scholarly journals Chaotic Behaviors in a Nonlinear Game of Two-Level Green Supply Chain with Government Subsidies

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Chang-Feng Zhu ◽  
Qing-Rong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Flip Bifurcation ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Channel Preference ◽  
The Government ◽  
D Investment ◽  
Preference Coefficient

In this paper, a two-level green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer is taken as the background. Considering the consumer’s double consumption preference and the manufacturer’s green product R&D investment, a differential game model of the green supply chain under the government cost subsidy strategy is constructed. Firstly, the equilibrium points of the system are solved and their stability is discussed and analyzed. Secondly, the dynamic evolution process of Nash equilibrium under the parameters of green degree, green preference coefficient, retail channel preference coefficient, coefficient of the sensitivity of price, and adjustment speed are described by numerical simulation. The results show that the two ways of a system entering chaos are Flip bifurcation and N-S bifurcation, respectively, by 2D bifurcation graph, and it is also verified in 1D bifurcation diagram. When the bifurcation parameters are small, the system maintains Nash equilibrium stability. If the green degree of products is increased, the green preference coefficient will also increase; on the contrary, the retail preference coefficient will decrease. Research and development cost subsidy policy can effectively improve the green degree of products and increase the sales volume of products, so as to improve the profit of supply chain members.

Construction of New Circulation Model for Green Supply Chain of Agricultural Products in China

2020 ◽  
pp. 220-230
Author(s):  
Syed Shahid Khan ◽  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Rural Economy ◽  
Circulation Model ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Circulation Mode ◽  
The People ◽  
Green Development ◽  
Green Production ◽  
The Government

With the continuous development of China's agricultural economy, the concept of green production has begun to penetrate into the hearts of the people. Exploring a new circulation mode adapted to China's green supply chain of agricultural products is an important way to promote green production in China, and also an important condition to promote the successful transformation and development of China's rural economy. But in the process of building a green supply chain of agricultural products and exploring circulation mode, there are many problems that hinder the development of green industry economy. Therefore, it is necessary for the government to play a guiding role and actively guide farmers to explore green development ways and new circulation mode to meet their own development needs, which provides reference for better optimizing the new circulation mode of agricultural products supply chain in China.

scholarly journals Research on an Enterprise Remanufacturing Strategy Based on Government Intervention

Energies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 6549
Author(s):  
Jian Cao ◽  
Jiayun Zeng ◽  
Yuting Yan ◽  
Xihui Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Management ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Government Intervention ◽  
Green Supply Chain Management ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Social Benefits ◽  
Chain Management ◽  
The Government

Due to rapid economic development and population growth, environmental pollution problems such as urban pollution and depletion of natural resources have become increasingly prominent. Municipal solid waste is part of these problems. However, waste is actually an improperly placed resource. As a part of green supply chain management, remanufacturing can turn waste products into remanufactured products for resale. Based on the development status of China’s remanufacturing industry, this paper establishes three Stackelberg game models, namely the free recycling model (model N), the government regulation model based on the reward–penalty mechanism (model G), and the government dual-intervention model (model GF). In this study, the standard solution method for the Stackelberg game method, namely the backward induction method, is applied to solve the dynamic game equilibrium. For comparison, a further numerical analysis is also carried. The research results show that: (1) in the closed-loop supply chain based on remanufacturing, the strengthening of cooperation between manufacturers and remanufacturers is beneficial in terms of maximizing supply chain profits; (2) in order to maximize social benefits, the government needs to intervene in green supply chain management; (3) government regulation is particularly important when the remanufacturing industry is in the initial stage of development; (4) government intervention needs to be based on the development level of the remanufacturing industry; (5) in order to maximize social benefits, it is recommended that the government consider the ratio between the green consumption subsidies and the taxes on new products.

scholarly journals Research on cooperation strategy between government and green supply chain based on differential game

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 828-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingwei Zeng ◽  
Baizhou Li
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Bottom Line ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Government Promotion

Abstract Based on the “three bottom line” and stakeholder theory, the paper considers the relationship and cooperation strategy between the government and the supplier and manufacturer of the green supply chain. By constructing the dynamic differential game model, the paper discusses the differences in the optimal effort level, green degree of product, reputation and the optimal benefit under the three situations of noncooperation, government promotion and collaborative cooperation. The results show that the optimal effort level, green degree of product, reputation and the optimal benefit in collaborative cooperation are obviously higher than the situations of non-cooperation and government promotion, and the cooperation of the three parties can promote the development of green supply chain. Government promotion is better than noncooperation. The government plays an active role in improving the optimal benefit and reputation of green supply chain. Finally, the reliability of the proposed proposition is verified by an example analysis, which provides an important reference for improving the efficiency of green supply chain.

