scholarly journals Using the CNI Model to Investigate Individual Differences in Moral Dilemma Judgments

2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (9) ◽  
pp. 1392-1407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Körner ◽  
Roland Deutsch ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Typical moral dilemmas pitting the consequences of a given action against the action’s consistency with moral norms confound several determinants of moral judgments. Dissociating these determinants, the CNI model allows researchers to quantify sensitivity to consequences, sensitivity to norms, and general preference for inaction over action regardless of consequences and norms. However, with the currently available set of dilemmas for research using the CNI model, the model is not suitable for studies with individual-difference designs. To overcome this limitation, the current research investigated the suitability of an extended dilemma battery to make the CNI model amenable for individual-difference research, examining relations of its parameters with psychopathy, empathic concern, need for cognition, self-reported utilitarianism, behavioral activation/inhibition, moral identity, and religiosity. The results support the suitability of the CNI model for individual-difference research with the extended dilemma battery, providing more nuanced insights into the underpinnings of individual differences in moral dilemma judgments.

2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722110350
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Although moral dilemma judgments are influenced by a variety of situational factors, there is evidence for considerable disagreement between individuals. Using the CNI model to disentangle (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas, the current research examined the temporal stability of individual differences along the three dimensions. Across two time points 1 month apart, sensitivity to consequences ( r = .81) and sensitivity to norms ( r = .84) showed high levels of stability that were comparable to the Big Five personality traits; general preference for inaction versus action showed lower stability ( r = .41). Exploratory analyses revealed reliable associations between the three dimensions of moral dilemma judgments and three of the Big Five (extraversion, agreeableness, openness). Together, these findings provide evidence for stable individual differences in moral dilemma judgments that are related to basic personality traits.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (7) ◽  
pp. 1013-1026 ◽  
Author(s):  
Meike Kroneisen ◽  
Daniel W. Heck

Research on moral decision making usually focuses on two ethical principles: the principle of utilitarianism (= morality of an action is determined by its consequences) and the principle of deontology (= morality of an action is valued according to the adherence to moral norms regardless of the consequences). Criticism on traditional moral dilemma research includes the reproach that consequences and norms are confounded in standard paradigms. As a remedy, a multinomial model (the CNI model) was developed to disentangle and measure sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction versus action ( I). In two studies, we examined the link of basic personality traits to moral judgments by fitting a hierarchical Bayesian version of the CNI model. As predicted, high Honesty–Humility was selectively associated with sensitivity for norms, whereas high Emotionality was selectively associated with sensitivity for consequences. However, Conscientiousness was not associated with a preference for inaction.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 81-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.V. Molchanov ◽  
O.V. Almazova

The paper presents results of an empirical study of adolescents' concepts of responsibility in different types of moral dilemmas characterized by violations of moral norms. The study proved that the type of moral dilemma and the context of interaction of its participants determine the adolescents' readiness to recognize the responsibility of the main character of the dilemma for violating the norm. In dilemmas of asocial type adolescents are more willing to recognize the responsibility of the offender whose behavior leads to obvious damage for one of the participants in the interaction. As for prosocial dilemmas and dilemmas of confronting norms, adolescents tend to deny the responsibility of the offender. The paper provides a comparative analysis of empirically identified types of adolescent concepts of responsibility, including the differentiated responsibility with egoistic orientation, high responsibility, low responsibility and ‘polar’ responsibility. The authors highlight the ambiguity of the relationship between adolescents’ evaluation of behavior, their readiness to recognize responsibility in moral transgression, and their judgment about the necessity of punishment. The paper concludes with the discussion concerning the relationship between the level of development of moral judgments/moral reasoning and the concepts of responsibility in adolescents.


Healthcare ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 505
Author(s):  
Shenglan Li ◽  
Daoqun Ding ◽  
Zhihui Wu ◽  
Liangliang Yi ◽  
Ji Lai ◽  
...  

Purpose: Fewer studies are about the influence of psychopath traits on moral judgment and the underlying psychological mechanism in Chinese cultural background. In this paper, we use the creative CNI (Consequences, Norms, Inaction versus action) model to quantify the subject’s reaction to moral dilemmas. Method: In this research, the Chinese version of the Levenson Psychopathic Scale, CNI model materials, and a multinomial model to further analyze the associations among the psychopathy characteristics and utilitarian moral judgment are applied. The CNI model is proposed by Gawronski et al., which can quantify the subjects’ sensitivity to moral consequence, sensitivity to moral norms, and the general preference for inaction or action in moral dilemmas. Result: This study finds that there were significant differences in the utilitarian moral judgment between the groups, t (360) = 3.24, p = 0.001, and Cohen’s d = 0.36. The analysis results of the CNI model show that the high psychopathy group on the N parameter was significantly lower than the group of low psychopathy, ΔG2 (2) = 79.70, p = 0.001. In terms of the C parameter, we found no significant distinctions between the two groups, ΔG2 (2) = 1.356, p = 0.244. For the I parameter, the two groups also have no significant differences, ΔG2 (2) = 0.093, p = 0.76. Conclusion: Persons with high psychopathy traits prefer to make more utilitarian moral judgments and have a weak sensitivity to moral norms (N). The sensitivity to consequences (C) of the two groups is no significant difference. The general preference for inaction versus action (I) also has no significant differences between those two groups. Moreover, the CNI model fits well in Chinese subjects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 014616722098799
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner ( deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good ( utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies ( N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.


