Research on Oil and Gas Station Integrity Management System

Author(s):  
Honglong Zheng ◽  
Muyang Ai ◽  
Lijian Zhou ◽  
Mingfei Li ◽  
Ting Wang ◽  
...  

As a preventative management mode, integrity management which is significantly effective is now applicable in modern industry. Based on the successful application of integrity management for the pipeline, managers expect an extension of the integrity management program for the oil and gas stations such as pumping stations, so as to make the best arrangement of resources and guarantee the safety of station facilities. The differences between station integrity management system in China and abroad are analyzed. It is claimed that the oil and gas station integrity management is more difficult and complicated in China. An integrity management program is developed for the oil and gas stations in China. The authors summarily introduce the station integrity management framework, and determine the processes and elements of management. For the main parts of the stations are plenty of facilities, the authors attempt to carry out the management on each category of facilities in particular. According to the characteristics and working status, field facilities can be classified into three categories: static facilities, dynamic facilities, and electrical instruments. For all these facilities, integrity management approach consists of five steps: data collection, risk assessment, integrity assessment, repair & maintenance, and performance evaluation. Station integrity management system comprises five aspects: system documents, standards & specifications, supporting technologies, management platforms and applications. This paper should be considered as a reference for the oil and gas station integrity managers in the future.


Author(s):  
M. Robb Isaac ◽  
Saleh Al-Sulaiman ◽  
Monty R. Martin ◽  
Sandeep Sharma

In early 2005, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) initiated a Total Pipeline Integrity Management System (TPIMS) implementation in order to carry out a major integrity assessment of its operating facilities, equipment, buried plant piping and pipeline network and to establish a continuing integrity management program. KOC Transit System is a complex infrastructure consisting of over three hundred pipelines, thousands of wellhead flow lines, and consumer and offshore lines for which there was a significant loss of data when the facilities were destroyed during a military invasion in 1990. An initial pipeline system assessment identified issues and actions regarding condition of the pipelines, corridors, requirements on in-line inspection (ILI), documentation, RISK assessment, status of international code compliance, and overall state of the system. Following recommendations from that initial assessment led to the development of a long term strategy; the execution of which required the implementation of a comprehensive integrity management program. This case study discusses the results obtained after five years of implementation of TPIMS at KOC. It will demonstrate some of the complex components involved in managing the integrity of the Transit System that have been made possible through the implementation of the system. The general concept and structure of TPIMS will be described, and how it deals with the complexity of the KOC pipeline system. The system made it possible to integrate and manage data from various sources, by conducting integrity assessment using ILI, Direct Assessment and hydrostatic testing, as well as structure a comprehensive RISK & Decision Support mechanism. This is one of the world’s first implementations of this magnitude which encompasses such a wide range of services and variables; all being managed in a single environment and utilized by a multitude of users in different areas at KOC. The biggest challenge in a project of this scope is data management. Examples will be shown of the integration structure to illustrate the benefits of using a single comprehensive and versatile platform to manage system requirements; ultimately providing system reliability and improving overall operational efficiency.



Author(s):  
Bushra Waheed ◽  
Brodie Couch ◽  
Gouri Bhuyan ◽  
Hassan Iqbal ◽  
Eddie Lee

Integrity Management Program (IMP) is a systematic and documented program for assuring asset integrity throughout the full life cycle of an asset. To ensure safe and reliable operation, the British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission (Commission) has been requiring its licensed pipeline operators through its regulations to develop and implement pipeline integrity management programs (IMPs) in accordance with Canadian Industry Standard CSA Z662. The auditing process, the collated results and findings from the IMP audit years (2011–15) were published in IPC 2016-64161[1]. Since 2016, the Commission has enhanced its IMP compliance assurance process, and aligned it with the management system approach using Deming’s model of plan-do-check-act (PDCA) for IMP components and incorporated a lifecycle approach that spans the entire lifecycle of a pipeline system from planning to abandonment. In addition, the Commission has adopted a multi-criteria decision-making approach when prioritizing which operators to audit. This method utilizes weighted rank approach and takes into account multiple factors, such as, previous IMP audit results, pipeline length and product, class location, incident frequency, and asset age. Through collaborative efforts with the University of British Columbia (Okanagan), an innovative risk based audit tool — Integrity Management Program Audit and Knowledge Tool (IMPAKT) has been developed to help evaluate the compliance of operators’ IMP in terms of the management system approach and its associated risk. This tool conducts three-dimensional analysis of IMP performance using the failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) technique and allows the Commission to generate a risk profile for each IMP component to determine which components are most critical, requiring immediate attention. The final audit results are presented as a Risk Priority Number (RPN), which is a product of severity, occurrence and action. An effective integrity management program requires a strong safety culture, therefore, safety culture aspects are incorporated into the risk based auditing tool, IMPAKT. This risk based evaluation process also allows the Commission to develop a compliance benchmark to make comparison between different operators’ IMP results for continuous performance improvement. This paper presents the innovative approach developed and implemented by the Commission for the IMP compliance oversight (auditing) process and implication of such changes.



