi

This paper discusses the behavior of political party in Deputy Governor election (Pilwagub) at Riau Islands Province (Kepri) 2017 with rational choice and cartel politics approach. The DPRD of Riau Islands Provincial decision to to choose and assign Isdianto as Deputy Governor requires controversy, it is caused by the domination of one coalition over the other in the 2015 Governor election. This study argues that the motive for power in inter-party relations at the local level, especially those who have seats in Parliament of Riau Islands Province, tends to influence DPRD’s decision. Political parties effort at the local level through electoral changes are characterized by the pragmatism of political parties. The parties that competed in the 2015 Pilgub challenged reconciliation since the 2017 governor election. The findings of this study are those that discuss cartel policy through unseen agreements that are reflected in the DPRD's plenary decision by acclamation.


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