scholarly journals Sistem Informasi Dalam Hubungan Prinsipal – Agen Di RSU-BLUD Bahteramas, Kota Kendari Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-85
Author(s):  
Zainul Abidin
Keyword(s):  
Information Systems ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
Conventional Systems ◽  
Reporting Procedures

 This study aims to analyze the information systems that occur, especially in terms of reporting procedures, budgeting systems and the role of the supervisory board at the Bahteramas Hospital, Kendari City, Southeast Sulawesi Province. This research uses a qualitative approach. The results show that the reporting procedure uses a combination of computers and manuals, but manual systems are still dominant. The budgeting system still uses conventional systems and also uses performance-based budgets. The supervisory board has carried out its duties, but it is still not optimal. Even so, there is complete information where the principal knows what the agent is doing. Even though in reality, there are still agency problems (moral hazard and adverse selection) both potentially and factually. For example, negligence in the supply of drugs, but on the whole does not hinder the disclosure of information by the principal.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

scholarly journals The Theoretical Linkages between the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) and Stakeholder Theory in the Islamic Financial Institutes: An Empirical Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 43-49
Author(s):  
K. M. Anwarul Islam ◽  
Abul Bashar Bhuiyan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Stakeholder Theory ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Real Data ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
Stakeholder Groups ◽  
Connected Body ◽  
Conventional Systems

As part the Corporate Governance, the Shariah Supervisory Board has a significant role in the Islamic Financial Institutes for ensuring its conformity with the Shariah standards. In general, the Corporate governance should be played essential roles to design and promote principles of fairness, accountability, and transparency to meet of all the stakeholder’s rights such as shareholders, the workers, the depositors, and the customers, etc. however, there are still struggling for convincing arguments to justify stakeholders’ participation in governance in the traditional conventional systems rather, the Stakeholder theory has become one of the most important developments in the field of business ethics, which is widely regarded as being a key element in Islamic banking, making it of extreme relevance in Islam’s principles of property rights, commitment. Therefore, this study aims to justify the theoretical linkages or relationship between the role of the Shariah Supervisory Board of Islamic banking and stakeholders’ model from the existing empirical literature review. The summary of empirical review findings revealed that the stakeholder concept in a way that overcomes many of the existing limitations and provides a different understanding of the identity and meaning of Islamic banking, specifically in terms of its relationship to stakeholder groups, such as Islamic banks are a connected body, they should have control over the external environment and should implement hierarchies. Moreover, the developed a conceptual framework to do empirical research by applying real data to test the significance of the above relationships for further policy explorations.

scholarly journals The Role Of The Sharia Supervisory Board (DPS) In Supervision Of Contract Implementation At The Binjai Branch Bri Sharia

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-78
Author(s):  
Abi Waqqosh ◽  
Fani Hairani Yusfa ◽  
Sri Sudiarti ◽  
Tri Dessy Fadillah ◽  
Haris Al Amin
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Qualitative Methods ◽  
Research Methods ◽  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
Descriptive Data ◽  
The People ◽  
Contract Implementation ◽  
And Function

This study aims to determine the position and function of DPS in contract making, supervision of contract implementation, and the effectiveness of contract supervision at Bank BRI Syariah Binjai Branch. In this research, the researcher conducted research using qualitative methods. Research that uses a qualitative approach aims to explore or build a proportion or explain the meaning behind reality. Researchers are based on reality or events that take place in the field. Qualitative research methods can be interpreted as research that produces descriptive data, regarding spoken and written words, and observable behavior of the people being studied. Qualitative research is also research that produces descriptions in the form of words or verbally from the phenomenon under study or from people who are competent in their fields. The results of this study are that the position and function of the DPS in drafting the BRI Syariah Bank contract is appropriate. In general, what is being done is to supervise all forms of activities related to existing contracts in the bank. This supervision also takes the form of standardizing and ratifying contract standards that apply nationally in the sense that it applies to all BRI Syariah branches, as well as assisting parties in disseminating information to BRI Syariah branches in the regions.

Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency Relationships

1998 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debi Prasad Mishra ◽  
Jan B. Heide ◽  
Stanton G. Cort
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Customer Relationship ◽  
Price Premiums ◽  
Agency Relationships ◽  
Institutional Differences ◽  
Service Managers

Many marketing exchanges are characterized by an information asymmetry between suppliers and customers. Specifically, customers are faced with both adverse selection and moral hazard problems that involve, respectively, uncertainty about supplier characteristics and the risk of quality cheating. Drawing on prior research, the authors propose that agency problems in a customer relationship can be resolved by means of customer bonds and price premiums, which serve as signals and supplier incentives, respectively. The authors also propose that adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist in relationships between suppliers and their employees. Similar to the customer relationship, these problems can be addressed with signals and incentives of various kinds. The authors present hypotheses regarding the agency problems in both of these relationships and test them empirically in the context of automotive service purchases. Data obtained from 287 service managers support the hypotheses. The data also suggest that institutional differences across service outlets (e.g., ownership structure and size) influence how the two types of agency problems are managed.

