scholarly journals Between-group competition and human cooperation

2008 ◽  
Vol 276 (1655) ◽  
pp. 355-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikael Puurtinen ◽  
Tapio Mappes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Distinctive Feature ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Widespread Occurrence ◽  
Organizational Hierarchy ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Group Members

A distinctive feature of human behaviour is the widespread occurrence of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Explaining the maintenance of costly within-group cooperation is a challenge because the incentive to free ride on the efforts of other group members is expected to lead to decay of cooperation. However, the costs of cooperation can be diminished or overcome when there is competition at a higher level of organizational hierarchy. Here we show that competition between groups resolves the paradigmatic ‘public goods’ social dilemma and increases within-group cooperation and overall productivity. Further, group competition intensifies the moral emotions of anger and guilt associated with violations of the cooperative norm. The results suggest an important role for group conflict in the evolution of human cooperation and moral emotions.

THE COEVOLUTION OF GROUP SIZE AND LEADERSHIP: AN AGENT-BASED PUBLIC GOODS MODEL FOR PREHISPANIC PUEBLO SOCIETIES

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (01n02) ◽  
pp. 1150007 ◽  
Author(s):  
TIMOTHY A. KOHLER ◽  
DENTON COCKBURN ◽  
PAUL L. HOOPER ◽  
R. KYLE BOCINSKY ◽  
ZIAD KOBTI
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Goodness Of Fit ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Monitoring Group ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Pueblo Societies

We present an agent-based model for voluntaristic processes allowing the emergence of leadership in small-scale societies, parameterized to apply to Pueblo societies of the northern US Southwest between AD 600 and 1300. We embed an evolutionary public-goods game in a spatial simulation of household activities in which agents, representing households, decide where to farm, hunt, and locate their residences. Leaders, through their work in monitoring group members and punishing defectors, can increase the likelihood that group members will cooperate to achieve a favorable outcome in the public-goods game. We show that under certain conditions households prefer to work in a group with a leader who receives a share of the group's productivity, rather than to work in a group with no leader. Simulation produces outcomes that match reasonably well those known for a portion of Southwest Colorado between AD 600 and 900. We suggest that for later periods a model incorporating coercion, or inter-group competition, or both, and one in which tiered hierarchies of leadership can emerge, would increase the goodness-of-fit.

Leader Punishment and Cooperation in Groups: Experimental Field Evidence from Commons Management in Ethiopia

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (2) ◽  
pp. 747-783 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kosfeld ◽  
Devesh Rustagi
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Real World ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Substantial Variation ◽  
Experimental Field ◽  
Relative Success ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Field Evidence ◽  
Group Members

We conduct a social dilemma experiment in which real-world leaders can punish group members as a third party. Despite facing an identical environment, leaders are found to take remarkably different punishment approaches. The different leader types revealed experimentally explain the relative success of groups in managing their forest commons. Leaders who emphasize equality and efficiency see positive forest outcomes. Antisocial leaders, who punish indiscriminately, see relatively negative forest outcomes. Our results highlight the importance of leaders in collective action, and more generally the idiosyncratic but powerful roles that leaders may play, leading to substantial variation in group cooperation outcomes. (JEL C93, D03, O13, Q23)

scholarly journals Self-reliance crowds out group cooperation and increases wealth inequality

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jörg Gross ◽  
Sonja Veistola ◽  
Carsten K. W. De Dreu ◽  
Eric Van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Self Reliance ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Shared Problem

Abstract Humans establish public goods to provide for shared needs like safety or healthcare. Yet, public goods rely on cooperation which can break down because of free-riding incentives. Previous research extensively investigated how groups solve this free-rider problem but ignored another challenge to public goods provision. Namely, some individuals do not need public goods to solve the problems they share with others. We investigate how such self-reliance influences cooperation by confronting groups in a laboratory experiment with a safety problem that could be solved either cooperatively or individually. We show that self-reliance leads to a decline in cooperation. Moreover, asymmetries in self-reliance undermine social welfare and increase wealth inequality between group members. Less dependent group members often choose to solve the shared problem individually, while more dependent members frequently fail to solve the problem, leaving them increasingly poor. While self-reliance circumvents the free-rider problem, it complicates the governing of the commons.

scholarly journals Hunger affects social decisions in a multi-round Public Goods Game but not a single-shot Ultimatum Game

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam Fraser ◽  
Daniel Nettle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Experimental Tests ◽  
Single Shot ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Social Decisions ◽  
Group Members

