4. From Social Order to Moral Order

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-58
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Moral Order

scholarly journals Evaluating evaluations: What different types of metapragmatic behaviour can tell us about participants’ understandings of the moral order

2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bethan L. Davies
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Daily Mail ◽  
Ordered Categories ◽  
The Social ◽  
Online Comments ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Linguistic Behaviour ◽  
Different Levels

Abstract Participant evaluations have been at the heart of recent discursive (im)politeness research, yet despite their importance, there has been little consideration of how we identify such behaviours and how we can substantiate their worth in an analysis. In this paper, it is proposed that we need to distinguish between different, ordered, categories of evaluation because these provide different levels of evidence for participants’ understandings of (im)politeness. Using online comments from Daily Mail articles relating to the Penelope Soto court hearings, I show that apparent agreements in the classification of linguistic behaviour as (im)polite can mask disagreements in the underlying rationales for those judgements. It is these rationales that provide the strongest warrant for analysts because they represent the ideological basis behind an individual’s understanding of politeness – why people should behave in this way. This links to Haugh’s (2013) use of ‘moral order’ and also Eelen’s (2001) key, but underdeveloped, notion of argumentativity. The rationale behind an individual’s judgement provides the argumentative link between metapragmatic behaviour and the social order. Classifications and positive/negative assessments of person are only clues to this underlying rationale, and need to be treated as such. Understanding these differences will assist analysts in assessing the ideological weight of metapragmatic behaviour and provide better-informed warrants for their analyses.

‘Freethinking’ and ‘Freedom of Thought’ in eighteenth-century Britain

1993 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 599-617 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter N. Miller
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Political Society ◽  
Early Modern Europe ◽  
Early Nineteenth Century ◽  
Intellectual Inquiry ◽  
The Social ◽  
Freedom Of Thought

ABSTRACTIn early modern Europe, religious heterodoxy and intellectual inquiry posed serious challenges to the authority of centralizing forces both secular and ecclesiastical. At the same time, however, these dangerous developments had been driven by those individuals whom eighteenth-century writers had adopted as ‘culture heroes’ for an age increasingly self-conscious of its own enlightened status. In Britain, the newly established order defended itself against the scepticism and moral determinism of ‘freethinkers’ by upholding a religious and moral order based on liberty. But ‘freethinkers’ such as Anthony Collins were themselves the inheritors of, and propagandists for, the seventeenth-century revolution in science which underpinned the ideology being wielded against them. Their challenge elicited from Edmund Law an argument which co-opted their epistemology to ground the familiar metaphysics of liberty associated with the Newtonian position of Samuel Clarke. Where ‘freethinking’ had been perceived as a dangerous solvent of the social order, ‘freedom of thought’, within limits that were themselves a leading subject of debate in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Britain, could be upheld as consistent with the demands of political society.

Piety and Wisdom in Socrates

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Legaspi
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Human Flourishing ◽  
Rational Discourse ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Face ◽  
Intellectual Limitations

For Socrates, wisdom begins with the recognition of a moral order that identifies human flourishing with the life of virtue. The virtuous individual lives in harmony with a world governed by divine benevolence and characterized by justice. Because virtue is found in people in varying degrees, the social order is not necessarily ordered to wisdom and is, at times, inimical to it. Social life is the venue for a pursuit of wisdom in which rational discourse—as opposed to power and manipulation—structures a search for the good. Rational discourse, however, also reveals human moral and intellectual limitations, such that any claim to know what is good must be held tentatively and kept open to revision. In the face of human ignorance and hostility, loyalty to the good is sustained by piety, or reverence for the good, and by integrity, the refusal to give up one’s own just life.

`That Miracle of Familiar Organizational Things': Social and Moral Order in the MBA Classroom

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (5) ◽  
pp. 733-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Fox
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Classroom Interaction ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Organization Studies ◽  
Socially Constructed ◽  
The Social ◽  
Executive Mba ◽  
Background Texture ◽  
Ethnomethodological Study ◽  
Shared Understandings

Garfinkel's work over the last five decades has created an alternate view of organizational phenomena which has been understood only at the margins of organization studies. His approach is profoundly empirical yet it is not positivist. He does not deny the reality of things but argues that their appearance as objects on any particular occasion is socially constructed. He shows us familiar organizational things in an unfamiliar way: organized phenomena of order in practical detail. This paper specifically examines the moral dimension of Garfinkel's approach. When Garfinkel says that members make settings accountable, i.e. `observable and reportable', he means accountable rationally and morally. To explicate this point, the paper examines data from a study of an executive MBA classroom in a way that builds on Macbeth's (2003) ethnomethodological study and examines the way in which the social organization of vernacular talk and interaction in the classroom is simultaneously moral organization. Moral order and social order are shown to be inseparably intertwined in and as the practical details of classroom interaction. Endogenously organized sequences of interaction and vernacular discourse accomplish the emergent socio-moral order of the class; a background texture of relevances which becomes a resource within which members' shared understandings progress.

scholarly journals Moral Community and Moral Order

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
James Caton
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Moral Community ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Minimum Standard ◽  
Community Members ◽  
Rule Systems

This work aligns James Buchanan’s theory of social contract with the structure of Michael Moehler’s multilevel social contract. Most importantly, this work develops Buchanan’s notions of moral community and moral order. It identifies moral community as the vehicle of escape from moral anarchy, where community is established upon a system of rules akin to James Buchanan’s first-stage social contract. Moral order establishes the baseline treatment of non-members by members of a moral community and also provides a minimum standard for resolving disputes that are not resolved by the more robust social contract shared among community members. This work links the multilevel contract to polycentric social order, noting that polycentric systems may promote development of the moral order by enabling experimentation with and emulation of rules and rule systems made available by overlapping and adjacent institutions.