2021 ◽  
pp. 216770262110438
Author(s):  
Dillon M. Luke ◽  
Craig S. Neumann ◽  
Bertram Gawronski

A major question in clinical and moral psychology concerns the nature of the commonly presumed association between psychopathy and moral judgment. In the current preregistered study ( N = 443), we aimed to address this question by examining the relation between psychopathy and responses to moral dilemmas pitting consequences for the greater good against adherence to moral norms. To provide more nuanced insights, we measured four distinct facets of psychopathy and used the CNI model to quantify sensitivity to consequences ( C), sensitivity to moral norms ( N), and general preference for inaction over action ( I) in responses to moral dilemmas. Psychopathy was associated with a weaker sensitivity to moral norms, which showed unique links to the interpersonal and affective facets of psychopathy. Psychopathy did not show reliable associations with either sensitivity to consequences or general preference for inaction over action. Implications of these findings for clinical and moral psychology are discussed.


2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (S2) ◽  
pp. 249-249
Author(s):  
M. Signorelli ◽  
A. Geraci ◽  
E. Aguglia

IntroductionSeveral studies revealed that cognitive functioning in BPD are impaired not only in the acute phase but over time (Mur et al., 2008). On Theory of Mind (ToM) recent studies found a impairment of this ability in remitted patients, supporting the theory that ToM deficits are trait-dependent (Bora et al., 2009) in contrast with another study that suggest a partially dependence(Wolf et al. 2010).ObjectivesWe explored: a) ToM in BPD investigating two cognitive processes: emotional recognition, second order beliefs attribution; b) Moral judgments in BPD; c) possible effects of neuropsychological functioning on ToM task and moral dilemmas.AimsThe principal aim is to investigate the domain specificity of ToM and Moral sense, studying selective impairments.MethodA total of 20 patients with bipolar I disorder were tested and 20 healthy controls. We use a complete neuropsychological assessment, two ToM tasks (Eyes test, Sullivan's stories) and we added two moral dilemmas to asses moral judgment Results: We found ToM deficits in BDP, with a multiple correlation between ToM and neuropsychological functioning. Also we found for the first time a impairment on personal moral dilemma, with a correlation between emotional recognition and moral judgments.ConclusionPatients with BPD are impaired in ToM partially independent of other cognitive dysfunctions and in moral reasoning.


1986 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Blum Chap

This was a cross-sectional study of the effects of age, sex, and moral dilemma content on adult moral reasoning. Hypothetical dilemmas were presented to sixty men and women, thirty of whom were elderly and thirty in early middle age. With education controlled there were no age or sex differences in moral maturity. Dilemma content had a significant effect on moral judgment, with a tendency for each age group to use a higher level of judgment when the situation described was age-appropriate, i.e., relevant to that group's stage of life. There was a significant age difference on a measure of spontaneous role taking: old persons made more definitive moral judgments than the younger adults, who attempted to reconcile the various points of view represented in a dilemma.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 1631
Author(s):  
Alice Foucart ◽  
Susanne Brouwer

Recent studies have shown that people make more utilitarian decisions when dealing with a moral dilemma in a foreign language than in their native language. Emotion, cognitive load, and psychological distance have been put forward as explanations for this foreign language effect. The question that arises is whether a similar effect would be observed when processing a dilemma in one’s own language but spoken by a foreign-accented speaker. Indeed, foreign-accented speech has been shown to modulate emotion processing, to disrupt processing fluency and to increase psychological distance due to social categorisation. We tested this hypothesis by presenting 435 participants with two moral dilemmas, the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma online, either in a native accent or a foreign accent. In Experiment 1, 184 native Spanish speakers listened to the dilemmas in Spanish recorded by a native speaker, a British English or a Cameroonian native speaker. In Experiment 2, 251 Dutch native speakers listened to the dilemmas in Dutch in their native accent, in a British English, a Turkish, or in a French accent. Results showed an increase in utilitarian decisions for the Cameroonian- and French-accented speech compared to the Spanish or Dutch native accent, respectively. When collapsing all the speakers from the two experiments, a similar increase in the foreign accent condition compared with the native accent condition was observed. This study is the first demonstration of a foreign accent effect on moral judgements, and despite the variability in the effect across accents, the findings suggest that a foreign accent, like a foreign language, is a linguistic context that modulates (neuro)cognitive mechanisms, and consequently, impacts our behaviour. More research is needed to follow up on this exploratory study and to understand the influence of factors such as emotion reduction, cognitive load, psychological distance, and speaker’s idiosyncratic features on moral judgments.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lena Nadarevic ◽  
Lena Klein ◽  
Janna Dierolf

Recent studies suggest that processing moral dilemmas in a foreign language instead of the native language increases the likelihood of moral judgments in line with the utilitarian principle. The goal of our research was to investigate the replicability and robustness of this moral foreign-language effect and to explore its underlying mechanisms by means of the CNI model—a multinomial model that allows to estimate the extent to which moral judgments are driven by people’s sensitivity to consequences (C-parameter), their sensitivity to norms (N-parameter), and their general preference for action or inaction (I-parameter). In two pre-registered studies, German participants provided moral judgments to dilemmas that were either presented in German or English. In Experiment 1, participants judged eight different dilemmas in four versions each (i.e., 32 dilemmas in total). In Experiment 2, participants judged four different dilemmas in one of the four versions (i.e., 4 dilemmas in total). Neither of the two studies replicated the moral foreign-language effect. Moreover, we also did not find reliable language effects on the three parameters of the CNI-model. We conclude that if there is a moral foreign-language effect, it must be very fragile and context specific.


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