scholarly journals Peter Munz and Historical Thought

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 378-394
Author(s):  
Frank Ankersmit

Abstract Few philosophers of history ever recognized the profundity of Peter Munz’s The Shapes of Time that came out in 1977. In this book Munz upheld the view that no part or aspect of the past itself provides us with the solid fundament of all historical knowledge. For him, the historian’s most fundamental logical entity is what he calls the Sinngebild. The Sinngebild consists of two events defined and held together by a covering law. These CL’s can be anything from simple truisms, the regularities we know from daily life to truly scientific laws. But ‘underneath’ these Sinngebilde there is nothing. Hence, Munz’s bold assertation: ‘the truth of the matter is that there is no ascertainable face behind the various masks every story-teller is creating’ and his claim that his philosophy of history is ‘an idealism writ small’. Next, Munz distinguishes between ‘explanation’ and ‘interpretation’. We ‘explain’ the past by taking seriously the historical agent’s self-description and ‘interpret’ it by stating what it looks like from our present perspective. ‘Explanation’ and ‘interpretation’ may ‘typologically’ be more or less similar. Relying on a number of very well-chosen examples from his own field (Munz was a medievalist), this enables Munz to argue why one historical interpretation may be superior to another. In his later life Munz developed a speculative philosophy of history inspired by Popper’s fallibilism.

1997 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee D. Parker

Historical research in accounting and management, hitherto largely neglected as a field of inquiry by many management and accounting researchers, has experienced a resurgence of interest and activity in research conferences and journals over the past decade. The potential lessons of the past for contemporary issues have been rediscovered, but the way forward is littered with antiquarian narratives, methodologically naive analyses, ideologically driven interpretation and ignorance of the traditions, schools and philosophy of the craft by accounting and management researchers as well as traditional and critical historians themselves. This paper offers an introduction to contributions made to the philosophies and methods of history by significant historians in the past, a review of some of the influential schools of historical thought, insights into philosophies of historical knowledge and explanation and a brief introduction to oral and business history. On this basis the case is made for the philosophically and methodologically informed approach to the investigation of our past heritage in accounting and management


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 14-31
Author(s):  
P. L. Gardiner

I should like to begin by removing a misconception to which the title of this lecture may possibly give rise. My concern is not with general propositions regarding certain fairly well-attested human characteristics of the kind to which historians may, from time to time, advert in the course of their work or to which they may appeal in support of the account provided of some particular event or occurrence. I am not myself an historian, and for me to make ex cathedra pronouncements on such topics as these might well seem to constitute an unjustifiable intrusion upon a field about which I am not qualified professionally to speak. My subject lies within the sphere of philosophy of history rather than of history proper; it belongs, in other words, to a branch of philosophical inquiry, and as such relates, not to empirical facts and events of the sort to which the practising historian addresses himself, but to those assumptions, categories and modes of procedure that are, or are believed to be, intrinsic to historical thought and discourse. In this general context I wish to discuss two approaches to the problem of elucidating the character of historical knowledge and explanation. Both of the approaches I have in mind have achieved a considerable measure of support at the present time; they have also been widely understood as offering profoundly divergent — indeed, diametrically opposed — views of what is central to the structure of historical thinking and to the type of activity upon which the historian is essentially engaged. It has on occasions been suggested that what — amongst other things — divides adherents to the views in question is the fact that they are committed to radically different conceptions of the subject-matter of the historical studies; that is to say, of human beings and their activities. In the light of this fundamental disagreement, it is argued, many of the more intractable controversies that have arisen concerning the concepts and interpretative schemes in terms of which it is possible or legitimate to treat the human past become readily intelligible. In what follows I want to examine this claim. First, however, let me give a brief, and necessarily somewhat crude, outline of the two positions I have referred to, starting with one that is often described as ‘positivist’.


Author(s):  
Артём Александрович Аванесян

Развиваемый Бенедетто Кроче подход к осмыслению специфики исторического познания приводит к формулированию идеи его укоренения в индивидуальном жизненном опыте познающего человека. Критика субстанциальной философии истории задает единственно возможную стратегию исследования прошлого через изучение единичных фактов и явлений, понимание которых определяется обстоятельствами и возможностями исторической ситуации работы исследователя. Такой проект истории приобретает черты изменчивого, ситуативного, принципиально незаконченного знания, находящегося в постоянном процессе становления. The approach to understanding the specifics of historical knowledge developed by Benedetto Croce leads to the formulation of the idea of its rooting in the individual life experience of a cognizing person. Criticism of the substantial philosophy of history sets the only possible strategy for studying the past through the study of individual facts and phenomena, the understanding of which is determined by the circumstances and possibilities of the historical situation of the researcher's work. This project of history acquires the features of a changeable, situational, fundamentally unfinished knowledge that is in a constant process of formation.