Sovereignty and Solidarity

2019 ◽  
pp. 186-215
Author(s):  
Kjersti Lohne
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
International Criminal Justice ◽  
Social Imaginary ◽  
Sociology Of Punishment

As apt for analysis that positions penality at the centre of social organization, the final analytic chapter cultivates a Durkheimian approach to global justice-making, and argues that international criminal justice reinforces a social imaginary of cosmopolitan solidarity embodied in the notion of humanity. Durkheim’s emphasis on how solidarity in modern society is based around a notion of individualism, and of law and punishment as modes of social integration, make his insights particularly equipped for sociological analysis of the global as a site of crime, justice, and solidarity; in short, to the integrative functions of international criminal justice for the making of global moral order. However, rather than something ‘given’, the moral order embodied by ‘humanity’ reflects a dominant moral order, and one that is actively constituted. The chapter thus demonstrates how agents of international criminal justice argue their cases and punish in the name of humanity. Using the Rome Statute as a ‘crowbar’ for penal aid and rule of law promotion in the global South, international criminal justice is intertwined with rule of law promotion and penal aid in contexts of ‘failed’ justice, where cosmopolitan values are supposed to spread through the notion of ‘positive complementarity’. Global justice-making through international criminal justice is thus a multiscalar project, and one which, albeit solidarist, is coercively and deliberatively implemented. In this manner, a sociology of punishment for international criminal justice reveals some of the ways in which moral, personal, and social order is constituted globally.

Disrupted Moral Order: A Conceptual Framework for Differentiating Reactions to Loss and Trauma

1996 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 817-829 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Rafman ◽  
Joyce Canfield ◽  
Jose Barbas ◽  
Janusz Kaczorowski
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Clinical Status ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Moral Dimension ◽  
Community Based ◽  
Child Victim ◽  
Psychological Consultation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Attribution Of Blame

To discern what turns a child victim of war into a patient, categories relevant to a disrupted moral dimension were applied to play sessions of two groups of children. Both groups had experienced familial loss in the context of war but differed in their clinical status: 7 children (all boys), aged 3 to 10 years, had been referred for psychological consultation and 15 community-based children (9 boys), aged 4 to 6 years, had not been so referred. Both groups exhibited vulnerability and vigilance. Whereas community-based children re-enacted scenarios of parental loss, the loss of a rule-governed universe characterised the play of referred children. Roles of perpetrator, victim, and witness shifted rapidly as moral ambiguities permeated fragmented scenes. Retaliation fantasies were intense but attribution of blame uncertain. Ambiguity and secrecy distinguished parents' narratives in the referred group. The concept of disruption in the moral order as well as the social order was useful as a framework in distinguishing children of differing clinical status.

scholarly journals Weber, Durkheim, and the Duality of Structure in Modern Society

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules Ostro
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Max Weber ◽  
Modern Society ◽  
Human Condition ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Emile Durkheim ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Duality Of Structure ◽  
The Relationship

The theoretical projects of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim address the character anddynamics of the modern social order. The implications of modern society on the nature of being human in a social world are vast, as demonstrated by the myriad upheavals witnessed since the ‘long’ 19th century2. But what are the implications of modern society on what it means to be a moral being? How do individualism and social solidarity coexist? The following addresses the complexity of these questions by analyzing Weber and Durkheim’s perspectives on the transition to modern life and the relationship between modern society and the individual. With Marx as a theoretical backdrop, this essay examines how Weber and Durkheim conceived of the problems of modern society by underscoring the dualities that are reflected in autonomy, authority, rationalization, and other dimensions of structure inherent within social organization and interdependence. These concomitant dualities evince the necessary doubleness of the human condition and how it enmeshes society in a “poverty of morality” (Durkheim, Suicide , p. 387) that is in need of a new moral order and greater social solidarity.

Old questions for the new anthropology of morality: A commentary

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 356-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A Shweder ◽  
Usha Menon
Keyword(s):  
Social Order ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Descriptive Study ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Order ◽  
Moral Foundations ◽  
Individual Judgment ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Many ◽  
Human Social Life

The return of anthropological interest to the descriptive study of the moral foundations of social life is a very welcome development. Nevertheless, if there is going to be a new anthropology of morality, it must have something new to say about some very old questions. The first is the analytic question: what counts as a morality? The second and third are descriptive questions: is some idea of an objective moral charter a feature of human social life and individual judgment; and what is the scope, generality and detail with which various aspects or domains of the social order (from gender relations to food customs) are understood and experienced as extensions of a moral order from the ‘native point of view’? Finally, why do the many peoples of the world apparently disagree with each other so much in both their spontaneous-habitual-unreflective-internalized-‘embodied’ (and hence implicit) judgments and in their reflective-reasoned-thoughtful-spelled out (and hence explicit) judgments about the rightness or wrongness of specific actions? Those are questions that no anthropology of morality, old or new, can or should avoid.

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