Financial Subsidies and their Effects on Environment-Friendly Products Supply in Green Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 712-715 ◽  
pp. 3038-3043
Author(s):  
Fang Miao Hou
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Production Scale ◽  
Environment Friendly ◽  
Price Competitiveness ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
The Government

The supply of environment-friendly products is an integral part of the green supply chain. Due to such reasons as lack of high-tech and lack of price competitiveness in contrast to traditional products, the manufacturers will not have incentive to produce and supply green products, so the Government should grant financial subsidies to producers which will compensate the profits entitled to them. Through the analysis based on game theory, the article concludes that there is disadvantage in constant subsidy and the variable subsidies will have more positive effects on the supply of environment-friendly products since the subsidy amount varies with the production scale.

scholarly journals Optimal Pricing Strategy and Government Consumption Subsidy Policy in Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Remanufacturer

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lijun Meng ◽  
Qiang Qiang ◽  
Zuqing Huang ◽  
Baoyou Zhang ◽  
Yuxiang Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Sustainable Manufacturing ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Government Consumption ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Optimal Pricing Strategy ◽  
The Government

Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable manufacturing, remanufacturing has been widely accepted by enterprises in many countries. In the process of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) development, to stimulate the demand for remanufactured products, the Chinese government’s interventions such as the “Trade old for Remanufactured” program cannot be ignored. However, prior research has not answered the questions of whether governments should offer consumption subsidies and how to determine the optimal subsidy value. This paper investigates the optimal government consumption subsidy policy and its impact on the operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces new products, while a Third-Party Remanufacturer (TPR) remanufactures the used products collected from consumers. A game model with a leader (government) and two followers (OEM and TPR) is then introduced. The government determines the consumption subsidy to maximize the social welfare, while the TPR and OEM attempt to maximize their own profit functions. Game theoretic models are proposed to explore and compare the scenarios, i.e., CLSC with a consumption subsidy policy and without a consumption subsidy policy. The equilibrium characteristics with respect to the government’s consumption subsidy decisions and the price decisions for chain members are derived. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, the results show that: (1) governments should not always offer a consumption subsidy; (2) the consumption subsidy cannibalizes demand for new products while boosting the demand for remanufactured products; (3) the consumption subsidy should be shared between the TPR and consumers when the TPR raises the sales price of remanufactured product; (4) the members of the CLSC do not always benefit from the consumption subsidy policy.

scholarly journals The Optimal Pricing Analysis for Remanufactured Notebooks in a Duopoly Environment

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 636
Author(s):  
Ruey-Chyn Tsaur
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Manufacturing Sector ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Information Technology Industry ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Technology Industry ◽  
The Government

The information technology industry plays an important role in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, and its total notebook production ranks top in the world. The rapid development of IT products has caused many of these products to be discarded, although most of them can be recycled, remanufactured, and reused. In order to reduce the manufacture of new products and the associated carbon emissions, this study aims to discover the optimal subsidy policy for remanufactured notebooks in the green market, focusing on the pricing of remanufactured notebooks and maximizing manufacturers’ profits while retaining optimal social welfare for consumers. We use a two-stage game theory model to identify the optimal government subsidy policies for a duopoly environment. The results are based on the subsidy ratio between consumer and manufacturers, as this factor is important to the entire green supply chain; manufacturers can still reap optimal profits by only producing new or remanufactured products, and the government should be aware of the likelihood of manufacturers colluding and of the need to intervene when necessary to avoid sacrificing social welfare.

Studying the Complexity of Multichannel Supply Chain with Different Power Structures Under Carbon Subsidy Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2150166
Author(s):  
Junhai Ma ◽  
Yi Tian ◽  
Liu Chengjin
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Order Quantity ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Bifurcation And Chaos ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Subsidy Rate ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
The Government

The game characteristics and equilibrium strategies of a triple-channel supply chain under the carbon subsidy policy are studied in this work with three different game power structures. There are simultaneous decision-making, manufacturer-dominated market and retailer-dominated market. The decision mechanism for order quantity of manufacturer and dual-channel retailer, is discussed. Meanwhile, their complex dynamic characteristics are studied. It is found that when the government implements dual low-carbon subsidies, the supply chain system in which the manufacturer dominates the market is more stable. The government should pay attention to the power structure of the market to determine an appropriate subsidy rate. The over-adjustment of order quantity from manufacturer’s direct sales channel and retailer’s online channel both will lead to large periodical fluctuations in the system, and even bifurcation and chaos. These will cause substantial fluctuations and even loss in the profits of supply chain companies. This analysis shows that delayed feedback can effectively stabilize the periodic bifurcation and chaos in the system.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Decisions Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Different Government Subsidies

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Su ◽  
Xiaojing Liu ◽  
Wenyi Du
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Emission Level ◽  
The Government

This study examined how to arrange the generation and pricing of supply chain members in the case of consumer green preference with different government subsidies. The green supply chain comprises a manufacturer and a retailer; the government subsidizes manufacturers who produce green products and consumers who buy green products. The study built a green supply chain pricing decision model with different forms of subsidy under various power structures. By backward induction and sensitivity analysis, this study analyzed optimal strategies of green supply chain under various modes, and we discuss how the government subsidy coefficient affects the optimal decision of a green supply chain. The results show that, firstly, whether the government subsidizes the manufacturers or the consumers, the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer is directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures. Secondly, when the government subsidizes the manufacturer, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are inversely proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the manufacturer leader; the carbon-emission level and the retail price are all directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the retailer leader. Finally, when the government subsidizes the consumers, the carbon-emission level and the retail price are directly proportional to the subsidy coefficient under the two power structures.

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