EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENT KNOWLEDGE ON AGGLOMERATION AND COOPERATION IN SPATIAL PUBLIC GOODS GAMES

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (supp01) ◽  
pp. 1250056 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHENG-YI XIA ◽  
SANDRO MELONI ◽  
YAMIR MORENO

Nowadays, our society is characterized by high levels of social cohesion and cooperation that are in contrast with the selfish nature of human beings. One of the principal challenges for the social sciences is to explain the emergence of agglomeration and cooperative behavior in an environment characterized by egoistic individuals. In this paper we address this long standing problem with the tools given by evolutionary game theory. Specifically, we explore a model in which selfish individuals interact in a public goods creation environment. As a further ingredient each agent is characterized by an individual expectation and, if unsatisfied, can change its location. In this scenario we study the effects of the knowledge of other players' performances on both cooperation and agglomeration and discuss the results in the context of previous and related works. Our results show that cooperation and agglomeration are generally robust against the inclusion of different information on other player performances and, in some cases, it can produce an enhancement of the cooperative behavior. Moreover, our results demonstrate that only in extreme and very competitive environments cooperation and agglomeration are lost.

2013 ◽  
Vol 380-384 ◽  
pp. 1783-1787
Author(s):  
Rui Xue Feng ◽  
Juan Ge

We introduce a self-questioning mechanism under spatial public goods game in the framework of Evolutionary Game Theory where players are located on a square lattice and realize it by a intensity parameter a. By stimulation and analysis, we find that compared with the original Fermi updating (a=0), the introduction of the self-questioning (a>0) can be better promote cooperative behavior at the smaller r. Subsequently, we stimulate in self-questioning mechanism (a=1), the cooperator frequency fc as a function of the factor r for different values of noise K. Results show that at the larger and smaller noise K, the system presents a considerably different cooperation phenomenon. Whats more, fc as a function of r has center symmetry nature about point (5.0, 0.5) whatever the noise K is. Further analysis indicates the reasons for the formation of these phenomena. Finally, we report the agents average payoff in the steady state and its reasons for it.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Mesoudi ◽  
Kevin N. Laland

We applaud Gintis's attempt to provide an evolutionary-based framework for the behavioral sciences, and note a number of similarities with our own recent cultural evolutionary structure for the social sciences. Gintis's proposal would be further strengthened by a greater emphasis on additional methods to evolutionary game theory, clearer empirical predictions, and a broader consideration of cultural transmission.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jose C. Yong ◽  
Bryan K. C. Choy

Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Xiaojie Chen

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.


Episteme ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Igor Douven

Over recent decades, computer simulations have become a common tool among practitioners of the social sciences. They have been utilized to study such diverse phenomena as the integration and segregation of different racial groups, the emergence and evolution of friendship networks, the spread of gossip, fluctuations of housing prices in an area, the transmission of social norms, and many more. Philosophers of science and others interested in the methodological status of these studies have identified a number of distinctive virtues of the use of computer simulations. For instance, it has been generally appreciated that as simulations require the formulation of an explicit algorithm, they foster precision and clarity about whatever conceptual issues are involved in the study. The value of computer simulations as a heuristic tool for developing hypotheses, models, and theories has also been recognized, as has been the fact that they can serve as a substitute for real experiments. This is especially useful in the social domain, given that human beings cannot be freely manipulated at the discretion of the experimenter (for both points, see Hartmann 1996). However, the main virtue of computer simulations is generally believed to be that they are able to deal with the complexities that arise when many elements interact in a highly dynamic system and which often evade an exact formal analysis (see, e.g., Humphreys 1991).


Author(s):  
Katia Sycara ◽  
Paul Scerri ◽  
Anton Chechetka

In this chapter, we explore the use of evolutionary game theory (EGT) (Weibull, 1995; Taylor & Jonker, 1978; Nowak & May, 1993) to model the dynamics of adaptive opponent strategies for large population of players. In particular, we explore effects of information propagation through social networks in Evolutionary Games. The key underlying phenomenon that the information diffusion aims to capture is that reasoning about the experiences of acquaintances can dramatically impact the dynamics of a society. We present experimental results from agent-based simulations that show the impact of diffusion through social networks on the player strategies of an evolutionary game and the sensitivity of the dynamics to features of the social network.