Author(s):  
Karine Kutrowski ◽  
Rob Bos ◽  
Jean-Re´gis Piccardino ◽  
Marie Pajot

On January 4th 2007 TIGF published the following invitation for tenders: “Development and Provision of a Pipeline Integrity Management System”. The project was awarded to Bureau Veritas (BV), who proposed to meet the requirements of TIGF with the Threats and Mitigations module of the PiMSlider® suite extended with some customized components. The key features of the PiMSlider® suite are: • More than only IT: a real integrity philosophy, • A simple intuitive tool to store, display and update pipeline data, • Intelligent search utilities to locate specific information about the pipeline and its surrounding, • A scalable application, with a potentially unlimited number of users, • Supervision (during and after implementation) by experienced people from the oil and gas industry. This paper first introduces TIGF and the consortium BV – ATP. It explains in a few words the PIMS philosophy captured in the PiMSlider® suite and focuses on the added value of the pipeline Threats and Mitigations module. Using this module allows the integrity analyst to: • Prioritize pipeline segments for integrity surveillance purposes, • Determine most effective corrective actions, • Assess the benefits of corrective actions by means of what-if scenarios, • Produce a qualitative threats assessment for further use in the integrity management plan, • Optimize integrity aspects from a design, maintenance and operational point of view, • Investigate the influence of different design criteria for pipeline segments. To conclude, TIGF presents the benefits of the tool for their Integrity Management department and for planning inspection and for better knowledge of their gas transmission grid.



Author(s):  
Alex J. Baumgard ◽  
Tara L. Coultish ◽  
Gerry W. Ferris

Over the last 15 years, BGC Engineering Inc. has developed and implemented a geohazards Integrity Management Program (IMP) with 12 major pipeline operators (consisting of gas and oil pipelines and of both gathering and transmission systems). Over this time, the program has been applied to the assessment of approximately 13,500 individual hydrotechnical and geotechnical geohazard sites spanning approximately 63,000 km of operating pipelines in Canada and the USA. Hydrotechnical (watercourse) and geotechnical (slope) hazards are the primary types of geohazards that have directly contributed to pipeline failures in Canada. As with all IMPs, the core objectives of a geohazard management system are to ensure a proactive approach that is repeatable and defensible. In order to meet these objectives, the program allows for varying levels of intensity of inspection and a recommended timescale for completion of actions to manage the identified geohazards in accordance with the degree of hazard that the site poses to the pipeline. In this way, the sites are managed in a proactive manner while remaining flexible to accommodate the most current conditions at each site. This paper will provide a background to the key components of the program related specifically to existing operating pipeline systems, present pertinent statistics on the occurrence of various types of geohazards based on the large dataset of inspections, and discuss some of the lessons learned in the form of program results and program challenges from implementing a geohazard integrity management system for a dozen operators with different ages of systems, complexity of pipeline networks, and in varied geographic settings.



Author(s):  
Lawrence Ator ◽  
Minh Ho

The National Energy Board of Canada (NEB), a federal energy regulator, has implemented a management system audit program as a tool to verify compliance with its predominantly goal-oriented Onshore Pipeline Regulations, 1999 (OPR) [1]. The OPR allow individual companies to choose the most effective way to manage their pipeline systems. The audit program is based on expected elements that the NEB believes are necessary to meet the goals of the OPR. This paper will explain why these audits and expected elements are necessary and describe how goal-oriented regulations will enhance pipeline safety. The audits conducted to date have identified several challenges that the NEB and pipeline companies face in pursuit of the goal of safe pipelines; these will be described and possible solutions will be proposed. The overall objective of the paper is to explain the benefits of using a management system approach to direct a company’s pipeline integrity management program and what is required of companies to meet the expectations of the NEB.



Author(s):  
Hao Song ◽  
Chenteh Alan Yu ◽  
Yongming Cheng ◽  
Jing Hou

Abstract The riser is a critical element in a subsea production system for transporting hydrocarbons from the seafloor to the surface. The track record of existing riser systems worldwide has shown that risers tend to be designed conservatively to accommodate dynamic loads, strength and fatigue requirements, and corrosion/erosion provision needs. Among all the riser types, the steel catenary riser (SCR) is the most installed riser configuration for deepwater oil and gas production worldwide in the last two decades. This is mainly because of their simple configuration and relatively low manufacturing and installation cost. As riser technology advances, SCRs are designed to tackle more challenging environments and longer service lives. For the riser life extension applications, regulatory bodies prefer riser operations to be managed through an integrity management program, demonstrating that a robust framework with detailed records on the conditions of the risers is in place. This paper studies an integrity management program for SCRs with a 30-year design life in a harsh environment. The planned riser integrity management program is based on successful industry practice and the newly published riser integrity management standard API RP 2RIM [4]. It starts with a review of the riser design basis and as-built data, continuing with key field data measurement and production fluid sampling. A digital model, continuously calibrated with the measured data, is established to assess the integrity of the riser system. Key physical quantities are selected to monitor the structural health of the SCRs, including vessel motion measurement, measurement of SCR top hang-off angles and tensions, and full water column current measurement. The relationship between the measurement data and the riser strength and fatigue performance is established. Details of the riser integrity assessment in a digital model utilizing the measurement data are presented. The implemented proposed riser integrity management program is expected to provide a more focused and efficient method with a higher level of confidence in operating the SCRs during the design life and potentially beyond.



