Gender Ideology and Fertility: Evidence for a Curvilinear Hypothesis

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serena Stefani ◽  
Gabriele Prati

Research on the relationship between fertility and gender ideology revealed inconsistent results. In the present study, we argue that inconsistencies may be due to the fact that such relationship may be nonlinear. We hypothesize a U- shaped relationship between two dimensions of gender ideology (i.e. primacy of breadwinner role and acceptance of male privilege) and fertility rates. We conducted a cross-national analysis of 60 countries using data from the World Values Survey as well as the World Population Prospects 2019. Controlling for gross domestic product, we found support for a U-shaped relationship between gender ideology and fertility. Higher levels of fertility rates were found at lower and especially higher levels of traditional gender ideology, while a medium level of gender ideology was associated with the lowest fertility rate. This curvilinear relationship is in agreement with the phase of the gender revolution in which the country is located. Traditional beliefs are linked to a complementary division of private versus public sphere between sexes, while egalitarian attitudes are associated with a more equitable division. Both conditions strengthen fertility. Instead, as in the transition phase, intermediate levels of gender ideology’s support are associated with an overload and a difficult reconciliation of the roles that women have to embody (i.e. working and nurturing) so reducing fertility. The present study has contributed to the literature by addressing the inconsistencies of prior research by demonstrating that the relationship between gender ideology and fertility rates is curvilinear rather than linear.

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 261-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Andersen ◽  
Anthony Heath ◽  
David Weakliem

AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between public support for wage differentials and actual income inequality using data from the World Values Surveys. The distribution of income is more equal in nations where public opinion is more egalitarian. There is some evidence that the opinions of people with higher incomes are more influential than those of people with low incomes. Although the estimated relationship is stronger in democracies, it is present even under non-democratic governments, and the hypothesis that effects are equal cannot be rejected. We consider the possibility of reciprocal causation by means of an instrumental variables analysis, which yields no evidence that income distribution affects opinion.


Author(s):  
Anne McDaniel

In recent decades, a dramatic shift occurred in higher education throughout the world. Women now enroll in and complete more education than men in the majority of countries. Using a lagged cross-sectional design on a dataset of 75 countries from 1990 to 2008, this study examines the predictors of the current gender gap in tertiary enrollment. I find that prior arguments developed by neo-institutionalist theorists do predict the gender gap in tertiary enrollment to some degree. Countries that have historically supported women's rights and experienced more rapid educational expansion are linked to a larger share of women enrolled in tertiary education than men. However, countries with greater memberships in IGOs and INGOs do not influence women's share of higher education enrollment. Additionally, fertility rates are important predictors of women's share of tertiary enrollment. Countries with lower fertility rates are associated with a larger female share of higher education. The results support the hypotheses that both neo-institutionalists arguments and fertility norms shape the female-favorable gender gap in tertiary enrollment throughout the world. ??? ?????????? , ?? ?????? ????? ?????? ?? ??????? ?????? ?????? . ????????? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ????? ?? ????? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ???? . 1990-2008 ??? 75 ????? ?? ?? ??????? ?? ?? lagged ??? ?? ???????? ?????? ?? ????? ????, ?? ?????? ?????? ??????? ??? ??????? ?????? ???? ?? ????????????? ?? ??? ???? ?? . ??? ?? ?????????? ????????????? ?????? ?????? ????? ???? ??? ?? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ?????????? ???? ???. ???????? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ???????? ?? ?????? ???? ?? ???? ???? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ????? ???? ?? ?? ??? ?? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?? ?? ???? ?????? ?? ????? ???. ???????, IGOs ?? INGOs ??? ???? ?? ???? ??????? ?? ??? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ?????????? ?? ???????? ???? ???? . ???? ???????? , ?????? ?? ?????? ??????? ?? ??????? ?? ?????????? ?? ?????????? predictors ??? . ?? ?????? ?? ?? ??? ??? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ?? ???? ????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ??? . ?????? ?? institutionalists ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ???????? ????? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ??????? ??? ????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?? ???? ?? ????????? ?? ?????? ??. ????????????????????????????????????????????????1990??2008??75???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????IGOs??????????INGOs???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist eine dramatische Verschiebung in der Hochschulbildung weltweit eingetreten. In den meisten L


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen-Hao Hsu

There has been much debate over the micro-level relationship between employment situations and fertility in Europe and Northern America. However, related research in East Asia is scant, although countries in this region have some of the lowest fertility rates in the world. Moreover, most studies analyze the employment-fertility relationship from a static perspective and only for women, which underemphasizes life-course dynamics and gender heterogeneity of employment careers and their fertility implications. Drawing on retrospective data from the 2017 Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS), this study explores women’s and men’s career trajectories between ages 18 and 40 in Taiwan using sequence cluster analyses. It also examines how career variations associate with different timing and quantum of birth. Empirical results show that economically inactive women experience faster motherhood transitions and have more children by age 40 than women with stable full-time careers. For men, having an unstable career associates with slower fatherhood transitions and a lower number of children. For both genders, self-employed people are the earliest in parenthood transitions and have the highest number of children by midlife. Our findings demonstrate sharp gender contrasts in employment careers and their diversified fertility implications in low-fertility Taiwan


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (16) ◽  
pp. 3931-3955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Ka-Lok Cheung ◽  
Erin Hye-Won Kim

This study examines how gender and family attitudes moderate the relationship between domestic labor and marital satisfaction in Korea, where the heavy and unequal burden of domestic labor on women intersects with traditional familism and gender ideology. We analyze panel data from the Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women and Families ( n = 11,488). Our individual fixed-effect regressions reveal that women’s time spent on domestic labor is negatively associated with the marital satisfaction of younger wives (in their 20s and 30s) when they do not hold traditional family attitudes. However, younger women’s satisfaction is positively associated with their husbands’ share of domestic labor regardless of the women’s gender-role attitudes. For older women (in their 40s or older), we find no evidence for either interaction effect. With the continued erosion of traditional familism in Korea, the burden of domestic labor may become more problematic for younger women’s marriages.