Author(s):  
Артём Александрович Аванесян

Теория исторического познания Р.Дж. Коллингвуда выстраивается на основе методики воспроизведения интеллектуального опыта человека прошлого в современном контексте. Такой подход отводит ключевую роль в процессе исследования прошлого рефлексии историка, работа которой ориентирована на осмысление исторических свидетельств. В результате развития этих идей складывается представление о присущем историческому познанию характере опыта, отличающегося принципиальной незавершенностью, изменчивостью и способностью к самосовершенствованию. The theory of historical knowledge by R.G. Collingwood is built on the basis of the method of reenactment the intellectual experience of a person of the past in a modern context. This approach assigns a key role in the process of studying the past to the historian's reflection, whose work is focused on comprehending historical evidence. As a result of the development of these ideas formed the conception of historical knowledge that has a nature of experience, characterized by fundamental incompleteness, variability and the ability to selfimprovement.


Author(s):  
B. L. Gubman

The article comparatively analyzes A.C. Danto’s and P. Ricœur’s theories of historical narration. Ricœur’s synthetic assimilation of Danto’s views is interpreted as a characteristic phenomenon of the dialogue between hermeneutics and analytical philosophy, and in a broader perspective – of contemporary European continental and Anglo-American philosophical traditions. The version of the analytical philosophy of history developed by Danto is interpreted as being formed in the course of overcoming epistemological program of logical positivism under the impact of a platform of linguistic philosophy, pragmatism and neo-pragmatism as well as F. Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the ideas of existentialism. The articles examines fundamental conclusions of Danto’s “descriptive metaphysics” of history, which influence his understanding of a number of epistemological factors and ontological assumptions specific for the theory of historical narration. At the late stage of the evolution of his philosophy of history, Danto spoke of a radical challenge to his views on the part of T. Kuhn’s theory, but he did not give to it a constructive answer. Despite the significant philosophical differences, a number of Danto’s historical narration theory’s theses became acceptable for Ricœur, especially in the light of the American colleague final confession that knowledge of the past is dependent on the kind of existential presence in history specific for a human being. Taking M. Heidegger’s and H.G. Gadamer’s ideas as a basis of his approach to narration problem, Ricœur considered also important the “linguistic turn” initiated by L. Wittgenstein. Offering a positive evaluation of Danto’s analysis of history language, Ricœur simultaneously rightly criticized him for his neglect of the formal instruments of organizing of narrative – plot, intrigue, and composition that should affect the knowledge resources and testify on the unity of narration features in history and fiction as well.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-195
Author(s):  
Réal Fillion

Speculative philosophy of history is concerned with history as a whole, which includes explicitly relating the past to the present and the present to the future. It proposes a philosophical appreciation of the importance of history in our lives and in our self-knowledge, but where history is understood not only as revealing to us what is past, but also as a shaping of the present, which itself sets the conditions for future developments. The notion of history-as-a-whole I propose to call, for the purposes of discussion, the past-present-future complex and it is this complex that is the explicit concern of the speculative philosopher of history. The speculative philosopher of history is never far from the historian and her work, whose concern is to elucidate the past and reveal its intelligibility, and in that sense, the past remains the privileged “object” of history, precisely because the past, as past, needs to be re-presented in order to be known, and is known through its re-presentations. I will here briefly discuss Frank Ankersmit’s account of the work of representation in his recent Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). Two things about this work of re-presentation will be noted: 1) because what is re-presented is a past reality, it provides a contrast to present reality, and 2) because the past re-presented is meant to be an account of the reality of the past, it gives us a sense of the necessity of what has been. For the speculative philosopher of history, taking these two features together raises the modal consideration of the relation between the necessity of what has come to pass (as re-presented) and the lived contingency of the present. Here I will briefly discuss the relevance of Michel Foucault’s work in relating past and present in terms of the contingent formations that shape our lives (including the histories we re-present). While Foucault’s focus on contingent formations privileges the notion of possibility within the historical field of the present, it does not systematically address how such possibility might relate to the future. For this last modal consideration, I will discuss briefly Ernst Bloch’s work, specifically the notions of Not-Yet- and What-Is- as discussed in the Principle of Hope (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986) as a way to address the future within the past-present-future complex that is the concern of speculative philosophy of history.