scholarly journals KEPATUHAN BANK SYARIAH TERHADAP FATWA DEWAN SYARIAH NASIONAL PASCA TRANSFORMASI KE DALAM HUKUM POSITIF

INFERENSI ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 517
Author(s):  
Agus Waluyo
Keyword(s):  
Supervisory Board ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Qualitative Approach ◽  
Compliance Monitoring ◽  
Islamic Banks ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
National Board ◽  
Islamic Bank ◽  
Positive Law

The purpose of this research is to analize the Islamic Bank Commitment to implementation of fatwa Sharia National Board that has been transformed into positive law. The design of this study is qualitative approach. This field research using qualitative approach with data from interviews with the banks. The result shows that the fatwa related to Islamic banks that has been transformed into positive law can be used as a legal basis to be obeyed. The results showed that the Islamic Bank commitment to implementation of fatwa Sharia National Board has not been effective and efficient. The functions of sharia by the director of compliance to all employees of Islamic bank normatively has been implemented in accordance with the principles of compliance, the compliance culture, management risk, and the values. The role of Sharia Supervisory Board in sharia compliance monitoring system has been implemented but not optimal.

scholarly journals Prioritizing Key Factors of Executive Information Systems to Manage Data and Explain Strategy in Small and Medium Industries with AHP

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 236
Author(s):  
Atena Mirhosseini Vakili ◽  
Habibeh Jafari
Keyword(s):  
Information System ◽  
Information Systems ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Executive Information Systems ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Expert Choice ◽  
Golestan Province ◽  
Executive Managers

Historically, executive managers have less opportunity to use computer compared with other members of a company. An executive information system has become a necessity as the only effective and complete information system for managers’ learning in a competitive market. Skill is the main and essential issue in solving problems especially for executive managers. To improve skills and to apply insight, company managers need to use backup equipment like executive information systems (EIS). Concerning the importance and role of determining strategy in an organization and managing its information, it is tried to explain strategy and to manage data in small and medium industries using EISs. Managers have been informed of the importance of EISs; this paper selects the best strategies for small and medium industries by collecting data and managing collected data. The research case study is small and medium industries in Golestan Province. It is attempted in this research to strengthen and analyze weaker factors by evaluating and analyzing quantitative and qualitative criteria determined to prioritize them. Data integrity is considered the best factor after reviewing factors using hierarchy model and Expert Choice software.

scholarly journals Study on the governance mechanism of rural e-commerce service centers in rural China: agency problems and solutions

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Cai ◽  
Deqiang Wang ◽  
Chunping Xia ◽  
Cuicui Wang
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Evaluation System ◽  
Service Sector ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Rural China ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Service Evaluation ◽  
Governance Mechanism

Agency problems, such as moral hazard and adverse selection, are prevalent in the public service sector, and the Chinese rural e-commerce service sector is no exception. With the focus on the top-down project ‘information and communication technology for development’ implemented in the underdeveloped areas in China, the rural e-commerce service center (RESC) operation mechanism was analyzed in this study. Based on the tension between RESC operators, local governments, and e-commerce service providers that was reported in a field survey, this study further employs the principal-agent framework to analyze the problems of asymmetric information. Based on this analysis, solutions are suggested that can remedy the moral hazard issues in rural e-commerce service delivery, including developing a service evaluation system, promoting the usage of ICTs, and enhancing rural social capital. To address the problem of adverse selection, the RESC recruitment process should be improved. Moreover, by dividing the potential RESC employees into native villagers and e-commerce entrepreneurs, the optimal subsidy schemes can be designed for both types of applicants according to their ability and sensitivity to incentive.

Transparency and Executive Compensation

2014 ◽  
pp. 412-433
Author(s):  
Raghavendra Rau
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
And Performance

There are two major types of agency problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Changing the transparency of executive compensation is one solution to reducing the two agency problems. I define transparency as any mechanism that reduces the information asymmetry between executives and investors. In this chapter, I discuss how executive compensation is structured, and discuss major regulations that have affected compensation. Finally, I examine how increasing the transparency of these schemes affects the pay level and performance relationship to the executives and how executives modify their behavior to affect transparency as a result of their pay structure.

scholarly journals Bend Them but Don't Break Them: Passionate Workers, Skeptical Managers, and Decision Making in Organizations

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 100-125
Author(s):  
Omar A. Nayeem
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Information Quality ◽  
High Tech ◽  
High Tech Industry ◽  
Frontline Workers ◽  
Knowledge Based

This paper explores the useful but delicate role of managerial skepticism in hierarchical knowledge-based organizations. In these settings, the decision-maker principal seeks advice from managers, who instruct expert frontline workers to acquire information. Given unverifiable information quality and private-valued agents, moral hazard and adverse selection arise with workers and managers, respectively. Pairing extremely passionate workers with moderately skeptical managers alleviates both problems; however, the degree of managerial skepticism must be finely tuned: too little skepticism fails to improve workers' incentives, while too much skepticism destroys workers' incentives altogether. Case studies from the high-tech industry support these insights. (JEL D23, D82, M12, M51)

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document