2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (24) ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Jean Claude Chesnais ◽  

History shows that migration usually moves from areas where population is growing fast to regions where this increase is slower. At present, immigration from poor regions to richer coun tries outstrips emigration from developed countries. A century ago in Europe and now in the poorest countries, migration has relieved tensions bred by declining mortality and accelerating popula tion growth. The map of international migration changes from decade to decade as each country’s demographic transition matures. Although historical migration fl ows still continue, this will not lead to a demographic explosion as fertility rates have declined signifi cantly and aging population increases all over the world. World population is estimated to remain stagnant at around 8 thousand million before it decreases slowly through this century. Thus, migration raises the challenge of a global multiethnic society.


Ultimately, the necessity to supply food, energy, habitat, infrastructure, and consumer goods for the ever-growing population is responsible for the demise of the environment. Remedial actions for pollution abatement, and further technological progress toward energy efficiency, development of new crops, and improvements in manufacturing processes may help to mitigate the severity of environmental deterioration. However, we can hardly hope for restoration of a clean environment, improvement in human health, and an end to poverty without arresting the continuous growth of the world population. According to the United Nations count, world population reached 6 billion in mid October 1999 (1). The rate of population growth and the fertility rates by continent, as well as in the United States and Canada, are presented in Table 14.1. It can be seen that the fastest population growth occurs in the poorest countries of the world. Despite the worldwide decrease in fertility rates between 1975–80 period and that of 1995–2000, the rate of population growth in most developing countries changed only slightly due to the demographic momentum, which means that because of the high fertility rates in the previous decades, the number of women of childbearing age had increased. Historically, the preference for large families in the developing nations was in part a result of either cultural or religious traditions. In some cases there were practical motivations, as children provided helping hands with farm chores and a security in old age. At present the situation is changing. A great majority of governments of the developing countries have recognized that no improvement of the living standard of their citizens will ever be possible without slowing the explosive population growth. By 1985, a total of 70 developing nations had either established national family planning programs, or provided support for such programs conducted by nongovernmental agencies; now only four of the world’s 170 countries limit access to family planning services. As result, 95% of the developing world population lives in countries supporting family planning. Consequently, the percentage of married couples using contraceptives increased from less than 10% in 1960 to 57% in 1997.


1993 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
DIANE N. LYE ◽  
TIMOTHY J. BIBLARZ

This study examines the relationship between the gender role and family attitudes of husbands and wives and five indicators of marital satisfaction. The authors argue that men and women who espouse nontraditional attitudes are likely to be less satisfied than their more traditional counterparts. An empirical analysis is presented using data from husbands and wives interviewed in the 1987-88 National Survey of Families and Households. Husbands and wives who hold nontraditional attitudes toward family life are less satisfied with their marriages, as are men and women whose attitudes diverge from their spouse's attitudes. The effects of attitudes did not vary according to the actual gender roles observed by the couple.


Author(s):  
Daria Tisch

Abstract This article studies the relationship between partner’s wealth share and their life satisfaction in different-sex couples using the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017). Resource-based theories and gender ideology are two prominent approaches to explain the effects of within-couple relative resources on various outcomes. Recently, scholars have argued that not relative but absolute personal resources are the crucial factor (autonomy perspective). Testing these different approaches is challenging because relative wealth mathematically perfectly depends on both partners’ absolute wealth, meaning the effects of relative and absolute wealth are hard to disentangle. To accurately test the theoretical approaches, this study analyses the relationship between relative wealth and life satisfaction under different conditions, such as whether relative wealth increases due to an increase in one’s own absolute wealth or a decrease in one’s partner’s absolute wealth. Individual fixed effects regressions show no statistically significant relationships between relative wealth and life satisfaction for men. In contrast, for women the relationship between their relative wealth and life satisfaction is significantly positive, in line with resource-based theories and the autonomy perspective. Further analyses reveal that this relationship is driven rather by changes in women’s own than in their partner’s absolute wealth.


Religions ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian McPhail

This study examines the effect of religious heterogamy on the transmission of religion from one generation to the next. Using data from 37 countries in the 2008 Religion III Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), I conduct a cross-national analysis of the relationship between parents’ religious heterogamy and their adult childrens’ religious lives. By estimating fixed effects regression models, I adjust for national-level confounders to examine patterns of association between having interreligious parents during childhood and level of adult religiosity as measured by self-rated religiousness, belief in God, and frequencies of religious attendance and prayer. The results indicate that having religiously heterogamous parents or parents with dissimilar religious attendance patterns are both associated with lower overall religiosity in respondents. Parents’ religious attendance, however, mediates the relationship when each parent has a different religion. Having one unaffiliated parent is associated with lower religiosity regardless of parents’ levels of religious attendance. The negative impact of parents’ religious heterogamy on religious inheritance is independent of national-level factors and has implications for anticipating changes in the religious landscapes of societies characterized by religious diversity and growing numbers of interreligious marriages.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L Whitehead

A number of recent studies explore predictors of gender ideology due to its consistent influence on a range of outcomes. Another growing body of research investigates the effects of images of God on an assortment of attitudes. This study unites these two strands of research to provide an account of the association between religious belief and gender ideology. Using data from a national random survey and multivariate analysis, I examine whether a masculine image of God is significantly associated with a more conservative gender ideology. The results demonstrate that viewing God as a “he” is robustly associated with a more traditional gender ideology.


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