scholarly journals Hoe structureren burgers hun opvattingen over culturele vraagstukken? : Stelsels van culturele opvattingen onder aanhangers van populistisch radicaal-rechtse partijen1

Sociologie ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-221
Author(s):  
Stijn Daenekindt ◽  
Willem de Koster ◽  
Jeroen van der Waal

Abstract Social scientists generally agree that all individuals structure their cultural attitudes in the same unidimensional fashion. However, various populist radical right parties remarkably combine moral progressiveness with conservatism regarding immigration-related issues. This suggests that the structuring of cultural attitudes among the electorate may also be more complex than typically assumed. Applying Correlational Class Analysis to representative survey data, we uncover three cultural belief systems. For individuals adhering to an integrated one, all cultural attitudes are interdependent, as typically assumed. However, we also uncover two alternative belief systems: intermediate and partitioned. In the latter, positions on one cultural attitude (e.g., ethnocentrism) are barely related to positions on others (e.g., rejecting Islam or opposing homosexuality). The existence of multiple cultural belief systems challenges the widely-held assumption that all people organize their cultural attitudes similarly. Both political party agenda’s and individuals’ education level and religion appear key to understanding variation in belief systems.

2017 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-811 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stijn Daenekindt ◽  
Willem de Koster ◽  
Jeroen van der Waal

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul E. Sum

Increasingly, European radical right parties have capitalized on citizen dissatisfaction with the European Union institutions. As a new EU member, to what extent have supporters of the radical right in Romania turned away from Europe? I evaluate this question by tracking the evolution of radical right parties in Romania. I find that supporters of the radical right in Romania are generally do not support or do not trust the EU. The Greater Romania Party is well-positioned to expand its electoral base in the foreseeable future if it can widen its appeal to those Romanians who are ambivalent to the EU.


Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110195
Author(s):  
Hugo Marcos-Marne ◽  
Carolina Plaza-Colodro ◽  
Ciaran O’Flynn

The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain’s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Castanho Silva

Radical parties have been found to succeed under conditions of mass polarization. It is argued that their message resonates better with voters at the extremes of an ideological spectrum. This paper investigates if the reverse also holds, meaning that radical parties may contribute to the polarization of the public. I test this claim in the Netherlands, a country that has experienced the rise of populist radical right parties since 2002, using a synthetic control model built with a pool of comparable countries and Eurobarometer survey data. Results show that, after the rise of Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, the level of polarization among the Dutch public increased more than it otherwise would have. These findings contribute to understanding the connection between elite- and mass-level polarization, and the consequences of populist radical right parties’ emergence in Western Europe.