Objective. People have the intuition that hunger undermines social cooperation, but experimental tests of this have often produced null results. One possible explanation is that the experimental tasks used are not rich enough to capture the diverse pathways by which social cooperation can be sustained or break down in real life. We studied the effects of hunger on cooperation in two tasks of differential interaction richness. Methods. We manipulated hunger by asking participants to eat, or refrain from eating, breakfast. Participants in experiment 1 (n = 106) played a one-shot Ultimatum Game. Participants in experiment 2 (n = 264) played twenty rounds of a Public Goods Game in the same groups of four, ten rounds with the possibility of punishing other group members, and ten without. Results. In experiment 1, skipping breakfast had no significant effects on either amounts proposed or minimum acceptable offers. In experiment 2, there were multiple different significant effects of the manipulation. No-breakfast participants were more generous in the first round of the game without punishment, and in subsequent rounds, were more influenced by what other group members had done the round before. In the punishment game, no-breakfast participants were also less likely to punish their group-mates than breakfast participants. Consequently, the possibility of punishment was less effective in increasing group cooperation levels in no-breakfast groups. Conclusion. Replicating earlier findings, we found a null effect of hunger on cooperation in a one-shot Ultimatum Game. However, in our richer Public Goods Game, the dynamics of cooperation differed with hunger, in subtle ways not simply classifiable as hungry participants being ‘more’ or ‘less’ cooperative overall.

scholarly journals Sex Differences in In-Group Cooperation Vary Dynamically with Competitive Conditions and Outcomes

2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 147470491201000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Drew H. Bailey ◽  
Benjamin Winegard ◽  
Jon Oxford ◽  
David C. Geary
Keyword(s):  
Young Adults ◽  
Sex Differences ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Previous Trial ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Male Bias ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Condition

Men's but not women's investment in a public goods game varied dynamically with the presence or absence of a perceived out-group. Three hundred fifty-four (167 male) young adults participated in multiple iterations of a public goods game under intergroup and individual competition conditions. Participants received feedback about whether their investments in the group were sufficient to earn a bonus to be shared among all in-group members. Results for the first trial confirm previous research in which men's but not women's investments were higher when there was a competing out-group. We extended these findings by showing that men's investment in the in-group varied dynamically by condition depending on the outcome of the previous trial: In the group condition, men, but not women, decreased spending following a win (i.e., earning an in-group bonus). In the individual condition, men, but not women, increased spending following a win. We hypothesize that these patterns reflect a male bias to calibrate their level of in-group investment such that they sacrifice only what is necessary for their group to successfully compete against a rival group.

A Cooperative Species

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Common Good ◽  
Cooperative Groups ◽  
Social Emotions ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Group Competition ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Shame And Guilt ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Common ◽  
Ethnographic Data

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. This book shows that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The book describes how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, the book provides a compelling and novel account of human cooperation.

scholarly journals Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Szolnoki ◽  
Xiaojie Chen
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pair Interaction ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Point Interactions ◽  
Social Games ◽  
The Public ◽  
Specific Parameter ◽  
Group Members

AbstractThe conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.

scholarly journals Tibetan Macaques with Higher Social Centrality and More Relatives Emit More Frequent Visual Communication in Collective Decision-Making

Animals ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 876
Author(s):  
Zifei Tang ◽  
Xi Wang ◽  
Mingyang Wu ◽  
Shiwang Chen ◽  
Jinhua Li
Keyword(s):  
Visual Communication ◽  
Visual Signals ◽  
Communication Process ◽  
Tobit Regression ◽  
Communication Behaviors ◽  
Group Cooperation ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Group Sex ◽  
Free Ranging ◽  
Social Centrality

Animals on the move often communicate with each other through some specific postures. Previous studies have shown that social interaction plays a role in communication process. However, it is not clear whether the affinity of group members can affect visual communication. We studied a group of free-ranging Tibetan macaques (Macaca thibetana) at Huangshan Mountain, China, and answered whether and how social centrality or relatives matter in visual signals during group movement using Tobit regression modeling. All individuals emitted the signals of back-glances and pauses in collective movement. The emission of two signals decreased with the number of participants increased. The back-glance and pause signals emitted by the participating individuals were stronger as the position moved backward in the group. Sex, age, and rank had no significant influence on back-glance and pause signals. Individuals with higher social centrality would emit more pause signals, but social centrality had no effect on the back-glance signal. Individuals with more relatives in the group had more back-glance signals, but this had no effect on the pause signal. This study verifies that social centrality and the number of relatives have effects on visual signals in Tibetan macaques. We provide insights into the relationship between communication behaviors and group cooperation in social animals.

scholarly journals On the Stability of Social Preferences in Inter-Group Conflict: A Lab-in-the-Field Panel Study

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199408
Author(s):  
Robert Böhm ◽  
Jürgen Fleiß ◽  
Robert Rybnicek
Keyword(s):  
Field Study ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Panel Study ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Group Conflict ◽  
Considerable Heterogeneity ◽  
Specific Preference ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Stability

Despite the omnipresence of inter-group conflicts, little is known about the heterogeneity and stability of individuals’ social preferences toward in-group and out-group members. To identify the prevalence and stability of social preferences in inter-group conflict, we gather quota-representative, incentivized data from a lab-in-the-field study during the heated 2016 Austrian presidential election. We assess social preferences toward in-group and out-group members one week before, one week after, and three months after the election. We find considerable heterogeneity in individuals’ group-(in)dependent social preferences. Utilizing various econometric strategies, we find largely stable social preferences over the course of conflict. Yet, there is some indication of variation, particularly when the conflict becomes less salient. Variation is larger in social preferences toward in-group members and among specific preference types. We discuss the theoretical implications of our findings and outline potential avenues for future research.

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