Old questions for the new anthropology of morality: A commentary
The return of anthropological interest to the descriptive study of the moral foundations of social life is a very welcome development. Nevertheless, if there is going to be a new anthropology of morality, it must have something new to say about some very old questions. The first is the analytic question: what counts as a morality? The second and third are descriptive questions: is some idea of an objective moral charter a feature of human social life and individual judgment; and what is the scope, generality and detail with which various aspects or domains of the social order (from gender relations to food customs) are understood and experienced as extensions of a moral order from the ‘native point of view’? Finally, why do the many peoples of the world apparently disagree with each other so much in both their spontaneous-habitual-unreflective-internalized-‘embodied’ (and hence implicit) judgments and in their reflective-reasoned-thoughtful-spelled out (and hence explicit) judgments about the rightness or wrongness of specific actions? Those are questions that no anthropology of morality, old or new, can or should avoid.