1988 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mona Abul Fadl

The need for a relevant and instrumental body of knowledge that can secure the taskof historical reconstruction in Muslim societies originally inspired the da’wa for the Islamizationof knowledge. The immediate targets for this da’wa were the social sciences for obvious reasons.Their field directly impinges on the organization of human societies and as such carries intothe area of human value and belief systems. The fact that such a body of knowledge alreadyexisted and that the norms for its disciplined pursuit were assumed in the dominant practiceconfronted Muslim scholars with the context for addressing the issues at stake. How relevantwas current social science to Muslim needs and aspirations? Could it, in its present formand emphasis, provide Muslims with the framework for operationalizing their values in theirhistorical present? How instrumental is it in shaping the social foundations vital for the Muslimfuture? Is instrumentality the only criteria for such evaluations? In seeking to answer thesequestions the seeds are sown for a new orientation in the social sciences. This orientationrepresents the legitimate claims and aspirations of a long silent/silenced world culture.In locating the activities of Muslim social scientists today it is important to distinguishbetween two currents. The first is in its formative stages as it sets out to rediscover the worldfrom the perspective of a recovered sense of identity and in terms of its renewed culturalaffinities. Its preoccupations are those of the Muslim revival. The other current is constitutedof the remnants of an earlier generation of modernizers who still retain a faith in the universalityof Western values. Demoralized by the revival, as much as by their own cultural alientation,they seek to deploy their reserves of scholarship and logistics to recover lost ground. Bymodifying their strategy and revalorizing the legacy they hope that, as culture-brokers, theymight be more effective where others have failed. They seek to pre-empt the cultural revivalby appropriating its symbols and reinterpreting the Islamic legacy to make it more tractableto modernity. They blame Orientalism for its inherent fixations and strive to redress its selfimposedlimitations. Their efforts may frequently intersect with those of the Islamizing current,but should clearly not be confused with them. For all the tireless ingenuity, these effortsare more conspicuous for their industry than for their originality. Between the new breadof renovationists and the old guard of ‘modernizers’, the future of an Islamic Social Scienceclearly lies with the efforts of the former.Within the Islamizing current it is possible to distinguish three principal trends. The firstopts for a radical perspective and takes its stand on epistemological grounds. It questionsthe compatibility of the current social sciences on account of their rootedness in the paradigmof the European Enlightenment and its attendant naturalistic and positivist biases. Consistencedemands a concerted e€fort to generate alternative paradigms for a new social science fromIslamic epistemologies. In contrast, the second trend opts for a more pragmatic approachwhich assumes that it is possible to interact within the existing framework of the disciplinesafter adapting them to Islamic values. The problem with modern sciene is ethical, notepistemological, and by recasting it accordingly, it is possible to benefit from its strengthsand curtail its derogatory consequences. The third trend focuses on the Muslim scholar, rather ...


2020 ◽  
pp. 1097184X2098078
Author(s):  
Max Stick ◽  
Tina Fetner

Men’s identification with and support for feminism has attracted the interest of masculinity scholars. This study explores an under-researched dimension of this phenomenon, investigating the relationship between feminist identification and sexual behavior. In heterosexual encounters, do feminist men report having sex more recently than those who do not call themselves feminists? During sexual encounters, do feminist men behave differently than non-feminists? In particular, do feminist men organize their sexual behavior in a way that prioritizes their partners’ sexual pleasure to a greater extent than non-feminists? Using representative survey data of Canadian adults, we examine the self-reported sexual behavior of heterosexual Canadian men. We find that self-identifying feminist men report having sex more recently and are more likely to report engaging in breast stimulation and performing oral sex on their partners than non-feminists. We discuss the implications of these findings on the sociological literature on gender and sexuality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402199716
Author(s):  
Winston Chou ◽  
Rafaela Dancygier ◽  
Naoki Egami ◽  
Amaney A. Jamal

As populist radical right parties muster increasing support in many democracies, an important question is how mainstream parties can recapture their voters. Focusing on Germany, we present original panel evidence that voters supporting the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)—the country’s largest populist radical right party—resemble partisan loyalists with entrenched anti-establishment views, seemingly beyond recapture by mainstream parties. Yet this loyalty does not only reflect anti-establishment voting, but also gridlocked party-issue positioning. Despite descriptive evidence of strong party loyalty, experimental evidence reveals that many AfD voters change allegiances when mainstream parties accommodate their preferences. However, for most parties this repositioning is extremely costly. While mainstream parties can attract populist radical right voters via restrictive immigration policies, they alienate their own voters in doing so. Examining position shifts across issue dimensions, parties, and voter groups, our research demonstrates that, absent significant changes in issue preferences or salience, the status quo is an equilibrium.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Sirus H. Dehdari

This paper studies the effects of economic distress on support for radical right parties. Using Swedish election data, I show that one layoff notice among low-skilled native-born workers increases, on average, support for the Swedish radical right party the Sweden Democrats by 0.17–0.45 votes. The relationship between layoff notices and support for the Sweden Democrats is stronger in areas with a high share of low-skilled immigrants and in areas with a low share of high-skilled immigrants. These findings are in line with theories suggesting that economically distressed voters oppose immigration as they fear increased labor market competition. In addition, I use individual-level survey data to show that self-reported unemployment risk is positively associated with voting for the Sweden Democrats among low-skilled respondents while the opposite is true for high-skilled respondents, echoing the aggregate-level findings.


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