scholarly journals The Russian factor in EU security policy and transatlantic relations

European View ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 178168582199984
Author(s):  
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz

Understanding Russia’s foreign policy requires an examination of Putin’s domestic incentives. Nationalism has been cynically instrumentalised to prop up the current regime. By combining it with, among other things, the malicious deployment of modern communication techniques on an unprecedented scale, Russia has been able to project power at home and abroad. However, Putin’s actions have had unintended consequences, and together with the arrival of a new US administration, the EU is presented with an opportunity to devise new solutions—making use of both the carrot and the stick. Re-establishing transatlantic unity and cooperation should not be an end in itself but rather be used as an avenue to implement policies to strengthen European security, some of which would also prove beneficial to Russia.

Author(s):  
Ian Bache ◽  
Simon Bulmer ◽  
Stephen George ◽  
Owen Parker

This chapter examines the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). From 1993 to 2009, external political relations formed the second pillar of the EU, on CFSP. Although CFSP was officially an intergovernmental pillar, the European Commission came to play an important role. There were serious attempts to strengthen the security and defence aspects of the CFSP in the face of the threats that faced the EU from instability in its neighbouring territories. However, the EU remains far from having a truly supranational foreign policy and its status as a ‘power’ in international relations is debatable. The chapter first provides a historical background on the CFSP, focusing on the creation of the European Political Co-operation (EPC), before discussing the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It concludes with an assessment of EU power and its impact on world politics.


2006 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-114
Author(s):  
Brian Crowe

AbstractThe Balkans have been the crucible of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the 1990s the appointment of David (Lord) Owen as a strong representative to manage the EU's Bosnian policy, the sidelining of the EU itself by the Contact Group, and American dominance at Dayton (what price 'this is the hour of Europe'?) and over Kosovo were important precursors to the important European Council decisions in June 1999 to appoint a high-profile international statesman as High Representative for the CFSP and to create the EU's own military capability in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Constitutional Treaty's further provisions, notably replacing the Presidency in external relations, will be sorely missed and will need to be brought back.ESDP is developing well, if modestly, and making a genuine contribution, mostly with a strong civ-mil component, in several parts of the world. The CFSP itself seems to be managing quite well. But the EU is not yet set up for serious 'events' or crisis management. Experience shows, and greater recognition is needed, that the EU (probably even with an EU Foreign Minister) needs to be represented by member states that carry conviction to outside interlocutors: some member states are inevitably more equal and carry greater weight than others, even if all have an equal voice. Since EU foreign policy is in large measure inescapably a function of US foreign policy, member states need to have a better common understanding among themselves about the nature of the transatlantic relationship. It will take confidence in the efficacy of the CFSP, to which all must give greater priority, before those member states that have alternatives will accept being bound to conducting their foreign policy (or being represented in the UN Security Council) through Brussels. at will take time and effort.


2021 ◽  
pp. 43-59
Author(s):  
Tomasz Dubowski

In the discussion on the EU migration policy, it is impossible to evade the issue of the relation between this policy and the EU foreign policy, including EU common foreign and security policy. The subject of this study are selected links between migration issues and the CFSP of the European Union. The presented considerations aim to determine at what levels and in what ways the EU’s migration policy is taken into account in the space of the CFSP as a diplomatic and political (and subject to specific rules and procedures) substrate of the EU’s external action.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (12) ◽  
pp. 30-40
Author(s):  
V. Vasil'ev

