scholarly journals The Heideggerian critique of Kant’s moral subject

KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gábor Tóth

The paper discusses Kant’s concept of the subject through Heideger’s critique. Heidegger deconstructs the structure of Kant’s idea of personal identity as the moral subject. In the 13th paragraph of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger distinguishes three basic aspects of Kant’s idea of the self: the personalitas transcendentalis, the personalitas psychologica, and the personalitas moralis. The personalitas moralis is defined as the sphere of pure morality, the intelligible realm of freedom. This is an aspect of the individual beyond physical features and also beyond the determinism of laws of nature. The causality by freedom forms the basis of practical actions ordered by moral law. Therefore, it acts as the highest level determinism of Being in human existence. Heidegger’s conclusion shows Kant’s failure in delineating a functional model of the moral subject but accepts Kant’s contribution to laying the foundations of such a theory.

Author(s):  
Jakub Čapek ◽  
Sophie Loidolt

AbstractThis special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the Anglophone debates on personal identity were initially formed by the persistence question and the characterization question, the “Continental” tradition included remarkably intense debates on the individual or the self as being unique or “concrete,” deeply temporal and—as claimed by some philosophers, like Sartre and Foucault—unable to have any identity, if not one externally imposed. We describe the Continental line of thinking about the “self” as a reply and an adjustment to the post-Lockean “personal identity” question (as suggested by thinkers such as MacIntyre, Ricœur and Taylor). These observations constitute the backdrop for our presentation of phenomenological approaches to personal identity. These approaches run along three lines: (a) debates on the layers of the self, starting from embodiment and the minimal self and running all the way to the full-fledged concept of person; (b) questions of temporal becoming, change and stability, as illustrated, for instance, by aging or transformative life-experiences; and (c) the constitution of identity in the social, institutional, and normative space. The introduction thus establishes a structure for locating and connecting the different contributions in our special issue, which, as an ensemble, represent a strong and differentiated contribution to the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological perspective.


Author(s):  
Ann Jefferson

This chapter traces the popular usage of “genius” in the nineteenth century. If genius no longer has the self-evidence that was attributed to it in the eighteenth century, this is due in part to the profligacy with which the word had come to be used. While the term is widely invoked—in fact, ever more widely so—it is rarely the subject of sustained theoretical scrutiny of the type established by aesthetics and philosophy in the previous century. The genius celebrated in this popular usage was, more often than not, a collective phenomenon linking success or supremacy with the individual character of institutional or abstract entities in a way that combined genius as ingenium with genius as the form of superlative excellence.


This section tells the story of my mother's stroke and what I have learnt from it about mind, body, consciousness, and the self, arguably the most cross-disciplinary topic of all. What gives us our sense of personal identity – our body? Our mind? Their union? And what if one of them is diminished – say, as a result of an accident; what then, do we stop being ourselves? This opening chapter sets the scene for the debate that follows, on this most fascinating mystery of all – our own self and consciousness. We question the still dominant dualist approach of the mind, seeking a more holistic view of the self; to this end, we believe that adding relevant experiential aspects will help complement the theory. Thus, an interdisciplinary, trans-theoretical account is needed in this endeavour. In this chapter, we introduce the dilemma and draw the main lines of argumentation related to it. In Chapter 2, we discuss the first experiential (in other words, the clinical) aspects of the mind, and neuroscientists' view of it, followed – in Chapter 3, by social aspects and psychologists' contributions to the subject. Chapter 4 will add more idiosyncratic aspects to the debate, such as the spiritual profile of a person, more often discussed in philosophy, religion, and art.


Author(s):  
Валентина Бикбулатова ◽  
Valentina Bikbulatova ◽  
Разият Рабаданова ◽  
Raziyat Rabadanova ◽  
Галина Юлина ◽  
...  

This article considers the problem of professional readiness and professional identity of students, the essence and method of development. The subject of research is the self-actualization of the individual of a student. The object of the research are students of psychological and pedagogical education, psychology of Moscow State University of Technologies and Managementnamed after K.G. Razumovskiy


Dialogue ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Hanly

Modern philosophy, if it has not settled any other of the chronic disputes that have troubled the history of the subject, appears to have decided once and for all the question of synthetic a priori principles. Logical analysis has demonstrated that synthetic propositions are empirical while a priori propositions are analytical and notational. Nevertheless, a broader survey of the contemporary philosophical scene reveals that the strict meaning of the expression “modern philosophy” above should be rendered “philosophers of one of the current schools of philosophy”. For contemporary European philosophers have not abandoned the notion of synthetic a priori principles altogether. They have modified without abandoning Kant's Copernican discovery of the laws of nature in the human mind. There are, to be sure, two ways of viewing the situation. Either logical analysis has overlooked certain unique phenomena and thus has failed to comprehend the arguments which take their description as premises, or existentialism has persisted in the use of an inadequate logic. The purpose of this paper is to test this issue and in doing so to explore the psychological roots of the idea of synthetic a priori principles. The means adopted is a critical study of the existentialist theory of emotion which claims to have discovered a previously unrecognized basis for synthetic a priori principles in the phenomenelogy of human existence.


