Finland will counter Russian threat with pragmatism

Subject Finland’s defence policy. Significance Finland’s traditional strong emphasis on territorial defence against Russia was complemented with an approach to address hybrid threats when the government opened the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki in September. Impacts Defence spending is likely to continue rising gradually and major decisions on procurement projects will be made in the coming years. The outcome of the presidential election will have little bearing on Finland’s consistent, consensual defence policy. A more vocal debate about joining NATO would heighten tensions with Russia. Finland’s new hybrid threats centre could contribute to shaping the security debate in Europe over the next years. The ethnic Russian minority remains vulnerable to external influences.

Significance With an election due soon, the governing Liberal-National Coalition’s pledge to ring-fence the defence spending commitments made in 2016 was under some pressure. However, defence spending in fiscal year 2021/22 will grow by over 4% in real terms and stay above the symbolic level of 2% of GDP. Impacts Growing popular and bipartisan concern with Chinese aggression is a conducive environment for increased defence spending. Low interest rates and a stronger Australian dollar are also supporting sustained levels of defence expenditure. Washington may increase pressure on Australia to conduct freedom of navigation exercises in the South China Sea. Major business groups are concerned that increased criticism of China in national politics will produce yet more punitive backlash.


Subject Future EU defence integration. Significance The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) have become key pillars of EU defence policy, but divergence between member states is increasingly making defence integration slow and limited. In addition, opposition towards third-party participation and arms exports, and uncertainty about the future EU-UK security relationship, threaten to diminish the capabilities of future EU defence projects. Impacts London’s exclusion from the EU’s Galileo project suggests Brussels does not want close UK collaboration in future EU initiatives. The EU will likely prioritise steps to enhance European defence industry integration in order to reduce duplication and overspending. National-level defence spending could stall over the coming years as a result of slowing economic growth across the euro-area.


Subject The economic outlook for China following the lifting of the COVID-19 lockdown. Significance The economic uncertainties due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic made this year’s National People’s Congress (NPC) unusually important. After GDP fell 6.8% year-on-year in the first quarter, the government for the first time announced no annual GDP growth target, indicating extreme uncertainty over the extent and durability of recovery. Impacts China’s industrial output will outpace export demand; trade tensions such as anti-dumping cases could rise. US-China tensions will rise, but both sides will be warier than last year of major moves that could jeopardise economic recovery. China’s commitment to high military spending is undiminished by its economic troubles; defence spending will rise as a share of GDP.


Significance The government has incurred debt to cover its COVID-19 business and social lockdowns. The defence budget is now a likely to target for cost-saving. Impacts COVID-19 is hitting Australia’s close defence and strategic partners (United States, Japan, India) much harder than Australia. China, which has also been hard hit by COVID-19, will be Australia’s primary strategic concern. Interest rates and the Australian dollar’s strength will affect COVID-19’s effect on defence spending. Rising unemployment may help the ADF address its long-standing recruitment problems. Constrained Australian defence outlays will make Canberra a weaker ally during that time.


Subject Sri Lanka's debt problem. Significance Sri Lanka late last month said it was planning to issue international sovereign bonds (ISBs) worth some 1.5 billion dollars, helping to repay loans soon to mature. The country’s gross outstanding debt stock rose to nearly 70% of GDP in 2018 from just under 40% in 2008. Impacts Debates around the presidential election due later this year will likely be dominated by security concerns rather than the economy. Political instability caused by rifts within the government will damage investor confidence in the country. Sri Lanka will step up efforts to attract tourists, hoping to sustain a key source of foreign exchange earnings.


Author(s):  
NEIL GRAYSTON

Abstract The Republic of Slovenia has been a member of NATO for 15 years. In preparing for NATO membership the Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) were required to prepare for radical change, from a territorial defence force to one that could contribute to NATO missions. The need for change became even more significant after the government decision in 2002 to end conscription and move to a fully professional SAF. A revised force structure for the SAF was agreed in 2003, prior to Slovenia joining NATO in 2004. Progress in developing the SAF in the first five years of NATO membership, while encountering a number of challenges, showed a positive trend, with a commensurate increase in defence expenditure. In the following five years the economic crisis which affected most NATO countries had a particularly damaging effect on the continued development of the SAF, with very severe reductions in defence expenditure. Today, after 15 years of NATO membership, the SAF has still not recovered from the cuts made in defence spending. Spending remains close to 1.0% of GDP and is inadequate to support the force plans of the SAF. The SAF is unable to make an effective contribution to NATO and a decision needs to be made on the future size and shape of the SAF which matches plans for future defence expenditure. Key words NATO, Slovenia, Professionalization, Defence Planning, Defence Expenditure, Missions, Force Structure, Democratic Control.


Author(s):  
Yevheniia Tykhomyrova

У статті розглянуто проблему наростання гібридних загроз, що виникла внаслідок агресивної політики Росії та створила небезпеку сучасному європейському інформаційному простору. Автор, посилаючись на рішення Єврокомісії щодо протидії гібридним загрозам й аналіз результатів Євробарометру (2018 р.), котрий вивчав  обізнаність громадян ЄС і їхнє ставлення до існування підроблених новин та дезінформації в Інтернеті, говорить про актуалізацію досліджуваної проблеми й потребу вивчення інституціональних аспектів протидії сфабрикованим новинам у сучасному інформаційному просторі. У статті досліджено такі Центри протидії дезінформації, як Оперативна робоча група зі стратегічних комунікацій ЄС (East StratCom Task Force) та Європейський центр передового досвіду для протидії гібридним загрозам (European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats), які діють у масштабах ЄС, а також і деякі національні Центри протидії дезінформації, зокрема в Чехії, Словаччині, Польщі.


Significance The requests are based on plea bargains from former executives of construction company Odebrecht. While the names in ‘Janot’s list’ have not been disclosed, several of them have leaked to the media. They include six ministers in the government of President Michel Temer, two former presidents, ten state governors, and the heads of both houses of Congress. If confirmed, this would make the list a potent bombshell for the Brazilian political class. Impacts The corruption scandal looks set to disrupt next year’s presidential election. Politicians’ disdain for accountability will fuel outrage with the political class. The ground could be fertile for a candidate claiming to be an ‘outsider’.


Subject Kremlin strategy for the 2018 presidential election. Significance With one year to go before the 2018 presidential election, the Kremlin strategy that will frame the process is starting to take shape. The nature of Vladimir Putin’s campaign has a bearing on his fourth term, during which he must either identify a successor or engineer an extension of his tenure beyond 2024. Impacts Putin will rally populist sentiment on the back of foreign policy successes in Crimea and Syria. A possible rapprochement with the United States would restrict the national narrative of ‘Russia encircled’. The Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist candidates will criticise the government but will not run opposition campaigns.


Significance Economic weakness plus popular resentment of an elite seen as corrupt creates potential for mass demonstrations by pro- and anti-EU factions. Russia's importance as an economic partner is waning but it retains substantial influence through sympathetic political parties. A presidential election this October will be coloured by the unresolved bank fraud scandal, which has created a gulf between the political establishment and the electorate. Impacts Mainstream politicians will be find it hard to shake off perceived links to corruption. Prominent figures, whether oligarchs or pro-Russian politicians, may therefore avoid standing as presidential candidates. Lack of systemic reforms is a constraint on Moldova's ability to engage with EU economies. Domestic turmoil makes the government less likely to challenge Transnistria, which will remain a conduit for Russian pressure.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document