The article investigates approaches taken by major political parties and civil society in the FRG toward the Transatlantic partnership. It reveals the tendencies of the prospective promotion of Berlin’s cooperation with Washington; the article also gives a forecast of further interaction between the EU and the USA, indicates the direction of discourse regarding the future Russia–Germany relations model in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and in reference to the increased transatlantic solidarity. Disputes in German socio-political circles on the issue of the FRG’s policy toward the U.S. are emerging all the time, but they have to be considered within a concrete historical and political context. Being of primary significance for all German chancellors, the Trans-Atlantic factor has been shaping itself in a controversial way as to the nation’s public opinion. This has been confirmed by many opinion polls, including the survey on the signing of the EU–U.S. Agreement on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Chancellor A. Merkel is playing an important role: she is either ascribed full compliancy with Washington, or is being tentatively shown as a consistent government figure in advancing and upholding of Germany's and the EU's interests. A. Merkel has implemented her peace-seeking drive in undoing the Ukrainian tangle by setting up the “Normandy format” involving the leaders of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine while having cleared it through with the U.S. President B. Obama well in advance. Despite the increasing criticism of Washington’s policy among some part of Germans, for the majority of German voters, the USA remains a country of implementable hopes, the only power in the world possessing a high education level and the most advanced technologies. Americans, for their part, are confident of the important role that Berlin plays in world politics, particularly in what concerns the maintenance of unity within the EU. Berlin aims at further constructive interaction with the USA in the frame of NATO as well as within other Trans-Atlantic formats. Notwithstanding the steady tendency toward increasing of the Washington policy’s critical perception degree in German society, officially Berlin continues as Washington’s true ally, partner and friend. There is every reason to believe that after the 2017 Bundestag elections, the new (the former) Chancellor will have to face a modernized Trans-Atlantic partnership philosophy, with a paradigm also devised in the spirit of the bloc discipline and commitments to allies. The main concern for Berlin is not to lose its sovereign right of decision-making, including the one that deals with problems of European security and relations with Moscow. Regrettably, Germany is not putting forward any innovative ideas on aligning a new architecture of European security with Russia’s participation. Meanwhile, German scholars and experts are trying to work out a tentative algorithm of a gradual return to the West’s full-fledged dialogue with Russia, which, unfortunately, is qualified as an opponent by many politicians. Predictably, the Crimea issue will remain a long-lasting political irritant in relations between Russia and Germany. Although not every aspect of Berlin’s activation in its foreign policy finds support of the German public, and the outburst of anti-American feeling is obvious, experts believe that the government of the FRG is “merely taking stock of these phenomena and ignores them”. Evident is the gap between the government's line and the feeling of the German parties’ basis – the public. It is noteworthy that the FRG has not yet adopted the Law on Holding General Federal Referendums on key issues of the domestic and foreign policy. There is every indication to assume that the real causes of abandoning the nationwide referendums are the reluctance of the German ruling bureaucracy and even its apprehensions of the negative voting returns on sensitive problems, – such as basic documents and decisions of the EU, the export of German arms, relations with the U.S., etc. The harmony between Berlin’s "Realpolitik" and German public opinion is not yet discernible within the system of Trans-Atlantic axes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-49
Author(s):  
Maja Kovacevic

The European Union (EU) is a unique player in the Western Balkans, where it has employed a wide array of foreign policy instruments since the 1990s such as diplomacy, trade, financial assistance, civilian missions, military missions, and enlargement, which is the EU?s most successful foreign policy tool. The region is an inspiring case for studying the EU?s transformative power. The undeniable success of the EU?s Enlargement Policy in influencing transitions of Central and Eastern Europe countries has inspired research of the Europeanization, or the EU?s transformative power in relation to candidate countries, and its impact on their political and economic reforms during the accession process. Since then, the EU?s global transformative power has been in crisis. The European Neighbourhood Policy was reviewed in 2015, aiming not any more towards the transformation of neighbouring states, but rather at fostering their resilience. Similarly, the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union?s Foreign and Security Policy set the principled pragmatism as a guideline. Moreover, the EU?s transformative power towards member states is questioned after two initiatives to trigger Article 7 TEU procedures against Poland and Hungary. What about the Europeanization of the Western Balkans? Despite the fact that the EU has been the main driver of change, the Europeanization of this post-conflict region has been slow. According to Freedom House, after substantial progress from 2004 to 2010, the Western Balkans has declined six years in a row, and its average Democracy Score in 2016 is the same as it was in 2004. With the exception of Albania, the scores of all countries are declining, not improving. The EU?s security-democratisation dilemma strongly affects its transformative power in the Western Balkans. By prioritising effective government rather than democratic governance, the EU has helped stabilise non-democratic and corrupt regimes rather than transforming them, legitimising Balkan "stabilitocrats".


