Subjective Character as the Origo a Quo of Phenomenal Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 98 (2) ◽  
pp. 222-242
Author(s):  
Kyle Banick
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Formal Ontology ◽  
Subjective Character ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
The Common ◽  
Relational Form ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
Intrinsic Feature

Abstract This article contributes to the debate on self-consciousness, inner awareness, and subjective character. Philosophers puzzle over whether subjective character has a monadic or a relational form. But the present article deploys formal ontology to show that this is a false dichotomy. From this vantage, a common objection to non-relational views is deflated. The common objection is that one-level, non-relational views are either unexplanatory or smuggle in resources from higher-order and/or relational views. The author uses an argument from formal ontology to suggest that such objections stem from a category error. The result is that first-order non-relational views need not lapse into higher order or relational views – subjective character can be a structured and intrinsic feature involved in the ontological constitution of mental acts. Ultimately, the author emphasizes the need to conceive of subjective character as the source of intentionality, and not the result of a prior intentional relation.

Gregory of Nyssa's Dialogue with Macrina

2005 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-222
Author(s):  
John L. Drury
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Christian Theology ◽  
Practical Significance ◽  
False Dichotomy ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
The Common ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Immortality Of The Soul

Through an analysis of Gregory of Nyssa's treatise On the Soul and the Resurrection, this article argues for the compatibility of the doctrines of the immortality of the soul and the resurrection of the body. Nyssa's view is explicitly contrasted to contemporary tendencies to set up a false dichotomy between the two doctrines. After answering the common objection that immortality is an intruder to Christian theology, a typology of four views on the relation between immortality and resurrection is set out. The article concludes with reflections on the theological and practical significance of Gregory's view.

scholarly journals N-soliton solutions and the Hirota conditions in (1 + 1)-dimensions

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Xiu Ma
Keyword(s):  
Common Factors ◽  
Soliton Solutions ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Kdv Equations ◽  
The Common ◽  
Bilinear Formulation ◽  
Generalized Kdv Equations ◽  
Hirota Bilinear

Abstract We analyze N-soliton solutions and explore the Hirota N-soliton conditions for scalar (1 + 1)-dimensional equations, within the Hirota bilinear formulation. An algorithm to verify the Hirota conditions is proposed by factoring out common factors out of the Hirota function in N wave vectors and comparing degrees of the involved polynomials containing the common factors. Applications to a class of generalized KdV equations and a class of generalized higher-order KdV equations are made, together with all proofs of the existence of N-soliton solutions to all equations in two classes.

scholarly journals The Concept of Feasibility: A Multivocal Account

Res Publica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Guillery
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Common View ◽  
The World ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
The Common

AbstractA common objection to a proposal or theory in political philosophy is that it is not feasible to realise what it calls for. This is commonly taken to be sufficient to reject a proposal or theory: feasibility, on this common view, operates as a straightforward constraint on moral and political theory, whatever is not feasible is simply ruled out. This paper seeks to understand what we mean when we say that some proposal or outcome is or is not feasible. It will argue that no single binary definition can be given. Rather, there is a whole range of possible specifications of the term ‘feasible’, each of which selects a range of facts of the world to hold fixed. No single one of these possible specifications, though, is obviously privileged as giving the appropriate understanding of ‘feasibility’ tout court. The upshot of my account of feasibility, then, will be that the common view of feasibility as a straightforward constraint cannot be maintained: in order to reject a moral theory, it will not be sufficient simply to say that it is not feasible.

scholarly journals Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Deery
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Mental Event ◽  
The World ◽  
Predictive Approach ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.

Intentionalität und Bewusstsein in der frühen Neuzeit

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Barth
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Essential Feature ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
René Descartes ◽  
Salient Features ◽  
Mental Acts ◽  
The Mind

How are we to explain the fact that we can refer to objects by means of mental acts? And what accounts for our being conscious of mental acts? René Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz provide fascinating answers to these two central questions of the philosophy of mind. In this study, the concepts of both authors are analyzed in detail, compared with each other and related to current positions. The analyses show that Descartes represents a deflationary conception of consciousness (conscientia). Consciousness is "only" an aspect of intentionality that constitutes the essential feature of the Cartesian mind. The analyses of Leibniz unveil that he represents a far more complex and demanding conception of the mind in comparison to Descartes, which makes for a higher connectivity with contemporary convictions. The salient features of his position are the structural conception of intentionality and the distinction between two forms of consciousness (apperception and conscientia) that correspond to the phenomenal consciousness and the reflexive self-consciousness. In contrast to Descartes, Leibniz also assigns consciousness to non-rational animals in the form of apperception. Conscientia, on the other hand, is reserved for rational substances.