Games ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurt Ackermann ◽  
Ryan Murphy

There is a large body of evidence showing that a substantial proportion of people cooperate in public goods games, even if the situation is one-shot and completely anonymous. In the present study, we bring together two major endogenous factors that are known to affect cooperation levels, and in so doing replicate and extend previous empirical research on public goods problems in several important ways. We measure social preferences and concurrently elicit beliefs on the individual level using multiple methods, and at multiple times during the experiment. With this rich set of predictor variables at the individual level, we test how well individual contribution decisions can be accounted for in both a one-shot and a repeated interaction. We show that when heterogeneity in people’s preferences and beliefs is taken into consideration, more than 50% of the variance in individual choice behavior can be explained. Furthermore, we show that people do not only update their beliefs in a repeated public goods game, but also that their social preferences change, to some extent, in response to the choices of other decision makers.


Sociology ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aurora Vergara-Figueroa

Race and racism are key analytical constructs that express fundamental issues not only of power and inequality, but also of justice, democracy, equity, and emancipation. The study of race in the social sciences is an established, dynamic, multidisciplinary, and international field. Work began at the end of the 19th century. To study race with a global perspective, it is necessary to have a transdisciplinary view to read critically the phenomena that intersect with this variable. This field includes contributions from sociology, history, philosophy, legal studies, anthropology, cultural studies, political science, epidemiology, and journalism, among others. Several declarations have been made in recent years about the alleged end of racism or the end of a race-coded era. However, even though they are not new, every time they resurge these doxas underline new regimes of truth, reconfigure racisms, and strength inequality. The vast literature produced by scholars in this field provides evidence of how race is based on narratives created to enslave, subordinate, exploit, and exclude millions of human beings across the globe.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-90
Author(s):  
Abdul Wahid

The study on a comparative study of educational thoughts of Allama Iqbal and Imam Ghazali) is made in order to know the contribution of Allama Iqbal Imam Ghazali in the educational system of Muslim world. Researcher use qualitative approach for this research in which interview was taken from the educationist of the Loralai city. Thoughts of both philosophers were analyzed by the respondents in which these results are found. These prominent philosophers have contributed a lot to the educational system of Muslim Umma. In the research it has been found that both legend philosophers ask that student should have to avoided bad character and they should have to adopt soul purity as well. Respect of teachers learning of Quran and Hadith, morality generosity and civility should have their actual and obligatory habits in their entire life. It has been concluded that an ideal student should adopt the useful and technical knowledge and he must have a clear and manifest objective of his knowledge in future to get desire target. The purpose of gaining Education is beneficial for society and individual as well. Apart from these, education will develop the student socially, morally and spiritually equally well. Education brings changes and efforts in human beings. The most important responsibility of the teacher is to develop spiritual insight and realize the difficulties of the students. it is the prime responsibility of the teacher to recognize the knowledge, ability and aptitude of the learners and motivate students towards lesson which is important to educational process. An ideal teacher disseminates the truth and teaches others without desire of getting reward or in the name of fame in the world. He follows the teaching of Islam truly. He should possess good moral and ethical character and act like role model for his students because the students learn from his character. Revealed knowledge i.e. Quran and Sunnah are the compulsory component of the curriculum. The subjects relating to humanities and social sciences essential for the social, material and spiritual betterment of humanity. In this context, Islamic culture and cultural languages, particularly Arabic should be the part of curriculum. Some recommendations for students’ teachers and curriculum development are that the students and teachers should recognize their responsibilities. Teacher should develop his own and student’s spiritual insight he should motivate students towards the learning process which is important for the educational process. He should simplify the difficult concepts and start learning from simple to complex and he should be sympathetic and Kind to the students. Students should put emphasis on soul purity he should not proud of themselves upon knowledge. He should learn the Quran and Hadiths. He must obey their parents, teacher and elders and should possess modesty, generosity and civility.   


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