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 14-31
Author(s):  
P. L. Gardiner

I should like to begin by removing a misconception to which the title of this lecture may possibly give rise. My concern is not with general propositions regarding certain fairly well-attested human characteristics of the kind to which historians may, from time to time, advert in the course of their work or to which they may appeal in support of the account provided of some particular event or occurrence. I am not myself an historian, and for me to make ex cathedra pronouncements on such topics as these might well seem to constitute an unjustifiable intrusion upon a field about which I am not qualified professionally to speak. My subject lies within the sphere of philosophy of history rather than of history proper; it belongs, in other words, to a branch of philosophical inquiry, and as such relates, not to empirical facts and events of the sort to which the practising historian addresses himself, but to those assumptions, categories and modes of procedure that are, or are believed to be, intrinsic to historical thought and discourse. In this general context I wish to discuss two approaches to the problem of elucidating the character of historical knowledge and explanation. Both of the approaches I have in mind have achieved a considerable measure of support at the present time; they have also been widely understood as offering profoundly divergent — indeed, diametrically opposed — views of what is central to the structure of historical thinking and to the type of activity upon which the historian is essentially engaged. It has on occasions been suggested that what — amongst other things — divides adherents to the views in question is the fact that they are committed to radically different conceptions of the subject-matter of the historical studies; that is to say, of human beings and their activities. In the light of this fundamental disagreement, it is argued, many of the more intractable controversies that have arisen concerning the concepts and interpretative schemes in terms of which it is possible or legitimate to treat the human past become readily intelligible. In what follows I want to examine this claim. First, however, let me give a brief, and necessarily somewhat crude, outline of the two positions I have referred to, starting with one that is often described as ‘positivist’.


Author(s):  
Daiva Milinkevičiūtė

The Age of Enlightenment is defined as the period when the universal ideas of progress, deism, humanism, naturalism and others were materialized and became a golden age for freemasons. It is wrong to assume that old and conservative Christian ideas were rejected. Conversely, freemasons put them into new general shapes and expressed them with the help of symbols in their daily routine. Symbols of freemasons had close ties with the past and gave them, on the one hand, a visible instrument, such as rituals and ideas to sense the transcendental, and on the other, intense gnostic aspirations. Freemasons put in a great amount of effort to improve themselves and to create their identity with the help of myths and symbols. It traces its origins to the biblical builders of King Solomon’s Temple, the posterity of the Templar Knights, and associations of the medieval craft guilds, which were also symbolical and became their link not only to each other but also to the secular world. In this work we analysed codified masonic symbols used in their rituals. The subject of our research is the universal Masonic idea and its aspects through the symbols in the daily life of the freemasons in Vilnius. Thanks to freemasons’ signets, we could find continuity, reception, and transformation of universal masonic ideas in the Lithuanian freemasonry and national characteristics of lodges. Taking everything into account, our article shows how the universal idea of freemasonry spread among Lithuanian freemasonry, and which forms and meanings it incorporated in its symbols. The objective of this research is to find a universal Masonic idea throughout their visual and oral symbols and see its impact on the daily life of the masons in Vilnius. Keywords: Freemasonry, Bible, lodge, symbols, rituals, freemasons’ signets.


Author(s):  
Marie-Sophie de Clippele

AbstractCultural heritage can offer tangible and intangible traces of the past. A past that shapes cultural identity, but also a past from which one sometimes wishes to detach oneself and which nevertheless needs to be remembered, even commemorated. These themes of memory, history and oblivion are examined by the philosopher Paul Ricoeur in his work La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli (2000). Inspired by these ideas, this paper analyses how they are closely linked to cultural heritage. Heritage serves as a support for memory, even if it can be mishandled, which in turn can affect heritage policies. Memory and heritage can be abused as a result of wounds from the past or for reasons of ideological manipulation or because of a political will to force people to remember. Furthermore, heritage, as a vehicule of memory, contributes to historical knowledge, but can remain marked by a certain form of subjectivism during the heritage and conservation operation, for which heritage professionals (representatives of the public authority or other experts) are responsible. Yet, the responsibility for conserving cultural heritage also implies the need to avoid any loss of heritage, and to fight against oblivion. Nonetheless, this struggle cannot become totalitarian, nor can it deprive the community of a sometimes salutary oblivion to its own identity construction. These theoretical and philosophical concepts shall be examined in the light of legal discourse, and in particular in Belgian legislation regarding cultural heritage. It is clear that the shift from monument to heritage broadens the legal scope and consequently raises the question of who gets to decide what is considered heritage according to the law, and whether there is something such as a collective human right to cultural heritage. Nonetheless, this broadening of the legislation extends the State intervention into cultural heritage, which in turn entails certain risks, as will be analysed with Belgium’s colonial heritage.


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