scholarly journals The Attractors of the Common Differential Operator Are Determined by Hyperbolic and Lacunary Functions

2008 ◽  
Vol 2008 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Wolf Bayer
Keyword(s):  
Differential Operator ◽  
Taylor Series ◽  
Analytic Functions ◽  
Chaotic Behavior ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Limit Behavior ◽  
Hyperbolic Functions ◽  
Limit Sets ◽  
The Common

For analytic functions, we investigate the limit behavior of the sequence of their derivatives by means of Taylor series, the attractors are characterized by -limit sets. We describe four different classes of functions, with empty, finite, countable, and uncountable attractors. The paper reveals that Erdelyiéshyperbolic functions of higher orderandlacunary functionsplay an important role for orderly or chaotic behavior. Examples are given for the sake of confirmation.

scholarly journals Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Moritz Drexl ◽  
Andreas Kleiner
Keyword(s):  
Decision Rule ◽  
Welfare Analysis ◽  
Status Quo ◽  
Majority Voting ◽  
Qualified Majority ◽  
Monetary Transfers ◽  
The Status ◽  
Common Objection ◽  
The Common ◽  
Strategy Proof

A committee decides collectively whether to accept a given proposal or to maintain the status quo. Committee members are privately informed about their valuations and monetary transfers are possible. According to which rule should the committee make its decision? We consider strategy-proof and anonymous mechanisms and solve for the decision rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare, which takes monetary transfers to an external agency explicitly into account. For regular distributions of preferences, we find that it is optimal to exclude monetary transfers and to decide by qualified majority voting. This sheds new light on the common objection that criticizes voting for its inefficiency. (JEL D71, D72, D82)

Defining consciousness

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 561-569 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaun Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Motor Control ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Phenomenological Description ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Control Processes ◽  
The Common

I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.

scholarly journals The Neural Correlates of Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness Seem to Coincide and Would Correspond to a Memory Center, an Activation Center and Eight Parallel Convergence Centers

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giancarlo Frigato
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
Third Person ◽  
The Common ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Hot Zone ◽  
Activation Center ◽  
Number Of Authors

An increasing number of authors suggest that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) have no selective, executive, or metacognitive function. It is believed that attention unconsciously selects the contents that will become conscious. Consciousness would have only the fundamental function of transforming the selected contents into a format easily used by high-level processors, such as working memory, language, or autobiographical memory. According to Dehaene, the neural correlates (NC) of access consciousness (AC; cognitive consciousness) constitute a widespread network in the frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. While Tononi localized the correlates of phenomenal consciousness (PC; subjective consciousness) to a posterior “hot zone” in the temporo-parietal cortex. A careful examination of the works of these two groups leads to the conclusion that the correlates of access and PC coincide. The two consciousnesses are therefore two faces of the same single consciousness with both its cognitive and subjective contents. A review of the literature of the pathology called “neglect” confirms that the common correlates include 10: a memory center, an activation center, and eight parallel centers. From study of the “imagery” it can be deduced that these eight parallel centers would operate as points of convergence in the third person linking the respective eight sensory-motor-emotional areas activated by external perceptions and the corresponding memories of these perceptions deposited in the memory center. The first four centers of convergence appear in the most evolved fish and gradually reach eight in humans.

scholarly journals Higher–Order Thought and the Problem of Shifting Subjectivity

2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madhu Mangal Chaturvedi ◽  
A. V. Ravishankar Sarma Ravishankar Sarma
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Lower Order ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Subjective Character ◽  
Target State ◽  
Conscious Mental State

In this paper, we argue that the two versions of the higher–order thought theory of consciousness, viz. Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought and Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought, fail to explain the subjective character of a conscious mental state. Both these theories face what we call the problem of shifting subjectivity. Since these theories explain the consciousness of mental states in terms of a representational relation between two unconscious mental states with the help of a two–tiered representational structure divided into a higher–order thought and a lower–order mental state (which is the target of the higher–order thought), they fail to explain the subjective character of conscious mental states, which is intrinsic to them. In their account, the subjective character intrinsic to conscious mental states seems to shift from the target state to the higher–order mental state, which is separate from the target state. The objection is strong against Rosenthal’s extrinsic higher–order thought theory, which clearly makes a distinction between a world–directed mental state and the higher–order thought representing it. However, although Gennaro’s intrinsic higher–order thought theory is an attempt to preserve the intuition that consciousness is intrinsic to conscious mental states, it faces the problem of shifting subjectivity in the case of introspective consciousness.

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