2017 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 393
Author(s):  
Sunny Barlow

Many organisations find it challenging to effectively integrate separate internal management systems and processes into one cohesive framework that supports organisational strategy. A management system is a framework of policies, processes and procedures developed to ensure an organisation can complete the tasks necessary to achieve its strategic objectives. International and industry standards typically take a functional view of management systems, often resulting in silos of information. In addition, inefficient and isolated safety, environmental, process safety, risk, compliance and quality management systems cost time and money, and can increase the likelihood of safety incidents in critical development and production environments. To support Woodside’s vision to be a global leader in upstream oil and gas, Woodside needed to establish a common approach to how it operates, wherever the location, and develop a strong foundation to support its strategic objectives. Woodside recently undertook an internally led company-wide project to renew its Woodside Management System (WMS) to improve integration between disparate functionally based management systems and capture the way we work more effectively. As part of the project, Woodside took the opportunity to redesign its WMS framework and streamline its processes and procedures by simplifying and removing duplicate or redundant existing information. Through the project, Woodside developed a single integrated management system that is independent of organisational structure and closely linked to our vision. The integrated control framework created within the WMS supports conformance to process and forms the foundation of assurance activities across the entire company. The WMS integrates a hierarchy of business processes, focused upon value stream activities, and clearly defines operational processes and activities. This paper discusses the objectives and outcomes of the project, some challenges during implementation and the change management approach to develop the culture and behaviours to drive continuous improvement and unlock the benefits of an integrated management system.



Author(s):  
Vlad Semiga ◽  
Aaron Dinovitzer

Fitness for service assessments of oil and gas pipelines, conducted either at the design stage or to evaluate an indentified anomaly, are generally carried out in a deterministic manner based on conservative estimates of the required input parameters. The following paper presents a probabilistic Fitness-for-Service (FFS) assessment approach which can be used in a risk based pipeline integrity management program. The probabilistic assessment utilizes an Advanced Monte Carlo simulation based approach and the fracture mechanics techniques described in BS 7910. The paper presents an overview of the basic approach and provides a demonstration of its capabilities in terms of estimating the risk of failure (or probability of failure) associated with a pipeline over time, due to the presence of a crack like flaw. The paper also discusses the sources of data and inherent assumptions used to model various input parameters required for a typical FFS analysis carried out according to BS 7910.



Author(s):  
Ashish Khera ◽  
Rajesh Uprety ◽  
Bidyut B. Baniah

The responsibility for managing an asset safely, efficiently and to optimize productivity lies solely with the pipeline operators. To achieve these objectives, operators are implementing comprehensive pipeline integrity management programs. These programs may be driven by a country’s pipeline regulator or in many cases may be “self-directed” by the pipeline operator especially in countries where pipeline regulators do not exist. A critical aspect of an operator’s Integrity Management Plan (IMP) is to evaluate the history, limitations and the key threats for each pipeline and accordingly select the most appropriate integrity tool. The guidelines for assessing piggable lines has been well documented but until recently there was not much awareness for assessment of non-piggable pipelines. A lot of these non-piggable pipelines transverse through high consequence areas and usually minimal historic records are available for these lines. To add to the risk factor, usually these lines also lack any baseline assessment. The US regulators, that is Office of Pipeline Safety had recognized the need for establishment of codes and standards for integrity assessment of all pipelines more than a decade ago. This led to comprehensive mandatory rules, standards and codes for the US pipeline operators to follow regardless of the line being piggable or non-piggable. In India the story has been a bit different. In the past few years, our governing body for development of self-regulatory standards for the Indian oil and gas industry that is Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) recognized a need for development of a standard specifically for integrity assessment of non-piggable pipelines. The standard was formalized and accepted by the Indian Ministry of Petroleum in September 2013 as OISD 233. OISD 233 standard is based on assessing the time dependent threats of External Corrosion (EC) and Internal Corrosion (IC) through applying the non-intrusive techniques of “Direct Assessment”. The four-step, iterative DA (ECDA, ICDA and SCCDA) process requires the integration of data from available line histories, multiple indirect field surveys, direct examination and the subsequent post assessment of the documented results. This paper presents the case study where the Indian pipeline operators took a self-initiative and implemented DA programs for prioritizing the integrity assessment of their most critical non-piggable pipelines even before the OISD 233 standard was established. The paper also looks into the relevance of the standard to the events and other case studies following the release of OISD 233.



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