2012 ◽  
pp. 67-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Caroline Lambert ◽  
Eric Pezet

This paper investigates the practices whereby the subject, in an organisational context, carries out systematic practices of self-discipline and becomes a calculative self. In particular, we explore the techniques of conduct developed by management accountants in a French carmaker, which adheres to a neoliberal environment. We show how these management accountants become calculative selves by building the very measurement of their own performance. The organisation thereby emerges as the cauldron in which a Homo liberalis is forged. Homo liberalis is the individual capable of constructing for him/her the political self-discipline establishing his/her relationship with the social world on the basis of measurable performance. The management accountants studied in this article prefigure the Homo liberalis in the self-discipline they develop to act in compliance with the organisation’s goals.


Kairos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
Danijel Berković ◽  
Dean Slavić

The work discusses a correlative relationship between the notions of the personal and the private in the context of biblical psalmist’s piety. Elements of anthropology (heart, soul, face) will obtain considerable importance, particularly the ideas of face and soul (פנה and נפש). These will be corresponding to the Greek idea of προσοπων (prosopon), person. The authors will insist on the distinction between the ideas of personal and private, but they will also recognize the interdependence of these ideas, in recognition that the individual and the societal, are both contributions in the building of the subject as the self. In Paul’s Hymn to Love (1 Cor. 13) the complementary nature between the personal and the private is evident. There we find both passive and active subject’s role claiming this double aspect of the human subject - personal and private. Discussion in this work follows long-term debates over the nature of the subject, its personality, and its privacy.


Modern Italy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-62
Author(s):  
Bertrand Marilier

This article examines the relationship of the young Giovanni Papini to the notion of imperialism. The period of Papini's intellectual formation was a time of intense debate among the Italian intelligentsia concerning imperialism and its relationship to nation and culture. He joined the conversation with a distinctive interpretation of the idea, one that could at once make him heir apparent to the tradition of Umbertian nationalism, while also rejecting the positivist slant of his forebears. William James's porous conception of the subject and Papini's sense of his own fragmented subjectivity provided the ground for a psychological understanding of imperialism: one that relied on knowledge and appreciation, which translated into literature at the individual level, and into culture at that of the nation. Ultimately, however, disappointments abroad, the demands of nationalist politics, and Papini's own avant-garde posture, led him to abandon his intellectual empire in favour of a more concrete one.


Diogenes ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Jungsik Um

The term “self” refers to the subject which persists through the changing experiences of a person. We think of it at least as the center of personal identity, or the organizing function within the individual. It may be desirable to examine cultural identity if there is something like “the communal self.” Kant believed that there is a “transcendental self” which transcends our experiences. Following him, we may analogously claim that there is a communal self, which transcends the history and the culture of the community, maintaining their identity throughout time by means of providing the unity principle. Korea is a typical example of a nation whose process of transculturation is most dynamically ongoing. Such a nation should apply this concept to her current cultural situations in order to be successful in the age of globalization.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Lorena Araya Silva

<p>La teoría del sujeto de Bajoit es una teoría que intenta explorar las conductas individuales, a partir de la capacidad de la persona para constituirse en un individuo-sujeto-actor mediante la conciliación de las expectativas relacionales que ha construido a lo largo del proceso de socialización. En este proceso el individuo va configurando su identidad personal que se constituye por las identidades asignada, deseada y comprometida. El malestar, en este marco teórico, surge de las tensiones existenciales que se provocan ante la imposibilidad del individuo para conciliar lo que cree que lo otros esperan de él y lo que él mismo desearía ser y hacer, impidiéndole convertirse en un sujeto y en un actor de su propia existencia.</p><p><strong>Palabras clave:</strong> sujeto, tensión existencial, malestar</p><p> </p><p class="Ttulo21"><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p>The Bajoit’s theory of the subject is a theory that attempts to explore individual behaviors, starting from the person’s capacity to become an individual-subject-actor through the reconciliation of the relational expectations that has built throughout the socialization process. In this process, the individual shapes his personal identity, constituted by the assigned, desired, and committed identities. In this theoretical framework, the malaise arises from the existential tensions that are provoked by the person’s impossibility to conciliate what he believes others expect from him, and what he himself would like to be and do, which in turn does not allow him to become subject and actor of his own existence.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong><em> </em>subject, existential tension, malaise</p>


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