Author(s):  
DENIS ČALETA ◽  
SARA PERKOVIĆ

Povzetek V analizi smo želeli prikazati, ali so tuji borci resnično nevarni za evropsko varnost, saj vemo, da je morebitna grožnja vedno mogoča. Do zdaj je bilo zelo težko oceniti grožnjo vrnitve tujih borcev. V raziskavo smo vključili dve državi, v katerih so napade izvedli tuji borci, ki so se vrnili v državo. Vključeni državi sta bili Belgija in Francija. V raziskavi smo primerjali politiko posameznih držav s skupno zunanjo in varnostno politiko EU. Ugotavljali smo, kako se te države spoprijemajo z vrnitvijo tujih borcev in kateri ukrepi so bili glede tega sprejeti. Poleg tega smo poskušali oceniti, ali so bolj osredotočeni na pregon tujih borcev, ki se vračajo, ali je njihov poudarek na programih deradikalizacije in reintegracije. Ključne besede Tuji borci, terorizem, Islamska država, EU, zakonodaja. Abstract This analysis will consider whether foreign fighters pose a real danger to European security, knowing that the potential threat is always possible. Up to now, assessing the threat of returning foreign fighters has been very difficult. In this article we have attempted to analyze the attacks that have been carried out by returning foreign fighters in Belgium and France. Our research compared the politics of individual countries with the common foreign and security policy of the EU. We have investigated how these countries are dealing with the return of foreign fighters and what measures have been taken in this regard. In addition, we have tried to evaluate whether they are more focused on the prosecution of returning foreign fighters or whether their focus is connected with deradicalization and reintegration programmes. Key words Foreign fighters, terrorism, Islamic state, EU, legislation.


Author(s):  
Victoria Ruda

Almost from the very outset the development of the common foreign policy and establishing the common defense have been the main aims of the European Community, but the real cooperation in these fields turned out to be quite complex and run into certain obstacles. As part of the European Community, the member states realize the necessity to comply with the common policy in order to become a full-fledged member on the political arena, but this does not take their fears to lose their national sovereignty and to give up some political advantages acquired through either the geographical position or the economic or political and military peculiarities. This explains to a certain extent the complexity of the consensus in searching process between the West European countries in the sphere of the common foreign and security policy. The integration process in Europe was concentrated on the economic cooperation in the first place. Later on the leaders of the West European countries recognized the readiness of the European countries to take a common position on the political and economic aspects of the security and the importance of the foreign policy cooperation in regard to the economic one was for the first time officially admitted. The development of the foreign policy pillar in the pre-Maastricht period clearly distinguished the sphere of competencies of the EU and NATO. The signing of the Single European Act allowed the EU country members to occupy the common position and coordinate their foreign policy. All this allowed the cooperation in the political sphere, which was evolving in two directions: first, conducting the coordinated foreign policy and secondly, ensuring the common security policy with a prospect of establishing the common defense as its separate pillar.


2021 ◽  
Vol 107 (7) ◽  
pp. 115-124
Author(s):  
Julia Melnikova ◽  

2016–2020 witnessed significant structural changes in the foreign and security policy of the European Union. External factors encouraged the need to strengthen the EU strategic autonomy not only in the form of particular practical moves related to the establishment and development of new institutions, but also as part of an attempt to formulate a new common discourse. The article examines these processes through the security communities theory, traditionally applied to analyze transatlantic dynamics. This helps to both systemically address the recent changes and identify miscalculations and missing elements in framing the European security community. Since the 2020 PESCO Strategic Review to a certain extent summed up the initial phase of development of the central initiative of the whole process, the article analyzes the so far achieved results in setting up the new agenda for the EU and the prospects of translating it into joint practices. The main assumption posits that the key obstacle for enhancing strategic autonomy is the need to use a collective identity - both a tool for developing institutions and a goal of this process. As a result, neither a new collective identity, nor a functional network of institutions have been built, leaving the EU unprepared to bring the idea of strategic autonomy further.


2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (54) ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Hana N. Hlaváčková ◽  

The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the show-the-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.


Author(s):  
Maxime H. A. Larivé

This empirical and historical analysis of the Western European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental defense organization, contributes to the broader understanding of the construction and integration of European security and defense policy. The WEU was established in 1954 by the Modified Brussels Treaty after the failure of the European Defense Community and at the time of the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over its lifetime, the WEU was confronted by two major trends: the centrality of collective defense agreement providing security on the European continent enforced by NATO and the construction of a European security and defense policy within the broad integration process of the European Union (EU). The WEU provided a platform for Western European powers, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, to engage in the construction of a European defense. Historically, these countries had diverging visions ranging from an autonomous force to one that should remain under the NATO auspice. The end of the Cold War accelerated the transfer of the WEU mission to the EU, but the crises in the Gulf region and in the Balkans in 1990s led to a period of activity for the WEU. The institutionalization of the EU, beginning with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, accelerated the construction of a European defense and security policy within EU structures. The transfer from the WEU to the EU began in the late 1990s and the WEU was dissolved in 2011.


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